DICTATORSHIPS
BARBARA
GEDDES, JOSEPH WRIGHT,
AND
ERICA FRANTZ
How Dictatorships Work
This accessible volume shines a light on
how autocracy really works by providing basic facts about how post-World War II
dictatorships achieve, retain, and lose power. The authors present an
evidence-based portrait of key features of the authoritarian landscape with
newly collected data on about 200 dictatorial regimes. They examine the central
political processes that shape the policy choices of dictatorships and how they
compel reaction from policy makers in the rest of the world. Importantly, this
book explains how some dictators concentrate great power in their own hands at
the expense of other members of the dictatorial elite. Dictators who can
monopolize decision-making in their countries cause much of the erratic,
warlike behavior that disturbs the rest of the world. By providing a picture of
the central processes common to dictatorships, this book puts the experience of
specific countries in perspective, leading to an informed understanding of
events and the likely outcome of foreign responses to autocracies.
barbara
geddes teaches at University of California, Los Angeles
(UCLA). Her 1999 article in the Annual Review of Political Science is credited
with changing the way social scientists think about dictatorships. She has
written extensively on regime transition, dictatorial politics, and research
design. She has won awards for data creation and graduate student mentoring.
joseph
wright’s research examines how international factors -
such as foreign aid, sanctions, human rights regimes, and migration - influence
politics in dictatorships. He is the author of multiple articles published in
top-ranked political science journals, as well as the award-winning book (with
Abel Escriba-Folch) Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival.
erica
frantz is an assistant professor of political science
at Michigan State University. She specializes in authoritarian politics,
democratization, conflict, and development. She has published five books on
dictatorships and development, the most recent of which is Authoritarianism:
What Everyone Needs to Know.
Power, Personalization, and Collapse
University of California
Pennsylvania State University
Michigan State University
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the highest international levels of excellence.
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107115828
DOi: 10.1017/9781316336182
© Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright and Erica
Frantz 2018
This publication is in copyright. Subject
to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing
agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2018
Printed in the United States of America by
Sheridan Books, Inc.
A catalogue record for this publication is
available from the British Library.
Library of Congress
Cataloging-in-Publication Data
names: Geddes, Barbara, author. | Wright, Joseph (Joseph George),
1976- author. |
Frantz, Erica, author. titLE: How dictatorships work : power, personalization,
and collapse /
Barbara Geddes,
University of California, Los Angeles, Joseph Wright,
Pennsylvania
State University, Erica Frantz, Michigan State University. dEScriptioN: New
York : Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge, [2018]
| Includes bibliographical references and index. idENtiFiErs: lccn 2018017449 | isbn 9781107115828 (hardback) | isbn 9781107535954 (paperback) suBjEctS:
Lcsh: Dictatorship. | Dictators. cLASSiFicAtioN: Lcc jc495 .g43 2018 | DDc 321.9-dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018017449
isbn 978-1-107-11582-8 Hardback isbn
978-1-107-53595-4 Paperback
Cambridge University Press has no
responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or
third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not
guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or
appropriate.
To our (ten) children:
Dylan
Danielle
Darcy
Demetria
Lee
Luca
Enzo
Rania
Luciana
Felix
who help us keep it all in perspective
List of Figures page
xl
List of Tables xiii
Acknowledgments xv
1 Introduction i
Implementing Our Definition of Regime 5
The Groups That Initiate Dictatorships 7
Conflict and Bargaining within the Seizure Group 10 Plan of the Book 13
Appendix: Coding Rules for Authoritarian Regimes 18
PART I INITIATION
2 Autocratic Seizures of Power 25 Who Do Dictatorial Seizure Groups Oust? 26 How Dictatorships Begin 26 Before the Seizure of Power 33 The Morning after a Seizure of Power 36 Post-Seizure Organization 38 Conclusion 42
3 What Do We Know about Coups? 44 Coups for Various Purposes 46 Preconditions Associated with Regime-Change
Coups 47 Inequality and
Coups 54 Conclusion 56
vii
vill
Contents
PART II ELITE CONSOLIDATION
4 Power Concentration: The Effect of Elite
Factionalism on Personalization 61 Elite
Bargaining in Dictatorships 65 Handing
Power to a Leader 68 Bargaining over the
Distribution of Resources and Power 74
Characteristics That Influence the Credibility of Threats to
Oust the
Dictator 76
Measuring
Personalism 79
Patterns of
Personalism 85
The Effect of Factionalism on the
Personalization of Power 89
Conclusion 92
5 Dictatorial
Survival Strategies in Challenging Conditions:
Factionalized Armed Supporters and
Party Creation 95
The
Strategic Context 97
The
Interaction of Dispersed Arms and Factionalism 99
The
Strategic Creation of New Political Actors 101
Evidence That Post-Seizure Party Creation Aims to Counterbalance
Factionalized
Armed Supporters i05
Post-Seizure
Party Creation and Dictatorial Survival 115
The Effect of Post-Seizure Party Creation on the Likelihood of Coups 118
Conclusion 123
part iii
ruling society: ImPLEmENTATION and
information gATheRiNg
6 Why Parties and Elections in
Dictatorships? i29 Implementation,
Monitoring, and Information Gathering i29
Elite Competition and Institutions That Engage Citizens i3i Parties i3i
Dictatorial Legislatures i36
Elections i37 Conclusion i50
7 Double-Edged
Swords: Specialized Institutions for
Monitoring
and Coercion i54
Internal
Security Agencies i56
The Army:
Bulwark of the Regime or Incubator of Plots? 162
The
Relationship between Counterbalancing and Interference i67
Conclusion i73
part iv dictatorial survival AND bReAkDowN
8 Why Dictatorships Fall 177 How Dictatorships End i78
Individual Support and Opposition i8i
Contents ix
The Effect
of Crisis on Decisions to Oppose the Dictatorship 18 6
Economic
Crisis and Breakdown 187
Power Concentration and Regime
Survival 190
Leadership
Changes and Regime Breakdown 201
The
Dictator’s Future and the Likelihood of Democratization 206
The Effect
of Personalization on Prospects for Democracy 211
Conclusion 214
9 Conclusion and Policy Implications 218
3.1 Regime-initiating
coups against incumbent dictatorships page
49
3.2 Coups
against incumbent democracies 53
3.3 Causes
of coups in dictatorships, by coup type 55
4.1 Frequency
of events that end dictatorships 72
4.2 Illustration
of personalism scores 83
4.3 The
first dictator’s advantage in personalizing power 87
4.4 Personalizing
power after the first three years 88
4.5 United
versus factionalized seizure groups 91
5.1 Post-seizure
party creation and the rotation of dictatorial
leadership 109
5.2 Post-seizure
party creation and military marginalization 110
5.3 Post-seizure
party creation before the leader’s election 111
5.4 Post-seizure
party creation, age, and rank of first dictator 112
5.5 Effect
of age, rank, and previous regime on post-seizure party creation 113
5.6 Post-seizure
party creation over time 114
5.7 Parties
and regime survival 118
5.8 Coups
in dictatorships with post-seizure parties or no parties 119
5.9 Post-seizure
party creation and coup risk 121
5.10 Post-seizure
party creation and reshuffling versus regime-change coups 123
6.1 Foreign
aid and the election of dictators 139
6.2 The
electoral spending cycle in dictatorships 146
6.3 Dictatorial
elections and health outcomes 148
7.1 Paramilitary
forces and interference in the army 171
7.2 Loyalist
paramilitary forces and interference 172
8.1 How
autocratic regimes end 179
8.2 Semi-competitive
elections and coup attempts in dictatorships 180
xi
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xil
List of Figures
8.3 |
Economic crisis, party networks, and
authoritarian breakdown |
189 |
8.4 |
The effect of personalism on
authoritarian breakdown |
196 |
8.5 |
The effects of personalism in
dictatorships with different |
|
|
leadership configurations |
200 |
8.6 |
Probability that dictator exit coincides
with regime collapse |
203 |
8.7 |
Effect of personalism on capacity to
handle succession |
204 |
8.8 |
Personalism and post-death regime
survival |
205 |
8.9 |
Personalism and democratization |
2i2 |
8.i0 |
Personalism, military rule, and
democratization |
2i4 |
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2.1
2.2
3.1
Proportion of dictatorships begun by
different kinds of |
|
seizures of power |
page 28 |
Proportion of dictatorships begun by
different kinds of |
|
seizure groups |
31 |
Area under the ROC for models of
regime-change coups |
|
in dictatorships |
52 |
Xlll
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This project has lasted longer than many
dictatorships. We are grateful to each other for the remarkably enduring and
painless power-sharing agreement. We have suffered no purges; all the original
plotters remain in the inner circle.
We have incurred
many debts while working on this book and the data collection that preceded it.
We have presented elements of it at many conferences and universities, and a
number of colleagues have read all or part of the manuscript. We are especially
grateful to Alex Debs, Alberto Diaz-Cayeros, Abel Escriba-Folch, David Laitin,
Ellen Lust, Beatriz Magaloni, Michael Miller, Milan Svolik, Wonjun Song, Clint
vanSonnenberg, Mauricio Velasquez, Valerie Wirtschafter, Jessica Weeks, and
Matthew Wilson for the gift of their time and for their penetrating and helpful
comments.
Generations of
our students have suffered through early drafts of the manuscript in classes
on authoritarian politics. We thank them for their questions, comments, and
enthusiasm. We have learned a great deal from students in our classes and from
discussions with students who grew up in dictatorships.
Searching for arcane
details about political bargaining and personnel appointments in dictatorships
might sound very dull, but coders’ meetings became weekly highlights as the
coders competed to report the best dictator stories. An old aphorism says power
corrupts, but it also nurtures eccentricity, caprice, paranoia, and delusions.
Our searches for information yielded many tales to marvel at or be appalled by
that found no place in the coding. We have talked about a coffee-table book
that would feature photos of charismatic Burkinabe dictator Thomas Sankara with
his motorcycle-mounted female bodyguard and the Turkmen dictator who had most
of his teeth replaced with gold (and then appointed his dentist as successor).
For help with the coding, good-natured tenaciousness, and retaining their
senses of humor during immersion in the demoralizing world of dictatorial
politics, we thank Joonbum Bae, Shahin Berenji, Ruth Carlitz, Marika Csapo,
Sebastian Garrido, Ron Gurantz,
xv
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xvi
Acknowledgments
Eric Kramon, Sarah Leary, Zsuzsanna Magyar,
Eoghan McGreevy-Stafford, and Amanda Rizkallah.
We also thank
Nicholas Bichay, Rosemary Pang, Wonjun Song, and Valerie Wirtschafter for
research assistance that helped us to stagger across the finish line.
Even imagining
the fine-grained data needed for this book would not have been possible without
the Department of Defense’s research initiative to fund scholarship on
autocracies, Minerva. We gratefully acknowledge funding from the National
Science Foundation/Minerva (NSF-BCS #0904478), National Science Foundation
(BCS-0904463), and the Minerva Research Initiative (ONR N000141211004).
Finally, and
most importantly, we thank our partners, Cliff Williams, Jaimie Wright, and
John Zaller. Without their daily support and encouragement, there might have
been no book about dictators.
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1
Since humans began to live in settled
communities, most have lived under autocracy.1 Dictatorships still
rule roughly 40 percent of the world’s nations. All international wars since
the end of World War I have involved dictatorships. Two-thirds of civil wars
and ethnic conflicts since World War II have erupted in countries under
authoritarian rule.2 Since the fall of the Berlin Wall,
dictatorships have perpetrated nearly 85 percent of mass killings by governments.3
In other words, dictatorships affect millions of people’s lives (and deaths)
and initiate most of the urgent international challenges that policy makers
face. We cannot avoid dealing with them. And yet a limited understanding of
how dictatorships work undermines our ability to influence and negotiate with
them.
Most academic
analyses of how governments work have focused on democracies. We therefore
know much less about dictatorial decision-making than about democratic. As a
further complication, dictatorships differ not only from democracies but also
from each other, and these differences have consequences for citizen welfare
and international conflict. Although some dictatorships initiate more than
their share of wars and political violence, many other
1 The absence of fair, reasonably competitive
elections through which citizens choose those who make policies on their behalf
defines autocracy or dictatorship. The coding rules that operationalize this
definition of dictatorship can be found at http://sites.psu.edu/dictators.
2 These figures were calculated using data on
regime type from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), data on civil wars from
Themner and Wallensteen (2014), data on ethnic conflict from Wimmer, Cederman,
and Min (2009), and data on mass killings from Ulfelder and Valentino (2008).
Civil war statistics are calculated from all civil war years, including
internationalized civil conflicts. Ethnic war and mass-killing statistics are
calculated from the onset years of conflicts. The years included are 1946-2010.
3 Calculated from data on
one-sided mass killings from 1989 to 2010 from Eck and Hultman (2007). The
figure excludes the genocide in 1994 Rwanda, which is hard to classify.
1
2
Introduction
dictatorships live in peace with their
neighbors and refrain from oppressing citizens. The fastest-growing countries
in the world are dictatorships, but the most economically mismanaged are dictatorships
as well. Some dictatorships have followed policies to equalize incomes, but
others have raised inequality to astonishing levels. Abstract theories that
treat all dictatorships as the same cannot make sense of these differences. We
need more realistic theories.
A great deal has
been written about specific autocracies by individuals with impressive local
expertise, but only a few comparative studies grounded in evidence exist. We
also have some interesting theories of dictatorship, but fewer theories firmly
anchored in the real world. We know little about why some dictatorships
establish stable government while others suffer continuous upheaval, why some
create democratic-looking political institutions to engage citizens and others
do not, why some distribute benefits broadly while others concentrate wealth
within a small group of regime supporters, or why some last many decades but
many collapse within a year or two. In short, we understand little about how
dictatorships work and why they sometimes fail to work.
Some of the
reasons why analysts have made less progress in the study of dictatorship than
democracy are obvious. Dictatorial decision-making often occurs in secret,
while policy-making and leadership choice in democracies are relatively transparent
(Lewis 1978, 622). Decision-making opacity interferes with understanding why
dictatorships do things. Small dictatorial elite groups usually make decisions
in informal settings: “formal institutions are not necessarily the place to
look when you want to understand everyday operating procedures” in
dictatorships (Fitzpatrick 2015, 278). Legislative debates and votes often
ratify policy choices made elsewhere, and cabinet ministers may be the
implementers of decisions, not the decision makers. Democracies publish great
quantities of data about themselves, making it easier for scholars to
investigate them. Not only do dictatorships publish less, but what they do
publish may be purposely inaccurate (Magee and Doces 2014). Election results
may reflect the resource advantage enjoyed by the ruling party rather than
voters’ preferences about who should rule, and published results may not match
votes cast.
For all these
reasons, in order to make progress in understanding dictatorships, we need
much more systematic information about them than has been available. More
challenging, the information needs to reflect informal aspects of real
dictatorial decision-making, not just the formal characteristics of rule
included in many existing data sets. More detailed information has begun to be
collected in recent years, facilitating the development of new theories about
dictatorship (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009; Cheibub, Gandhi, and
Vreeland 2010; Svolik 2012). In this book we use additional newly collected
data to build on these efforts, which enables us to take another step toward
explaining political choices in dictatorships.
A second,
perhaps less obvious, reason for the difficulty in developing a systematic
understanding of authoritarian politics is the great heterogeneity
Introduction
3
across autocracies in the way decisions are
made and leaders chosen, which groups influence these decisions and who is
excluded, who supports the dictatorial elite, and who benefits from their
decisions. The policy-making process in Saudi Arabia is quite different from
that in China, and both differ from decision-making procedures during military
rule in Argentina between 1976 and 1983. Thus, while many theories about how
democratic governments function fit all democracies, useful theories about
authoritarian politics have to explain and take into account the differences
among dictatorships.
This means that
in order to develop theories about authoritarian politics, we may first need to
explain their differences. Our approach to doing that begins with identifying
characteristics of the different groups that seize dictatorial power, which we
can observe before the dictatorship begins. Groups potentially able to initiate
dictatorship have varying capacities, resources, organizational structures,
ways of making decisions, and distributions of within-group power. After the
seizure of power, these characteristics shape the way decisions are made in the
ensuing dictatorship and who can influence them. Preexisting traits of the seizure
group, as we show below, affect which citizens outside the group can influence
decisions, which part of the citizenry is likely to support the regime, how the
dictatorship responds to citizens who oppose it, which domestic and
international policies the dictatorship chooses, and what kinds of formal
political institutions it establishes to solve its cooperation problems,
monitor potential opponents, and incorporate citizens into unchallenging forms
of participation.
We use the term
“seizure group” to refer to the small group that literally ousts the incumbent
and takes over in order to initiate dictatorship, as well as their organized
support base. For example, when military officers seize power in a coup, the
seizure group includes both the individual coup plotters and the part of the
military (possibly all of it) that provides less active support for them.
Seizure groups are thus similar to Haber’s (2006) “launching groups” except
that we make no assumptions about their ability to solve collective action
problems or oust the dictator they install. Nor do we assume that the group
that helps the dictator seize power takes over the bureaucracy, courts, police,
and military because, in the real world, they often do not. Frequently, in
fact, these institutions remain staffed or partly staffed by individuals hired
by those who ruled before the seizure of power.
As an example,
consider a coup such as the one in Argentina in 1976: the commanding officer of
the armed forces, supported by a consensus among other high-ranking officers,
seizes control of government. In this kind of situation, before the coup most
members of the seizure group have direct control of weapons and expertise in
using them but less expertise in bargaining. They have a hierarchical organization
structure that can usually ensure disciplined implementation of orders by
soldiers (though not civilians), as well as a technocratic decision-making
style, with decisions concentrated at the top of the military hierarchy. These
characteristics can be expected to influence the way decisions
4
Introduction
are made after the seizure of power.
Because of strong norms about the chain of command within the military, for
example, military seizure groups usually choose their highest-ranked officer as
dictator.
Contrast this
portrait of military rule with rule by a party that won an earlier free and
fair election, but then used its control of the legislature to pass laws that
severely disadvantaged the opposition, thus “authoritarianizing” the
government.4 For example, between 2002 and 2005, the elected Chavez
government in Venezuela used harassment and intimidation of the opposition,
arrests of opposition leaders, and interference with the media to authoritaria-
nize the political system. Other ways that democratically elected governments
have authoritarianized include banning opposition parties and closing
legislatures.
A party
leadership that initially grew out of competitive election campaigns has
developed very different capacities, organization, and resources than a
military seizure group. Such party-based seizure groups typically lack weapons
and expertise in using them, but have a great deal of experience in bargaining,
cooptation, and electoral mobilization. The party may have a hierarchical
organization in the sense that decision-making is concentrated in the party
leader, but its activists and employees tend to be undisciplined because of the
use of jobs and other benefits to coopt opponents and buy support from people
with diverse interests. As a consequence, decisions made at the top may be
distorted during implementation to benefit local officials or simply not implemented.
Like the central traits of military seizure groups, these characteristics also
tend to carry over into post-seizure dictatorships established by parties that
were once fairly elected.
Several
intuitions lie behind the claim that preexisting characteristics of the group
that establishes the dictatorship persist and shape political processes that
follow. First, we expect the inner circle of the dictatorship to be chosen from
the seizure group. Second, we expect groups represented in the inner circles of
dictatorships to dominate early decision-making and to have more influence on
decisions than excluded groups throughout the life of the dictatorship. We also
expect organized included groups to wield more power than unorganized ones.
Parties and militaries are large, often well-organized groups frequently represented
in seizure groups and thus initially in the dictator’s inner circle. The
dictator’s inner circle may also represent the interests of particular class,
ethnic, religious, or regional groups, but since such groups tend to be loosely
organized, we expect them to have less capacity to influence decisions and
implementation than more effectively organized groups. Third, we expect groups
that have developed skills and routinized ways of interacting and making
decisions to gravitate toward these same ways of doing things immediately after
seizures of power. Our theories build on these intuitions.
4 This is a frequent means of
establishing dictatorship, as shown in Chapter 2.
Introduction
5
We expect
preexisting characteristics of the seizure group to influence the kind of
autocratic regime that emerges after a seizure of power. By “regime” we mean
the set of very basic formal and informal rules for choosing leaders and
policies. We “measure” regimes as the continuous country-years in which the
same group - though not necessarily the same individuals - controls the
government and uses the same basic rules. Regimes can and often do include the
tenures of more than one dictator, as in China under Communist Party rule or
Saudi Arabia under the Al Saud family dynasty. “Very basic” rules include such
unspoken requirements as the necessity for paramount leaders to come from
particular ethnic groups or from highest-ranking officers, not necessarily
electoral rules or constitutional provisions, which the dictatorial inner
circle can change and/or abrogate. Because dictatorships lack third-party
enforcement of formal political rules (Svolik 2012), the kinds of formal
political institutions that shape politics in democracies have less influence
on the behavior of elites in dictatorships. The basic rules that define
dictatorial regimes are those, whether formal or informal, that really shape
the choice of top leaders and important policies.
IMPLEMENTING OUR DEFINITION OF REGIME
For gathering the data on which this study
depends, we relied on a set of detailed rules to identify the beginnings and
ends of autocratic regimes. In keeping with much of the literature, countries
are coded as democratic if government leaders achieve power through direct,
reasonably fair competitive election; indirect election by democratically
elected assemblies; or constitutional succession to democratically elected
executives.
Events that
define the beginning of dictatorship include the following:
• Government
leaders achieve power through some means other than a direct, reasonably fair
competitive election; or indirect election by a body at least 60 percent of
which was elected in direct, reasonably fair, competitive elections; or
constitutional succession to a democratically elected executive.
• The government
achieved power through competitive elections, as described above, but later
changed the formal or informal rules such that competition in subsequent
elections was limited.
• If competitive
elections are held to choose the government, but the military either prevents
one or more parties for which substantial numbers of citizens would be expected
to vote from competing, or dictates policy choice in important policy areas
(e.g., foreign policy in the Middle East). We label such regimes “indirect
military rule.”
These rules are
mostly uncontroversial, but they lead to a few coding decisions with which
others may disagree. For example, we code the government of Indonesia’s popular
first leader, Suharto, as authoritarian because he was not elected before
taking power. Some other independence leaders whose
6
Introduction
governments were coded as democratic at
independence (because of fair competitive pre-independence elections) were
later classified as authoritarian after they banned an opposition party,
arrested opposition leaders, or used violence and intimidation against
opposition voters.
Once a
country-year is coded as authoritarian, successive years in the same country
are coded as part of the same regime until one of the following events occurs:
• A competitive
election (as defined above) for the executive, or for the body that chooses the
executive, occurs and is won by a person other than the incumbent or someone
closely allied with the incumbent; and the individual or party elected is
allowed to take office. The end date for the regime is the election, but the regime
is coded as ending only if the candidate or party elected is allowed to take
power.
• Or the ruling
group markedly changes the rules for choosing leaders and policies such that
the identity of the group from which leaders can be chosen or the group that
can choose major policies changes.
• Or the
government is ousted by a coup, popular uprising, rebellion, civil war,
invasion, or other violent means, and replaced by a different regime (defined
as above: a government that follows different rules for choosing leaders and
policies).
We code
competitive elections as ending dictatorships only if the incumbent is defeated
because so many dictatorships hold competitive elections. Many of the ways that
dictatorships manipulate electoral outcomes do not occur on election day or
during vote counting, so foreign observers may not see rigging. This makes it
difficult to judge whether elections are free and fair. We use incumbent
turnover because it is a clear indicator that the dictatorship did not control
the election outcome. This is a conservative rule in the sense that we code
dictatorships as continuing unless we are sure they have ended. This rule leads
to a few controversial classifications; for example, we code Ghana’s last
democratization as of the 2000 election, which led to the first incumbent
turnover since Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings’s seizure of power, but many
analysts code it as of 1992, the first multiparty election.
The most
difficult coding decisions involve coups (defined as the overthrow of the
incumbent leader by members of the military of the regime being ousted),5
which sometimes replace the whole ruling group and sometimes replace only the
dictator in an ongoing regime. We classify coups as regime changes if they
replace the incumbent government with one supported by regions, religions,
ethnicities, or tribes different from those that supported the ousted incumbent
or if they eliminate civilian collaborators from the inner
5 Our definition is thus
consistent with everyday usage, but differs from that of Svolik (2012) and
Roessler (2016), who label any replacement of the dictator by regime insiders
as a coup.
Introduction
7
circle. Such coups are coded as regime
changes because they change the composition of the group that can influence policy
and leadership choice. For example, we treat the coup that replaced the
military dictatorship led by Colonel Saye Zerbo in Burkina Faso with one led by
Captain Thomas Sankara as a regime change because Sankara’s military faction
was rooted in different ethnic groups than Zerbo’s (Englebert 1998, 51-65). If
a coup simply replaces a ruling general with another general from the military
command council, without changing the underlying group from which leaders are
selected, we code it as a leader change, but not a regime change.
In a very small
number of instances, we also classified leader changes in party-led
dictatorships as regime changes because of dramatic changes in the ethnic,
religious, regional, or tribal base of the ruling group initiated by the new
dictator. In nearly all situations, a peaceful transition from one leader to
another in a dominant-party regime would be considered a leader change in an
ongoing dictatorship. However, Paul Biya’s succession in Cameroon is one of the
handful that we coded as a new regime. The coalition that had supported Ahmadou
Ahidjo, Cameroon’s first leader, was multiregional and multiethnic though
northern Muslims were favored; Ahidjo was a northern Muslim and Biya, his prime
minister, a southern Christian. Soon after becoming president, Biya began
narrowing the group with political influence and concentrating power in his own
small (southern) ethnic group at the expense of the coalition he had inherited.
The post-1983 government is treated as a different regime because the regional
and ethnic bases of policy influence changed along with the group from which
officials were selected (Harkness 2014, 598-99).6
THE GROUPS THAT INITIATE DICTATORSHIPS
Two kinds of groups establish most
contemporary dictatorships: groups of officers and soldiers, and groups of
civilians organized into parties. Historically, tribal or clan leaders
supported by armed followers began most monarchies, but this means of
establishing dictatorship may have disappeared. Outgoing colonial rulers (re)established
a number of post-World War II monarchies.
Seizures Led by a Group
of Military Officers
Military officers usually achieve power via
coups, though they are sometimes handed political control during popular
uprisings. After the seizure, officers initially decide who will rule the
country and make basic policy decisions. Policy choice in some areas may be
delegated to civilians, especially for decisions that require technical
expertise, but officers choose which civilians and
6 For the full coding rules for identifying
regime beginnings and ends, see the Appendix to this chapter. The data on
regimes and all coding rules for defining them are available at http://sites .psu.edu/dictators.
8
Introduction
can dismiss them. Other officers may have
the capacity to constrain the military dictator and force him to consult about
major decisions, because the wide dispersion among officers of arms and men
under orders ensures that they can make credible threats to oust the dictator if
he fails to consult or to heed their advice.7 Such credible threats
to depose give the dictator incentives to consult with other officers, but only
if they can in turn make credible promises to support him if he consults. The
dictator has less reason to consult with officers from a recently created,
undisciplined, or factionalized officer corps, which cannot make credible
promises of support because those bargaining with the dictator cannot count on
being obeyed by junior officers and thus cannot prevent rogue coups.
An example of a
seizure of power by a unified military is the 1980 coup in Turkey led by
General Kenan Evren and the rest of the military high command. The Turkish army
has a long history of disciplined professionalism. The coup was planned by the
high command and voted on by the generals at the War Academy.8 They
ruled through the National Security Council, a consultative body composed of
the service chiefs and the commander of the gendarmerie. During the
dictatorship, officers made many key policy decisions and chose civilian
technocrats to handle the economy. Officers also planned and oversaw the
orderly return to civilian rule that ended the dictatorship.
Parties achieve dictatorial power in three
main ways: via “authoritarianization” after winning competitive elections, by
armed insurgency, and through imposition by a foreign occupier. The different
means of establishing dictatorship are associated with different internal
party-governing structures and different ways of interacting with ordinary
people. But in all, party leaders and procedures control personnel appointments
and hence the political careers of those who wish to share power and influence
or work for the government after the seizure of power. High party officials,
who can include officers as well as civilians, can constrain the dictator if
his hold on office depends ultimately on their support. Dictatorial ruling
parties range from highly organized, disciplined networks with tentacles
reaching into every neighborhood and village to cliques of the dictator’s
friends who can mobilize public employees to turn out votes for the dictator in
sham elections but perform few other functions. Parties that led a
7 Historically, the vast majority of dictators
and members of their inner circles have been male. The data set used as the
basis for most empirical statements in this book includes one female dictator,
who served as regent for a year during the minority of the prince designated as
successor to the deceased king of Swaziland.
8 This experience contrasts of course with the
failed Turkish coup of 2016, which was organized by one faction of the military
but defeated by a combination of courageous civilian mobilization and loyal
troops from opposing factions.
Introduction
9
long struggle to mobilize popular support
prior to the seizure of power tend to be more organized and disciplined than
those that were cobbled together during the last competitive election before
authoritarianization or those created after the seizure of power in order to
reward the dictator’s supporters with public employment and other benefits.
As an example of
party seizure of power, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) of Zambia
used a typical authoritarianization strategy. UNIP and its leader Kenneth
Kaunda had led the independence movement and won a fair pre-independence
election in 1964. The party enjoyed widespread popularity at independence and
developed an effective grassroots political network by fighting the competitive
elections held before authoritarianization. UNIP transformed itself into a
dominant-party dictatorship by using intimidation and violence against
opponents to ensure its victory in the 1967 by-elections. It then ruled Zambia
until 1991, maintaining its grip on power by banning rival political parties
and repressing opponents. During UNIP rule, civilian party members dominated
policy-making and governance. The party elite had little ability to constrain
its leader, however. Until 1967, Kaunda unilaterally chose the party’s
executive committee members. Then, after the first internal party elections,
the executive committee factionalized along ethnic/regional lines, leading
Kaunda to reassert personal control over it to reduce ethnic conflict (Molteno
1974, 67-68; Tordoff and Molteno 1974, 9-11, 29, 35). If the dictator chooses
the members of the leadership group, they cannot limit his decision-making
autonomy.
Seizures Led by What
Becomes a Ruling Family
Seizures of power that result in
family-controlled dictatorships have occurred via the conquest of territories
by a family-led group and their armed supporters, usurpation of the throne of
an established monarchy by the armed followers of a different family or clan,
and imposition by an outgoing colonial power. After such seizures, a ruling
family chooses future leaders and plays an important role in the
decision-making inner circle, though economic and some other aspects of policy
are often delegated to commoners with expertise. The monarch’s brothers,
uncles, and/or sons often control the most important ministries and lead the
military and security services (Herb 1999). In this way, power is dispersed
within the ruling lineage, which both limits the discretion of the monarch and
protects the ruling family from external challenges. Powerful members of the
family can influence policy decisions because, in extreme circumstances, they
can dismiss the monarch.
What became the
ruling family of Oman established the Al Said dynasty via traditional military
prowess. In 1741 Ahmed bin Said al Busaidi, governor of Sohar on the coast of
what is now Oman, led the city’s defense against a Persian invasion during a
very chaotic time. As a result, he was formally chosen as imam in about 1744.
The Al Said have remained in power as traditional sultans
10
Introduction
ever since. In the current era, Said bin
Taimur inherited the throne when his father abdicated in 1932. His son, Qabus
bin Said Al Said, ousted him in 1970 at the behest of the rest of the family
(and with support from the British) for obstructing investment and development.
Qabus continues to rule today (Mohamedi 1994; Smyth 1994; Plekhanov 2004,
94-99).
In contrast to
Oman, Jordan’s Hashemite dynasty is a British creation. The first Jordanian
monarch, King Abdullah I, was the son of the Ottoman emir of Mecca, who claimed
a hereditary right to rule in the Hijaz (now part of Saudi Arabia). He was a
leader of the Arab nationalist movement against Ottoman rule and sided with the
British during World War I. In 1921, the British appointed him emir of Jordan,
a state constructed by the British, and he remained in power when Jordan gained
independence in 1946. When Abdullah was assassinated in 1951, his oldest son
succeeded to the throne but abdicated in favor of his underage son the following
year due to mental illness. A Regency Council controlled the country until
Crown Prince Hussein came of age. Hussein died in 1999 and was succeeded by his
oldest son, who continues to rule (Haddad 1971, 484-91; Lewis 1989; Wilson
1990; “Background Note: Jordan” 2011).
CONFLICT AND BARGAINING WITHIN THE SEIZURE
GROUP
The different groups that initiate
dictatorship have different arrangements for organizing themselves, making
decisions, and taking action. The procedures and norms established in the seizure
group before the dictatorship exists then influence who rules after the seizure
of power, the kind of institutions they create to organize their rule, and
their first policy choices. The group’s preexisting rules and procedures for
making decisions provide a focal point in the chaos that characterizes the
early weeks of many dictatorships. Many seizure groups apparently give little
thought to the practical details of what they will do after ousting the old
regime. Following the Iraqi coup in 1968, for example, “Like all other
post-coup governments in Iraq, al-Bakr and his colleagues had no very clear
idea about politics or administration on a day to day basis” (Farouk-Sluglett
and Sluglett 1987, 116). After the Sudanese coup in 1958, Woodward says, “it
was clear that few plans for the post-coup situation had been made” (1990,
102). Some plotters have not even chosen who will rule the nation. Describing
the 2008 coup in Mauritania, Pazzanita notes, “Although the 6 August coup was
swiftly and efficiently executed ... the composition of the HCE (Haute Conseil
d’Etat, the new ruling council) evidently was not well thought-out beforehand”
(2008, 160). Sometimes more than one member of the seizure group assumes he
will become regime leader.
Under pressure
to make many decisions quickly, the new rulers tend to rely on their existing
leadership and familiar decision-making structures. After the seizure of power,
members of the group must quickly decide who will lead, who will fill other top
offices, and how much power the new leader will have relative
Introduction
11
to other members of the inner circle. These
are difficult, hugely consequential, and potentially dangerous decisions that
can provoke conflict within the group.
Preexisting
traits of seizure groups shape dictatorial choices immediately after they gain
power, but power struggles, policy failures, and other events sometimes change
the power of the dictator relative to other members of the dictatorial elite in
later months and years. Disagreements within the ruling group can trigger
splits among previously close allies. Power struggles are common during the
early years of dictatorships. Winners may jail or kill losers, torture losers’
supporters, and impoverish their families. Power struggles are frequently
entangled with institutional innovations and reversals. These conflicts and
institutional experiments can change the distribution of power within the
ruling group, either strengthening procedures for consultation or increasing
the concentration of power and resources in the new dictator’s hands. Postseizure
power struggles can result in much greater concentration of power in the
dictator’s hands than his comrades intended or foresaw.
We label
dictators who have concentrated powers in their own hands personalist.
Personalism tends to develop after the seizure of power, as we show below, when
seizure groups are factionalized and lack discipline. A disunited group cannot
prevent the new dictator from playing off first one faction and then another
against the others, in the process ridding himself of the supporters most
capable of challenging his decisions and power grabs. If dictators can choose
the members of the regime’s top decision-making inner circle, they can change
its composition without taking into account party procedures, the military
chain of command, or, in monarchies, the opinions of ruling-family members. The
dictator’s control over appointments to the inner circle means that he can
threaten his lieutenants with exclusion from power and benefits, but the
lieutenants cannot credibly threaten him with ouster.
A unified
seizure group, in contrast, can enforce its standard procedures for promoting
officers or choosing members of the party executive committee because it can
overthrow a dictator who violates group norms. It can thus limit the dictator’s
discretion over the composition of the dictatorial elite. It can also block the
dictator’s efforts to take personal control of internal security services. A
dictator who can spy on, intimidate, or kill other members of the dictatorial
elite cannot be constrained by them. Other members of the dictatorial elite who
understand this will try to retain control of the security forces within the
party or regular military chain of command rather than permitting the dictator
to take personal control of them.
The leader of a
new dictatorship rarely controls recruitment to the inner circle or the
internal security services the morning after the seizure of power. These are
weapons he may acquire, however, through the jockeying over power among members
of the seizure group during the first months and years after the group has
gained control. Personalist rule can arise in any kind of seizure group. Like
Idi Amin of Uganda, personalist dictators often originate in the military,
leading many observers to refer to the dictatorships they lead as
12
Introduction
military regimes despite the
marginalization of most officers from decisionmaking. And like Hugo Chavez of
Venezuela, personalist dictators often rely on parties to organize supporters.
Nevertheless, they achieve so much control over the lives and prospects of
party officials and military officers that they are largely unconstrained by
these institutions. Though personalization develops after the seizure of power,
the internal characteristics of the seizure group that give the dictator
advantages in bargaining with other members of the inner circle predate the
seizure. Discipline and unity take time to develop in organizations and cannot
be produced overnight when the challenge of controlling a new dictator arises.
Bargaining and
conflict between the dictator and members of the inner circle are central
features of authoritarian politics and among the things we would most like to
understand, since they affect international behavior and many other policy
choices. Previous research has shown, for example, that dictators who have
concentrated great power in their own hands start more wars than more
constrained dictators and pursue more erratic economic strategies (Frantz and
Ezrow 2011; Weeks 2012). The bargaining and conflict within the dictatorial
inner circle can also motivate the initiation or change of formal political
institutions, which can help routinize decision-making, end destructive power
struggles, or consolidate the power of one man. Institutional choice is another
aspect of authoritarian politics we would like to understand since some institutions
seem to stabilize authoritarian rule, while others contribute to political
chaos.
This book
addresses these subjects. It is about authoritarian politics. That is, the book
explains why some dictators make certain policy choices while others make
different ones, and then how these decisions affect the dictatorship’s
vulnerability to threats to its survival. It thus takes a step toward answering
some of the questions policy makers and other observers would like to answer.
The first stage
of our explanation begins with preexisting characteristics of seizure groups,
not only because they help explain dictatorial decision processes, but also
because these characteristics are exogenous to the dictatorship; that is, they
predate it. Other observable features of dictatorships, such as how many
parties they allow, whether they have a legislature, and the extent to which
they rig their elections, are strategic choices made by the dictatorial elite
after the seizure of power and thus are part of what needs to be explained.
Our starting
point for thinking about autocratic differences is not the only one possible.
Other analysts, such as Hadenius and Teorell (2007), Gandhi (2008), and Boix
and Svolik (2013), have proposed alternatives based on whether the dictatorship
has a legislature and the number of parties allowed in it. In a related vein,
Levitsky and Way (2010) classify dictatorships based on how much competition
they allow in elections. These classifications are useful for some purposes,
but the characteristics they use as starting points reflect attempts by ruling
groups to retain power. These features should not therefore be used to explain
authoritarian durability, for example, because we cannot
Introduction
13
rule out the possibility that something
that contributed to the dictatorial decision to establish the institution
being investigated also caused the outcome (Pepinksy 2014). We therefore opt
for a theoretical approach based on exogenous characteristics of the seizure
group, measured before the existence of the dictatorship.
For theory
testing purposes, the resources and capacities of the seizure group before it
takes control (or the observable traits that reflect unobservable resources and
capacities) are exogenous. Capturing these characteristics, however, requires
detailed and subtle data. The data need to allow the assessment of
characteristics of pre-seizure party organizations and of how factionalized the
military that seizes power was before the seizure. Military factionalization
and weak party organization, as we show in what follows, predispose seizure
groups toward the personalization of dictatorial control.
To test other
arguments, we also need to assess post-seizure features of dictatorial rule,
and the real world of dictatorships is complicated. Officers sometimes lead
regimes in which a ruling party makes central decisions and most officers
simply obey orders. In other military-led dictatorships, one officer may manage
to concentrate a great deal of power in his own hands, in the process excluding
most other officers from decision-making. Since we want to distinguish these
kinds of dictatorship from those in which a group of high- ranking officers
rule in a somewhat collegial fashion, we need information beyond knowing
whether the dictator wears a uniform. Ruling parties exist in most
dictatorships, including many regimes controlled by military officers and a
couple of monarchies, as well as regimes actually led and controlled by
parties. Thus, we cannot use the simple existence of a regime-support party to
infer that party institutions really control dictatorial decision-making.
Ideally, we would like to be able to distinguish dictatorships led by groups of
officers representing the military institution from other dictatorships led by
individual officers, and we would like to distinguish dictatorships in which
party officials have some ability to constrain the dictator from those with
toothless parties. For these reasons, we collected and make use of the
Authoritarian Regimes Data Set, which was designed to capture the distinctions
we consider theoretically important, including, among other things, specific features
of the seizure group both before and after the seizure of power.9
PLAN OF THE BOOK
The order of the book follows the common
sequence of challenges faced by dictatorial elites: (1) initiation, the seizure
of power; (2) elite consolidation; (3) the extension of rule to society -
policy implementation and information
9 The dataset, along with a
codebook that explains the rules for coding, is available at our data website: http://sites.psu.edu/dictators/how-dictatorships-work/.
14
Introduction
gathering; and (4) breakdown.10
To correct common misperceptions about dictatorships, Chapter 2 provides some
concrete facts about how they come into existence and what happens immediately
after seizures of power. It shows the frequency of different methods of seizing
control, the kinds of regimes that dictatorial seizures of power replace, and
which kinds of groups use which methods to gain political power. Most
dictatorships replace an earlier autocratic regime rather than a democracy -
as, for example, the replacement of monarchies by military officers in
Afghanistan, Burundi, Cambodia, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen. Knowing
something about how dictatorships begin helps us to understand their later
political choices.
Coups are the
most common means of initiating new dictatorships, simply because they are
easier to organize than insurgencies or popular uprisings. Scholars have
disagreed about the reasons for military seizures of power. In Chapter 3, we
investigate the reasons for coups that initiate dictatorships. We find no
relationship between mass popular mobilization, rebellion, or income inequality
and coups that replace either democracies or incumbent dictatorships. Thus, we
find no evidence that officers represent the interests of economic elites.
Instead, we find support for Nordlinger’s (1977) claim that coups reflect the
interests of officers.
Whether they
secure power through a coup or in some other way, once in control of the
capital, members of the seizure group immediately confront all the problems
that helped make the overthrow of the old regime possible. They also have to
establish or reorganize internal security police to prevent the mobilization of
opposition. While juggling these problems and tasks, they must also assign
spheres of authority to different members of the new ruling group and devise
methods for settling disputes among themselves. The starting point for
assigning tasks and making decisions is the preexisting organization of the
seizure group and its norms and procedures for choosing leaders, making
choices, and maintaining internal unity.
Chapters 4 and 5
focus on the elite consolidation stage, which is dominated by sometimes violent
struggles over power and distribution within the inner circle of the
dictatorship, beginning soon after the seizure of power (Jowitt 1975). Chapter
4 develops our central theory of politics in dictatorships. The choice of one
member of the seizure group as regime leader (dictator) creates a serious
control problem for the rest of the dictatorial inner circle. Much of the
conflict during the first years of dictatorships arises from the inner-circle
members’ efforts to control the dictator, and the dictator’s attempts to escape
10 We revise and extend Kenneth Jowitt’s (1975)
implicitly evolutionary argument that successful Leninist regimes exhibit
different traits during different stages of their existence. Building on Crane
Brinton (1938), Morris Janowitz (1977, 8) also describes a “natural history of
revolution,” in which a chaotic revolutionary period is followed by the
consolidation of power by one man, itself followed by some relaxation. We
suggest a general explanation for these patterns, which we think apply to
nonrevolutionary dictatorships as well as post-revolutionary ones.
Introduction
!5
control. This struggle leads either to the
concentration of power and resources in the dictator’s hands or to the
reinforcement of somewhat more collegial rule. In order to limit the dictator’s
personal discretion, his closest allies must be able to credibly threaten him
with ouster. Threats of ouster are more credible when the ruling group is
unified. This chapter shows how factionalism within the seizure group enables
the dictator to consolidate personal power. Using detailed historical data on
observable features of dictatorial rule, we offer the first empirical evidence
linking pre-seizure characteristics of the seizure group to the consolidation
of personal power in the hands of dictators.
Chapter 5
introduces the complication of wide dispersal of control over arms across
members of the dictatorial elite. In armed seizure groups, typically most
members of the inner circle have direct access to weapons and command over men
trained to use them. This makes it possible for many different individuals to
threaten the dictator with ouster, thus increasing the bargaining power of
members of the inner circle relative to the dictator. All else equal, the
increased bargaining power of members of the inner circle should lead to more
constraint on the dictator, as the ease of ouster makes the dictator’s promises
to share more credible. In factionalized armed seizure groups, however, other
members of the inner circle cannot make the credible commitments to support the
dictator that are needed to solidify their side of the exchange. Their promises
to support the dictator if he shares power are not credible because
factionalism or indiscipline undermines their control of their subordinates,
who also have guns. Consequently, they cannot sustain power-sharing bargains.
A dictator
facing this situation has little reason to share power with other officers.
Instead, he has strong incentives both to invest in new security forces loyal
to himself to counterbalance his unruly and potentially disloyal military
supporters (discussed in Chapter 7) and to create civilian support
organizations to diversify his support, thus reducing his dependence on armed
members of the ruling group. Military dictators who cannot count on the rest of
the military for support because of factionalism or indiscipline in the army
try to marginalize most of the military from decision-making, and to shift the
support base of the regime to civilians, who are less threatening because
unarmed. Dictators often do this by having themselves popularly elected,
creating a civilian support party, appointing a civilian cabinet, and
dissolving the military ruling council. Observers label this series of events
civilianization, and sometimes even interpret it as democratization, but it is
a dictatorial strategy to survive and consolidate personal power in the face
of a factionalized and unreliable military support group.
Once
decision-making within the elite has become somewhat routinized, the next
challenge facing dictatorships is extending their rule over society. They must
either create new agencies for pursuing the radical changes in policy that
motivated the seizure of power or trust implementation to public employees
likely to have been the patronage appointments of the ousted government. In
order to rule, they have to have information about what is happening in
i6
Introduction
different parts of the country and how
their policies are working. They also have to be able to monitor the behavior
of lower-level officials to make sure their policies are not being sabotaged.
These are difficult problems for dictators and their allies. Officials tasked
with reporting on local conditions often have incentives to misreport
conditions on the ground.
Dictators use a
number of strategies to try to ensure the loyalty of officials and routinize
the collection of accurate information about the grassroots. In Chapter 6 we
focus on their use of mass organizations that engage citizens, especially
ruling parties, elections, and legislatures, to incentivize information
gathering and good behavior in officials. Dictatorial elites often make ruling-
party membership a condition for public employment to try to ensure the loyalty
of officials. Ruling parties link central elites to vast numbers of officials
and state employees. Elites hope to exchange jobs and other benefits for
loyalty, effort, and honesty from officials. Without monitoring, however, they
cannot ensure that officials live up to their side of the bargain.
Elections for
legislative and local offices can partially substitute for regular monitoring.
Although the ruling party is unlikely to lose elections, individual officials
can lose if citizens are fed up with them. Bad local election outcomes notify
central authorities about especially corrupt, incompetent, or abusive officials
and unworkable policies. Local and legislative offices are highly valuable
because of the benefits that accompany office, so the possibility of losing
elections incentivizes officials to extend their distributive networks down to
the grassroots, limit theft, and lobby central officials for benefits for their
areas. Future elections also motivate officials to report local problems and
policy failures to the center and to compete for access to local public goods.
In these ways, elections and the knowledge that they will face future elections
incentivize the transmission of information about local conditions to the
center. Even choice-free elections can serve this purpose because competition
for ruling-party nominations is intense regardless of whether there is partisan
competition.
In Chapter 7 we
consider the other side of monitoring and information gathering: spying. We
describe the coercive institutions that protect dictatorships. We stress the
differences between the interests of army officers and those of internal
security police. We describe the sources of military autonomy from the
dictatorships they are supposed to protect and how dictators try to overcome
their autonomy. In contrast to the army, internal security services are usually
created anew to serve dictatorships and thus have less autonomy. Their main
tasks are to spy on and intimidate anyone who might oppose the dictator or
dictatorship, which includes members of the dictatorial elite, the ruling
party, and military officers. Internal security agencies can be controlled by,
and thus serve as agents for, the ruling party, the military high command, or
the dictator himself. In this chapter, we analyze how control of internal
security changes the distribution of power within the dictatorial inner circle.
Chapter 8
analyzes authoritarian breakdown. Events beyond the dictatorship’s control can
reduce the costs of various behaviors - such as participating
Introduction
in demonstrations, campaigning for the
opposition, and plotting - that in turn reduce regime survival chances. In this
chapter, we show how characteristics of the dictatorship shape its ability to
withstand such challenges. We describe how the relationship between the
dictator and his inner circle interacts with institutions originally created
for other purposes - such as parties formed to win democratic elections - to
reduce vulnerability to different kinds of challenge. This interaction explains
why economic crisis dooms some dictatorships but not others and why some have
more difficulty surviving succession struggles after a dictator dies. The
chapter highlights the relationship between past institutional choices and
regime survival. We also show how different expected post-exit fates affect the
responses of both dictators and their closest allies to popular opposition. We
bring these various strands together to explain, first, why some kinds of
dictatorship are more resilient than others in the face of challenges and,
second, why some kinds of dictatorship tend to permit fair, contested elections
when faced with widespread opposition and thus to exit peacefully, while others
clutch desperately at power until bloodily removed.
In Chapter 9,
the concluding chapter, we summarize the facts established and arguments made
in other chapters. Several of our findings lead directly to policy
recommendations. For example, the evidence we offer implies that policy makers
should hesitate to intervene in personalist dictatorships (such as Moammar Qaddafi’s
in Libya or Saddam Hussein’s in Iraq). Such dictators may be hated and
incompetent, and they may have committed horrific human rights abuses, but
deposing them may nevertheless make the average citizen of the countries they
have ruled worse off. The ouster of personalist dictatorships is less likely to
result in democratization than the overthrow of other kinds of dictatorship
(Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014). A violent ouster will probably result in a
new autocracy, but could end in civil war or a failed state.
These outcomes
occur because the destruction of both political and civil society institutions
under personalist rule leaves nations that have endured it with very little
human infrastructure with which subsequent political leaders can build stable
government. The decimation of institutions under personalist rule often
includes the military and police, leaving these forces subsequently incapable
of maintaining order or defending the new government from violent attacks by
supporters of the ousted dictator. In addition, the personalist dictator’s
systematic elimination of politically talented potential rivals reduces the
quality of the pool from which new leaders can come. These several kinds of
damage mean that post-intervention governments struggle to carry out ordinary
functions such as keeping streets safe and delivering water.
The foreign
intervener is then likely to be blamed for the violence and decline in living
standards that follow intervention. For these reasons, intervention to overthrow
a personalist dictator is unlikely to result in a friendly country with a
stable government willing to protect the intervener’s economic and security
interests.
We conclude with
a series of policy recommendations that, like this one, are implied by our
findings.
Coding Rules for Authoritarian Regimes
Dictatorship begins when any one of the following has occurred:
• The government
leader achieved power through some means other than a direct, reasonably fair
competitive election; or indirect election by an assembly at least 60 percent
of which was elected in direct, reasonably fair, competitive elections; or
constitutional succession to a democratically elected executive.
o Elections are not considered reasonably competitive if one or more
large party is not allowed to participate; and/or if there are widespread
reports of violence, jailing, and/or intimidation of opposition leaders or
supporters; and/or if there are credible reports of vote fraud widespread
enough to change election outcomes (especially if reported by international
observers); and/or if the incumbent so dominates political resources and the
media that observers do not consider elections fair. o Elections are not
considered reasonably fair if less than 10 percent of the population
(equivalent to about 40 percent of the adult male population) was eligible to
vote. o Regimes are not coded authoritarian if an elected executive is ousted
by the military, nonconstitutional legislative action, or popular pressure, but
is succeeded by a constitutionally mandated successor and the successor behaves
in accordance with the constitution. (Such governments may be unconstitutional,
but they are not authoritarian regimes because they continue to follow
democratic rules concerning succession, length of term, means of choosing the
next executive, and legislative-executive relationship.)
• Or the
government achieved power through competitive elections, as described above,
but subsequently changed the formal or informal rules such that competition in
subsequent elections was limited.
18
Introduction
19
o Events and rule changes that should be coded as causing a
transition from democracy to autocracy in electoral regimes:
Opposition parties representing more than
20 percent of voters are banned or not allowed to run candidates in elections.
Most opposition parties are forced to merge
with the ruling party. Legislature is closed unconstitutionally.
There are widespread reports of violence
and/or intimidation of opposition leaders or supporters; exclusion of
opposition deputies from the legislature; the jailing of one or more opposition
leaders.
There are credible reports of vote fraud
widespread enough to change election outcomes (especially if reported by
international observers). Election results are annulled. o Start of autocracy
dates from change in rules if formal rules are changed, from date the
legislature closed, from date of campaign in which violence was first reported,
from election in which fraud is reported; from date when annulment occurred; or
from date when deputies were excluded or when opposition leaders were jailed. o
The following irregularities are not coded as authoritarian:
Reports of vote buying (because it is very
common in democracies) Scattered reports of fraud
Fraud complaints by the opposition without
supporting evidence or corroboration by neutral observers Opposition boycott of
election in the absence of other evidence of unfairness
• Or if
competitive elections are held to choose the government, but the military
either prevents one or more parties that substantial numbers of citizens would
be expected to vote for from competing, or dictates policy choice in important
policy areas (e.g., foreign policy in the Middle East). We label such regimes
“indirect military rule.”
• The start date
for monarchical regimes is the first year of the dynasty if the country was
independent in 1946; or the first year of independence.
Once a
country-year is coded as authoritarian, successive years in the same country
are coded as part of the same regime until one of the events identified below
as ending a regime occurs.
Authoritarian
regimes end when any of the following occurs:
• A competitive
election (as defined above) for the executive, or for the body that chooses the
executive, occurs and is won by a person other than the incumbent or someone
closely allied with the incumbent; and the individual or party elected is
allowed to take office. The end date is the election, but the regime is coded
as ending only if the candidate or party elected is allowed to take power. o
Remember that in cases of indirect military rule, the incumbent leader is
the top military officer. If leaders of an
indirect military regime change the rules such that all major parties and
population groups are permitted to
20
Introduction
compete in fair elections, and the civilian
winner is allowed to take office and to make policy in areas previously
reserved for the military, this change is coded as democratization. The
authoritarian end date is the date of the election, but cases are not included
unless the person elected is allowed to take office. o If a country has both a
popularly elected president and a prime minister chosen by the elected
legislature, and it is not clear which has the most political power, loss of either
office by the incumbent party indicates the end of the authoritarian regime.
• Or the
government is ousted by a coup, popular uprising, rebellion, civil war,
invasion, or other violent means, and replaced by a different regime (defined
as above, as a government that follows different rules for choosing leaders and
policies). Regimes should be coded as ending if:
o Civil war, invasion, popular uprising, or rebellion brings to
power individuals from regions, religions, ethnicities, or tribes different
from those who ruled before (i.e., the group from which leaders can be chosen
has changed).
o A coup (defined as the overthrow of the incumbent leader by
members of the military of the regime being ousted) replaces the government
with one supported by different regions, religions, ethnicities, or tribes. If
a coup simply replaces an incumbent general from one military faction with a
general from another without changing the group from which leaders are
selected, this is coded as a leader change, not a regime change.
o Assassinations are treated like coups; i.e., if the assassinated
incumbent is replaced by someone else from within the same ruling group, it is
not coded as a regime end. If the assassinated incumbent is replaced by someone
from a different group, as described above, the assassination is counted as a
regime end.
• Or the ruling
group markedly changes the rules for choosing leaders and policies such that
the identity of the group from which leaders can be chosen or the group that
can choose major policies changes. Examples of regime changes implemented by
leaders of the incumbent regime include:
o The new regime leader after a regular authoritarian succession
(e.g., the dictator dies and is succeeded by his constitutional successor)
replaces the most important members of the ruling group with individuals drawn
from a different region, religion, tribe, or ethnicity and changes the basic
rules of how the regime functions. o Transitions from military rule to indirect
military rule, which occur when military regime leaders allow the election of a
civilian government that has many of the powers of a democratic government, but
military leaders maintain substantial control over leader and policy choice,
either by preventing parties for which large numbers of citizens would be
expected to vote from competing or by directly controlling the selection of
Introduction
21
important cabinet posts and policies.
Indirect military regimes are coded as distinct from the prior military-led
regime because many in the leadership are chosen through fair elections, and
these elected officials control important aspects of policy; they are not
simply puppets. Transitions from indirect military rule to democracy are coded
from the date of the fair, competitive election.
Transitions from indirect military rule to
other forms of autocracy occur when the elected civilian partner of an indirect
military regime is removed from office by the military partner or some other
group. These changes usually occur via coup.
Country-years are excluded from the authoritarian regimes data set
if:
• Country is
democratic (defined as above)
• Country has a
provisional government charged with conducting elections as part of a
transition to democracy, if the elections actually take place and the candidate
and party elected are allowed to take office; or if a provisional government
that is following the rules set up as part of a transition to democracy exists
on January 1, but is ousted before the transition is complete by a group
different from the one that held power before the provisional government was
established; or if the provisional government remained in power on January 1,
2010, the last date coded
o To be considered transitional, the majority of top leaders cannot
have been top members of the prior authoritarian regime during the months
preceding the change in leadership. o If instead of holding elections, the
provisional government converts itself into the “permanent” government, it is
coded as authoritarian. o If elections are held but elected leaders are not
permitted to take office, it is coded depending on who prevents them from
taking office and who governs instead.
If actors from the old regime (from before
the provisional government) prevent those who won elections from taking office
and return to power themselves, the provisional government and the one that
succeeded it are coded as a continuation of the authoritarian regime that
preceded the provisional government.
If actors from the old regime prevent those
who won the elections from taking office but replace them with a government
drawn from a different group than the one that ruled before (e.g., the military
that used to rule replaces elected civilians with a civilian whose base of
support lies partly outside the military), the new government is coded as a new
authoritarian regime.
If actors from the old regime prevent those
who won the elections from taking office, but they are then ousted by a group
that forms a government based on a different support group, using different
rules for choosing leaders and policies, the new government is coded as a new
authoritarian regime.
22
Introduction
• Country is not independent
• Cases are excluded if foreign troops occupy
the country and the occupier governs it, or if occupation is the only thing
that prevents the country from being coded as democratic. Cases are not
excluded if a foreign power influences the (authoritarian) government but
allows it to make many decisions.
• Country has no government or has multiple
governments, no one of which controls most of the resources of the state.
o Cases are not excluded because of civil war if one government
still controls significant territory and the capital.
PART I
INITIATION
2
Most thinking about dictatorship pictures the
starting point as the violent overthrow of democracy - something like the
bloody Chilean coup of September 11, 1973, in which military forces led by
General Augusto Pinochet overthrew elected President Salvador Allende. But in
reality, less than a third (30 percent) of post-World War II autocratic regimes
began by replacing democracies. Among these democratic breakdowns, more than a
quarter (28 percent) were “self-coups,” meaning that a democratically elected
government “authoritarianized” itself, usually by banning the opposition,
arresting its leaders, or closing the legislature. The Chilean scenario, the
violent overthrow of a democratic government, initiated only 20 percent of
post-1946 dictatorships.1
In this chapter,
we provide this kind of basic information about how dictatorships form, and we
describe the conditions facing seizure groups the day after the seizure of
power. The first sections show how dictatorships begin and who begins them. We
start with some facts about the initiation of dictatorship because differences
among seizure groups have long-term consequences, as we show in later chapters.
Next, we analyze the distribution of power between the leader and other
plotters before they have seized power. We then describe the situation that
faces seizure groups the morning after they oust the old regime and the kinds
of ruling groups that different kinds of seizure group typically create. Our
aim is to provide some background for the analysis in the chapters to come.
1 “Violent” is defined here as
overthrow by a coup or armed rebellion.
25
26
Initiation
WHO DO DICTATORIAL SEIZURE GROUPS OUST?
The largest proportion of post-war
dictatorships began by ousting an earlier dictator and his supporters as, for
example, when a popular uprising ousted the Shah of Iran in 1979 and ushered in
the theocracy led by Ayatollah Khomeini, or when the insurgency led by Laurent
Kabila toppled Mobutu Sese Seku in what is now the Democratic Republic of
Congo. The regimes introduced by these interventions differed from the
dictatorships they replaced in that the identity of the group controlling
government changed. The new rulers altered the pool from which leaders and
elites could be drawn, as well as other basic rules for making leadership and
policy choices. In short, following the definition of regime used in this
book, long authoritarian spells in these and many other countries include two
or more different authoritarian regimes.2 Forty-two percent of
autocratic regimes begin with the ouster of a different dictatorship.
Many of the
remaining dictatorships, 26 percent of the total from 1946 to 2010, began with
the ouster of foreign rulers or a handover from foreigners to an undemocratic
government. Most of these foreign initiations involved transitions from colonial
control at independence.3 In the remaining few cases, autocratic
rule has succeeded a period of warlordism.
This variation
in the status quo ante may explain some of the difficulty scholars have had in
discovering systematic reasons for the initiation of dictatorship. The
conditions that motivate the creation of an insurgency to end colonial rule may
be quite different from the conditions that motivate the ouster of a populist
democracy or the overthrow of an arbitrary traditional monarchy. These figures
also suggest that studying only those dictatorships that follow democracies, as
occurs inadvertently when analysts rely on data sets that code only transitions
between democracy and autocracy, could lead to a biased understanding of both
the causes of dictatorship and how they operate in practice.
how
dictatorships begin
We sometimes speak of dictators as though
they rule alone, but individuals lack the resources to overthrow or transform
existing governments (Haber 2006).
2 Of course, not all leadership changes are
regime changes, only those that accompany basic changes in the identity of the
group in power and the formal and informal rules for choosing leaders and
policies. See Chapter 1 for our definition of regime and Geddes, Wright, and
Frantz (2014) for an elaboration of how regime changes differ from leadership
changes and undifferentiated spells of consecutive years under authoritarian
rule.
3 As colonialism has become uncommon and
democracy has spread, these figures may change just because there are fewer
foreign occupiers and autocrats to oust. Since democracy is less susceptible
to overthrow than autocracy, however, the number of dictatorships may simply
fall rather than the proportions changing.
Autocratic Seizures of Power
27
Only groups can do it. Groups plotting to
attain dictatorial power choose methods of achieving their goal that make the
most of their own resources and capacities relative to those of the group to be
ousted or defeated. For example, military officers, who have an advantage in
deploying force and the threat of force, tend to take power through coups,
which rely on credible threats of armed violence. Democratically elected
incumbent groups usually assume dictatorial control through
“authoritarianization,” a strategy unavailable to nonincumbent seizure groups.
They choose this strategy because they already control their countries’ legal
and judicial systems and can thus most easily initiate dictatorship via legal
changes like banning opposition.
The empirical
record indicates that modern dictatorships begin in six main ways.
• Coups (defined
as ousters carried out by members of the military of the government being
overthrown) replace the incumbent government with one preferred by military
officers. Coups can replace either democratic or autocratic regimes.
• Insurgents
defeat the incumbent militarily and replace it with their own leaders.
Insurgency is usually used to replace foreigners or incumbent autocrats with a
new dictatorship supported by different groups. This strategy is rarely
successful against democracy.
• Popular
uprisings persuade incumbents to hand power to opposition or seemingly neutral
leaders such as military officers. Popular uprisings can result in dictatorship
when the interim leader reneges on promises to democratize. Popular uprisings
have occurred against both democratic and autocratic incumbents.
• Foreign
conquest or imposition leads to the eventual control of the state by a group
preferred by the invaders. Foreign impositions have ended both democratic and
autocratic regimes, as well as nonstate forms of rule.
• Autocratic
elites initiate rule changes that alter the kinds of groups permitted in the
regime’s inner circle.
• Competitively
elected elites initiate rule changes that prohibit opposition groups from
competing effectively, a process we refer to as “authoritarianization.” Such
rule changes replace democracy with autocracy under the same ruling group.
The last two
kinds of seizure differ from the others in that incumbents remain in the ruling
group; such “seizures” are motivated not by the desire to redistribute away
from incumbents, as most other dictatorial seizures are, but to prevent
redistribution away from the group currently in power, which might follow fully
competitive elections.
Table 2.1 shows
the distribution of these methods of seizure for post-World War II
dictatorships.
28 Initiation
table 2.1 Proportion of dictatorships begun by different kinds of seizures of
power
Kind of Seizure |
Percentage of All Seizures |
Coup |
45 |
Foreign imposition* |
16 |
Authoritarianization |
15 |
Insurgency |
14 |
Popular uprising |
5 |
Elite rule change |
5 |
* Includes colonial handovers to ruling
groups not chosen in democratic elections.
As Table 2.1
shows, coups initiate the largest proportion of dictatorships.4 By definition,
military officers carry out coups. Sometimes the officers have civilian
supporters, but coups nevertheless usually lead to government controlled by an
officer or group of officers. Examples include the 1973 Chilean coup mentioned
above and the 1963 ouster by a coalition of officers with Ba’thist sympathies
of an earlier Syrian dictatorship led by the military high command in
collaboration with an elected civilian president. The 1963 coup was coded as a
regime initiation because it replaced a government led by a military high
command consciously selected to unify the military despite its partisan
factions with one led by a single faction, the pro-Ba’thists (Be’eri 1970,
150-53; Haddad 1971, 294). The 1963 coup eventuated in the Assad dictatorship
that still rules much of Syria as this is written.
Foreigners
imposed about 16 percent of post-1946 dictatorships, either as outgoing
colonial powers or as occupying forces. Outgoing colonial powers created quite
a few post-World War II dictatorships by handing power either to a civilian
party-led regime with formally democratic institutions or to a monarchy that
was constitutional on paper but not in practice. Soviet occupying forces
created many of the rest. The first wave was the party-led regimes with
communist institutions imposed by Soviet occupation forces during and after
World War II. The second occurred when a number of ex-Soviet nations achieved
independence under governments chosen before independence by the Soviets. Where
we have labeled the initiation of a dictatorship foreign-imposed, occupiers
usually influenced the choice of individual leaders as well as the rules and
institutions for making future leadership and policy choices. Some foreign
impositions involved a finger on the scale rather than all-out coercion, as
when foreigners outlawed popular leftist parties during the period leading to
preindependence elections in order to help a favored party or when they chose
to
4 Coups have declined in frequency since the end
of the Cold War (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz 2014; Marinov and Goemans 2014), but
still accounted for more than one-third of all authoritarian initiations
between 1990 and 2010.
Autocratic Seizures of Power
2 9
negotiate independence with monarchists
rather than republicans. Military occupation and all-out repression occurred in
other cases, as in Eastern Europe. Since few colonies remain, foreign
impositions have become less common.
Democratically
elected incumbents initiate a surprising number of dictatorships by changing
political institutions or practices to authoritarianize the political system.
Examples include the incremental transformation of Venezuelan politics from
democratic to authoritarian during the presidency of Hugo Chavez and President
Alberto Fujimori’s unconstitutional closure of Congress and dismissal of judges
(autogolpe) in Peru. Elected presidents supported by ruling parties carry out
most authoritarianizations.
Fourteen percent
of autocracies begin when armed rebels defeat incumbents. Parties lead most insurgencies.
Until the end of colonization, many insurgencies ousted foreigners. Examples
include the Algerian, Vietnamese, and Mozambican wars of independence.
Insurgencies that have replaced domestic incumbents include the Sandinistas’
defeat of the Somoza family dictatorship in Nicaragua in 1979 and the defeat of
the Habre dictatorship in Chad by Idriss Deby’s forces in 1990.
Popular
uprisings and elite rule changes are the least common ways new autocracies
start.5 Popular uprisings generally demand democracy, and the
individuals to whom power is entrusted usually announce transitions to democracy,
but they sometimes consolidate authoritarian rule instead. Examples include the
uprisings that ousted Robert Gue'i in Cote d’Ivoire in 2000 and the Duvalier
family dictatorship in Haiti in 1986. Guei’s overthrow brought to power Laurent
Gbagbo, who had probably won the election that protesters accused Gue'i of
stealing, but Gbagbo then governed as an autocrat (Englebert 2003, 332). A
military-civilian transitional ruling council tasked with holding elections
replaced the Duvaliers, but officers in the council prevented democratization
(Payne and Sutton 1993, 80-89).
Elite rule
changes initiate new regimes in the sense that they change the identity of
groups that control leadership and policy choice, even though the current
incumbent remains a part of the inner circle of the new dictatorship. An
example is the transition from direct to indirect military rule in Guatemala
in 1985, when military rulers agreed to allow competitive elections for the
presidency and legislature, but prevented popular leftist parties from
participating (which is the reason the case is coded as authoritarian, despite
competitive elections). The military also retained control over important
aspects of policy as a condition for allowing real civilian control in other
policy areas. Elected civilian President Cerezo said he “held no more than 30
percent of power with no control over the armed forces” (Schirmer 1998, 176).
Under our definition of regime, Cerezo’s election began a new regime because
the pre-1985 political system limited leaders to high-ranking military
5 Since 1990, popular uprisings
have become more common.
30
Initiation
officers, but the post-1985 regime involved
a power-sharing arrangement between officers and competitively elected
civilians.
The initiation
of the rump Yugoslavian (Serbian and Montenegrin) government under the same
leadership as before the breakup of pre-1990 Yugoslavia is another example of
an elite-initiated rule change. Slobodan Milosevic, who had led Serbia before
the breakup but ruled pre-1990 Yugoslavia in coalition with the leaders of five
other nationalities, remained Serbia’s leader but within a ruling group that
included only Serbians and Montenegrins after the breakup. Elite rule changes,
like authoritarianizations, do not fit the standard image of autocratic
seizures of power, but, as Table 2.1 shows, they initiate a number of
dictatorships.
Current (or
former) military officers and groups organized as parties carry out a large
majority of transitions to autocracy. Organized groups have a big advantage
over the unorganized when it comes to difficult and dangerous endeavors like
overthrowing governments. Soldiers carry out coups, but they also sometimes
lead other kinds of seizures. Ex-officers lead 8 percent of the insurgencies
that initiate dictatorships; officers implement more than half of the elite
rule changes that result in new regimes; and they are handed power during
almost one-third of the popular uprisings that end up failing to democratize.
Parties lead three-quarters of authoritarianizations, most insurgencies, and
some popular uprisings. Half of autocracies imposed by foreign powers are led
by dominant parties, as in Eastern Europe after World War II and a number of
postcolonial regimes in Africa and Asia.
Military and
party leadership are not mutually exclusive. Some seizures involve both
officers or ex-officers and parties. The exceptions to leadership by a party or
the military include a few instances in which popular uprisings have catapulted
party-less opposition leaders to power; some insurgencies that were not
organized as parties before the seizure, though insurgent organizations always
perform some of the functions usually taken care of by parties; and some cases
in which foreign rulers left power in the hands of individuals not supported by
parties (usually monarchs, but Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan is another). Table
2.2 shows the frequency of seizures led by current (or former) military
officers and/or parties.
Ousters of
incumbent governments, whether democratic or autocratic, usually occur when
things are going badly, that is, when the economy is in trouble, when disorder
and violence make people feel unsafe, and/or when scandal or arbitrary
brutality has discredited incumbents. These are the reasons coups are often
“welcomed throughout society because, initially, the military coup means all
things to all men. The army is popular not because of what it stands for (which
nobody knows, at first), but because of what, quite patently, it has fought
against” (Finer 1976, 104). After the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy, the
first army broadcast invited citizens to “go out and watch the edifices of
tyranny crumble. Within the hour a mob of hundreds of thousands was milling
through the streets screaming its joy and its thirst for vengeance” (Dann 1969,
33).
Autocratic Seizures of Power
31
table 2.2 Proportion of dictatorships begun by different kinds of seizure
groups
Seizure Leadership |
Percentage of All Seizures |
Military |
50 |
Party-based |
40 |
Neither |
18 |
Both |
8 |
Note: Leadership of the seizure group is
coded as military if the regime seized power via coup or the military put the
first regime leader into office. It is coded as party if what became the regime
support party existed prior to the seizure. The sample consists of 280 regimes
that appear in the post-1946 data, including those that seized power before
1946.
Citizens welcomed the 1980 coup in Burkina
Faso and also the 1982 coup that ousted those who had been welcomed in 1980
(Otayek 1986). Surveys carried out after the 1966 coup in Argentina and the
1992 autogolpe in Peru show popular support for the takeover in each instance
at above 60 percent (O’Donnell 1973, 39; Stokes 2001,142).
When things are
going badly for the incumbent and ordinary people are thoroughly fed up, it is
not uncommon for more than one group to plot during the months before the
successful ouster and for rumors of coups to circulate. Sometimes newspaper
editorials publicly urge the military to end an unsuccessful government.6
Multiple different actors often reach the conclusion that drastic action is
needed to “save” the country or that bold action to advance their own interests
has become feasible. Several separate groups of officers may be plotting coups
at the same time, and sometimes senior officers stage coups to forestall junior
officers whom they know to be plotting. In Libya during the months before
Moammar Qaddafi’s coup, for example, “at least three and possibly four groups
were jostling to unseat the king” (Blundy and Lycett z987, 53). Because multiple groups
were known to be plotting, “Several officers took part in [Qaddafi’s] coup
without knowing who was leading it” (First 1974, 108-9). In such circumstances,
there is quite a bit of luck involved in which plotters complete their
preparations first to become the actual seizure group. One of the reasons no
one opposed the Qaddafi coup is that the seizure group did not announce their
identity, and many other officers assumed that a more senior group known to be
plotting was in charge.
The choice of
the method by which to replace an incumbent regime and install a new
dictatorship is largely opportunistic. Coups are the most frequent method for
ousting fellow citizens (as opposed to foreigners) simply because officers’
access to weapons and command of soldiers make them much easier to
6 Stepan (1971), for example,
reports the frequency of editorials calling on the military to oust the elected
government before the 1964 coup in Brazil.
32
Initiation
organize than other overthrows. Minority
military factions carry out many coups. Qaddafi was a twenty-seven-year-old
captain supported by a small number of other low-ranking officers carrying
small arms and forty-eight rounds of ammunition (Singh 2014, 29). Small numbers
of conspirators can succeed in part because of military discipline;
lower-ranked officers and soldiers usually follow orders so few have to know
about the plot. Describing the first Nigerian coup, Robin Luckham writes, “the
other officers and men thought they were going out only on a night exercise”
(1971, 31). After a coup attempt in Guatemala, Jennifer Schirmer reports that
“few lower-ranking officers and none of the soldiers were told that the purpose
of the mobilization was to overthrow the government” (1998, 218). Rebellions
and popular uprisings, in contrast, require substantial voluntary sacrifices by
participants. Coups oust 64 percent of autocracies that are replaced by new
autocracies and 60 percent of democracies that suffer breakdowns.7
A foreign
occupier or colonial power, however, has never been ousted by coup. The reason
is obvious, but we mention the point because foreign occupation, whether after
invasion or colonial incursion, is almost the only situation in which the armed
forces do not have an advantage when it comes to toppling incumbents.
Otherwise, the armed forces have a clear edge, which begins soon after a
military is created, as the many coups carried out by small, newly created
armies shortly after independence demonstrate.
This advantage
means that military officers dissatisfied with an incumbent government face
fewer impediments to acting than do similarly dissatisfied civilians. As a
consequence, civilian groups that rate their chances of getting into power
through legal means as low, whether because they cannot attract wide popular
support or because they face an incumbent who prevents fair elections, often
ally with military factions. They hope to achieve power by outmaneuvering
officers after a coup ends the old regime. For example, the communists in
Afghanistan and the Ba’th Party in Syria and Iraq used this strategy. It
worked, in the sense that the party achieved power rather than being
marginalized by its erstwhile military ally, on the first try in Syria, on the
second in Afghanistan, and on the third in Iraq. After the first effort in
Afghanistan and the first two in Iraq, the military ally who assumed leadership
right after the coup quickly eliminated the civilian party ally from the
government.
While force is
the obvious choice for military officers contemplating a seizure of power, the
comparative advantage of party-based groups lies elsewhere, so they choose
nonviolent means of seizure when possible. They most often initiate
dictatorship via authoritarianization because it is relatively easy once a
party controls a democratic government. Authoritarianization also has a high
7 These figures for coups are larger than those
in Table 2.1 because the universe of autocratic initiations used for the table
includes 26 percent that arose in territory that was either foreign- occupied
or not independent prior to the seizure of power that started an autocratic
regime. The figures on this page are for coups that end regimes in independent
countries.
Autocratic Seizures of Power
33
success rate, though we know of a few cases
in which a democratically elected president’s proposal to merge all parties
into one (and thus authoritarianize) was successfully resisted and a couple in
which such a proposal led to the elected government’s overthrow. The
authoritarianization strategy is obviously available only to groups that
already control the government, however. Some of the authoritarianizations
included in the data we use happened during the run-up to independence or
during foreign occupation. The foreign occupier may have promoted it because it
ensured control by a group friendly to the occupier’s interests, or foreigners
may have cared more about extricating themselves than about who ruled after
their departure.
Insurgency, in
contrast, has very high costs for participants compared with either coups or
authoritarianization. Insurgent leaders must sustain armed forces for long
periods compared with those engaged in coups. Insurgencies last about a decade
on average (Fearon 2007), whereas coups are typically over within a day or two.
Insurgent leaders must find some way to fund their forces since the government
does not pay their salaries or buy their weapons - as it does for soldiers involved
in coups. The chances of death, disability, privation, and loss of livelihood
are much higher for participants in insurgencies than for participants in coups
or popular uprisings. Furthermore, insurgency is unlikely to succeed. Insurgent
groups secure outright victories against incumbents only about a third of the
time (Fearon 2007). By contrast, a bit more than half of all coup attempts
succeed (Powell and Thyne 2011). Probably for these reasons, more insurgencies
have ousted colonial powers and foreign occupiers than domestic governments. In
other words, insurgency is rarely the strategy of choice; it is used when no
other strategy is available.
Popular
uprisings also sometimes initiate authoritarian regimes, but this is not
usually the intention of those who joined the uprising. When massive
demonstrations persuade an incumbent to resign, power is handed to interim
leaders to manage the transition. These leaders are supposed to oversee competitive
elections to choose a new government, but they may opt to consolidate power in
their own hands instead, initiating a dictatorship.
To summarize
this section, the selection of means to overthrow governments is largely
instrumental. The method of seizure reflects the resources and capacities that
comprise the comparative advantage of different kinds of seizure groups. Most
autocracies begin with coups because the command of men and weapons gives coup
plotters a great advantage relative to other would-be seizure groups. Coups are
the easiest and cheapest means available, unless the group bent on establishing
a dictatorship already controls government as the elected incumbent.
BEFORE THE SEIZURE OF POWER
Many are called to the vocation of
dictatorship, but few are chosen. The majority of seizure groups fail. Apart from
groups that already control
34
Initiation
government at the time of
authoritarianization, members of would-be seizure groups lead difficult lives.
Some are jailed or killed by the governments they seek to overthrow. They also
risk their careers, income, and liberty. These difficulties and dangers put
strong evolutionary pressures on would-be seizure groups. Those we observe
after the initiation of dictatorship are highly selected for traits that were
useful in getting them to that point. Because this selection pressure weeds out
much of the natural diversity among those who aspire to establish
dictatorships, we can make some generalizations about those who succeed.
Centralization
of authority within the group of plotters contributes to discipline and secrecy,
both of which help seizure groups survive in a hostile environment.
Nevertheless, successful seizure groups must usually also maintain a somewhat
collegial internal organization in order to retain sufficient membership.8
Seizure-group leaders cannot usually impose heavy costs on those who abandon
the cause. Out-of-power leaders have little ability beyond moral authority and
force of personality to enforce discipline. They usually have no police
apparatus at their disposal and few means to intimidate. Individuals who
disagree with a leader can simply leave the party or coup conspiracy. It is
estimated, for example, that 90 percent of those who joined the Communist Party
in the United States had left by the end of the first year. Leaving the party or
coup conspiracy entails few costs for the one who leaves. In contrast, the loss
of comrades can be quite damaging to remaining conspirators. They may be left
with too few allies for effective action, and their former colleagues may turn
them in to authorities. In short, if leaders demand too much obedience and
subordination from adherents, they may simply desert, leaving the group too
small to accomplish its goals - arguably the fate of all the western communist
parties rigidly controlled by the Comintern.
To maintain the
minimum support needed for effective action, plot leaders must therefore
consult and be somewhat open to the ideas and interests of members of the
group. As a result, successful seizure groups usually enforce norms of
discipline and secrecy with respect to outsiders, but relationships within the
group tend to be relatively collegial before seizures of power.
Seizure groups
need some support from the populace as well and thus must be somewhat
responsive to popular aspirations. A group bent on seizing power does not need
majority support, but it needs some. Regardless of the mode of seizing power,
groups need the “contingent consent” of the ruled (Levi 1997). To attract the
support they need, military seizure groups typically promise things nearly all
citizens want, such as public order, growth, and an end to
8 We build on Kenneth Jowitt’s (1975) argument
about traits that help Leninist parties succeed at different stages. During the
chaotic period of power seizure, according to Jowitt, collegial relationships
within the party give cadres the autonomy and discretion to respond to changing
conditions, thereby contributing to survival. A different set of traits
contributes to survival during the post-seizure period.
Autocratic Seizures of Power
corruption in their first broadcast
informing the people of a coup. Other kinds of seizure groups make equally
attractive promises.
Seizure groups
are more likely to succeed when they (1) articulate goals that are attractive
and intelligible to many ordinary people, such as peace, prosperity, and the
end of corruption (Jowitt 1975) and (2) choose a moment to seize power when
disgust with incumbents has spread through much of the populace. When both
these conditions hold, seizure groups can attract broad, though often
temporary, public support. Elite groups as well as ordinary citizens often
support a dictatorial seizure of power simply because they want to oust the old
order.
During
insurgencies, the evolutionary pressures on seizure groups are even stronger.
If the struggle is long and violent, the seizure group needs to draw manpower
and other resources from the population, and it cannot do this entirely through
coercion. Where the struggle to oust the old regime has been prolonged and the
seizure group has needed to maintain popular support for some years and also to
recruit fighters and extract resources from the population, successful groups
have generally provided more than promises. As Samuel Popkin (1979) argues,
change-oriented movements are more likely to succeed in attracting mass support
if their leaders can provide real benefits to those they seek to mobilize.
Since they have few material resources to hand out, they often provide goods
such as land redistribution and organization for self-defense in the areas they
control, along with individual benefits that require cadre labor but little
money.9 Literacy campaigns are a common strategy. These benefits are
valued by recipients and create loyalty that ideology and promises alone could
not elicit. Leninist parties in China and Vietnam relied on these strategies
during the years of insurgency (Johnson 1962; Popkin 1979). Before the seizure
of power, communist parties redistributed land to tillers. Only after they
controlled the government, military, and security services did they carry out
unpopular collectivizations of agriculture.
The point of
this discussion of collegial relationships within potential seizure groups and
groups’ efforts to respond to popular demands is to highlight the contrast with
the change in power relationships that occurs after seizures of power. The
bargaining power of followers relative to leaders within seizure groups and of
ordinary citizens relative to seizure group members is much stronger before the
seizure of power than afterward.
The dependence
of leaders on the led carries over into the immediate aftermath of the
seizure, when the regime is still uncertain of its grip on power and reliant on
much of the ousted incumbent’s bureaucratic and military apparatus. The seizure
group’s responsiveness to citizens declines, however, as the new leadership
gains control over the implementing arms of government, such as the
9 See Mampilly (2011) for a
study of how rebel groups provide public goods to citizens who live in
territory they control.
36
Initiation
police and tax authorities. The longer-term
fate of collegial leadership in dictatorships is discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.
THE MORNING AFTER A SEIZURE OF POWER
Nonincumbent groups seize control of
government in order to change public policies and redistribute the fruits of
control of the state.10 Even if personal ambition motivates
participants, groups that lead seizures also expect to be able to advance
public welfare by improving economic performance, restoring order, and achieving
other widely shared goals, though these expectations arise more from
inexperience and ideological commitment than realistic assessment. The fruits
to be redistributed include status, power, and opportunities as well as
material goods. Seizure groups expect to be able to redistribute away from the
individuals and groups they believe benefited from the status quo and toward
groups seen as having a legitimate claim to more, including themselves. The
anticipated redistribution sometimes includes private property but invariably
includes the direct benefits of controlling government. In short, many of the
same goals motivate authoritarian seizure groups as motivate out-of-power
parties competing in democratic elections.
Nonincumbent
seizure groups, however, tend to lack experience in government, and they also
often lack a detailed plan for what to do if they succeed in capturing power.
Before the overthrow, seizure groups typically have developed a thoroughgoing
critique of the government they hope to oust, which is needed to attract
support, and they usually have a practical plan for how to force it from
office.
For military
officers, this usually means careful, detailed plans for which officers will
order troops they command to surround or seize key government facilities.11
Plotters have to include officers who actually command troops stationed near
facilities to be taken. Depending on the kind of defenses the incumbent
controls, plotters may need the cooperation of officers who command tank
regiments or heavy artillery. They may have to coordinate with the police and
air force. If plotters include highest-ranking officers, they can minimize
opposition to their plans by retiring officers loyal to the incumbent before
they attempt the coup. Much of the planning effort for coups goes into securing
the support of other officers so that the ruler being ousted will not have an
equally threatening armed force on his side (Potash 1969, 1980, 1996; Stepan
1971; Decalo 1976; Nordlinger 1977; Fontana 1987). One of the goals of careful
coup planning is to minimize the chance of bloodshed or, worse,
10 Dictatorships begun by the
authoritarianization of a democratic government or elite rule changes are
exceptions.
11 There are of course exceptions. Sometimes
barely planned coups succeed by luck. The 1981 coup in Ghana led by J. J.
Rawlings and the 1980 coup led by Samuel Doe in Liberia are examples of barely
planned coups.
Autocratic Seizures of Power
37
protracted armed conflict (Potash 1969,
1980, 1996). Because of the obvious and credible threat posed by tanks and
armies drawn up around the presidential palace, coups have been accomplished
without bloodshed about two-thirds of the time.12
Party-based
nonincumbent seizure groups have a more difficult task because, unlike
officers, they cannot order others to participate. They must usually attract
large numbers of other civilians to demonstrate, strike, or fight along with
them. The leadership’s main task beforehand is the persuasion and organization
of supporters drawn from the initially uncommitted population. Great effort has
to be put into gathering the resources and attracting and training enough
militants to mobilize large numbers into the streets and keep them there beyond
the first few days, or to recruit and supply an insurgent army and keep it
alive and fighting for months or years.
In other words,
for nonincumbent seizure groups - regardless of whether they are led by a party
or the military - the plotting, planning, and organizing required for a
successful overthrow usually take a lot of effort, attention to detail, and
strategic thinking. The urgent need to get this part of the plan right limits
the amount of attention that goes into planning what to do after the overthrow,
and the need for secrecy can limit the seizure group’s ability to consult
experts and interest groups. Moreover, sometimes the details about who will
rule post-seizure and what policies will be followed need to be kept vague in
order to attract key support. After the 1958 Iraqi coup, for example, “Those in
power lacked both experience and a shared ideology, with the result that
fundamental issues of principle, such as who was in command, and what form of
government and political system should be adopted, remained unresolved”
(Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 1987, 52). Describing another Iraqi coup ten
years later, the same authors say that “the coup had been carried out by a
group of officers, each of whom felt equally entitled to play a, or the, key
role in government” (119).
For all these
reasons, nonincumbent seizure groups usually achieve office without a detailed
policy plan. Those who carry out seizures of power typically have idealized
goals they expect to accomplish, and they may have decided to initiate a few
grand policy changes, such as nationalization of natural resources, land
redistribution, or economic liberalization. Their lack of practical experience
in government limits their ability to make detailed plans for how to implement
their policies, however. Members of the seizure group may agree on the general
direction of policy changes, but not on specific strategies for how to carry
them out, elicit the cooperation of affected citizens, or impose the policies
on those who will inevitably be damaged by them. They usually have not made decisions
about priorities among desired changes, speed of
12 This estimate was tabulated
using the Center for Systemic Peace’s “Coups d’Etat, 1946-2013”
data set (available at www.systemicpeace.org), which provides
data on the number of deaths
associated with successful coups worldwide.
38
Initiation
implementation, or the mix of coercion and
cooptation that should characterize their interaction with different groups of
citizens. Differences of opinion about these things cause conflict within the
group.
After their
accession, they face immediately all the economic and other problems that
helped make their seizure of power possible, as well as the urgent need to make
a large number of appointments and policy decisions quickly. They have to adapt
the group’s previous decision-making procedures to policymaking on the fly.
They have to either create human structures for implementing policies and
protecting themselves or make use of the perhaps disloyal public employees
hired during the ousted regime. And they also have to create or adapt police
and other agencies that interact with the public to prevent the mobilization of
opposition.
While engaged in
a frenetic effort to deal with problems, they must also devise methods for
reaching policy decisions and find ways to resolve disagreements among
themselves. Thus, the early days of dictatorship tend to be anxious, chaotic,
and full of uncertainty.13
POST-SEIZURE ORGANIZATION
Regardless of how seizure groups achieve
power, the starting point for assigning tasks and making decisions is the
group’s preexisting organization and its norms and procedures for choosing
leaders, making choices, and maintaining internal cohesion. Preexisting
organization and norms vary by kind of group. In this section we discuss
characteristic differences among seizure groups.14
Coups tend to
lead to the occupation of the top offices in the new dictatorship by officers,
regardless of what civilian allies might have hoped. Because of strong hierarchical
norms within the military, plotters often choose the top- ranked officer who
cooperated with plotters as regime leader because other officers would balk at
being led by a lower-ranked officer. Higher-ranked officers who opposed the
coup tend to be retired (or jailed, exiled, or killed) in order to prevent
potential destabilizing challenges to the chain of command. After the coup led
by Qaddafi (a captain), 430 of Libya’s 600 officers were retired, jailed, or
posted abroad (Blundy and Lycett 1987, 64).
13 Seizures led by incumbents face fewer
challenges of course. Pushing rule changes through legislatures is less
dangerous than insurgency or staging coups. Incumbent seizure groups may have
filled the army and police with supporters before authoritarianization,
eliminating one of the most urgent tasks facing other seizure groups. Seizure
groups that authoritarianize an elected government also have more government
experience than other seizure groups, and they can typically count on the
loyalty of existing bureaucrats (many of whom they appointed). In addition, the
gradual and subtle nature of some authoritarianizations can leave citizens
without a focal point around which opposition might coalesce.
14 We do not discuss monarchies
in this section because foreigners handed control over to nearly all
authoritarian monarchies that have ruled since 1946.
Autocratic Seizures of Power
39
The clear formal
hierarchy of command in military seizure groups tends to centralize
decision-making within an inner circle of highly ranked officers. The wide
dispersion of arms and command of troops across the officer corps, however,
means that before making key decisions, military dictators must consult with
other officers or risk a coup led by their colleagues. To deal with that basic
feature of military rule, regime leaders include as many officers as they
believe are needed to ensure the cooperation of all parts of the armed forces
in the ruling inner circle. For highly professionalized militaries, this means
a junta made up of the commanders of the branches of the armed forces and often
also the commander of the national police. In more factionalized militaries,
however, the ruling military council may include many more officers in order to
ensure ethnic representation or to include all officers who command troops. In
some, even representatives of noncommissioned officers and soldiers are
included.
Uniformed
members of the inner circle serve as representatives of their subordinates and
thus facilitate consultation between the leader and the forces that serve as
his primary support base. Officers in the inner circle are expected both to
advocate for policies that serve their subordinates’ interests or reflect their
opinions and to ensure subordinates’ loyalty to the leadership. The policies
of dictators established by military seizure groups thus tend to reflect the
views of their officer corps, leading to increased spending on the military
(Bove and Brauner 2014), pay raises, immediate promotions of those involved in
the coup and sometimes all officers, violent responses to minority demands for
greater rights and autonomy (Nordlinger 1977), and the adoption of policies
favored by other officers regardless of whether the dictator himself shares
their ideas. For example, Mathieu Kerekou in Benin and Didier Ratsiraka in
Madagascar introduced socialist rhetoric and policies, though neither had
displayed much earlier leftism (Decalo 1979, 1986).15
The need to retain the support of other
officers also constrains the dictator’s discretion over personnel appointments.
All dictators try to appoint loyalists to key posts, but the need to conform to
military promotion norms in order to avoid alienating other officers limits the
discretion of military dictators. Even after the murder of senior commanders
during coups, “coup participants still [keep] up the normal command
relationships between each other” (Luckham 1971, 31). As a result, military
dictators often lack the full control of membership in the dictatorial elite
enjoyed by some other dictators because they can only choose appointees from
among candidates with the right rank and senior- ity.16 Policy
implementation can also be undermined because appointments to
15 Decalo (1986) describes
Ratsiraka as a “bourgeois technocrat ... with no previous ideological
convictions” (129).
16 For multiple examples, see
Potash’s (1969, 1980, 1996) careful descriptions of decision-making in several
Argentine military dictatorships.
40
Initiation
ministries and state agencies depend on the
promotion and retirement norms of the armed forces rather than substantive
competence (North 1983, 273).
At the time of
the seizure, the military usually lacks an organized civilian network capable
of mobilizing, or even reaching and gathering information from, ordinary
citizens. Officers’ training to obey and to give orders exacerbates this
deficiency, as does their lack of training or experience in persuasion,
bargaining, and compromise.
Civilian seizure
groups are more heterogeneous than military seizure groups. Some are armed
while others are not. We first describe those that seize power via armed
insurgency. Successful insurgency leads to control of the dictatorship’s inner
circle by the leadership of the rebellion. Military and civilian roles tend to
be fused in insurgencies, and that often persists in the post-seizure inner
circle.
Insurgent
seizure groups share some (but not all) of the characteristics of military
seizure groups. Arms and command over troops are widely dispersed within
insurgent groups, but military promotion norms do not constrain the leader’s
discretion over appointments, increasing his power relative to others in the
inner circle. Successful insurgent groups develop strong discipline, but where
regional commanders have led autonomous insurgent forces in different parts of
the country, intense factionalism can develop. That is, discipline may operate
within region-based factions, but not necessarily across them. The various
factions will then need to be represented in the post-seizure dictatorial elite
for the same reason that ruling military councils include many officers when
the military is factionalized. Examples of factionalized insurgencies include
the multiple armed forces that cooperated with difficulty during the Mexican
revolution and the several separate regional Khmer Rouge armies in Cambodia,
each led by its own party/military commander before the fall of Phnom Penh.
Since successful
insurgency requires the maintenance of organized networks for recruiting
fighters, extracting resources, training soldiers, and disciplining dissidents,
insurgent groups often have much more of the organizational structure needed
to reach most citizens and to incorporate them into the seizure group’s project
than do other seizure groups. Internal party institutions in dictatorships
brought to power by insurgency thus tend to be stronger relative to society but
weaker relative to the dictator than those of parties that achieved power via
authoritarianization or popular uprising. Because they have often developed
internal security services before the seizure, they can very quickly
consolidate control over the population once the ruling group has control of
the resources of the state.
Insurgents who
have achieved power usually purge and reorganize, or replace, the armed forces
and security services of the ousted regime. They may have sufficient trained
soldiers and cadres to replace the incumbent army and part of the incumbent
administration rather than having to retrain and monitor (or compromise with)
them, as most other seizure groups do.
Autocratic Seizures of Power
4i
Former insurgents thus have less need to
coopt opposition leaders and more ability to respond to opposition with
coercion than do dominant parties that achieved power by nonviolent means. In
short, their ability to penetrate both state and society, and thus to implement
dramatic policy shifts, initially tends to be much greater than that of
military or unarmed party-led seizure groups.
Because of the
great costs and risks associated with joining insurgencies, those who become
their leaders and most dedicated militants tend to have commitments to extreme
ideologies or policies (DeNardo 1985). Only individuals who want radical
changes would shoulder such costs.17 Consequently, insurgent seizure
groups often want to impose unpopular policy changes - for example,
collectivization of agriculture or the exclusion of distrusted classes or
ethnicities from government jobs. Because of the prior development of extensive
cadre networks and security agencies, they may also have greater capacity to
carry out such changes than do military or unarmed party-led seizure groups.
Unarmed civilian
seizure groups, in contrast, tend to be more loosely organized. Intensive
organization is not needed to win a democratic election, the precondition for
authoritarianization, which is the most common way for civilian seizure groups
to achieve power. Nor is much organization needed to mobilize people into the
streets for a few days or weeks. There are a few well- known cases in which
well-organized groups seized power by mobilizing ordinary people for a popular
uprising (e.g., the Iranian revolution), but most of the time popular uprising
is a tactic chosen by groups that lack the organization and resources to
maintain insurgency or a multiyear electoral campaign against an authoritarian
incumbent. In short, unarmed civilian seizure groups are usually loosely
organized, partly because they did not need high internal unity in order to
achieve power, but also because they so often include many different parties or
groups that joined forces only to win an election or oust a previous incumbent.
Authoritarianization
usually results in civilian leadership of the new dictatorship, with power
centered in the hands of the incumbent. It involves a change in the
relationship between the ruling party and the opposition, but often not in the
composition of the government’s inner circle. Parties that achieve control via
authoritarianization very often coopt the leaders of other parties, thus
reducing societal opposition at the expense of their own discipline and
ideological coherence. They may also coopt military officers, but they rarely
bring them into the regime’s inner circle.
Paradoxically,
loose party organization gives leaders more autonomy relative to the rest of
the inner circle than military dictators initially enjoy. Both electoral and
revolutionary parties have rules for choosing leaders, making strategy choices,
and delegating tasks. Leaders of out-of-power parties can
17 A seminal article by Kalt and
Zupan (1984) developed the logic linking political activism with
extremism in democracies. The logic is even
more compelling when activism is physically
dangerous.
42
Initiation
usually be removed by followers. Relative
bargaining power often changes after the seizure of power, however, and the
members of the inner circles of dictatorships that achieved power via popular
uprising or authoritarianization may have limited ability to constrain the
dictator's policy choices because they lack unity and arms.
At the same
time, the weak organization of such parties can also mean that the dictator
cannot restrain or discipline party subordinates, which undermines policy
implementation and efforts to limit corruption. At the beginning, such groups
usually have very broad citizen support, but linkages with ordinary citizens
tend to be superficial and ultimately depend on delivering benefits. In
contrast to the military, such civilian seizure groups usually have little
coercive capacity but a great deal of experience in persuasion and compromise.
They are good at coopting opposition elites, but bad at delivering on their
promises to ordinary citizens, which requires a disciplined and honest cadre of
officials to implement reforms and distributive decisions.
These
characteristics of the seizure group set in motion political processes that
define the dictatorship initially. These features in turn affect who can become
the leaders of the new dictatorship, how centralized power is within the
dictatorial inner circle on the morning after the seizure, and how the new
elite responds to citizen demands and opposition.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we have provided some
basic facts about how dictatorships begin and who leads them. We also described
the immediate aftermath of different kinds of seizures of power. We noted that
most dictatorships replace earlier autocracies and that the regimes they oust
are often incompetent, dishonest, or both, as well as repressive. Since World
War II, military coups have established more dictatorships than other means of
seizing power. Authoritar- ianization by a democratically elected incumbent,
insurgency, and foreign imposition are the other common ways of establishing
dictatorship.
Groups of
military officers or civilian-led parties install most dictatorships. We see
decisions about how to seize power as strategic and opportunistic. That is,
military officers have a comparative advantage in using violence and threats of
violence to take over governments, so that is what they usually use. Incumbent
elected parties that decide to prevent future electoral defeats can most easily
sustain their rule by using their control over the legislature and courts to
change formal or informal rules in ways that prevent fair competition. Insurgency
is a very costly and difficult way to gain political control, so it is only
used when other means are unavailable, as, for example, against foreign
occupiers. The initiation of new dictatorships by insurgents has become less
frequent as foreign occupation has become less common and as more incumbent
dictatorships have allowed semi-competitive elections, giving opponents a less
costly way to challenge them.
Autocratic Seizures of Power
43
Because of the
difficulty and risk of trying to force out an incumbent government, groups that
seek to do so focus their efforts on organizing the details of the physical
overthrow, often at the expense of planning what to do post-seizure. In order
to attract sufficient support, they may need to promise different things to
different people or keep their policy goals vague. The need for secrecy during
plotting means they cannot usually choose important cabinet officials, develop
detailed implementation plans, or consult experts for policy advice before the
seizure of power. Sometimes they have not even decided who will lead the new
government. The lack of detailed planning about what to do post-seizure tends
to make the first months after forcible impositions of dictatorship chaotic.
Power struggles occur between supporters of different policies and different
individual officeholders. Strategic skills not previously displayed in public
and unforeseen events affect who wins post-seizure power struggles, which add
to the difficulty of predicting what kind of policies will emerge after the
establishment of a new dictatorship. It may take time for observers and even
participants to figure out what kind of regime is being created.
3
In 1952, the arbitrary and corrupt Egyptian
monarchy ended. Troops commanded by a group of young officers who had named
themselves the Free Officers occupied the army’s general headquarters and
arrested twenty of the highest-ranking officers - the king’s strongest military
loyalists. Tanks simultaneously surrounded the broadcasting building, the
telephone exchange, the railroad station, and the airports. This classic coup
took only a few hours. Two guards were killed. No one else resisted. The Free
Officers did not arrest the king or his ministers. Three days later, they asked
the king to abdicate, and he left the country, ending the monarchy (Haddad
1973, 21-23).
King Farouk had
ruled “comfortably for sixteen years and would have probably ruled longer if
revolutionary action had depended on the people’s initiative,” according to
George Haddad (1973, 10). The Free Officers’ leader, Colonel Gamal Abdel
Nasser, stated that the army was “‘the force to do the job’ because it had more
cohesion, its men trusted each other ... and it had ‘enough material strength
at its disposal to guarantee a swift and decisive action’” (Haddad 1973, 15).
The Free Officers had been plotting since at least 1949. Soldiers blamed
Egypt’s poor performance in the Palestine War of 1948 on senior officers, the
king, and his cronies, which alienated much of the officer corps from the
monarchy. A scandal involving the corrupt procurement of defective arms had
become public and implicated the king. In short, much of the officer corps felt
betrayed by the king and the officers he had promoted to the highest ranks, but
most ordinary Egyptians appeared content with the monarchy. When violent
conflict with the British over control of the Suez Canal led to a destructive
riot in Cairo and a cabinet crisis, the Free Officers decided the time to end
the old regime had come (Haddad 1973, 7-11). The plotters struck during a high
point of cabinet disorganization and popular anger with the government’s Suez
policy in order to reduce the chances of bloodshed, effective opposition, and
failure.
44
What Do We Know about Coups?
45
Coups, as noted in the previous chapter,
are the most frequent means of initiating new dictatorships and also the most
common way of ending them, as we show in later chapters. Yet we lack a good
general understanding of why they happen. When insurgents seize control of a
government or an elected ruling party authoritarianizes a democracy, it seems
self-evident that providing benefits for themselves and their supporters
motivates their actions. Analysts debate the motivations behind military seizures
of power, however.
Some scholars
have viewed officers as defending the interests of economic elites, and thus as
more likely to seize power if popular mobilization becomes threatening to
elites or if politicians responsive to popular interests propose redistribution
(e.g., O’Donnell 1973; Acemoglu and Robinson 2001). In this view, officers are
allied with economic elites and serve as their agents rather than pursuing
their own interests, not only when plotting coups but also while they control
governments. If this view is correct, officers’ comparative advantage in
overthrowing governments gives economic elites a powerful weapon to use in
bargaining with incumbent governments whether democratic or autocratic.
Scholars such as
Nordlinger have challenged this idea, however, noting that “the personal
interests of officers - their desire for promotions, political ambitions, and
fear of dismissal” (1977, 66) have motivated many coups. Nordlin- ger also
observes that although some military-led governments choose policies that
benefit existing economic elites, others expropriate private property and
pursue redistributive policies. Svolik (2012) has proposed an interesting synthesis
of these two views: he suggests that incumbent political leaders increase the
funding of their military agents when organized mass opposition threatens their
political control, but that then the military uses the additional resources to
seize power for itself, rather than serving as a loyal agent.
In this chapter,
we examine what currently available evidence can tell us about soldiers’
seizures of power. We first discuss the various ways that coups are used to
change the political status quo and why we might expect these different uses to
be associated with different officer motivations, political contexts, or social
forces. Next, we compare the conditions associated with coups that end
democracies and those that replace one dictatorship with another. At issue is
whether popular mobilization against economic elites or incumbent political
leaders increases the likelihood of military intervention. Claims that the
military intervenes to prevent redistribution usually assume implicitly that
coups oust democratic governments sympathetic to popular demands, which leads
to the expectation that the circumstances associated with coups differ for
democracies and dictatorships. In the final empirical section, we retest
Svolik’s argument about the association between popular mobilization and coups.
We find no relationship between various measures of mobilized popular
opposition and regime-change coups. This finding indicates that coups have
little to do with elite fears of redistribution or with the buildup of military
46
Initiation
resources in response to popular
mobilization. Instead, we find that officers’ grievances are associated with
coups.
coups FOR VARIOUS PURPOSES
Investigating the conditions associated
with coups requires some preliminary discussion because of the various kinds of
change accomplished via coup. Coups are military officers’ instrument of choice
in several different situations, but here we are interested only in those coups
that bring new dictatorships to power. Regime-initiating coups include the
highly visible events that replace an elected civilian leader with someone who
wears a uniform and carries a weapon, but coups also oust incumbent
dictatorships. Such coups replace one dictatorship with another. The coups that
ousted monarchies in Egypt (1952), Iraq (1958), and Libya (1969) are examples.
Coups against incumbent dictatorships can oust any type of preexisting
autocratic ruling group, even those controlled by rival ethnicity-based
military factions. These coups result in new autocratic regimes.
Officers also
use coups as a means of changing leaders in ongoing dictatorships, however,
especially those led by the military. These leader-shuffling events are not
military seizures of power because they replace one military dictator with
another from the same ruling group; the basic formal and informal rules remain
unchanged. The coups in Argentina during the early 1970s that replaced one
general with another are examples. They did not begin (or end) the
dictatorship, which lasted from 1966 to 1973 and ended in an election. Each
coup replaced the junta leader but did not replace the group - in this case top
military officers - that could select leaders and make key policy decisions.
Other examples include the 1980 and 1984 coups in Mauritania, each of which
sacked one member of the Military Committee for National Salvation and replaced
him with another allied officer. We do not treat these leader replacements as
military seizures of power because the same group of elites within the military
continues to rule before and after the leader change.
We emphasize the
difference between regime-initiating coups and leader- shuffling coups because
available coup data sets do not distinguish the two, and most analysts have
used these data without disaggregating.1 In what follows, we show
that lumping together leader-shuffling coups and those that initiate new
dictatorships can blur our understanding of the causes of regime-initiating
coups. To more accurately model the process by which a military faction ousts
an incumbent government that did not include members of the plotters’ faction,
we exclude reshuffling coups from the sample used in the first tests below and
focus only on regime-initiating military seizures of power. We explore the
implications of doing so for previous research as well as for our own analysis.
1 Aksoy, Carter, and Wright
(2015) are an exception.
What Do We Know about Coups?
47
PRECONDITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH REGIME-CHANGE
COUPS
We begin by examining two kinds of
regime-initiating coups: those that replace democracy with dictatorship and
those that replace one autocracy with another. We examine these separately to
see if they have different causes. The first sample includes only incumbent
dictatorships. The second sample includes only incumbent democracies. The
second analysis is similar to research on the causes of democratic breakdown.
We treat authoritarianizations by the incumbent democratic leadership - or
what others call power grabs or autogolpes by the democratic incumbent - as
right-censored events.2
We have good
measures of popular mobilization (protest, violent protest, and civil
conflict), which are needed to test arguments about the effects of widespread
popular opposition on the likelihood of military seizures of power. A finding
that popular participation in protests or civil conflict increases the
likelihood of coups would support the view of officers as agents of civilian
elites since widespread popular mobilization might be expected to lead to elite
fears of redistribution or loss of political control.
We lack the
kinds of measures of soldiers’ specific grievances needed for careful tests of
Nordlinger’s argument about soldiers’ reasons for seizing power. As an
approximation of the latter, we use information about officers’ past
experiences and measures of ethnic representation that we believe might affect soldiers’
grievances.
We first examine
the factors that prior studies have most often linked to military intervention:
level of development, oil wealth, growth, international and civil conflict,
protest, and ethnic diversity.3 We also include indicator variables
to investigate the possible effects of earlier political experience. The first
identifies countries that were democratic before the current dictatorship (in
the sample of incumbent dictatorships); the second identifies countries that
had previous experience with military rule. Earlier studies have found that a
history of past military intervention increases the likelihood of coups. To
account for unmeasured factors that vary by country, we estimate a model with
country-level random effects and standard errors clustered by country.4
All specifications include decade fixed effects and a logged measure of
duration dependence.
2 Authoritarianization is the
other way democracies are replaced by dictatorship. We treat them as
right-censored in order to avoid inadvertently treating them as surviving
democracies.
3 Level of development is measured as the log of
GDP per capita, lagged one year. Oil wealth is measured as the log of oil
income, lagged one year. Growth is lagged one year. These variables come from the
Ethnic Power Relations data set (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). Data on international
and civil conflict are lagged dummy variables for conflict exceeding 1,000
battle deaths in a calendar year, from Themner and Wallensteen (2014). Data on
violent and nonviolent protest movements are lagged one year, from the NAVCO2
project (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013).
4 Variables for the manner in
which the autocratic regime seized power, used in models 2 and 3, are from our
data, http://sites.psu.edu/dictators/how-dictatorships-work/.
They do not vary
48
Initiation
For the sample
of incumbent dictatorships, we also examine two characteristics of the
incumbent regime that could influence the likelihood that officers develop
grievances against regime elites: how the dictatorship came to power in the
first place and the ethnic composition of the officer corps and government. We
include the way the incumbent dictatorship achieved power as a proxy indicator
of the congruence of interests between military officers and ruling elites. We
expect more shared interests after insurgent seizures of power because new
rebel governments often replace the existing officer corps with rebel officers.
We also
investigate the effects of ethnicity because of literature linking ethnic
exclusion with different forms of political instability, such as coups and
civil wars. For example, Roessler (2011, 2016) argues that leaders who use
ethnic criteria to exclude rivals within their initial support coalition may
decrease the risk of coups but increase the risk of ethnic insurgency. To
investigate the relationship between ethnic inclusion and coups, we include
variables that measure ethnic fractionalization in the society and the share of
the politically relevant ethnic population that is excluded from participation
in the incumbent government.5 This measure of ethnic exclusion
focuses on the groups that share executive political power, not the military.
To measure ethnic inclusiveness in the military, we include an indicator
variable for whether the officer corps is ethnically heterogeneous, that is,
whether it includes members of all larger ethnic groups. This variable, from
our own data collection, exists only for the sample of incumbent dictatorships.
Figure 3.1 shows
the results for models of regime-initiating coups against incumbent
dictatorships. The shapes (diamond, square, and triangle) indicate the point
estimates produced by different models, while the lines represent 90 (thick)
and 95 (thin) percent confidence intervals. The first specification, shown as
diamonds, excludes the seizure-of-power and ethnicity variables. The second,
with square point estimates, adds the seizure-of-power variables, while the
third specification (triangles) adds the ethnicity variables. Because the
estimator is nonlinear, the estimates are not directly comparable across
variables.
In these models,
the only structural variables consistently associated with military seizures of
power are the level of development and population size: the military is less
likely to initiate a (new) dictatorship in wealthier countries, as also found
in previous research (Londregan and Poole 1990). We find no consistent
association between military seizures of power and oil income,
substantially within most countries, so we
use a country random-effects estimator. Of the 118 countries, 65 have no
variation in coup seizure, 100 have no variation in foreign seizure, and 97
have no variation in rebel seizure.
5 Ethnic exclusion and fractionalization data,
both lagged one year, are from version 3 of the Ethnic Power Relations data
(Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009).
What Do We Know
about Coups? 49
Incumbent dictatorships
Duration (log) - |
_ 2 |
|
GDP pc (log) - |
=5= |
|
Oil pc (log) - |
|
|
Population (log) - |
3=5= |
|
Civil conflict - |
|
-- 0—5--- |
Int'l conflict - |
------- 0—— |
|
Violent protest - |
|
|
|
|
|
^ Non-viol. protest - |
|
|
.g Prior democracy - |
|
-------- |
Prior military - |
|
-------- |
Growth - |
|
|
Coup - |
|
|
Rebellion - |
|
|
Foreign - |
|
|
Ethnic frac. - |
----- 4 |
|
Excluded pop. - |
|
--- A----- |
Hetero military - |
|
-- A-- |
-2-10 1 2 Coefficient estimate
o Base model □
Add seizure a Add ethnicity figure 3.1
Regime-initiating coups against incumbent dictatorships.
economic growth, civil or international
conflict, and protest, all of which have been suggested as causes of coups by
other analysts. The lack of relationship between protest and coups means that
our findings fail to support arguments that officers seize power in order to
defend the interests of economic elites threatened by popular mobilization.
Prior regime type, however, does appear to be correlated with coups:
dictatorships in countries that had earlier experienced military rule or
democracy are more likely to be ended by coups than dictatorships in countries
previously ruled by civilian dictatorships.
Next, we
consider some circumstances that might contribute to the development of
officers’ grievances against incumbent rulers. We expect the makeup of the
dictatorship’s inner circle and its relationship with military leadership to
affect the congruence of interests between rulers and officers, and thus the
likelihood of regime-change coups motivated by officers’ grievances. We use the
way the dictatorship first achieved power (coup, rebellion, foreign
50
Initiation
imposition, and nonviolent) as an indicator
of the military’s relationship to the dictatorial elite. The excluded category
of seizure includes the less violent means of achieving dictatorial power
(authoritarianization, elite rule changes, and popular uprising).
The variables
for how the dictatorship initially seized power do not vary over time within
individual dictatorships. Instead, they identify a characteristic of the
seizure group measured prior to the initiation of dictatorship. This last point
is important because the dictator cannot change this characteristic in order to
forestall coups. That is, these characteristics of the seizure group are
exogenous with respect to later attempts to prevent coups.
The coefficient
labeled “Coup” estimates the chances of a regime-change coup in year N against
dictatorships first established by coup relative to the left- out group,
dictatorships that achieved power in less violent ways. We expect military
dictators to consult more with other officers than do other dictators and to
share many of their interests. Consequently, we might expect fewer grievances
to develop in the officer corps during periods of military rule, leading to
fewer regime-change coups. On the other hand, consultation does not eliminate
factionalism or personal ambition, other causes of coups. The officer corps of
newly independent countries were especially prone to factionalism for the
reasons described later in the discussion of ethnic heterogeneity. As a result
of these cross-cutting influences, we may see no difference in coup
susceptibility between regimes initiated by coup and those initiated by less
forceful means.
In contrast, we
expect no cross-cutting influences in regimes initiated by rebellion.
Successful rebellion leads to political control by the insurgents and often the
replacement of the preexisting army by the rebel army. Consequently, the
dictatorial elite and the new army share interests, ideas, experiences, and
often friendship, which should reduce the seriousness of differences between
officers and rulers and hence officer grievances.
Foreign
imposition of dictatorship also often goes along with replacing, retraining,
and reorganizing both the military and the internal security forces of the
occupied country. These strategies aim at coup-proofing. The occupier may also
station troops in the country for some years after the formal occupation has
ended. For example, Vietnam kept troops in Cambodia for ten years after its
replacement of the Khmer Rouge government in 1979. We expect military
reorganization, improved internal security, and the stationing of foreign
troops to deter coups against foreign-imposed dictatorships.
We test these
expectations in the second model in Figure 3.1. We find that coups are unlikely
to unseat dictatorships that come to power via rebellion or foreign imposition.
The likelihood of regime-change coups in military-led dictatorships (initiated
by coup) is not statistically different from their likelihood in regimes that
came to power by more peaceful means. These results suggest an association
between officers’ grievances and regime-change coups.
Once we account
for how a dictatorship seized power, the estimates for earlier democratic
experience or military rule lose statistical significance, in part
What Do We Know about Coups?
51
because military regimes differ
systematically from other dictatorships in how they end (Geddes 1999). These
earlier regime endings are the same events used to code the current regime’s
method of power seizure. Our estimates thus suggest that some of the
explanatory power attributed by other research to earlier experience with
military rule may simply reflect the fact that researchers have yet to examine
systematically how characteristics of different autocratic seizure groups
affect the likelihood of later coups.
The final
specification in Figure 3.1 adds ethnicity variables to the model: ethnic
fractionalization of the population (ethnic fractionalization), the share of
the ethnically relevant population excluded from executive political power
(excluded), and a measure of whether the officer corps includes members of the
larger ethnic groups in the country (heterogeneous military). Ethnic fractionalization
and the exclusion of representatives of significant ethnic groups from
political influence do not correlate with military seizures of power against
dictatorships. An ethnically heterogeneous officer corps, however, is
associated with a higher likelihood of regime-change coups.
A heterogeneous
officer corps means that men from several ethnicities have enough control over
armed men to oust a government. Most colonial governments tended to recruit
soldiers from relatively underdeveloped regions, with the result that the first
officers at independence often came from one region and one or a few ethnic
groups. Political leaders at independence usually came from more developed
parts of the country, and thus from different regions and ethnicities (Horowitz
1985). When post-independence leaders took over recruitment of officers, they
usually either recruited from their own regions (to ensure officer loyalty) or
from all regions - to try to create a truly national army. This recruitment
sequence led to a post-independence officer corps that was heterogeneous but
nevertheless stratified by ethnicity. Top officers often came from one area and
lower-ranking officers from others. As a result, we see quite a few coups
carried out by junior officers from one ethnic cluster against ruling senior
officers from another. These coups reflect the grievances of junior officers
over slow promotions and their regions’ share of federal spending.
We view the
pattern of officer recruitment before and after independence as the underlying
reason for the association between regime-change coups and an ethnically mixed
officer corps. We note that coups carried out by officers from heterogeneous
armed forces were much more likely during the years when the forces of newly
independent countries still reflected colonial recruitment (z957-z974)
than afterward. Indeed, we show (in the replication files) that regime-change
coups in countries with heterogeneous militaries were most common in the first
five years of a dictatorship’s existence and quite rare afterward. This finding
adds to the evidence that officers’ grievances can motivate coups.
These empirical
tests improve on the standard model of coups by adding variables that reflect
characteristics of the autocratic leadership group that bargains with the
military, as well as characteristics of the officer corps itself.
52
Initiation
table 3.1 Area under the ROC for models of regime-change coups in dictatorships
Model |
Area under the ROC |
Structural |
°.748 |
Structural + Seizure Type |
°.771 |
Structural + Seizure Type + ethnicity |
0.776 |
As shown in Table 3.1, the model with
standard variables has an area under the ROC - a measure of in-sample
predictive power - of 0.748. Adding measures of the seizure type - a proxy for
the relationship between the incumbent ruling group and the military - improves
model accuracy, with an area under the ROC of nearly 0.771. The final model
that adds ethnic variables again increases model accuracy, with an area under
the ROC of 0.776. The difference in predictive accuracy between the first and
third models is statistically significant at the p<0.05 level, indicating a
substantial improvement in model accuracy. Equally important, the variables
that capture the relationship between the incumbent leadership group and the
military are exogenous to dictatorial attempts to retain power because they
measure a characteristic that cannot be altered after the seizure of power,
namely, how the incumbent ruling group seized power in the first place.
Figure 3.2 shows
the results from a similar series of tests that investigate the factors
associated with military coups against democratic leaders. In the baseline
model, shown as diamonds, we find that the only significant correlates of such
coups are the level of development, the Cold War (1947-1989) period, and
whether the country had experienced an earlier military intervention.6
As with coups that end dictatorships, there is no consistent association
between coups that end democracies and oil income, conflict, or protest.
Instead, the findings are consistent with those who argue that poor countries
are likely to experience coups (Londregan and Poole 1990) and that democracies
preceded by military rule are more vulnerable to coups (Cheibub 2006).
Next, we add to
the model a set of variables that measures how the democratic regime came into
existence. A large number of post-1946 democracies (31 percent) began with a
competitive election (election) held by an outgoing dictatorship. An additional
22 percent of democracies arose in the aftermath of popular uprisings
(uprising), while roughly 20 percent were formed by armed force, including
those initiated after coups (coups), rebellions, or foreign invasions
(rebel/foreign). The remainder were initiated by elite rule changes such as
suffrage expansions, which is the reference category.
6 We also find that longer-lasting democracies
are less likely to end in coups. Without modeling potential nonproportional
hazards, we cannot interpret democratic duration as “consolidation.” See Svolik
(2008) on modeling consolidation of democracy using a split-population
estimator.
What Do We Know
about Coups? 53
Incumbent democracies
Duration (log) - |
— |
|
GDP pc (log) - |
——S——- |
|
Oil pc (log) - |
- □ |
F— |
Population (log) - |
|
|
Civil conflict - |
----- — |
|
Int'l conflict - |
|
------------- |
Violent protest - |
|
O-- |
Non-viol. protest - |
|
- ;<D-- |
.n Prior military - |
|
|
^ Cold War - |
|
------- O-- |
Growth - |
|
|
Coup - |
|
|
Rebel/Foreign - |
|
|
Election - |
|
|
Uprising - |
|
|
Ethnic frac. - |
------- A--- |
|
Excluded pop. - |
|
-------- A-------- |
-2 0 2 4
Coefficient estimate
O Base model □
Add seizure A Add ethnicity figure
3.2 Coups against incumbent democracies.
We add these
variables to keep the tests as similar as possible, but we do not interpret
them the same way as in dictatorships. The events that usher in democracy often
do not determine the identity of subsequent leaders and thus do not have the
same implications for the later relationship between political leaders and
military officers. That is, when coups or popular uprisings lead to democracy,
the transitional leadership that takes power initially oversees a fair,
competitive election that chooses who rules. Elite rule changes that initiate
democracy also lead to fair, competitive elections. Since leadership during the
democratic regime is chosen in elections regardless of how the democracy was
initiated, we would not expect particular modes of initiation to be associated
with later military grievances. Foreign or rebel initiation might, however,
deter coups by reducing the likelihood that they would succeed.
Adding these
variables does not change the findings for level of development and earlier
experience with military rule. Democracies initiated after armed
54
Initiation
seizures of power by rebel groups or foreigners
are less likely to be ousted in a coup than those initiated by elite rule
changes (the reference category), though this relationship may be spurious.
One-third of the foreign-initiated democracies arose after US liberation of
Western Europe during World War II. None of the foreign-initiated democracies
later fell to a coup. This probably has more to do with the past history and
economic performance of these countries than with how democracy began.
Initiation by coup, election, or popular uprising has no effect on the
likelihood of succumbing to a later coup, as expected.
In the final
model, we add ethnicity variables: ethnic fractionalization of the population
and the share of the ethnically relevant population excluded from executive
political power. We do not have data from democracies on whether the military
is ethnically heterogeneous, so we cannot test this idea for the sample of
democracies. While ethnic fractionalization per se is not associated with
coups, ethnic political exclusion increases the likelihood of coups against
democracies.7 This suggests that the military is more likely to
intervene against incumbent democrats when executive power is not shared widely
across ethnic groups. This finding is consistent with the earlier argument that
coups are more likely when dissatisfaction with the incumbent is widespread. It
also seems likely that when a large part of the citizenry lacks representation
in the executive, many officers also lack representation, leading to
grievances.
INEQUALITY AND COUPS
In this section, we test Svolik’s (2012)
argument that threats from organized societal opposition against incumbent
dictators increase their allocations to the military, which in turn heightens
the military’s ability to seize power for itself. Officers, in this view, are
most likely to replace the incumbent regime when political elites face the
threat of “mass, organized, and potentially violent opposition” (2012, 125).
Figures 3.1 and 3.3 show the effects of violent and nonviolent protest as well
as civil conflict on regime-change coups. These coefficients are not close to
standard levels of statistical significance. These results thus fail to support
the idea that widespread popular opposition increases the likelihood of
military intervention, either directly or through the mechanism Svolik
suggests.
Svolik’s own
tests, however, use income inequality as a proxy for mass, potentially violent
opposition rather than direct measures of protest. So, our next tests assess
the effect of inequality on coups. Svolik expects popular challenges to be most
threatening at middle levels of income inequality. He then shows that middling
inequality predicts coups in a data set that combines
7 Adding seizure and ethnic variables to the
model of coups against incumbent democracies does not substantially improve the
predictive accuracy of the model, in part because the baseline model has high
in-sample predictive power, with an area under the ROC of 0.88.
What Do We Know about Coups?
Entry
Exit
Gini - Gini2-
GDP pc - Growth - Fuel exp - Trade open -
Cold war - Dem. nbr. - Ethnic frac - Int'l conflict - Civil conflict - Prior
mil. leader - Log time - Mil. leader -
--- r~
-4 -2 0 2 -4
Coefficient estimate
♦ All coups * Seizure ° Reshuffle
figure 3.3 Causes of coups in dictatorships, by coup type.
leader-shuffling and regime-change coups.
It is possible, however, that coups that initiate new dictatorships might be
caused by factors different from those associated with leader-shuffling coups,
particularly if the latter serve as a mechanism to maintain leader
accountability to other elites. Some military regimes use reshuffling coups to
replace leaders much the way parliamentary regimes rely on votes of no confidence.
We investigate the possibility that the causes of regime-change coups differ
from those of reshuffling coups in the later analysis.
To do this, we
first verify the main finding from Svolik’s analysis. The data he used
separately identify coups that result in the initiation of an individual
officer’s tenure as dictator and coups that remove a dictator from power
(meaning that reshuffling coups are included in both samples, along with
regime-change coups). We then further disaggregate his data to distinguish
regime-change coups from leader-reshuffling coups. We separate his leader-
entry coup data into two groups: (1) those that correspond to military seizures
of power, i.e. regime changes, and (2) reshuffling leadership changes in
ongoing authoritarian regimes. Roughly 47 percent of Svolik’s entry coups are
military seizures of power, while 53 percent replace leaders in ongoing
dictatorships. For coups that involve the exit of dictators, 39 percent
initiate regime transitions. The other 61 percent are leadership reshuffles
among members of
56
Initiation
the same ruling group. Altogether, the
majority of coups in these data are reshuffling coups.
Figure 3.3 shows
the results from this analysis. The left panel presents the estimates for
leader-entry coups, while the right panel depicts the estimates for leader-exit
coups.8 The top coefficient estimate (diamond shape) for each
variable comes from the specification verifying Svolik’s results, and thus
reflects data that include both regime-change and leader-shuffling coups.9
The middle estimate (triangle shape) for each examines only regime-change
coups, that is, coups that establish new autocratic regimes. The bottom
estimate (square shape) for each comes from a model that examines only
reshuffling coups.
The main
variables of interest are the Gini coefficient (i.e., inequality) and the
squared term that captures the nonlinearity in the hypothesized effect of
inequality. For both entry and exit coups, the coefficients of interest are
statistically different from zero in the verification model (top estimates,
using a sample that combines regime-change and reshuffling coups) and the model
that examines reshuffling coups only (bottom estimates). For regime-change
coups - those in which an out-of-power military faction seizes power from the
incumbent dictatorship and establishes a new autocratic regime - the estimates
for the inequality variables are small and not close to statistical
significance. Civil conflict, arguably a direct measure of “mass, organized, and
potentially violent opposition,” may reduce the likelihood of regime-change
coups rather than raising it, as claimed in Svolik’s argument, though it is not
statistically significant for coups that establish new dictatorships (entry
coups). It does not increase the likelihood of either kind of coup. Thus, we
find no support for Svolik’s argument with regard to regime-change coups.
These findings
suggest that Svolik’s empirical results depend primarily on reshuffling coups
within ongoing dictatorships. Eighty-five percent of leader- change coups occur
in military-led dictatorships, however. In other words, most of these coups
replace one military dictator with another rather than replacing a civilian
dictator with a military one, as would be expected if they reflect a transition
from rulers with a comparative advantage in cooptation to rulers with a
comparative advantage in repression, as Svolik argues.
CONCLUSION
Our findings on the causes of coups fail to
support the claim that popular mobilization in protest or rebellion increases
the likelihood of coups against
8 We drop international conflict
from the specification because there are no observations in which international
conflict occurs in the same year as a regime-change exit.
9 These reported results are not exactly the same
as those reported in Svolik (2012) because the verification file does not
include code setting the random seed for estimating a random coefficients
model using the gllamm package. For substantive purposes, however, the top
estimates we report are identical to those reported by Svolik.
What Do We Know about Coups?
57
either democratic or authoritarian
governments. Instead, our results suggest that officers are motivated by their
own interests. Coups that end democracies are less likely when the incumbent
government includes representatives of all the country’s ethnic groups,
implying that all ethnic groups represented in the officer corps are
represented as well.
Regime-change
coups that oust dictatorships are less likely when the dictatorship originally
achieved power by means of insurgency or foreign imposition. We interpret this
result as indicating that officers who share experiences, values, ideas, and
friendship (developed during the insurgency that created the regime or imposed
by foreign occupiers) with regime leaders are less likely to develop grievances
against them. We also find that ethnic heterogeneity in the army is associated
with more regime-change coups. Ethnic heterogeneity predisposes the military
to factionalism. The grievances of one ethnic faction can motivate coups
against dictatorships led by other ethnic factions. This result suggests one of
the mechanisms underlying the inability of factionalized armies to provide a
stable basis for rule, which we analyze in Chapter 5.
In the retest of
Svolik’s (2012) argument about the effect of income inequality on the
likelihood of coups, we show that his results depend on combining leader-
shuffling coups with regime-change coups. When the two kinds of coups are
looked at separately, we find that middling levels of inequality are associated
with leader-shuffling coups in ongoing dictatorships, but not with coups that
initiate new dictatorships. Leader-shuffling coups usually replace one military
dictator with another, rather than replacing civilian dictators with military
rulers, as Svolik theorized. Regime-change coups are unrelated to inequality.
The direct indicators of threatening mass opposition (protest and civil
conflict) also have no effect on the likelihood of regime-change coups. In
short, we find no support for the idea that regime-change coups are motivated,
either directly or indirectly, by elite fears of popular opposition or
redistribution.
Instead, the
variables associated with military seizures of power, especially those that end
earlier dictatorships, reflect characteristics of the officer corps and the
group of political leaders with which the military bargains. Although
theoretical models of coups have focused on this bargaining relationship, to
date there have been few empirical tests of the effects of characteristics of
the actors doing the bargaining. We show that when dictatorial leaders share
many interests and experiences with military officers - which we argue happens
more often after seizures of power by armed rebellion or foreign invasion -
their military forces are less likely to oust them.
These results
justify treating the military as an interest group and organized political
actor in its own right. In this book, we build on that result. We pay attention
to the special capacities the military can deploy and the consequences of
military organization for bargaining, both among officers and between them and
other political actors. We treat officers as motivated by their own interests.
They can ally with other groups just as any other political actor can, but they
do not routinely represent any particular societal interest.
PART II
ELITE CONSOLIDATION
4
The Effect of Elite Factionalism on Personalization
Islam Karimov, Soviet Uzbekistan’s last
Communist Party leader, remained in power after 1991, to become independent
Uzbekistan’s first dictator. The rest of the Uzbek political elite at
independence had also spent their careers in the Communist Party. There had
been no nationalist uprising in Uzbekistan. Russian-officered Soviet troops
were still stationed in the country, and the KGB managed internal security
(Collins 2006, 173). Indeed, many observers saw the Karimov regime as a simple
continuation of Communist Party rule under a new name.
Yet, even before
formal independence, Karimov had eliminated the Communist Party of Uzbekistan
(CPU) as the institutional base for the regime and taken personal control of
the security services and high-level appointments previously controlled by the
party. Karimov retained the support of most of Uzbekistan’s pre-independence
elite despite destroying the formal underpinnings of their political power
because the informal bases of their power remained intact. Regionally based
loyalty networks, usually referred to as clans, continued to structure
political bargaining and decision-making as they had during communist rule.1
When first
appointed, Karimov was weak; he was not a clan leader or an important figure in
the ruling party (Carlisle 1995, 196, 255; Collins 2006, 118-23). The most
influential Uzbek clans had consolidated their informal control during Soviet
rule by infiltrating and coopting the CPU, which enabled them to take over
party and government patronage networks along with different parts of the
state-owned economy. Gorbachev’s earlier efforts to clean up corruption and
limit clan power had failed, and he had bowed to political
1 Clans are “informal power networks mobilised to
capture the state and its resources in the interest of the members and leaders
of these networks” (Ilkhamov 2007, 70). Note the similarity between this
definition and Downs’s definition of parties as teams organized to capture
government.
6i
6 2
Elite Consolidation
necessity in appointing a new CPU general
secretary supported by the most powerful clans. Clan leaders backed Karimov
because they distrusted one another. Karimov lacked an independent power base
and needed the clan leaders’ support to retain power, so he was expected to be
responsive to their demands (Collins 2006, 122-23; Ilkhamov 2007, 74-76). Clan
leaders “thought of him as their puppet” (Carlisle 1995, 196).
When Karimov was
appointed first secretary, he “needed to demonstrate sensitivity to local elite
interests, and to maintain a balance of power amongst the various significant
clan actors ... [E]ven though [he] did not trust certain clan or regional
factions,” he incorporated “at least token members of each regional elite into
the new government” (Collins 2006, 128). He had to share the most with the clan
leader most eager to replace him, whom he appointed first as prime minister and
then as vice president (Carlisle 1995, 196, 198; Collins 2006, 129). Supporters
of the vice president dominated the Supreme Soviet.
As of early
1991, Karimov somewhat precariously controlled the CPU and government by
balancing and juggling competing clan interests. He lacked a Soviet patron, and
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was disintegrating. Karimov had to
choose political and economic strategies to “retain all the major [clan]
players in the pact” (Collins 2006, 193). One observer described his governing
style as “consensual” (Ilkhamov 2007, 75, 78).
All clans
included in the pact benefited from the regime, but they nevertheless competed
fiercely over high-level posts and the opportunities to make profits and strip
state assets that came with appointments. The clans’ mutual antagonism
provided Karimov with opportunities for power grabs at the expense of
particular clans, despite his need to maintain the support of most of them. On
the heels of the Soviet coup attempt, Karimov banned the CPU and seized its
assets, in part to reduce the resources and power of the Supreme Soviet.
Banning the party stripped many deputies of their privileged access to jobs as
members of the nomenklatura.2 He then created a new
government-support party, the National Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, led by
himself. It never controlled the resources the CPU had, however, or dominated
politics and controlled appointments. In the future, legislative nominations
would be vetted not by the party but by Karimov personally, reducing the power
of the legislature (Collins 2006, 194-95, 253, 257). Outlawing the CPU shifted
the balance of power between Karimov and others in the ruling elite sufficiently
for him to abolish the office of vice president, arrest some of the vice
president’s allies, and
2 In communist systems, high-level jobs in the
bureaucracy, party, economy, education, and military were reserved for
individuals approved by the Communist Party. The nomenklatura was the official
list of individuals, nearly all of whom were party members, who could be
appointed to jobs at different levels of importance. By ending the party,
Karimov opened recruitment for these jobs to much wider competition.
The Effect of Elite Factionalism on
Personalization
63
thus rid himself of his most threatening
supporter. Other clans did not defend those excluded or arrested.
“The result of
[Karimov’s] policies from 1990 through 1993 was the gradual transformation from
a communist regime to an autocratic one, in which power belonged not to a
hegemonic party, but to Karimov himself and the clique of clan elites who
surrounded him” (Collins 2006, 198). A feature of the postSoviet context that
aided Karimov’s power grab is that he was not threatened militarily. The clans
had not penetrated the military stationed in Uzbekistan or the KGB because
Russians controlled both, and none of the clans had its own militia.
In the wake of
the Soviet coup attempt, Karimov increased his control of security forces. He
shifted resources to the presidential guard and the Committee for Defense,
which he had created a few months before to counterbalance the Soviet troops
stationed in Uzbekistan. He also put Soviet military forces under the highest-ranking
Uzbek officer’s command (Collins 2006, 162) and appointed a close ally from his
own clan to lead the internal security agency. From then on, Karimov kept the
presidential guard, army, and internal security agency “under his close
supervision and control” (Collins 2006, 274).
Through the
early 1990s, Karimov continued juggling multiple clan supporters, mostly by
distributing state-controlled economic opportunities among them. “[W]ith a
tenuous political pact supporting him, Karimov had no choice but to engage in a
negotiating process with various factions” (Collins 2006, 257). On the civilian
side, he used his “political budget,” funded largely by the export of cotton,
gold, and oil along with the drug trade, to secure support (Collins 2006, 262-67;
De Waal 2015). In contrast to the dictators described by De Waal (2015),
however, he had a near-monopoly on the means of violence. Members of Karimov’s
clan staffed the internal security agency. In the military, Russian officers
were purged and usually returned to Russia, while politically motivated
promotions and dismissals solidified the loyalties of Uzbek officers (Collins
2006, 274).
In the
mid-1990s, Karimov began incrementally eliminating some of his erstwhile allies
from the inner circle. “Gradually, he consolidated power under his personal
control and loosened his dependence on his previous allies and partners”
(Ilkhamov 2007, 76). For example, the all-important head of cadre policy, a
representative of one of the most powerful clans, was arrested in 1994. Karimov
transferred the head of the Uzbek KGB, a man from his own clan, to a less
important post in 1995, and created a second security service so that the two
could report on each other (Collins 2006, 263).
Nevertheless,
most clans continued to support Karimov in exchange for the vast economic
opportunities made possible by continued state ownership of much of the
economy. The Jurabekov clan linked to Samarkand, for example, controlled oil
and gas, many of the bazaars, and the cotton complex. The Alimov clan from
Tashkent controlled much of the banking system, the Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations, the tax inspectorate, the general procurator,
64
Elite Consolidation
a share of the dollar trade, and most
import-export businesses. Less powerful clans controlled less, and a few were
entirely excluded (Collins 2006, 264-68). The monopoly rents, black market
currency dealing, asset stripping, and widespread corruption facilitated by
clan control of the economy, however, led to slow growth, increased poverty,
and rising inequality.
By the late
1990s Karimov was “locked in an ongoing struggle to maintain and increase his
own personal autocratic control and to hold together powerful regional and clan
elites without allowing them to strip the state of its capacity to survive”
(Collins 2006, 170). He dismissed or demoted the prime minister, defense
minister, and several members of the inner circle from the Ferghana network
without political consequences. In 1998, Karimov dismissed Jurabekov, Uzbekistan’s
most powerful clan leader, along with many other members of his network. A few
months later, however, Karimov reinstated Jurabekov after an assassination
attempt attributed to him (Collins 2006, 170-71).3 Though Karimov
narrowly escaped assassination, the attempt demonstrated the Jurabekov clan’s
credible threat to oust the dictator if he failed to share with them, and he
promptly reinstated them. However, the other clans did not make similarly
credible threats and therefore could not prevent power grabbing at their
expense.
As Karimov
excluded important members of the original inner circle from office and
benefits, members of his own family took control of key sectors of the economy.
“Step by step, the major export resources were concentrated in the hands of the
central government, under the President’s personal control” (Ilkhamov 2007,
76). By the early 2000s, the family controlled the major state telecoms
company, gold mining, and part of the oil business (Collins 2006, 170-71). In
2006, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported that Karimov had “chip[ped] away
at the political and economic might of some of Uzbekistan’s most influential
clans.” Jurabekov was dismissed once more in 2004 and accused of corruption.
This time he did not return to the inner circle. The defense minister was
forced to resign in 2005 and tried for corruption and abuse of office. About
200 families had grown very rich under Karimov’s original system of power
sharing, but the circle of beneficiaries became smaller and smaller in the
2000s, as it narrowed to not much more than the Karimov family.4
Until his
natural death in 2016, Karimov remained “a master at maneuvering among the
various clans in Uzbekistan and playing them off one another” (Panier 2016). He
retained control by balancing the clans, allowing no single one to become too
powerful, and rotating ministers, governors, and other
3 “Analysis: Uzbek Eminence Falls from Grace,”
2005, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (February 22), www.rferl.org/a71057594.html;
“Uzbekistan: Islam Karimov vs. the Clans,” 2005, RFE/RL (April 22), www.rferl.org/a/i0586ii.html.
4 “Uzbekistan: Karimov Appears
to Have Political Clans Firmly in Hand,” 2006, RFE/RL (August 3i), www.rferl.org/a/i070977.html.
The Effect of Elite Factionalism on
Personalization
65
appointments frequently to prevent
officials from building their own support networks from which to challenge him
(Saidazimova 2005; Ilkhamov 2007, 77; Panier 2016). Nevertheless, “[c]ompeting
regional and clan factions trusted Karimov more than they trusted each other,
and hence preferred to have him at the center” (Collins 2006, 261).
Uzbekistan’s experience raises the
question: How can a political leader who seemed entirely dependent on the
support of his country’s most powerful political forces concentrate power at
their expense and without forfeiting their support? In this chapter, we explain
how this happens. We show how factionalism in the ruling group - in
Uzbekistan, their division into multiple competing clans - undermines power
sharing and thus facilitates the emergence of one- man rule. This happens for
two reasons. First, disunited ruling groups have difficulty making credible
threats to oust the dictator and therefore cannot constrain him. And second,
most members of the support group remain willing to support the dictator even
when he unilaterally reduces their access to benefits because they are still
better off inside the inner circle than excluded from it. In contrast, a united
seizure group can constrain the dictator’s ability to concentrate power, as
well as his policy and distributive discretion, because they can make credible
threats to oust him if he fails to share.
The chapter
begins with an overview of how bargaining works in dictatorships. It describes
the central dilemma of new dictatorships: the colossal control problem caused
by handing dictatorial power to one member of the ruling group. It explains our
theory of how this problem affects bargaining between dictators and other
members of the dictatorial elite and describes the central interests of both.
The second half
of the chapter shows how preexisting characteristics of the seizure group
affect its ability to make enforceable bargains with the new dictator. The
dictator has little need to share or consult with his closest supporters if
preexisting factions facilitate bargaining with them separately, as Karimov
could with clan leaders. Bargaining separately induces competition among
faction leaders, which drives down the price dictators have to pay for support.
Based on these insights, we generate expectations about conditions that
facilitate the concentration of power in the hands of one man, which we call
“personalism.” We then explain how these informal bargaining relationships,
established during the dictatorship’s first years, can become sticky over time.
Last, we test these ideas using new data and show evidence consistent with our
arguments.
ELITE BARGAINING IN DICTATORSHIPS
In autocracies, a small number of regime
insiders, usually acting in private under informal rules, hammer out key
decisions about leadership and policy directions even in regimes with stable,
well-developed formal institutions.
66
Elite Consolidation
The influence and authority of members of
the dictatorial elite may be renegotiated frequently during the early years
and subject to arbitrary and violent change. Dictatorial elites may ignore
formal rules and institutions if they obstruct the drive to amass power. Losers
in policy debates may be excluded from the inner circle, demoted, arrested, or
even executed. Life in a dictatorial elite is thus insecure, dangerous, and
frightening. Informal procedures may become institutionalized over time,
meaning that they become both more predictable and costly to change, but for
the first months or years after an autocratic seizure of power, bargaining
within the dictatorial elite often occurs in an environment of contested,
changing, and nonbinding institutions (Svolik 2012).
When making
decisions about policy, leadership, and institutional choice, the dictator and
members of his inner circle take into account expected effects of the choice on
regime survival, but also how decisions may affect their individual power,
influence, and access to resources. Members of dictatorial elites live in grim,
dog-eat-dog worlds. Taking one policy position can provide the opportunity to
take a bite out of another dog, while taking a different one could incite the
pack to tear you apart. Autocratic policy makers, like democratic ones, may
care deeply about the substance of policy, but they cannot afford to ignore how
their decisions will affect regime survival and their personal survival as
well.
To explain these
decisions, we focus initially on the interests of members of the seizure group.
Because the members of groups never share exactly the same interests, our
theory begins with strategic interactions among them. We do not assume that
seizure groups, or the regime elites that derive from them, are unitary actors
because the empirical record shows that discipline among them is imperfect. How
much discipline they can maintain requires empirical investigation.
Consequently, neither the dictatorship’s inner circle as a whole nor any subset
of it larger than one member should be assumed to behave as a unitary actor.
We do assume
that members of the dictatorship’s inner circle want to maintain the
dictatorship, which they expect to further their policy goals, as well as
provide opportunities for personal advancement and often enrichment. However,
they also want to increase their personal share of power relative to others in
the inner circle. They must compete with each other for power, not only to
improve their standing in the inner circle or their access to wealth, but also
to maintain their current positions against lower-ranked regime supporters
striving to replace them in the inner circle. An increase in power for one
member of the inner circle comes at the expense of someone else. We see power
as a rank ordering based on politically relevant resources, understood by
insiders even when not perceptible to observers. One insider cannot move up the
rank order without displacing someone else.
Because of the
intense competition within the inner circle, we expect the dictatorship’s most
powerful decision makers to consider how all policy, appointment, and
institutional choices might affect their own standing, as well
The Effect of Elite Factionalism on
Personalization
67
as regime maintenance. The creation of new
formal institutions benefits the individuals who will lead them and those who
will work in new agencies associated with their implementation. Policy choices
also often entail the creation of new agencies, which, again, benefits those
chosen to lead and work in them. Policies also have distributional consequences
that advantage some and disadvantage others. They thus affect the welfare of
the constituents of inner circle members differently. Consequently, we expect
inner-circle members to favor policies and institutions that both improve their
own place in the hierarchy and increase the likelihood of regime survival.
However, both are impossible for everyone in the inner circle since any change
that increases the powers of one member decreases those of others. Bargaining
over policy thus has a noncooperative dimension, and strategic considerations
often affect substantive policy choices (just as in democracies).
In other words,
the dictator and inner circle engage simultaneously in two kinds of strategic
interaction: (1) a cooperative effort aimed at keeping all of them (the regime)
in power and (2) noncooperative interactions in which different
members/factions seek to enhance their own power and resources at the expense
of others in the inner circle. Each individual strives to amass resources and
capacities up to the point at which his efforts would destabilize the regime or
lead to his own exclusion from the inner circle.
The dictator has
a resource advantage because he has the most direct access to state revenues
and an information advantage because he has access to the reports of all
internal security services. Nevertheless, the dictator faces the same dilemma
as other members of the inner circle: he wants to extend and consolidate his
control up to the point at which other members of the inner circle would take
the risk of trying to oust him. The struggle over the distribution of power in
a new dictatorship can transform the seizure group from the cooperative
near-equals who had plotted the fall of the old regime into competitors in a
vicious struggle for survival and dominance.
We see these
incentives as common to all dictatorships, but they play out in different ways,
depending on concrete characteristics of the seizure group that pre-date the
installation of the dictatorship. We argue that preexisting differences among
the groups that initiate dictatorship lead to post-seizure differences in what
kinds of individuals with what interests become members of the dictatorial
inner circle, how the inner circle makes decisions, which policies and
institutions they choose, how they seek to attract members of society as
allies, and how they respond to opposition. Preexisting characteristics of the
seizure group do not determine everything that happens over the course of a
dictatorship, but they do affect the likelihood that regimes will display
specific, often long-lasting, patterns of behavior. The institutions chosen by
dictatorial elites after they take power also have consequences for subsequent
bargaining and the way dictatorships break down. That is their purpose, after
all. Preexisting characteristics of the seizure group, however, influence the
choice of these institutions.
68
Elite Consolidation
We thus share
with Svolik (2012) the view that all dictatorships face certain dilemmas, such
as the dictator’s temptation to grab more power than his supporters want to
delegate, but we emphasize that these dilemmas can have different outcomes,
depending on characteristics of the seizure group that affect the bargaining
power of different members of the group. In this chapter, we explain how one
preexisting feature of seizure groups, their position on a continuum from
factionalism to unity, affects authoritarian politics.
We provide
greater detail in the sections that follow, beginning with the first decision
seizure groups confront: selection of a leader.
HANDING POWER TO A LEADER
In order to govern, seizure groups must
choose a leader (dictator).5 They need a leader to speak on behalf
of the new government, represent it to the populace and foreign actors,
organize the implementation of policies made by the group, coordinate their
activities across agencies and levels of government, mediate conflicts within
the inner circle, act in emergencies, and make final decisions when opinions in
the group are divided. The point of choosing a leader is to achieve the goals
of the group. However, the delegation of the powers needed to fulfill these
responsibilities in the largely institution-free setting of early dictatorship
causes the interests of the dictator to diverge from those of his closest
allies. While the dictator hopes to defang his allies’ threats to oust him if
he disregards their interests, they seek to hold the new dictator in check.
This happens regardless of whether the dictator and his allies come from the
same ethnic or other close-knit group. This divergence of interests creates the
colossal problem of how to control a leader with dictatorial powers.
When the seizure
group delegates powers to a leader, it does not intend to give him the capacity
to choose policies most of them oppose, unilaterally exclude from the inner
circle individuals who helped seize power, or dismiss, jail, or kill
seizure-group members, their allies, and family members. These are highly
visible depredations on the ruling group. The absence of binding limits and
institutional checks on the dictator, however, mean that only credible threats
to oust the dictator deter him from reneging on agreements and abusing his
supporters (Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2012).
The dictatorial
elite cannot costlessly dismiss the dictator. On the contrary, efforts to oust
a dictator always involve a high risk of failure, followed by nearcertain
exclusion from the ruling group and possible exile, imprisonment, torture,
and/or execution. And yet the dictatorial elite can limit the dictator’s
5 Literal leadership choice often occurs before
the seizure of power. Regardless of the timing of original leadership choice,
after the seizure of power groups “choose” leaders in the sense that if the
support of enough members were withdrawn, the leader could not retain his
position (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).
The Effect of Elite Factionalism on
Personalization
69
depredations only if they can credibly
commit to ousting him if he seizes more power or resources than they have
agreed to transfer.
Seizure groups
should anticipate the possibility that the man chosen to lead could escape
their control, since the dictator cannot make credible promises not to use his
powers. Before they take power, some seizure groups try to hem in the dictator
by making rules about who should help him make policy, how these lieutenants
should be chosen, the periodic rotation of leadership, and how they will handle
succession. When plotters come from professionalized militaries, which tend to
be legalistic and rule-bound, they may negotiate quite detailed arrangements
for term limits and consultation over policy choice within the officer corps
(Fontana 1987). These rules can be enforced at the time they are agreed to
because power is dispersed within the group. The man who wants to be leader
must agree to power-sharing arrangements such as regular consultation or term limits
in exchange for the support of other members of the seizure group.
Most dictators,
like Karimov, are weak the day they become regime leader. Karimov needed
support initially from several clan leaders and the Communist Party to stay in
power, and thus had to distribute state offices and the resources they
controlled among them. Military dictators are sometimes weak because they have
had to retire from active duty, and thus give up the ability to control others’
promotions, postings, and retirements, in order to secure the support of others
in the junta for their appointment as leader.
Bargains made
when the dictator is weak, however, last only as long as they are
self-enforcing because of the lack of third-party enforcement institutions in
dictatorships (Barzel 2002, 257; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005, 429;
Svolik 2012). The initiation of dictatorship creates immediate opportunities
for changing the relative distribution of power within the seizure group.
History is replete with examples of men who were invited to lead by plotters
who believed they would be malleable figureheads, but who quickly marginalized
and sometimes killed those who had expected to call the shots. Plotters
sometimes consciously choose an individual considered uncharismatic and
legalistic to reduce the likelihood of future concentration of power in his
hands. It has been reported that Chilean plotters chose General Augusto
Pinochet, a latecomer to the coup conspiracy, for that reason. He was quick to
concentrate power in his own hands, however. Other examples include Major
Mathieu Kerekou, who was invited by even more junior coup plotters to lead the
1972 seizure of power in Benin. Within three years, he had excluded the
original plotters from government, apparently killing one and jailing several
others (Decalo 1979; Allen 1988). After the 1975 coup in Bangladesh, junior
officers and ex-officers released General Mohammad Zia ul-Hak from jail and
appointed him Chief Martial Law Administrator because they feared the rest of
the army would not acquiesce in the coup if a junior officer was appointed. Zia
quickly excluded them from the ruling group, arrested those who tried to oust
him for violating their initial bargain, and executed their leaders for treason
(Codron 2007, 12-13).
70
Elite Consolidation
This problem is
not limited to military seizure groups. Malawi’s Hastings Banda, recruited as a
presidential candidate by young civilian nationalists, not only excluded his
youthful colleagues but quickly transformed the elected government he led into
a highly repressive autocracy. Banda, a doctor who had been working outside the
country for more than twenty years, was invited to lead by young independence
leaders who “assumed he could not conceivably harbor any long-term political ambitions”
(Decalo 1998, 59). After the founding election, he dismissed his young allies
from their cabinet posts, forced them into exile, and purged the ruling party
of anyone suspected of challenging his “unfettered personal rule” (Decalo 1998,
64), which then lasted for more than thirty years.6
The frequency of
this sequence of events suggests that control of the state, even as rudimentary
a state as Malawi’s at independence, gives the paramount leader a resource
advantage over his erstwhile colleagues. The new dictator finds himself “almost
immediately in command of all the financial and administrative resources of
the state” (Tripp 2007, 143). Becoming head of state gives the new dictator
access to revenues - especially from taxes, the export of natural resources,
and foreign aid - far greater than he has had before and greater than other
members of the seizure group can command. This control endows the new dictator
with agenda-setting power when it comes to policymaking and distributive
decisions. Revenues can be shared with the inner circle or spent by the
dictator to buy personal support and security. Further, access to state
revenues gives the dictator substantial control over appointments to state
offices, which he can use to bring loyalists into decision-making positions and
to create state agencies to pursue goals not shared by the rest of the seizure
group.
These revenues
can enable the dictator to outmaneuver his allies. In some circumstances, he
can buy the support of some members of the inner circle for the exclusion of
others. He may even be able to buy their support for changes that further
enhance his power at the expense of theirs. In short, a dictator who was first
among equals on the day he was chosen has substantial potential to grab additional
resources and power later.
We refer to
dictatorships in which the leader has concentrated power at the expense of his
closest supporters as personalist. The defining feature of person- alist
dictatorship is that the dictator has personal discretion and control over the
key levers of power in his political system. Key levers of power include the
unfettered ability to appoint, promote, and dismiss high-level officers and
6 Of course, the respectable senior leader does
not always win these power struggles. General Naguib, invited by the youthful
Free Officers to lead the government that would replace the Egyptian monarchy,
was ousted two years later by Colonel Nasser, the plotters’ original leader
(Haddad 1973, 11-42). Regardless of who eventually emerges on top, however,
these are examples of why struggles for power within the dictator’s inner
circle often begin soon after seizures of power.
The Effect of Elite Factionalism on
Personalization
71
officials, and thus to control the
agencies, economic enterprises, and armed forces the appointees lead. In such
regimes, the dictator’s choices are relatively unconstrained by the
institutions that can act as veto players in other dictatorships, especially
the military high command and the ruling party executive committee. Personalist
dictators juggle, manipulate, and divide and rule other powerful political
actors. Like all dictators, they need some support, but they can choose from
among competing factions which ones can join or remain in the ruling elite at
any particular time.7 Personalist dictators are thus powerful
relative to other members of the elite, but not necessarily relative to society
or to international actors.
Islam Karimov’s
rule exemplified personalism, especially in later years. His control of Uzbekistan’s
political system derived from his appointment powers. Initially, he had to
bargain with several clan leaders over the composition of his government and
the control of all important state-owned enterprises and government agencies.
Over time, however, he achieved much greater personal discretion over
appointments, and most important clans continued supporting him despite losing
some of their influence and access to income.
We argue that
discretion such as Karimov’s arises from the dictator’s ability to bargain
separately with supporters, to play them off against each other, to ally with
some in order to damage or exclude others, and to bring previously excluded
groups into the dictatorial inner circle in order to tip the balance of power
in his favor when needed. The concentrated power wielded by person- alist
leaders is thus not absolute but rather depends on the dictator’s ability to
use a changeable divide-and-rule strategy against supporters who could control
or overthrow him if they could unite. The description of Yemen’s Ali Abdullah
Saleh as “dancing on the heads of snakes” captures this understanding of the
personalist dictator as not necessarily the deadliest member of the ruling
coalition but rather the one who can stay aloft by pitting some factions
against others in an ever-changing balancing act (Clark 2010).
Personalism can
rise and fall during a single dictator’s tenure, for reasons we describe later.
(The data we use to measure personalism are coded yearly to capture these
within-ruler and within-regime changes. They thus differ from our older
regime-type coding, which could not capture these real-world variations.)
7 Some definitions of personalism emphasize
informal alliances between the dictator and leaders of ethnic or other kinds of
groups and personal loyalties maintained through patronage networks (e.g.,
Roessler 2016). We put less emphasis on informality for two reasons. First,
personalist dictators distribute formal offices in government, the ruling
party, and the military to their elite supporters. The bargains that keep the
ruling group together could not be maintained without access to state revenues,
and even rudimentary states have formal governing structures that provide the
resources that hold alliances together. Second, personalized relationships and
bargaining can occur within formal institutions such as ruling parties. For
example, Stalin had nearly full discretion over appointments and
decision-making during the last decade of his life, but most of those decisions
were made in party committees and implemented by party cadres.
72
Elite Consolidation
The Dictator’s Interests
Since achieving the post of dictator
requires great effort (as well as quite a bit of luck), we can infer that those
who achieve it wanted it. Regardless of whether the job lives up to
expectations, the danger inherent in giving it up predisposes dictators to try
to hang on to power. Twenty percent of dictators are jailed or killed within
the first year after losing office, while another fifth flee their native
countries to avoid such consequences.8
Dictators must
fear their closest allies. Their careers can end in two ways other than natural
death: the overthrow of the regime or the ouster of the dictator despite regime
continuity. Members of dictatorial inner circles often lead ousters even when
they also involve popular mobilization. Figure 4.1 shows the frequency of the
various events that end dictatorial regimes, a subject we return to in Chapter
8. More dictatorships end in coups, that is, overthrows by the officers who
were entrusted to defend them, than in other ways. Formerly powerful members of
inner circles, however, have also led many popular uprisings and opposition
election campaigns, the other common ways that autocracies end.
Only about half
of dictator ousters accompany regime failures (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz
2014). The rest of the time, dictators are replaced but the regime survives.
Regime insiders cause nearly all dictator replacements in surviving
autocracies. Coups cause about a quarter of these. Eighty-five percent of such
leader-shuffling coups replace one military dictator with another. Deaths,
party decisions, and term limits enforced by the dictatorial inner circle
account for most of the remaining three-quarters of dictator replacements in
80
60
40
20
0
|
||
|
38 |
|
|
|
|
5
Rule change Election Uprising Coup
Rebellion Foreign
figure 4.1 Frequency of events that end dictatorships.
Note: Election includes those in which
incumbents lose or do not run.
Failed state
77
59
10
8 Calculated from Archigos data.
The Effect of Elite Factionalism on
Personalization
73
ongoing regimes. It is rare for popular
action to oust a dictator without ending the dictatorship as well.
These basic
facts about dictator ousters reveal the potential threat to the dictator posed
by members of the inner circle (Svolik 2012; Roessler 2016). This threat gives
the dictator an interest in closely scrutinizing his allies’ activities and
dismissing, jailing, or killing them if he begins to suspect their loyalty. The
dictator’s interest in limiting threats from the inner circle implies that
members of the dictator’s support coalition today cannot count on being
included in it tomorrow.9
To sum up, the
average dictator has good reasons for wanting to retain power since he cannot
count on a safe, affluent retirement if he steps down. Nor can he count on his
family being left in peace and prosperity. The individuals most likely to be
able to oust him are members of his inner circle. The dictator thus needs their
support. Because promises can never be completely credible, however, the
dictator has reason to spy on his allies to try to assess whether they are
plotting behind his back. The dictator has every reason to try to build his own
political resources at the expense of his allies, as he can never fully trust
them. In other words, he has strong reasons to violate the implicit leadership
contract by aggrandizing his own power.
The Interests of Other
Members of the Inner Circle
Exclusion from the dictator’s inner circle
can result in execution, torture, long imprisonment, property confiscation,
exile, and poverty. Family members may have to bear these costs along with the
target of the dictator’s suspicions. Consequently, constraining the dictator’s
ability to exclude members from the inner circle ranks at the top of its
members’ goals. Members of the inner circle also want to influence policy
choices and build their own clientele networks, which are needed to secure
their influence and acquire wealth. Some of them yearn to supplant the
dictator. To accomplish these goals, they need to retain influence on decision
making, and they need to obtain posts and promotions that entail both some
policy discretion and the ability to hire, promote, and do favors for others.
The opportunities available to members of the inner circle vary with the kind
of posts they occupy.
The members of
the dictator’s inner circle thus have strong reasons to want to maintain
collegiality in decision-making and the dispersion of resources within the
group, rather than allowing the dictator to usurp policy discretion and control
over top appointments. These aims give members of the dictator’s inner circle
good reasons to create institutions that enforce constraints on the dictator,
and thus to prefer some institutional arrangements to others.
For example,
members of the inner circle may demand term limits for the leader as a way of
both limiting his ability to amass powers over time and
9 This statement of the
dictator’s interests thus conflicts with a central feature of the model
proposed by Bueno de Mesquita et al.
(2003).
74
Elite Consolidation
increasing their own chances of occupying
the top post in the future. In dictatorships led by a military officer, other
officers in the inner circle also want him to retire from active duty, which
establishes the credibility of his commitment not to use control over their
promotions, retirement, and postings to concentrate power at their expense
(Arriagada 1988; Remmer 1991). If the dictatorship is organized by a ruling
party, members of the inner circle want party procedures for choosing its
executive committee (politburo, standing committee) to be followed in spirit
not just letter; they do not want the dictator personally to choose members of
the party’s decision-making body since that would mean that he can exclude
anyone who might disagree with him.
Members of the
inner circle also favor an institutional arrangement that limits the dictator’s
personal control over internal security forces. Preventing the dictator from
gaining personal control over the internal security apparatus is important to
the welfare of members of the inner circle. If a dictator controls the security
police, he cannot credibly commit not to use it against his allies.
Conflict over
the distribution of power between dictators and their supporters afflicts all
new dictatorships. Many of the power struggles during the first months and
years of dictatorship can be understood as efforts by the inner circle to
control the dictator, efforts by the dictator to escape control, and efforts by
both to institutionalize the relationship in order to reduce potentially
regime-destabilizing conflict between them.
In this
environment, everyone’s actions are somewhat unpredictable, prompting both the
dictator and his lieutenants to remain on guard and trigger-happy. Furthermore,
the unreliability of information increases the likelihood of misinterpreting
the actions of others, opening the way to paranoia. Despite his information
advantage over others in the inner circle, the dictator’s information about
what they really think and what they may be planning remains limited and
unreliable (Wintrobe 1998). For all these reasons, early periods in
dictatorships tend to be unstable, conflictual, and sometimes bloody.
BARGAINING OVER THE DISTRIBUTION OF
RESOURCES AND POWER
Earlier studies have emphasized the
importance of whether the dictator can credibly commit to fulfill promises he
makes (e.g., Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2012; Boix and Svolik 2013). Less attention
has been paid to how much spoils and power the dictator really needs to share
with his closest allies to retain their support. Here we ask: Assuming the
dictator could credibly commit to sharing power, how much does he need to
share? That is, how much power sharing does his personal survival require?
A dictator can
reduce the amount he shares in two main ways: by reducing the number of
supporters with whom he shares spoils and influence and by reducing
The Effect of Elite Factionalism on
Personalization
75
the amount of power or influence he shares
without decreasing the number of supporters. These two strategies often go
together. Reducing the number of groups represented in the inner circle, and
thus reducing the benefits received by the constituencies they represent, is
easier for outsiders to observe than reductions in influence while the
individuals who have lost some power remain part of the dictatorial elite. We
discuss reducing the size of the ruling coalition first.
Seizure groups
are often large when they take power. At the time of a coup, for example, many
members of the officer corps must acquiesce in the seizure for it to succeed,
even if they do not actively support it; “authoritarianization” can occur only
after a party has attracted the support of most citizens in an election. A
dictator may not need all this support to survive, however, because some
members of the seizure group may lack the means to oust him.10 This
means that the inner-circle members linked to some constituencies can be safely
shed, and the dictator can keep their “share” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).
Bargaining
between the dictator and others in the inner circle over the distribution of
power and spoils begins when the dictator decides whether to stick to
arrangements initially agreed to or renege on the implicit or explicit
commitment to share and consult. The dictator controls some amount of goods and
powers that both he and other members of the inner circle value highly. These
can include access to material goods, such as the revenues from state- owned
natural resources, as well as control over various aspects of policy and the
choice of personnel to fill high and low offices. These goods are valuable,
both to have and to dole out to clients. The dictator makes an initial decision
about how to distribute these goods to best secure the adherence of needed
supporters. His lieutenants expect to be consulted about these decisions and to
receive a share, but their expectations may not be enforceable.
The dictator’s
agenda-setting power gives him an advantage over those who can only react to
proposals (Baron and Ferejohn 1989). Those whose only options are to accept or
reject distributive proposals must make decisions about whether to continue
supporting the dictator - based on a comparison between what the dictator
offers and what they expect to receive if they withdraw from the ruling group.
Once the dictator has demonstrated the way he intends to handle the resources
he controls, other members of the inner circle can acquiesce in the distribution
he proposes or contest it. If they could replace the dictator, they might do
much better, but if they see the choice as lying between acceptance of what the
dictator offers and exclusion from the ruling coalition (the consequence of
rejecting the offer), they would be better off accepting even quite a small
amount in exchange for their continued support. This logic leads to the
counterintuitive conclusion that members of dictatorial elites may continue to
support the dictator even if they receive only a little in return.
10 Thus we focus here on the
groups Roessler (2016) does not consider, those that it is safe to exclude
precisely because they cannot threaten the dictator with overthrow.
76
Elite Consolidation
The capacity of
the dictator’s allies to influence his distribution decisions (enforce their
expectations) depends on the credibility of their threats to oust him. The
dictator can always be removed by the united action of other elites. Sometimes
he can be removed by small groups of them. Trying to remove dictators is risky,
however, and no one plotting such a course can count on success. Terrible
consequences can follow the discovery of plots. As a result, fewer allies plot
than are dissatisfied with their share. The dictator thus reaps an additional
bargaining advantage from the riskiness of plots. The more unlikely a plot’s
success, the larger share a dictator can keep.
To summarize
these points, all dictators need some support, which they must reward, but they
need to offer only enough to maintain the minimum coalition required to stay in
power. The other original members of the seizure group, and the parts of its
larger support coalition associated with them, can be excluded without
endangering the regime. There is a strong incentive to exclude them because the
dictator can then keep their “share” or give it to others whose support he
needs more. Remaining inner-circle members want to share spoils and power, but
they still have little bargaining power besides the threat to replace the dictator.
These conditions mean that the dictator can often get away with keeping the
lion’s share for himself, just as the proposer in standard legislative
bargaining games can (Baron and Ferejohn 1989).
This logic thus
makes clear why members of authoritarian coalitions often acquiesce in the
concentration of power and resources in the hands of dictators. Note that
although Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) result does not fit empirical reality in
democratic legislatures very well - that is, prime ministers do not generally
keep the lion’s share of resources - it is eerily similar to the reality of
conspicuous consumption and Swiss bank accounts enjoyed by many dictators.
CHARACTERISTICS THAT INFLUENCE THE
CREDIBILITY OF THREATS TO OUST THE DICTATOR
So far we have treated members of the
dictator’s inner circle as separate individual actors. A real inner circle
might resemble this image if, for example, the leaders of multiple clans,
parties, or ethnic groups, who had cooperated to throw out a previous regime or
colonial power, formed the new ruling group. Militaries riven by ethnic,
ideological, or personal factions may also contain many faction leaders who
bargain individually rather than being subsumed in a single unified military
bargainer. Parties colonized by clans, as in Uzbekistan, can also contain
multiple faction leaders who bargain individually on behalf of their members.
So can recently organized parties formed by coopting the leaders of older rival
parties. In these circumstances, the dictator does in fact bargain with
multiple separate actors, and threats to oust him are less credible because of
the high risk of plots involving single factions and the difficulty of
The Effect of Elite Factionalism on
Personalization
77
uniting the factions for joint action. As a
result, the dictator can often concentrate resources and power in his own
hands, as Karimov did.
Preexisting
discipline and unity within the seizure group - from which the dictatorial
inner circle is chosen - tilt post-seizure bargaining against the dictator,
however. Internally cohesive seizure groups can bargain as something close to
unitary actors over issues such as limitations on the dictator’s personal
discretion. They also face fewer collective action problems when it comes to
organizing the dictator’s overthrow. Disciplined unity develops in professionalized
militaries and parties formed as “organizational weapons”11 because
these institutions transparently link individuals’ future career success to
obedience to superior officers or the party line. Officers are punished or
dismissed for disobeying senior officers, thus ending their careers and
livelihoods. In disciplined parties, ordinary party members can be excluded
for criticizing the party line, and elected deputies who vote against it may be
expelled from the party and lose their seats. Such incentives are needed to
maintain unity within groups.
Many armies and
ruling parties lack this degree of internal discipline. In armies factionalized
by ethnic, partisan, or personal loyalties, officers’ career prospects depend
on their faction leaders’ success in achieving promotions and access to other
opportunities. In such a military, lower-ranked officers cannot be counted on
to obey the orders of higher-ranked officers from rival factions. In parties
that have achieved dominance by persuading the leaders of other parties to
“cross the aisle” in return for jobs and other spoils, discipline also tends to
be low. A party history of incorporating most major political interests into
one party tends to result in party factionalization based on ethnicity, region,
policy position, or personal loyalties.
Where dictators
have to bargain with an inner circle drawn from a unified and disciplined party
or military, the threat of ouster is more credible and the price of support
higher. Dictators in this situation face groups that, like labor unions, can
drive harder bargains than the individuals in them could drive separately
(Frantz and Ezrow 2011). In these circumstances, dictators usually find it
expedient to consult with other officers or the party executive committee and
distribute resources broadly within the support group.12 In short,
the prior organization, unity, and discipline of seizure groups give dictators
reason to maintain power-sharing arrangements with members of the inner circle.
11 Selznick’s (1952) term for
communist parties characterized by “democratic” centralism and extreme
discipline.
12 In a bargaining model, commitment by the
seizure group to make decisions as a unitary actor turns the negotiation
between the dictator and his allies into a two-person game. In two-person games
where exclusion from the game is not possible without ending the game (that is,
the dictator cannot retain power if the unified support group turns on him or
if he excludes them) and the cost of bargaining is the same for both players,
the division of the pie will be equal (Rubinstein 1982).
78
Elite Consolidation
If the original
seizure group includes both a disciplined group and some additional allies,
supporters affiliated with more disorganized groups pose weaker threats to the
dictator and are thus less risky to exclude. As an example of this process,
within months of the Sandinista rebels’ victory over the forces of Nicaraguan
dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle in 1979, they had eliminated the democratic
reformist (non-Sandinista) members of the broad coalition that supported the
revolution (Gorman 1981, 138-42). Cold War observers noted that when broadly
based coalitions that included a well-organized Marxist party ousted a
government, the non-Marxist members of the coalition were shed soon after power
was secured. The special perfidy of Marxist parties does not explain this
phenomenon, however. It arises from the logic of the post-seizure situation.
Military coup makers and well-organized non-Marxist parties also excluded their
less unified and unneeded supporters once they had secured power. Non-Ba’thist
officers from the intensely factionalized Iraqi military, for example, led the
1968 coup, supported by the Ba’th Party. To try to stabilize power sharing
between these groups, the plotters chose a Ba’thist president (regime leader),
and the non-Ba’thist coup leaders got prime minister, minister of defense, and
command of the Republican Guard. Within less than two weeks, however, one of
the non-Ba’thist coup leaders had been persuaded to join the party. The other
non-Ba’thist coup leaders could then be excluded safely. They were forced into
exile, leaving the Ba’th Party and its chosen leader able to consolidate a more
narrowly based dictatorship (Tripp
2007, 184-85).
The dictator’s
drive to narrow his support base arises from minimum- survival coalition logic
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). That is, the dictator wants enough support to
survive in power, but no more because support must be paid for, even if at a
low rate, in resources and shared power. The larger the number of individuals
or groups over which resources must be spread, the less for each one. Because
authoritarian governments need less support to remain in power after they have
captured and transformed the state bureaucracy, courts, military, police, and
taxing authority than for the initial seizure of power, they can get away with
excluding some members of the seizure coalition and large parts of the population
from the distribution of benefits.
The internal
cohesion of seizure groups affects bargaining within the inner circle via two
different paths. First, the dictator can bargain separately with each member of
a factionalized seizure group, offering some special deals in return for siding
with him on crucial decisions and inducing members of the inner circle to
compete with each other for resources. If the dictator excludes a member of a
factionalized inner circle, as Karimov did many times, remaining members are
more likely to seize the resources of a fallen comrade and use him as a
stepping-stone to a higher place in the hierarchy than rally to his support.
Overall, members of factionalized seizure groups tend to get less from the
The Effect of Elite Factionalism on
Personalization
79
dictator in exchange for their support
because their competition with one another lowers the price they can extract.
Second,
factionalism reduces the credibility of threats to oust the dictator if he
fails to share. Factionalized support groups have difficulty organizing to oust
the dictator, and most unarmed factions lack the capacity to oust him on their
own. As we saw in the summary of recent Uzbek history at the beginning of the
chapter, if one faction can credibly threaten the dictator with ouster, it can
enforce its own sharing agreement, but most of the time unarmed factions
cannot. Consequently, the dictator can concentrate more powers in his own
hands.
In this section,
we focused on one characteristic of seizure groups, which influences the
credibility of threats by members of the dictatorial inner circle to oust the
dictator: how much unity and discipline had been enforced within the seizure
group before it seized power. When united militaries or disciplined parties
lead authoritarian seizures of power, lieutenants are likely to be able to
resist extreme concentration of power in the dictator’s hands. When, instead,
factions divide the officer corps or parties are recent amalgams of multiple
jostling cliques, they cannot obstruct the dictator’s drive to concentrate
power. Our argument thus suggests an explanation for the personalization of
power in many African countries noted by Africanists (e.g., Bratton and van de
Walle 1997) after an initial seizure of power by the military or a transition
from elected government to single-party rule. The newness of parties and the
recent Africanization of the officer corps at the time of independence often
resulted in factionalized party and military seizure groups in the first decades
after independence.
MEASURING PERSONALISM
In the next section, we test the argument
about why dictators can concentrate power in their hands at the expense of
their closest supporters. Though anecdotal evidence supports the ideas we
propose, the absence of a measure of personalism has hampered our ability to
evaluate them systematically in the past. Here, we leverage new data we
collected on various features of dictatorship to derive such a measure.
To capture the
idea of personalism, we use eight indicators of dictators’ observable behavior
(assessed yearly) that we believe demonstrate power concentration at the
expense of others in the dictatorial elite (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2017;
Wright 2018). We create a time-varying index of personalism using these eight
indicators: dictator’s personal control of the security apparatus, creation of
loyalist paramilitary forces (create paramilitary), dictator’s control of the
composition of the party executive committee, the party executive committee
behaving as a rubber stamp, dictator’s personal control of
8o
Elite Consolidation
appointments, dictator’s creation of a new
party to support the regime, dictator’s control of military promotions, and
dictator’s purges of officers.13
The first two
reflect the dictator’s relationship with security forces: whether he personally
controls the internal security police (security apparatus) and whether he has
created a paramilitary force outside the normal chain of military command
(create paramilitary). Personal control of internal security agencies increases
the dictator’s information advantage over other members of the dictatorial
elite as well as his ability to use violence against them. The dictator’s
advantage comes not only from his access to the information collected, which he
can keep from other members of the inner circle, but also from his ability to
order security officers to arrest his colleagues. Knowledge provided by
security agencies can help the dictator identify members of the inner circle
who might challenge him. Actions by the dictator that we code as indicating
personal control of internal security include his direct appointment of the
head of the security service (if this appointment appears to ignore the normal
military hierarchy), his creation of a new security agency, and his appointment
of a relative or close friend to lead a security force.
Dictators use
paramilitary forces to counterbalance the regular military when they see it as
unreliable. The creation of armed forces directly controlled by the dictator
increases the concentration of power in that it reduces the regular military’s
ability to threaten the dictator with ouster if he fails to share or consult.
In order to identify only paramilitary forces created by dictators to solidify
their personal power, we exclude party militias and those created to help fight
insurgencies. We code both the appointment of a relative or close friend to
command a paramilitary force and the recruitment of a paramilitary group
primarily from the dictator’s tribe, home region, or clan as indicating his
personal control. The forces coded as dictators’ paramilitary forces include
Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana’s President’s Own Guard and Saddam Hussein’s Republican
Guards.
The next
indicator of personalism assesses the dictator’s relationship with the ruling
party’s leadership. We code whether the regime leader chooses or vetoes members
of the party executive committee (party executive) in dictatorships organized
by a ruling party. The dictator has concentrated power, we argue, if he chooses
top party leaders rather than party leaders choosing him. In communist Hungary,
for example, the first dictator, Matyas Rakosi, began the regime with a
politburo composed of about equal numbers of close allies who had spent the war
with him in Moscow and cadres who had spent the war underground or in jail in
Hungary. Rakosi did not choose the leadership of the
13 Adding to the index additional indicators of
personalism that measure whether the dictator appoints his relatives to high office,
rule by plebiscite, whether the military is ethnically homogenous, and whether
the regime leader also leads the support party does not alter the findings
reported below. A composite measure that includes these additional variables is
correlated with the one used at 0.982.
The Effect of Elite Factionalism on
Personalization
81
underground party members, meaning that he
did not initially control the composition of the Politburo. After the seizure
of power, however, Rakosi gradually eliminated those with independent bases of
support in Hungary - life-long dedicated communists who were accused of
treason, subjected to show trials, and sentenced to long prison sentences or
execution (Kovrig 1984). By the early 1950s, Rakosi fully controlled who joined
or was dismissed from the Politburo, and thus the Politburo could not constrain
him.
A fourth
variable also captures information about the ruling-party executive committee.
It identifies party executive committees that serve as arenas for hammering out
policy decisions rather than as rubber stamps for policy and personnel choices
made by the dictator (rubber stamp). We see discussion of policy alternatives
and disagreements over choices, which are reported in the media and in
secondary sources, as indications that the dictator has not concentrated
policy-making power. The absence of policy disagreements indicates the
opposite. In North Korea, for example, Kim Il-sung reorganized the Korean
Workers’ Party (KWP) leadership structure at the 1966 Party Congress; by 1968
“he faced no further challenges from within KWP” (Buzo 1999, 34). The party
leadership had been transformed into a rubber stamp.
The variable
appointments assesses the dictator’s control over appointments to important
offices in the government, military, and ruling party. To code this item, we
rely on secondary literature such as this statement about Mobutu Sese Seko,
dictator of what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo:
State-party personnel are completely
dependent on him for selection, appointment, and maintenance in power ...
Mobutu constantly rotates the membership of the highest organs of power.
(Callaghy 1984, 180)
The variable new
party identifies country-years in which autocracies organize new ruling
parties. We consider the dictator’s creation of a new support party a strategy
for adding personal loyalists to the dictatorial inner circle. Bringing new
members into the dictatorial elite dilutes the power of existing members
(usually those who helped seize power) and increases the weight of the faction
supporting the dictator. We code a new support party if the dictator or a close
ally created a new party after the seizure of power or, in a few cases, during
an election campaign before authoritarianization.i4 When a dictator
organizes a ruling party, he chooses its leadership. Such parties rarely
develop sufficient autonomous power to constrain the dictator.
The last two
indicators of personalism assess the dictator’s relationship with the military:
whether he promotes officers loyal to himself or from his tribal, ethnic,
partisan, or religious group (promotions) and whether he imprisons or kills
officers from other groups without fair trials (purges). Dictator-controlled
promotions and purges demonstrate the dictator’s capacity to change the
14 Once the dictator or close
ally creates a support party, all subsequent years for that leader are
coded as having a new party that was
created to support the dictator.
82
Elite Consolidation
command structure of the military, and thus
the composition of military decision-making bodies. If the dictator can control
the composition of the officer corps, the military cannot make credible threats
to oust him if he fails to share power.
There is
substantial overlap among these indicators, both because dictators who use one
strategy for concentrating power in their own hands often use others as well
and because one piece of historical information can sometimes be used to code
more than one indicator. The information that Saddam Hussein appointed
relatives to the military high command and to head the security apparatus and
Republican Guard, for example, demonstrates that he controlled the internal
security forces (security apparatus), personalized a paramilitary force (create
paramilitary), and controlled military promotions (promotions).
Using these
eight indicators, we create a composite measure of personalism from an item
response theory (IRT) two-parameter logistic model (2PL) that allows each item
(variable) to vary in its difficulty and discrimination.15 We transform
the scores from this latent trait estimate into an index bounded by 0 and 1,
where higher levels of personalism approach 1 and lower levels of personalism
approach 0.
The personalism
index differs from the categorical regime-type variables used in past research
(e.g., Geddes 2003). The old measure classified differences across regimes
(that is, spans of consecutive country-years), but the new one is coded every
year in every regime to measure changes over time in the dictator’s
concentration of power. Importantly, this time-varying measure is coded for all
dictatorships - not just those with powerful leaders - to capture differences
between regimes, between leaders in the same regime, and over time during any
individual leader’s tenure in power. This allows us to investigate the gradual
concentration of power by individual dictators (the most common pattern) as
well as occasional reversals.
Figure 4.2 shows
the personalism scores for six dictatorships: three communist dictatorships in
Asia, all identified by Levitsky and Way (2013) as revolutionary regimes, and
three coded as hybrid regimes by Geddes (2003) and not considered
revolutionary. This latter group has features of personalist rule as well as
features of military and party-based rule, which is the reason they were coded
as hybrids of the three pure types. The personalism scores show how the
concentration of power in the hands of paramount leaders varied over time in
these long-lasting dictatorships.
In the left
panel, we see that the personalism score for China (solid line) reflects the
ups and downs in power concentration since the Chinese Communist Party took
power in 1949. The highly collegial communist leadership immediately after the
revolution was followed by the modest concentration of
15 As an alternative, we used principal component
analysis (PCA) to extract the first dimension from these variables. This
factor, with an eigenvalue greater than 3, is correlated with the personalism
index employed throughout at 0.99.
The Effect of Elite Factionalism on
Personalization
83
Personalism in 3
communist regimes Personalism in 3
hybrid regimes
Year Year
I China — North Korea Vietnam |...... |
Indonesia — Paraguay ..... Syria
figure 4.2 Illustration of personalism scores.
power in Mao’s hands during the 1950s,
Mao’s loss of power after the failure of the Great Leap Forward, and then Mao’s
rapid concentration of power in the 1960s during the Cultural Revolution.16
The concentration of power dropped again as Mao’s health failed and normalcy
was reestablished in the 1970s. Chinese leadership then became unusually
collegial again except for a short time during Deng Xiaoping’s dominance.17
The North Korean regime (dashed line) was moderately personalist during its
first years in existence under Soviet tutelage, but Kim Il-sung dramatically
increased his control relative to other ruling party elites in the late 1950s
and even more during the 1960s.18 His son and grandson maintained
the extreme personalization of power in North Korea.
In contrast,
Vietnam’s (hatched line) first dictator, Ho Chi Minh, never concentrated great
power in his hands. The uptick of personalism in the late 1960s reflects the
exclusion of the faction opposed to escalating the war in the south as Le Duan
consolidated his position as successor to Ho Chi Minh in the years before Ho’s
death (Vu 2014, 28-30). The larger surge in personalism scores from the
mid-1970s to mid-1980s reflects the post-war consolidation of
16 Changes in the graph appear slightly later than
real-world changes because the data are coded as of January 1, meaning that if
a dictator increases the concentration of power in his hands in one year, it
will first appear in the data set the following year.
17 As we write, China specialists suggest that the
current leader, Xi Jinping, is concentrating greater power in his hands. (See,
for example, Lee, 2015.) The data on which the personalism score depends extend
only to 2010, however, so Xi’s term is not shown.
18 To reflect this, the Communist
regime in North Korea was classified as a hybrid, dominant- party-personalist,
in the old regime-type coding (Geddes 2003).
84
Elite Consolidation
power by Le Duan and a handful of close
supporters at the expense of other veteran communists. Le Duan’s appointment of
his son to head the secret police, appointment of other relatives to other
important posts, and the purge of pro-Chinese factions from the party elite
that enabled him to control promotions in the military demonstrate his
concentration of power (Nguyen 1983, 70-72). The decline in Vietnamese
personalism in 1986 coincides with Le Duan’s death.
In the right
panel, we note first that the early years of the dictatorships in Syria and
Paraguay show a pattern similar to that in North Korea and China while Mao was
alive: an initial period of relative collegiality followed by the rapid
concentration of power in the dictator’s hands. This is the average pattern we
find in the data. Note that in all three of these hybrid regimes, first
dictators began their rule with more power than any of the communist leaders because
none of them had to bargain with well-developed, unified party institutions.
Suharto of
Indonesia (solid line) faced remarkably little constraint from other political
elites even at the beginning. Not only did he lack a support party until
creating one a few years after seizing power, but the upper ranks of the
officer corps had been decimated by assassinations during a violent uprising
not long before the coup that brought him to power. Consequently, Suharto did
not have to negotiate with other highly ranked officers as most dictators from
the military do. The precipitous drop in the personalism score for the last
year of this dictatorship reflects Suharto’s resignation and his replacement by
a weak protege who lacked a support base in the military.
In Paraguay
(dashed line) and Syria (hatched line), military dictators allied with
preexisting but highly factionalized parties, which they reorganized, purged,
and molded into effective instruments of personal rule over their first years
in power. The Colorado Party in Paraguay was especially useful because,
although hopelessly factionalized at the elite level and thus unable to exert
much constraint on the dictator, it had a well-organized mass base that
Stroess- ner coopted to use for both spying and mobilization against challenges
from fellow officers. The steep drop in personalism followed by reconcentration
in the 1980s reflects the development of competing factions within the
Stroessner ruling group as he aged and members of the inner circle began to battle
over succession. Stroessner briefly reasserted himself, but was then ousted by
a member of his inner circle. The dramatic decline shortly before the regime
ended reflects the tenure of this less powerful successor.
In these cases,
the dictator who concentrated great personal power lived for several decades
longer and maintained a high level of personalization, followed by a
precipitous drop when he died, resigned, or was ousted. In Syria, we see a drop
in personalization when Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father in 2000 and then
an upswing as Bashar consolidated his hold on the system. In the other two,
successors were unable to reconcentrate personal power or maintain the regime.
In all cases, the personalism score seems to track historical events well.
The Effect of Elite Factionalism on
Personalization
85
Importantly,
these time-varying indicators of personalism reflect observed behavior after
the seizure of power. The indicators of factionalism within the seizure group
that we employ below in the analysis to explain personalism reflect
characteristics of what later became the seizure group measured prior to the
seizure of power. They are thus not endogenously determined by dictators’
strategic behavior aimed at remaining in power.
PATTERNS OF PERSONALISM
In this section, we use our measure of
personalism to describe typical patterns of power concentration in
dictatorships. Personalism scores tend to be low during the year after seizures
of power, as would be expected if most dictators are weak, like Karimov,
relative to other members of the ruling group when dictatorships begin. Where
the dictator can take first steps toward power concentration soon after
seizures of power, however, we expect him to then use his increased resources
to eliminate from the inner circle individuals who have the greatest ability or
disposition to challenge him in the future - as Karimov did. In this way, he
can concentrate more power in his own hands. This strategy is associated with
longer tenure in office for the dictator. First dictators - that is, those who
are the first to assume power after the initiation of dictatorship - with
higher personalism scores during their first three years in office retain
their positions nearly twice as long on average as first dictators with low
early personalism scores. First dictators with high personalism scores (top
third of the personalism index) during the first years in power survive 14.7
years on average, while first leaders with low personalism scores (bottom
third) survive only 7.8 years on average.19
Changes in the
relative power of inner-circle members can become long lasting through the
replacement of individuals who might potentially have challenged the dictator
with others who lack independent support bases and are thus more dependent on
him. Whatever resolution arises from the earliest conflict between the dictator
and his closest allies increases the likelihood of a similar resolution to the
next one. In other words, if the dictator gains more control over political
resources as a result of the first conflict with other members of the inner
circle, he then has a greater advantage in the next conflict with them.20
In this way, where steps toward personalization occur soon after the seizure of
power, it is likely to progress further.
In contrast,
initial reliance on collegial institutions reduces the chance of later
personalization. Where members of the inner circle have developed the
expectation of participating in key decisions, attempts by the dictator to
reverse
19 The median tenure for first leaders with low
personalism scores is 4 years; for those with high personalism scores, the
median is 11.5 years. Note that this comparison pertains only to first leaders
who survive at least three years in office, since scores during the first three
years were used to create the comparison groups.
20 Svolik (2012) shows how
greater leader power enables the dictator to defeat regime insiders who try to
use rebellion to deter further power grabs.
86
Elite Consolidation
their policy choices or postpone regular
meetings of the collegial decisionmaking body become focal points around which
it is relatively easy (though never easy in absolute terms) to organize
collective action against the dictator.
In short, we
expect the deal agreed to by the dictator and members of the seizure group in
the early months after the seizure of power to shape later interactions.
Whatever pattern of power aggrandizement is established during the first years
of a dictatorship tends to be perpetuated until the first dictator dies,
sickens, or is overthrown.
The replacement
of one dictator by another during a single regime often involves renegotiation
of the distribution of power within the inner circle. Those who yearn to
replace the dictator, whether after his death or via violent overthrow, must
promise their colleagues a larger share of power in order to attract their
support, but as with the first dictator, such promises are unenforceable unless
members of the inner circle can both oust him if he reneges and credibly commit
their subordinates to refrain from overthrowing him if he sticks to the
bargain. The main differences between subsequent struggles and the first one is
that members of the inner circle have learned from earlier struggles and may
have developed disciplined, within-regime networks that allow them to bargain
more credibly and effectively with the new dictator. In dictatorships that last
beyond the tenure of the first leader, power relationships between the dictator
and the inner circle thus tend to become somewhat more equal under subsequent
leaders.
We assess these
expectations in two ways. First, we examine how levels of personalism change
over time for a regime’s first leader relative to subsequent ones. The first
dictator has an advantage in bargaining relative to later ones because of the
inexperience of members of the ruling group. That is, they are experienced as
military officers, insurgents, or party militants, but they have not usually
had experience in the rule-free and dangerous context of bargaining within the
inner circle of a dictatorship. The day after the new regime seizes power, the
new dictator can begin using state resources, appointing officials,
establishing procedures, and issuing decrees. It can take some time for other
members of the inner circle to grasp all the implications of some of the
dictator’s initiatives. This implies that, on average, first dictators have
advantages over later ones in parlaying initial gains in personal power into
further increases over time.
Figure 4.3
compares levels of personalism over time for initial regime leaders with the
personalism scores of subsequent dictators in the same regime. The horizontal
axis marks the first three full years each dictator rules, while the vertical
axis shows the predicted level of personalism from a regression model in which
the dependent variable is the measured level of personalism:
Personalism = a0 + p1*
Duration + P2 * FirstLeaderi
+p* {Duration *
FirstLeaderi) + yt + eit (4.1)
In this equation, Duration is the natural
log of leader years in power; First- Leader is a binary indicator of whether
the dictator is the first one after the
The Effect of Elite Factionalism on
Personalization
87
Pooled data
Leader fixed effects
First leader
Subsequent leader
Leader time in power (years)
First leader
Subsequent leader
Leader time in power (years)
figure 4.3 The first dictator’s advantage in personalizing power.
regime seizes power; yt are
five-year time period effects; and i indexes leader and t indexes years in
power. Time-period effects ensure that measurement error correlated with
historical time is not driving the estimates of interest.21 The
figures below report the substantive effect of the linear combination of P2
and P3, which estimates levels of personalism for first regime
leaders; and of fiT, which estimates levels of personalism for
subsequent leaders. By design, the approach simply shows the average levels of
personalism as years in power increase, setting the average level in the first
year as the baseline (set to zero on the vertical axis). The right panel of
Figure 4.3 shows the result from a similar model specification but adds one
crucial set of controls: an individual-level fixed effect for each dictator
(8j). This allows the model to isolate the changes over time for each leader, net
of any baseline differences between leaders in different countries or regimes.
The left panel
shows the pooled data. During his first three years in office, the first regime
leader, on average, increases the level of personalism nearly 0.15 points on
the (0, 1) scale. For subsequent regime leaders, the gains in personalism are
less than half of this. The right panel shows a similar pattern: the first
leader increases personalism in the first three years by almost 0.09 points,
while later leaders increase it by less than 0.02 points. The size of these
effects is smaller in the right panel because the model accounts for all
21 If we can better observe
manifestations of personalism for more recent periods (e.g., post-2000), for
example, this could systematically bias estimates.
88
Elite Consolidation
First leader advantage
Initial gains advantage
First
leader Subsequent leaders
Leader time in power (years)
High
initial gains No initial gains
Leader time in power (years)
figure 4.4 Personalizing power after the first three years.
differences in the average level of
personalism for each individual leader and thus looks only at each dictator’s
time-trend in personalism. The descriptive patterns in Figure 4.3 are
consistent with the expectation that first regime leaders have advantages in
accumulating power. In the early years of dictatorship, the first dictator
concentrates power faster than leaders who follow him.
Next we examine
what happens after an initial three-year period of regime consolidation. In
this exercise, we look at how personalism evolves in years four to ten for
different groups of dictators. Figure 4.4 shows the pattern of personalism
across all dictators who survive in power at least four years, using the
average level of personalism at the start of year four as the baseline level
(set to zero). The left panel of Figure 4.4 reports the estimates for a model
similar to Equation 4.1 but with leader fixed effects (like the right panel of
Figure 4.3). After a period of initial power concentration, first leaders
continue to have an advantage in accumulating power relative to subsequent
leaders: first dictators, on average, boost personalism scores by a further
0.07 points between years four and ten, while subsequent leaders increase their
power by half as much during these years. These increases are smaller than
those reported in Figure 4.3 because power concentration is more rapid during
initial periods of regime consolidation than during later years.
Another way to
analyze personalization after the initial period of consolidation is to
compare leaders who successfully personalized during the first three years with
those who did not. For each leader, we construct a variable that measures
whether his score on the personalism index increased a lot during the
The Effect of Elite Factionalism on
Personalization
89
first three years he ruled (high initial
gains).22 Then we test a regression model similar to those used
above (with leader fixed effects), but compare leaders with high initial gains
in personalism scores with leaders who did not concentrate power during their
first three years. The right panel of Figure 4.4 shows that leaders who
concentrate personal power in their first three years further increase their
personalism scores by more than 0.06 points from years four to ten. Leaders who
failed to accumulate personal power in their first three years do not make this
up later; their gains after the initial period are smaller than those of
leaders who amassed personal power from the outset. This evidence is consistent
with Svolik’s (2012) model of power concentration in which initial successful
power grabs beget more successful power concentration over time.
THE EFFECT OF FACTIONALISM ON THE
PERSONALIZATION OF POWER
Next we test our explanation of why some
dictators can concentrate more power than others. We look at the effect of the
degree of factionalism in the seizure group before the initiation of
dictatorship on how personalism evolves over time after the group takes power.
We expect more unified seizure groups to bargain more successfully, and thus to
limit the accumulation of power in the dictator’s hands.
Though we lack
direct measures of seizure-group unity, we investigate the effects of two proxy
measures. The first is the pre-seizure history of the group that becomes the
dictatorship’s ruling party after the seizure. We posit that a support
coalition organized as a political party either to contest elections or to lead
a revolution before the seizure of power has greater organizational unity, and
can thus more successfully bargain with the dictator, than a support coalition
not organized as a party before the seizure.23
The second proxy
for coalition unity is intended to capture the pre-seizure unity of military
seizure groups. For dictatorships that seized power in coups, we use the first
dictator’s military rank before the seizure of power as a proxy measure of
factionalism. The logic is as follows. Junior and mid-level officers carry out
many coups. In countries with relatively unified and disciplined military
forces, however, lower-ranked coup leaders hand regime leadership to a senior
officer after the coup because they do not expect other senior officers
22 Of the 312 leaders who last more than three
years in power, 28 percent have high initial gains during their first three
years in power. About half (53 percent) of the 312 leaders are first regime
leaders.
23 Parties organized to contest elections ran
candidates in one or more elections in an earlier authoritarian or democratic
regime. We do not include the parties that were organized as vehicles for the
dictator’s election campaign prior to authoritarianization (e.g., Cambio 90,
organized by Fujimori to manage his presidential campaign in 1990). Vehicle
parties are centered on the leader from their creation and often have little
independent organizational existence.
90
Elite Consolidation
to follow orders issued by junior officers.
In factionalized armies, however, multiple hierarchies exist, some of which
junior officers lead. When senior officers lead dictatorships, we cannot be
sure whether the military that backs them is unified, but when junior officers
such as Captain Moammar Qaddafi of Libya or Sargent Samuel Doe of Liberia lead
dictatorships, we know that the military that backs them was factionalized
before the coup. The indicator we use here groups regime leaders ranked major
and below in one category and all those ranked higher in the other.24
It thus distinguishes the most factionalized cases (only the top 9 percent)
from all others.
Seizure of power
via popular uprising is another indicator of a factionalized army. Because
popular uprisings are defined as unarmed seizures of power, they occur only
when the country’s military has refrained from using its advantage in violence
to quell the upheaval. When the army is united, either it backs the incumbent
to prevent popular demonstrations from ousting him or it replaces the incumbent
itself. The overthrow of a government by popular uprising suggests an army
divided between government supporters and opponents just before the regime
change, and possibly along other dimensions as well.
We can thus use
both seizure of power by popular uprising and the first dictator’s rank before
seizure via coup as indications of pre-seizure factionali- zation in the
military coalition that supports the dictatorship.
The data
indicate that more than one-third (37 percent) of dictators are supported by an
inherited revolutionary or electoral party when they seize power (a sign of
unity). Only 15 percent of dictators are supported by a highly factionalized
military.25 These two features are almost mutually exclusive: of the
280 regimes in the data, only seven have both an inherited party and a
factionalized military.
We expect
leaders who bargain with supporters organized in inherited (electoral or
revolutionary) political parties, which should on average be more united than
newly created parties or informally organized coalitions, to be less capable of
personalizing power. By the same logic, leaders who bargain with a more unified
military should be less likely to concentrate power in their own hands than
those who negotiate with a more factionalized officer corps.
24 Colonel was the highest rank
in many armies at the time of coups, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, so the
meaning of this rank is ambiguous.
25 Note that each of these measures creates a more
homogeneous set of cases on one side of the dichotomy than the other. Dictators
in cases with inherited parties must all bargain with inner circles organized
by inherited parties. In the cases that lack inherited parties, some dictators
bargain with newly created parties that tend to lack organizational coherence,
but others lack parties and bargain instead with officers from a disciplined,
professional officer corps. In other words, the cases that lack inherited
parties are a mix of cases with factionalized ruling groups and cases with
united ruling groups. Our proxy measure of military factionalism implies that
the militaries identified here as less factionalized include a mix of factionalized
and unified military forces, so we can show the effect of high factionalism but
not of high levels of military unity.
The Effect of Elite Factionalism on
Personalization
91
Inherited
party Not inherited
2 4 6 8 10
Leader duration
(years) Leader duration (years)
figure 4.5 United versus factionalized seizure groups.
A first look at
the raw data provides some evidence consistent with these expectations. While
roughly 41 percent of first leaders increase personal power in their first
three years, this figure differs considerably depending on the type of group
with which the leader bargains. Less than one-third (32 percent) of first
dictators who face an inherited support party concentrate power in their own
hands, but nearly half (47 percent) of those who do not bargain with an
inherited party do so. Fifty-four percent of first dictators who face a highly
factionalized military concentrate power, while only 38 percent of those who
face a more unified military do so.26
The left panel
of Figure 4.5 compares the increase over time in personalism levels for first
leaders who bargained with an inherited party (a more unified support
coalition) and those who bargained with a new party or with supporters not
organized into a party.27 First leaders who do not bargain with an
inherited party personalize by 0.098 points on average during the first three
years; those who negotiate with an inherited political party, however, increase
their personalism score by much less (0.053 points). By the end of the first
decade in power, those who do not face an inherited party have increased
personalism scores by 0.163 points, and those who bargain with an inherited
party do so by a little more than half that amount (0.089 points). This
suggests
26 These differences for
inherited party and factionalized military are both statistically significant
at the 0.05 level. Figures are for first regime leaders, excluding subsequent
ones.
27 The estimates on the vertical
axis reflect the predicted change in the level of personalism from a regression
model similar to Equation (4.1) but with leader and year fixed effects.
92
Elite Consolidation
that dictators who must bargain with a
unified support group can less easily concentrate personal power than leaders
whose supporters are less organized.
The right panel
of Figure 4.5 shows the average level of personalism for first leaders who face
a highly factionalized military and those who do not. We see an even stronger
pattern: those who bargain with very factionalized militaries boost personalism
by 0.14 points in their first three years, while those who bargain with more
united militaries increase personalism by only 0.07 points, on average.28
After a decade in power, dictators facing more unified officer corps have
increased their power by 0.12 points, on average, while those whose military
supporters are more factionalized increase it by twice as much (0.23 points).
We interpret this evidence as suggesting that leaders who initially bargain
with a highly factionalized military have a clear advantage in personalizing
power.
To summarize,
our empirical analysis shows that first dictators have an advantage in
concentrating power in their own hands relative to later ones. Moreover,
initial gains in power tend to make further gains easier. Dictators whose
efforts to grab power are blocked early on are likely to concentrate power more
slowly if at all later, even if they survive long in office.
We also show
that dictators who have to bargain with a more united seizure coalition face
stiffer resistance to concentrating personal power than those who do not.
Inherited parties, we show, limit dictators’ gains in personal power, as do
more unified militaries. In contrast, dictators who bargain with factional-
ized military or civilian supporters have great advantages in concentrating
personal power.
CONCLUSION
All members of the inner circles of
dictatorships have common interests in regime survival but compete with each
other over power and resources. Each individual member, including the dictator,
has strong reasons to try to increase his power and access to resources at the
expense of the others. Even if some individual members do not yearn for the
dictator’s job, they must compete in order to maintain their positions against
ambitious regime supporters below them in the hierarchy. The competition within
the inner circle means that for most purposes dictatorships should not be
analyzed as unitary actors. Instead, we see members of the inner circle as
continuously engaged in simultaneous cooperative strategies aimed at regime survival
and noncooperative strategies aimed at increasing personal power.
The choice of
one member of the inner circle as dictator (or the elected leader’s acquisition
of dictatorial powers if the seizure of power is accomplished via
authoritarianization) results in the central political dynamic of authoritarian
politics: conflict over the distribution of power within the regime’s
28 Remember that “more united” is
a mix of fully united and fairly factionalized since we have no
indicator for fully unified.
The Effect of Elite Factionalism on
Personalization
93
leadership group. Once the dictator is
chosen, his interests diverge from those of his lieutenants. Dictators who had
been first among equals in a collegial conspiracy before the ouster of the old
regime gain reasons to concentrate power and resources in their own hands in
order to increase their security at the top. Other members of the inner circle,
meanwhile, have good reasons to try to limit the dictator’s resources and
policy-making discretion in order to protect their own positions and maintain
their own influence and clientele networks. This conflict plays out in
different ways, depending on the ex ante factionalism of the seizure group.
Characteristics
of the seizure group that pre-date the establishment of the dictatorship
influence the initial distribution of resources within the inner circle and
what kinds of bargains can be enforced among them. In this chapter we focused
on one ex ante characteristic: the unity or factionalism developed within the
seizure group before they gained power. By unity, we mean that members of the
inner circle can bargain with the dictator as a unitary actor and thus drive a
harder bargain with him. Some military forces are unified by virtue of enforced
discipline and the hierarchical command structure, but others are
factionalized. The same goes for parties. Where the dictator’s supporters are
divided into factions, they are unlikely to be able to make credible threats to
oust the dictator if he fails to share power and spoils. Where, however, they
can behave as a unitary actor, they can more easily act together to oust him
and thus the dictator’s promises to share are credible.
The focus on
bargaining highlights the logic behind coalition narrowing in dictatorships. We
argue that if the members of the seizure group have been able to develop ways
of enforcing their own internal unity, dictators’ efforts to concentrate power
tend to fail. In the real world, enforced internal unity develops in
professionalized military forces and highly disciplined parties. In contrast,
where a conspiracy drawn from a factionalized officer corps or party seizes
power, the dictator’s supporters often fail to resist the personalization of
rule.29
Authoritarian
regimes differ enormously from each other in levels of repression,
distribution of costs and benefits across societal groups, policies followed,
and ideological justification. Nevertheless, the impulse toward personalization
seems to be common in all. The elite bargaining described in this chapter
explains why these processes occur in such apparently different kinds of
dictatorship.
In this chapter
we have focused on how the factionalism or unity of the seizure group affects
its ability to oust the dictator and thus the credibility of the dictator’s
promises to share power and spoils. In the next, we focus not on what
29 Analysis in the replication files shows that
dictatorships in the past two decades are increasingly likely to seize power
with a factionalized military and less likely to seize power with an inherited
political party. Together, these trends may explain why we observe an increase
in personalist regimes since 1990 (Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, and Wright 2016).
94
Elite Consolidation
makes the lieutenants’ threats to oust the
dictator if he fails to share more credible but rather on whether their
promises to refrain from ousting him when he shares are credible. Allies’
promises of support are credible only if their subordinates obey orders because
dictators can be overthrown or assassinated by small numbers of armed men. We
then consider the options available to the dictator when the promises of
support from other members of the ruling group are not credible. In the
process, we explain why seizure groups that did not need an organized civilian
support base to achieve power sometimes later create mass parties.
5
Dictatorial Survival Strategies in Challenging Conditions
Factionalized Armed Supporters and Party Creation
When Benin became independent in 1960,
three parties dominated politics, each rooted in a region and its ethnic
groups. The same regional loyalties factionalized the newly created army. Most
officers came from the south. They had started in the ranks during French rule
and were promoted rapidly in order to indigenize the officer corps at
independence. Most enlisted men came from the north (Decalo 1976, 55-57). As of
1965, when Benin’s second coup occurred, the army was a few years old and had
only 1,700 men. It had 43 indigenous officers and 12 French ones (Bebler 1973,
12-13). During the first decade after independence, divisions between older
officers, who were rapidly promoted as the new nation built its army, and
younger ones trained in military schools, whose promotions were soon blocked by
budget crises, reinforced and overlaid regional factionalism within the army
(Decalo 1976).
After the first
coup in 1963, soldiers replaced the civilian president with a different
civilian and returned to the barracks. Officers themselves took power after
thei965 coup. Factionalism undermined Benin’s first military dictatorship,
which ended with a coup in 1967 that brought to power a new military regime of
mid-ranking officers from a different ethnic group. The second military
dictatorship attempted to deal with army factionalism by appointing an
ethnically balanced cabinet. The new cabinet included captains, lieutenants,
and NCOs in the dictatorship’s inner circle to make sure that all army
interests were represented. The leadership also dismissed some southern senior
officers and promoted some from the north in an effort to equalize
opportunities (Bebler 1973, 20-23). Nevertheless, another faction-based coup
ousted this regime two years later. Officers then tried to reunify the military
around an inclusive decision-making body with collegial leadership, but were
unsuccessful. They returned power to civilians in 1970 because they could not
find a successful formula for power sharing within the officer corps.
95
96
Elite Consolidation
Benin’s history
in the 1960s is a story of military dictators’ repeated failure to consolidate
their rule because the factionalized officer corps could not provide stable
support. Decalo describes the army as a “patchwork of competing
personalist/ethnic allegiance-pyramids centered around officers of all ranks in
which superior rank or authority was only grudgingly acknowledged” (l979:>
234).
A seizure group
that includes many members with control over armed force should be able to
achieve an especially advantageous power-sharing arrangement with the leader
because their threats to oust the dictator are highly credible. Responding to
these threats, early military dictators in Benin agreed to oversight by broadly
representative groups of officers, but to no avail. These strategies failed
because officers included in the regime’s inner circle could not prevent rogue
coups led by other officers formally subordinate to them. Despite successive
dictators’ efforts to secure stability by consulting with representatives of
many military factions, some officers always remained dissatisfied and quick to
oust the current dictatorship. These failures were caused not by the inability
of dictators’ allies to make credible threats to oust the dictator if he fails
to share, but rather by their inability to make good on promises of support
when he was sharing. In that situation, a dictator cannot make himself safe by
sharing more and more because dictators, like all other political leaders, face
budget constraints.
This destructive
game of musical chairs among military factions ended a few years after the 1972
coup that brought Major Mathieu Kerekou to power. Kerekou initially followed
the same strategy as earlier military dictators. He dismissed all senior
officers, appointed a cabinet of junior officers, and consulted a military
ruling council representative of major military factions. Despite Kerekou’s
effort to consult all factions, the military remained unable to provide a
stable base of support. Kerekou survived several coup attempts during his first
two years in power (Decalo 1976, 76-84). Then, in 1974 Kerekou began creating
an organized civilian support base, the Benin People’s Revolutionary Party
(RPB), to counterbalance the military and help stabilize his rule. Six “close
friends of the president” made up the new party’s politburo (Martin 1986, 68).
Over time, Kerekou gradually increased civilian participation in inner-circle
decision-making. Their support enabled him to remove the most threatening rival
officers from posts from which armed challenges could be launched (Martin 1986,
68-75). Adding a loyal civilian support group to balance the factionalized
military stabilized Kerekou’s rule. He retained control until 1990, when
widespread popular opposition forced him to democratize.
In this chapter, we explore two theoretical
ideas highlighted by Benin’s history. First, armed supporters can drive a hard
bargain with the dictator when they maintain unity but not otherwise;
factionalism prevents them from making credible promises to support the
dictator if he shares. To be viable, a power- sharing bargain between the
dictator and his allies must be credible on both
Factionalized Armed Supporters and Party
Creation
97
sides: allies must believe the dictator’s
promise to share, and the dictator must believe the allies’ promises to support
him if and only if he shares. The allies’ promise of support is not credible,
however, if they cannot commit their own subordinates to honor the bargains
they make. The second theoretical idea is that dictators can in some
circumstances change the balance of forces within the ruling group by
empowering new political actors. Kerekou did this when he organized a new
support party and brought its leaders into the inner circle of the
dictatorship.
In Chapter 4, we
analyzed how and why dictators exclude rivals from their inner circle. Here we
focus on the dictator’s strategic inclusion of new players he expects to be
more malleable and less dangerous than the original members. We also consider
the conditions under which he has the ability to exercise this option.
In the first
part of this chapter, we describe the especially difficult situation facing
dictators whose power initially depends on an armed support base, or what Alex
De Waal (2015) calls specialists in violence. In the next, we spell out our
argument about how the interaction of dispersed armed force and factionalism
in the seizure group can limit the dictator’s options for bargaining with these
supporters.1 The third section considers the dictator’s incentives
to bring into the inner circle political actors who are more dependent on him
for benefits and protection than are specialists in violence (military officers
or others who command armed subordinates). It explains why civilian support
groups are less dangerous to dictators than armed factions, and it discusses
party creation as a strategy for mobilizing organized civilian support to
counterbalance unreliable armed supporters. The fourth section provides
evidence that party creation in dictatorships that lack support parties when they
seize power contributes to a strategy designed to concentrate more power and
resources in the dictator’s hands, reducing his need to rely on members of the
original seizure group. The last sections show evidence that fewer coups
against dictators occur after party creation and that dictatorships that create
parties post-seizure last longer than otherwise similar regimes lacking party
organization.
THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT
Dictators who achieve power through armed
force face an especially difficult survival problem. Consider the dilemma faced
by a dictator who comes to power in a coup.2 Besides the support of
fellow plotters, he probably has the
1 De Waal (2015) focuses on factions based on
ethnicity and cases in which all relevant players are specialists in violence.
We analyze the more general situation in which the seizure group is divided
into factions for any reason and some potentially powerful political players
lack easy recourse to violence.
2 A large majority of the
dictators who achieve power by force do so via coup, but sometimes officers are
handed power during popular uprisings; insurgencies bring some armed groups to
98
Elite Consolidation
initial support of some civilian elites who
were fed up with the ousted incumbent but who would lack the capacity to save
the new leader from ouster if his armed supporters turned against him.
At the outset he
often has quite a bit of popular support as well, and for the same reason:
dissatisfaction with the overthrown incumbent. This popular support, however, is
unorganized, opportunistic, and superficial. “The people” or “the street” may
support a coup in order to rid themselves of an incompetent, brutal, or
disreputable leader, but that support will evaporate if the economy fails to
improve quickly or if any other disaster strikes. Much of the citizenry can
swing rapidly from support to opposition. Egypt’s recent experience
illustrates the volatility of unorganized popular support: Egyptian protestors
forced a military-supported dictatorship from power in 2011, but in 2013 helped
oust a democratically elected president and return the military to power.
The coup leader
needs widespread support from other officers to survive in power when popular
opposition arises, as it inevitably does. Military dictators have the support
or acquiescence of many other officers at the time of seizure (otherwise their
coup would have failed), but no way of guaranteeing that support in the future.
Even at the beginning, support from the rest of the military might be quite
superficial. As shown in earlier work (Geddes 2003), the incentives facing
military officers when their colleagues initiate a coup create a first-mover
advantage similar to that in “battle of the sexes” games. This means that if a
small group of officers makes a successful first “coup move,” such as seizing
the airport and presidential palace, the rest of the military tends to go
along, whether they sincerely want the intervention or not. So, the fact that a
seizure of power has occurred implies temporary acquiescence by the rest of the
officer corps but very little in terms of sincere or long-term support. In
short, military dictators cannot count on the support of fellow officers
tomorrow even if they have it today, and today’s support may be shallower than
it appears at the time the military seizes power.
Within the
dictatorial inner circle, support for the dictator may also be short lived.
Even though the dictator was a brother officer - and often a longtime ally and
friend of other high-ranking officers - the day before he was selected as
supreme leader, their interests diverge after his selection just as those of
civilian dictators and their supporters do. Officers in the support group want
to ensure large military budgets and their continued monopolization of force.
They do not want their budget reduced in order to hire more security police or
provide
power; and a few are imposed by foreigners.
After insurgencies or foreign impositions, the new ruling group usually
replaces the incumbent officer corps with its own supporters. Thus, when we
speak of officers, we refer not only to the armed forces of an ousted regime
that achieved power for themselves via coup or popular uprising, but also to
those who replaced incumbent officers after insurgent seizures of power. Once
the old officer corps has been replaced, “the military” is the new one imposed
after regime change.
Factionalized Armed Supporters and Party
Creation
99
patronage jobs for civilian supporters of
the dictator. They oppose the creation of presidential guards or people’s
militias to protect the dictator because such forces challenge their own
monopoly of force and the credibility of their threats to oust the dictator if
he fails to share, as well as depleting the budget. They have an interest in
consultation within the officer corps before major policy decisions. They want
to avoid the concentration of power, resources, and discretion in one man’s
hands, as well as the favoritism and deprofessionalization within the military
that often accompany it. Dictators who succeed in concentrating resources and
discretion in their own hands, that is, in personalizing power, threaten both
the military as an institution and individual officers, since they control
promotions, postings, forced retirements, and access to profit opportunities
(both legal and illegal). At the extreme, such dictators control life and death
through their personal control of the security apparatus, and military officers
have no special immunity from security police. The same logic applies to other
dictators brought to power by specialists in violence.
Since coups have
ousted most dictators, especially those who come from the military, it is
obvious that officers can be dangerous. Weapons, know-how, and the command of
troops are widely dispersed in armies and in some insurgencies. This reality
creates a hazardous environment for dictators, because coups require only a
small number of individual plotters to execute them. Indeed, coups involving
fewer than twenty men have occasionally succeeded.3 Only a minority
of coups involve consensus among the whole officer corps. Instead, small
conspiratorial groups of officers carry out most coups using the first- mover
strategy (Nordlinger 1977). In short, many different small groups of officers
could stage a coup with reasonable prospects for success.
THE INTERACTION OF DISPERSED ARMS AND
FACTIONALISM
Though much of the literature on
autocracies has emphasized dictators’ credibility problem,4 it is
not the main impediment to successful sharing bargains when arms are widely
dispersed within the ruling group. Military dictators can increase the
credibility of their promises to share in some ways not available to civilians,
for example, by retiring from active duty.5 Once they no longer
command other officers, do not determine promotions, and cannot decide which
officers will command which garrisons, leaders’ ability to deter coups depends
almost entirely on their ability to satisfy the rest of the military’s policy
3 For example, Master Sergeant Samuel Doe and
seventeen men ended the dictatorship of William Tolbert and the long reign of
the True Whig Party in Liberia (Thomson 1988, 44); sixteen NCOs carried out the
1980 coup in Surinam that ousted then-President Johan Ferrier (Hoefte 2013,
133).
4 For example, Acemoglu and
Robinson (2005); Magaloni (2008); and Svolik (2012).
5 Sometimes officers are
required by the rest of the military to retire before becoming junta president
for exactly this reason (Remmer 1991).
100
Elite Consolidation
and budget demands. This makes their
promises credible. Military dictators can also increase their credibility by
leaving internal security services within the military chain of command, thus
limiting their ability to spy on, intimidate, and murder other officers.
The more serious
impediment to successful power-sharing bargains is that armed supporters’
promises not to oust as long as the dictator shares are never completely
credible because they cannot always prevent “rogue” coups or armed ouster by
other specialists in violence.6 These are coups by factions, often
led by lower-ranked officers, that could be defeated if the rest of the armed
forces mobilized against them, but the dictator cannot count on the rest of the
army doing so. The first-mover advantage built into the incentives facing
officers means that a faction that makes a credible first coup move without
being met by violent opposition can overthrow the government because the rest
of the armed forces will acquiesce to this coup just as they did to the one
that brought the current leader to power.7 All dictators face some
risk from armed supporters, but the less control commanding officers have over
lower-ranked officers - that is, the less disciplined and unified the armed
support group is - the less ability officers in the inner circle have to make
enforceable bargains with the dictator that would reduce the risk.
An alternative
way to express this problem is to note that militaries and other armed groups
are not unitary actors, though some more closely approximate unity than
others. In more professionalized militaries and unified insurgent groups,
individuals’ future career success is inextricably bound to following the
orders of their commanders. Professional success depends on obedience to orders
from the day that youths enter military school. Subordinates obey superiors
regardless of personal, ethnic, or political loyalties. The likelihood of a
rogue coup succeeding is low in unified militaries, and the cost of a failed
attempt very high because serious breaches of discipline end careers. Coup
leaders can also face court-martial, jail time, or execution. In this kind of
military institution, commanding officers can count on lower-ranked officers to
obey orders, which transforms a large group of individuals into something
approximating a unitary actor. Unitary actors can make credible promises.
Factionalized
militaries were common between 1946 and 2010, however, especially in newly
independent countries. A factionalized army, “far from being a model of
hierarchical organization, tends to be an assemblage of armed men who may or
may not obey their officers” (Zolberg 1968, 72). In factional- ized forces,
discipline is less predictably enforced because personal, partisan, or ethnic
loyalties can cross-cut military hierarchy. “[S]oldiers often [have] a
6 Thus, for dictatorships with an armed support
base, we see the supporters’ credibility problem as the opposite of that
emphasized by Svolik (2012). He sees their threat to oust a dictator who
violates power sharing as lacking credibility, but we believe it is supporters’
promise to refrain from ousting a dictator who shares that most often lacks
credibility.
7 See Singh (2014) for an
elaboration of which actions make the first move of a coup credible.
Factionalized Armed Supporters and Party
Creation
101
stronger sense of commitment to their unit
commander than to the army” (Crouch 1978, 27). Promotion and protection for
lower-ranked officers, NCOs, and soldiers depend on faction leaders, not just
on compliance with orders and military norms. Routes to higher rank other than
the slow but predictable rise via increasing seniority are more available.
Consequently, lower-ranked officers may disobey the orders of higher-ranked
officers if they conflict with those of faction leaders. Support for coups can
be a short-cut to rapid promotion, and punishment for coup attempts is not
always severe. Some coup attempts result only in demotion, apparently because
dictators fear the consequences of imposing harsher punishments in factionalized
militaries. Others result in dismissal, but when changes at the top occur
later, as they often do in countries with factionalized militaries, dismissed
officers may be reinstated.
Officers
included in the inner circle in this kind of setting cannot commit their
subordinates to abide by the sharing bargain as they would be able to in a more
unified military institution because faction leaders command the obedience of
their members but do not offer unconditional obedience to hierarchical
superiors. If factions become dissatisfied with their share or oppose a policy
decision, they have a reasonable chance of bringing off a successful coup.
If the dictator
has reason to doubt higher-ranked officers’ ability to prevent factions from
launching rogue coups, it makes little sense for him to share and consult
because doing so will not protect him. Instead, he will renege on sharing
agreements and use the resources saved to pursue other strategies for deterring
coups.
THE STRATEGIC CREATION OF NEW POLITICAL
ACTORS
Dictators facing a factionalized armed
support base use several strategies for trying to deter coups and thus reduce
their vulnerability. They spend heavily on the military. They promote loyal
officers and retire opponents or appoint them as ambassadors to faraway places.
They resist resigning from active service so that they can maintain personal
control of promotions and command assignments. They strengthen security police
and try to take personal control of them. They create paramilitary forces and presidential
guards led by relatives and recruited from their home regions to counterbalance
the regular military.
These strategies
show how much dictators fear military supporters. Though these strategies may
sometimes be useful, they can also backfire because other officers try to
defend their own positions of power, which depend on the credible threat to
oust the dictator. Officers resent and sometimes resist policies that undermine
that threat. Promotion of the dictator’s friends over the heads of competent
officers violates military norms and leads to anger. Officers who have been
passed over for promotion, dismissed, jailed, or exiled have led many coups and
insurgencies. Officers may also resent the creation of paramilitary
102
Elite Consolidation
forces. In other words, these strategies
are not risk free. They are highly visible to officers and may trigger the
outcome they were designed to prevent.
Bangladeshi
dictator General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, for example, created a paramilitary force
soon after achieving power and remained active duty chief of staff for several
years to try to control the officer corps, but every time he intervened in
promotions, mutinies broke out. He frequently transferred officers, sent them
for new training, and raised salaries (Codron 2007,14). Despite these measures
and many executions of rebellious soldiers, he “did not manage to make the
military a safe constituency to back his rule” (Codron 2007, 15). He began
organizing a support party “to create a civilian power base when he failed to
achieve the united support of the armed forces” (Rizvi 1985, 226).
Creating a
civilian support organization, as General Zia did, is a subtler and often safer
strategy for counterbalancing the military. Paul Lewis (1980) interprets
Paraguayan dictator General Alfredo Stroessner’s reorganization of the Colorado
Party into a support vehicle in exactly this way. After describing Stroessner’s
lavish spending on the military and attempts to manage its factions, Lewis
notes:
Other Paraguayan presidents [also] tried to
buy military support and surrounded themselves with trusted officers. In the
end, however, they failed to keep the greedier or more ambitious soldiers in
line. Stroessner ... achieved a real advantage over his predecessors [by] fashioning
... a dominant single-party regime, based on a purified and obedient mass
organization ... This instrument ... makes it risky and unprofitable for
[officers] to conspire against him. (1980, 124-25).
Samuel Decalo
describes the civilianization of the military regime in Niger similarly: “Faced
with continuous factionalism within both the Supreme Military Council (CSM)
and his cabinet, Kountche progressively disencumbered himself of his most
threatening ... officer colleagues” (1990, 277). Kountche could not afford to
challenge other officers openly. “ [H]e was forced rather to ‘work his way
around them by mobilizing the masses’” (p. 278).8 Egyptian military
dictator Gamel Abdel Nasser established the National Union party “to strengthen
his personal power and weaken the RCC [Revolutionary Command Council, dominated
by the Free Officers]” (Perlmutter 1974, 143).
Organizing
civilians aims at reducing the dictator’s dependence on the military. A
civilian support base can change the calculations of potential coup plotters by
reducing their chances of a credible first coup move. Civilian support for
dictators, even if superficial and manipulated, can deter coups because
officers do not want troops on their way to encircle the presidential palace to
confront crowds of fellow citizens. As a Guatemalan officer explained to an
interviewer after an aborted attempt to overthrow a military dictator, “with
civilians standing in front of the artillery tanks, the commander didn’t want
to cause civilian casualties” (Schirmer 1998, 218).
8 The quote within the quote is
from Jeune Afrique, April 28, 1982.
Factionalized Armed Supporters and Party
Creation
103
Many coups are
bloodless. That is because potential coup leaders choose times when they expect
little opposition. Since the Russian Revolution, officers have understood that
asking troops to fire on their fellow citizens can lead to indiscipline,
desertions, and mutiny.9 The military can of course defeat unarmed
or lightly armed civilian demonstrators, but orders to beat or fire on
civilians risk provoking defiance among troops, which would undermine the
military institution and officers’ political power base, so officers exercise
caution in what they demand of soldiers. The strategy of organizing a mass
civilian support base - a new support party - helps dictators survive because
of officers’ strong preference for unopposed coups. The “fear of having to deal
with massive civilian opposition” deters military plotting (Brooker 1995, 111).
As an example of
how deterrence can work in practice, consider this sequence of events in
Paraguay. Two top officers central to General Stroessner’s military support
base publicly criticized his decision to sign a treaty, which they claimed
would compromise Paraguayan sovereignty. Such open criticism was extremely rare
during Stroessner’s rule. Insiders interpreted it as a sign of widespread
military disaffection, indicating danger of a coup to replace Stroessner. In
response, Stroessner mobilized his civilian support vehicle, the Colorado Party,
in a massive campaign. Letters supporting Stroess- ner poured in to the
newspapers. The party organized a pro-Stroessner demonstration in the capital.
They used posters, fliers, full-page newspaper ads, and sound trucks in every
neighborhood to publicize the event. Local party activists contacted people in
person. The party assembled more than 1,400 cars and trucks to transport people
in and out of the capital. On the day of the demonstration, the vehicles
deposited people at party headquarters where they were all given red party
T-shirts and large pictures of the dictator to brandish during the
demonstration. The party provided free lunch. All public officials and their
families were required to attend. In these ways, a demonstration of 50,000
people, “enormous by Paraguayan standards,” turned out to support the dictator
(Lewis 1980, 148). The military dropped its opposition to the treaty and made
no coup attempt (Lewis 1980, 148-50).
The ability to
mobilize mass demonstrations and overwhelming votes in support of the dictator
makes organized civilians useful to dictators. Dictatorships provide organized
civilian supporters with access to mass communications and
government-controlled transportation, as in the Paraguayan example above. They
supply party cadres with the carrots and sticks to make sure that ordinary
people turn out for big demonstrations or vote when told to. Some
9 During the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, “Army
units dispatched to the scene not only refused to attack the demonstrators but
handed over their weapons ... [T]he bulk of the military either remained
inactive or joined the insurgents” (Kovrig 1979, 300-301). Soviet troops had to
be used. Even at Tiananmen Square, where soldiers did fire on demonstrators,
troops from the countryside had to be brought in because officers and troops
stationed nearby had expressed sympathy with the demonstrators.
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Elite Consolidation
autocratic parties also earn popular
support by distributing benefits to ordinary citizens, providing good economic
policy, and making opportunities for education and upward mobility available to
people whose futures looked bleak before.
Parties’
usefulness to dictators does not depend on supplying benefits to citizens,
however. Many of the toothless parties created after armed seizures of power
are incompetent, abusive, corrupt, or simply inconsequential for most people.
Cadres may sell the things they are supposed to distribute, and they may use
their party positions to exploit their fellow citizens. According to Mobutu Sese
Seku’s Commissioner of Political Affairs, for example, cadres of the party
created after Mobutu’s seizure of power “treat the population with arrogance
... [and] love to threaten [people] with arrest for any reason at all, large or
small” (Callaghy 1984, 168). Nevertheless, these party cadres can turn out
masses of citizens for votes and demonstrations of support by threatening to
block their future access to important services or to turn the names of those
who fail to participate over to security police. One of the main tasks of
Mobutu’s party was organizing mass marches to demonstrate the people’s
“unfailing attachment and support for the Father of the Nation” (Callaghy 1984,
324).
Party militants
develop a vested interest in the dictator’s survival since the dictator
supplies them with benefits in return for support. The dictator’s control of
state revenues makes this strategy possible. Party officials and activists
often draw salaries. They have preferential access to jobs in the state
bureaucracy and schooling for their children. They have insider opportunities
to form businesses subsidized by the government and to manage or even take
ownership of expropriated businesses and land. Their connections help them to
get lucrative government contracts and profit from restrictions on trade. They
have the possibility of rising in the party to achieve the political power and,
usually, wealth associated with high office. Party militants’ stake in regime
maintenance derives from these advantages. Even where party activists enjoy no
current benefits, their connections open up future possibilities for rewards
and upward mobility (Svolik 2012). These benefits explain why dictators never
have difficulty recruiting civilians into their support parties.
Dictatorships often
also task party members, especially local party officials, with reporting
suspicious behavior, hostile attitudes, and the presence of strangers in
villages or neighborhoods. Party militias can be used to set up roadblocks to
impede the movement of weapons and to patrol at night looking for clandestine
meetings and other suspicious activity. The effectiveness of such mass spy
networks varies a lot from one dictatorship to another, but in some, the
pervasiveness of spies and informers makes it very hard for potential plotters
to find ways of meeting and communicating with each other. In this way as well,
civilian support parties can reduce the likelihood of coups.
Although many
dictators who achieved power without party support create one after the seizure,
most do not. About 40 percent of groups that established
Factionalized Armed Supporters and Party
Creation
105
dictatorships after 1946 were organized as
parties beforehand. If monarchies are excluded, military officers led about
four-fifths of the nonparty seizure groups. Of those cases in which groups not
organized as parties seized power, 38 percent of the time a party was later
created to support the dictatorship and 9 percent of the time the dictator
coopted and allied post-seizure with an existing party that had been organized
during an earlier regime. In the latter scenario, the dictator often
reorganized and purged the party, refashioning it into a personal support
machine. In the other 52 percent of cases, the dictator never created or
coopted a party - as would be expected if party creation is attractive to
dictators who depend on the support of an officer corps riven by factions but
not to those whose military support base is more unified and thus more stable.
EVIDENCE THAT POST-SEIZURE PARTY CREATION
AIMS TO COUNTERBALANCE fACTIONALIZED Armed
supporters
The argument that dictators create parties
after seizures of power in order to counterbalance factionalized armed support
groups unable to make credible sharing bargains implies that a number of relationships
should be observable in the real world. If authoritarian party creation is a
strategic choice by dictators to protect themselves from armed rivals, we
should see that dictators themselves initiate most party creations. We cannot
observe that directly because public announcements may be untruthful or may not
make clear who sought to create this new institution. We should, however,
observe the following:
Most newly created dictatorial support parties should be led either
by the dictator himself or one of his relatives or close allies.
If dictators
create parties to counterbalance their armed rivals, we should also find that
party creation brings with it lessened military influence on policymaking. As
an example, consider events in the Somalian dictatorship led by Major General
Siad Barre. When a group of colonels ousted the elected government in 1969,
they formed the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) of twenty-five officers to
rule the country and invited Barre to lead it. Barre had to consult with other
officers on the SRC to formulate policy. After surviving several coup attempts,
in 1976 the dictator created a new ruling party (the Somali Revolutionary
Socialist Party, SRSP).10 Decision-making was formally transferred
from the military SRC to the seventy-five-man executive committee of the party,
which included Barre’s civilian supporters as well as some of the officers from
the SRC. The SRC was disbanded, ending Barre’s formal
10 Barre’s Soviet allies pressed their standard
blueprint, which included a ruling party, on him. He may have created the party
to please Soviet aid providers rather than to consolidate power, but it
nevertheless functioned as other post-seizure dictatorial parties do to help
stabilize his regime.
Elite Consolidation
consultation with the military but
retaining the most powerful officers in the party executive committee. After
this first step toward military marginalization, the military had to share
decision-making with selected civilians. Barre then further concentrated power
in the party’s five-member politburo, which included Barre and his son-in-law,
who headed the internal security service. Over time, Barre replaced officers in
the politburo with civilians, further marginalizing the military. Though the
SRC was revived in 1980, it functioned thereafter as a parallel structure to
the SRSP, with Barre very clearly the key regime decision maker (Adibe 1995,
8). In general, we expect that:
Dictators create authoritarian support parties as part of an effort
to marginalize armed supporters from policy-making.
Elections to
confirm the dictator as president of the nation help to strip armed supporters
of their role as king-maker and -breaker. Elections create an appearance of
popular support aimed at undermining the feeling among officers that what the
military gives it has the right to take away. Parties help incumbents “win”
such elections even if no opposition candidates are permitted. Party
activists, who are often public employees, spread the regime’s messages,
distribute T-shirts and benefits, hold campaign events, and make sure that
citizens turn out to vote and vote for the right candidate (if they have a
choice). When legislatures have the task of anointing the president, the
selection of legislative candidates achieves high importance. Ruling party
executive committees typically choose candidates, usually in consultation with
the dictator himself. Because parties help dictators control elections, we
should expect party creation to predate elections to confirm the dictator.
Parties should be created before elections that confirm the dictator
as national executive.
If the military
were unified and able to bargain effectively, the dictator would be unable
either to redistribute resources toward new civilian supporters unilaterally
or to add new actors to the dictatorship’s inner circle at will. Consequently,
dictators infrequently propose party creation in countries with unified armed
forces.ii It is instructive therefore to observe one of the few
times when a dictator misunderstood the strategic situation and tried to create
a party despite the existence of a fairly unified army. General Gustavo Rojas
Pinilla, the leader of a military regime in Colombia (1952-58), announced the
creation of a new party, the Third Force movement. The idea received an
unenthusiastic response from other officers, and languished unimplemented until
the following year,
11 In the small number of instances in which
dictators have created post-seizure parties despite relatively unified and disciplined
militaries (as in Brazil during military rule), enforced leader rotation and
term limits have usually accompanied their creation. These institutions serve
as an insurance policy for other officers to prevent the concentration of power
in the dictator’s hands that a party might otherwise facilitate.
Factionalized Armed Supporters and Party
Creation
107
when Rojas brought it forward again. But
after meeting for several hours with an incensed group of more than a hundred
other officers, Rojas let the party quietly disappear (Szulc 1959). They had
made the threat to oust credible.
If more united
seizure groups have greater ability to resist the personalization of rule, and
hence party creation, then in military-led regimes, we might also expect to see
more parties created in dictatorships led by junior officers compared with
those led by senior officers. If the military is united and its hierarchy
intact, junior officers who lead successful coups will turn power over to a
senior officer immediately. This happens because a senior officer can command
the cooperation of officers who do not share the goals of those who led the
coup and because many officers would object to the violation of military norms
involved in a junior officer becoming president and thus commander-in-chief of
higher-ranked officers. The ability of junior officers actually to take power
after a coup suggests severe factionalism. It indicates that factional
loyalties have undermined the military’s conventional emphasis on hierarchy and
discipline.
Military dictatorships led by junior officers should create more
support parties than those led by higher-ranked officers.
Finally, we
think it unlikely that party creation would be the only effort a threatened
dictator would make to try to safeguard himself from coups. We expect that a
dictator who fears rogue coups would also invest in internal security agencies
to spy on possible plotters and that he would create new, more loyal armed
forces to protect himself from army attempts to oust him. If party creation is
part of a broad strategy for reducing reliance on the military as a base of
support, then we might expect to see that dictators who create parties are also
more likely to take personal control of the security forces and to establish paramilitary
forces to counterbalance the military than are dictators who can rely on a
united military support base.
Dictator control over internal security services should be more
likely in dictatorships that create a new support party than in those that do
not.
The establishment of new paramilitary forces to protect the dictator
should be more likely in dictatorships that create a new support party than in
those that do not.
In what follows,
we use our data set (unless otherwise noted) to examine whether these
expectations match empirical reality.
Is Party Creation Usually Initiated by the
Dictator?
In three-quarters of dictatorships in which
a party was created after the seizure of power, we find that the dictator or a
close relative led the newly created party, as would be expected if he controls
party creation. The dictator always
Elite Consolidation
delegated the leadership of the new party
to a close ally if he did not keep the post for himself or a relative.
Is Post-Seizure Party Creation Part of a Military Marginalization
Strategy?
If dictators initiate party creation as
part of a strategy to concentrate power, then party creation should be part of
a process of marginalizing other officers from policy-making. To examine
whether the process visible in Somalia is more general, we investigate how the
creation of a new support party influences bargaining between the dictator and
other officers by examining three related measures of military marginalization:
leadership rotation within the military ruling group, consultation with other
officers about policy decisions, and military representation in the cabinet.
Because this argument pertains to military-led regimes, we test these
expectations on dictatorships that gained power through armed seizures of power
(coup, rebellion, uprising, or foreign imposition) in which the military
selects the dictator. We further restrict the analysis to regimes that did not
inherit a regime support party so that we can examine the extent to which the
creation of a new party influences military marginalization. Among these
regimes, 42 percent create a new support party, while the majority rule without
a political party.12
The strongest
indicator of collegial decision-making is the regular rotation of the
presidency among officers. We expect party creation to be associated with less
leadership rotation since it helps the dictator to reduce the power of his
armed supporters. Regular leadership rotation is relatively rare: it occurs (at
some point) in only 9 percent of military-led regimes that came to power in
armed seizures (and lacked an inherited support party). We test the
relationship between party creation and leader rotation using a model with
regime-case fixed effects to isolate the influence of creating a new support
party.13 The model thus controls not only for cross-country
variation in factors such as level of development and colonial legacy, but also
for regime-specific features such as how the regime seized power, the prior
experience of regime elites, and the institutional environment in which elites
operate. We also control for two factors likely to influence the creation of
new parties: whether the current dictator is the first leader of the regime,
and the change in the international environment after the end of the Cold War
to encourage the creation of “democratic-looking” political institutions such
as parties. Figure 5.1 shows
12 These percentages differ slightly from those
above because the universe of cases in which the percentages are calculated is
different. Because military-led regimes that create a new support party last
longer than those that do not, the number of regime-years with a new support
party is larger: 55 percent of military-led regime-years have new parties.
13 This means we are comparing
periods before and after new party creation within the same regime, and then
pooling these estimates.
Factionalized
Armed Supporters and Party Creation 109
Cold war -
New party -
First regime leader - <>------------- 1
-0.1
-0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0 0.02
Probability of
rotation agreement figure 5.1
Post-seizure party creation and the rotation of dictatorial leadership.
Note: Estimating sample is military-led
regimes with an armed seizure of power and no prior support party.
that post-seizure party creation (New
party) reduces the likelihood of the regular rotation of the presidency by
roughly 2.5 percent for military leaders
who seized power without a party.
We next look at
two other measures of military marginalization: lack of consultation with
officers about policy decisions and civilianization of dictatorial
policy-making. We capture the former using country specialists’ assessments of
whether the dictator consults regularly with other officers. We measure the
latter by looking at the composition of cabinets. Military representation in
the cabinet is measured as whether the most important members of the cabinet -
other than the defense minister - are active duty or recently retired military,
police, or security officers. We define the “most important” ministries as the
prime minister (if one exists), the ministry of interior or state (which in
most countries controls the police, internal security agencies, and voting),
and others that are particularly important in the country context (e.g., the
ministry that deals with oil in oil-exporting countries). These forms of
military marginalization are quite common: in more than half of these
military-led regimes (56 percent) the dictator makes most decisions without
regular military consultation; and in most (77 percent), cabinets have little
military representation.
To analyze the
effect of party creation on these measures of military marginalization, we
again estimate a linear probability model with regime-case fixed effects, and
controls for the Cold War period and first regime leader. This approach
compares periods prior to party creation with periods after party creation
within the same regime, and then pools these comparisons into one average
estimate. It accounts for cross-country variation in economic and cultural
factors as well as regime-specific features that affect elite
110
Elite Consolidation
Not consult |
l 0.47 |
||
military |
1 I I I |
|
|
Exclude military from cabinet |
1 I 1 j 0.16 0------- 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
|
95% ci |
i---- 1---- 1---- 1---- 1---- r~
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Probability of military marginalization
figure 5.2 Post-seizure party creation and military marginalization.
Note: Estimating sample is military-led
regimes with an armed seizure of power and no prior support party.
decision-making. Figure 5.2 reports the
results, showing that party creation is associated with increases in both the
probability that dictators eschew consultation with other officers and the
likelihood that officers are excluded from the most important cabinet posts.
We also expect
that if dictators create parties as part of an effort to marginalize the
military, they should often be established in the run-up to elections that
confirm the dictator as national leader, either directly or through the
election of a legislature tasked with doing so. To assess this, we again
restrict our analysis to dictatorships that came to power via armed force and
lacked a support party when they seized power. In order to model the creation
of a new support party, the sample includes only the observation years in which
the dictatorship lacked a support party in the previous year.
We use data on
national-level elections in which the incumbent, his party, or his chosen
successor appears on the ballot to identify election years. We test the
likelihood of party creation in the year before or year of elections relative
to other years of the same regime.14 As shown in Figure 5.3, we find
that dictatorships are much more likely to create parties in the year of or
before leader elections (31 percent) than at other times (4 percent). We also
tested this prediction in a logistic regression model with control variables
(Cold War, seizure type, a polynomial of years with no new party, and first
leader), with
14 Election data are from NELDA3.We examine only
national-level presidential and parliamentary elections in which the office of
the incumbent was contested (NELDA 20) and in which the incumbent or his chosen
successor ran (NELDA 21).
Factionalized Armed Supporters and Party
Creation
III
o
.S'
30
20
o
.S'
<3
CL
10
|
31 |
|
||
|
|
|||
|
|
|
||
|
4.2 |
|
|
|
|
||||
No election
Election
figure 5.3 Post-seizure party creation before the leader’s election.
Note: Military-led regimes with an armed
seizure of power and no prior support party.
a similar result. Finally, we tested a
linear model with regime-case fixed effects to isolate variation over time
within dictatorships. Again, we find that dictatorships are more likely (18
percent) to create new parties in the run-up to elections.
0
Can More United Militaries Deter Party
Creation?
To test the hypothesis that a more unified
officer corps can better deter party creation, we use two individual traits of
autocratic leaders as proxies for factionalism/unity within the officer corps:
their age when they seized power and their rank just prior to the seizure of
power.I5 As explained above, we think that the pre-seizure rank of
the first dictator can be used as a proxy measure for factionalism. We reason
that dictatorships led by highly ranked officers may depend on either
factionalized or united officer corps for support (since a faction may be led by
a high-ranked officer), but that those led by junior officers all rely on a
factionalized military base. The future dictator’s rank before the seizure of
power is exogenous to promotions and other decisions made by the dictatorship.
We use a parallel logic with regard to the age of the first dictator. Youthful
military dictators are either low-ranked officers or higher-ranking officers in
newly created armies. We expect new armies to have more problems with
factionalism and indiscipline. We restrict the analysis to first leaders in
regimes that came to power in armed seizures of power after 1945; there are 135
dictators in this group.
15 Data on leader age from
Horowitz and Stam (2014), with updates by the authors to fill in missing data.
112
Elite Consolidation
75
<5
50
25
0
<=40
>40
low-ranking
officer
mid-ranking high-ranking not military
officer officer officer
Leader characteristics
figure 5.4 Post-seizure party creation, age, and rank of first dictator.
Figure 5.4 shows
the share of dictators in each category that created a new party. The left two
bars show that dictators forty years old or younger at the time they seized
power were almost twice as likely to create a new party as those older than
forty.
Next, we divide
these dictators into four categories: civilians before seizing power and
military officers of different ranks.16 The four bars on the right
show that two-thirds of low-ranking military dictators create new parties,
while just over one-quarter of mid- and high-ranked officers do. Just over half
of the civilian dictators to whom officers delegate power create post-seizure
parties. In other words, young or low-ranking military dictators, who reflect
factionalism in the armed forces, are even more likely to create parties than
civilians.
Next, we examine
whether these patterns persist when we control for potential confounders. To do
this, we estimate a model that compares first regime leaders with one another,
while controlling for seizure type (rebellion, uprising, and coup, with foreign
imposition as the baseline category), indicators for whether the regime before
the one being coded was a democracy or a military regime (with nonmilitary
dictatorship as the reference category), and a variable measuring whether the
dictator seized power before 1990. We cannot test dictator age at the time of
seizing power in the same model as
16 High-ranking officers are either generals or
colonels in a military where colonel is the highest officer rank. Mid-ranking
officers are colonels in a military with generals; and low-ranking officers are
majors and below. Civilians are simply nonofficers. The cases include some
civilian dictators because occasionally military officers delegate power to a
civilian leader.
Factionalized Armed Supporters and Party
Creation
113
(B
§
1
(B
CO
>40 yrs age - Prior democracy - Prior
military regime - Cold war entry - Coup - Rebellion - Uprising - Low rank - Mid
rank - Not mil. officer -
Age model
Rank model
0
-1
0
1
2
1 2 -2 Coefficient estimate
figure 5.5 Effect of age, rank, and previous regime on post-seizure party
creation.
variables for officer rank because age and
rank are highly correlated: more than 80 percent of low-ranking officers who
seize power are aged forty years or younger, while almost 90 percent of mid-
and high-ranking officers are older than forty.
Figure 5.5 shows
the results. The estimates in the left panel show that older dictators are less
likely to create new parties than younger ones, while the right panel shows
that low-ranking officers are more likely than high-ranking officers to do so.
If leader age and officer rank are good proxies for military factionalism,
then these findings suggest that dictatorships launched by factionalized
militaries are more prone to personalization. Previous democratic experience
reduces the likelihood that a new dictatorial support party will be created, as
does earlier experience of military rule, relative to earlier experience of
civilian- led autocracy.
Finally, as
another proxy indicator of less professionalized military forces, we look at
the newness of the military institution, the idea being that discipline and
norms about hierarchy probably take some time to develop. In most previously
colonized countries, the officer corps was created at around the time of independence,
so we might expect to see more post-seizure party creation in new nations with
new indigenous officer corps. To investigate this possibility, we examine the
calendar time trend in post-seizure party creation by estimating a nonlinear
model with a cubic calendar time polynomial and controls for how the regime
seized power (coup, rebellion, and uprising, with foreign imposition as the
reference category), leader’s time in office (log), and whether the dictator is
ii4
Elite Consolidation
0.3- r
CD
<D
^ 0.2
S &
M—
0 _><
1 0.1 - ro
.Q
o
1950
1960
1970
1980
Year
1990
2000
2010
figure 5.6 Post-seizure party creation over
time.
Note: Sample is military-led regimes
following an armed seizure of power, with no support party.
0
the regime’s first leader.17
Figure 5.6 shows that early in the post-World War II period, when indigenous
militaries in many countries were still quite new, dictators had the highest
propensity to create new parties. Party creation drops to a low point in the
mid-1970s, once the period of decolonization was largely finished, and remains
low for the next forty years, with a slight rise as the Cold War ended and
newly independent countries emerged from the Soviet Union. Some of these
countries lacked indigenous officers and had to create new officer corps at
independence just as the earlier wave of newly independent countries did, and
leaders in some of the post-Soviet dictatorships created new parties.
Is Party Creation Part of a Strategy to
Reduce the Dictator’s Vulnerability to Coups?
If dictators organize new support parties
as part of a broad strategy to reduce the likelihood of coups, as suggested
above, we would also expect them to engage in other coup-proofing strategies.
Coup-proofing could include taking personal control of internal security in
order to monitor potential plotters. It could also include establishing
paramilitary forces such as presidential guards, which are often recruited from
dictators’ home regions. Such paramilitary forces help to defend dictators by
remaining loyal during coup attempts by regular military
17 For this analysis we want to
model variation in party creation among countries in different time periods, so
we do not include country fixed effects.
Factionalized Armed Supporters and Party
Creation
officers. In the dictatorships in which a
party was created after the seizure of power, the dictator also takes personal
control of internal security 72 percent of the time, compared with 27 percent
of the time for dictators of regimes never supported by a party. Dictators who
establish new support parties are three times as likely to establish
paramilitary forces to protect them (52 percent) than are dictators who do not
form post-seizure parties (17 percent).
As in the tests
above, these relationships hold after we account for crosscountry variation in
a model with fixed effects: creating new parties is associated with a 25
percent increase in the probability of personalizing the security apparatus and
a 33 percent rise in the chances of forming a paramilitary force loyal to the
dictator.
These
relationships indicate that dictators initiate party creation as part of a
strategy to reduce dependence on the regular military when their original armed
support base was too factionalized to make commitments of stable support in
exchange for power sharing credible. Party creation after armed seizures of
power thus paradoxically contributes to the personalization of dictatorial
rule. Parties originally organized to lead a revolution or the struggle for
independence may develop enough internal unity and discipline to constrain the
dictator, but parties created by sitting dictators rarely do so because the
dictator himself chooses and dismisses their leaders and controls the resources
they need to maintain themselves.
POST-SEIZURE PARTY CREATION AND DICTATORIAL
SURVIVAL
We concur with other analysts in seeing
dictatorial ruling parties as autocratic survival tools (Gandhi and Przeworski
2007; Gandhi 2008; Magaloni 2008). We believe that post-seizure parties, like
inherited parties, prolong dictatorial survival beyond what it would have been
without them, but we see parties created after armed seizures of power as playing
a quite different role in bargaining among elite actors than that played by
parties that lead seizures of power. Post-seizure parties reduce intra-elite
conflict by helping the dictator to concentrate power at the expense of armed
supporters. The reduction in elite conflict increases dictatorial longevity.
Beatriz
Magaloni’s (2008) influential argument suggests that parties extend the life of
dictatorships because they make possible credible intertemporal promises by
the dictator to continue sharing spoils if allies continue supporting him. She
suggests that parties can solve dictators’ credibility problem if the dictator
delegates control over appointments to high offices, including the dictatorship
itself, to the party. When the party controls access to office, the dictator
has reason to fulfill his promises because he knows he can be ousted, and his
allies have reason to remain loyal because they can expect higher offices in
the future. She refers to this form of power sharing as delegation by the dictator
to the party, which implies that the dictator’s own interests are served by it.
Elite Consolidation
That seems a
dubious assumption. Such agreements prolong regime survival while limiting both
the dictator’s time in power and his resources while in power. Thus, they do
not appear to serve the dictator’s interests. We suggest that dictators agree
to such arrangements when they are weak relative to the rest of the dictatorial
elite. That is, they agree to limit their own discretion when their choice is between
becoming dictator under constraints and not being dictator at all. We can
identify two empirical conditions that contribute to the dictator’s relative
weakness: (i) very recent accession to leadership, which we discuss in greater
detail in Chapter 8 and (2) the wide dispersion of armed force among factions
within the ruling group. Weakness forces the dictator to grant this form of
power sharing. If power has already begun to be concentrated in the dictator’s
hands when the party is created, or if creating a new party helps the dictator
reduce his dependence on armed supporters, he has less reason to delegate
powers that may increase regime survival but not his own time in office. After
most seizures of power through force, the dictator does not delegate control
over highest offices to the party.
With the notable
exception of the PRI regime in Mexico, nearly all dictatorships in which the
dominant party actually controls access to high office were brought to power by
parties originally organized before the seizure of power to win elections, lead
revolutions, or fight for independence. In very few cases in which parties were
created after the seizure of power does the party control access to high
office.
Instead, as
shown above, the dictator himself or one of his relatives leads the newly
created party most of the time. In 45 percent of regimes in which the dictator
creates a post-seizure support party, he also controls appointments to the
party executive committee.18 Controlling appointments to the party executive
committee is symptomatic of much broader control. A contemporary observer of
Mobutu (who created a post-seizure support party), for example, reports: “He
controls and distributes all offices, all the posts, all advantages linked to
power. All revenue, all nominations, all promotions ultimately depend on
presidential good will.”19 Where the dictatorship’s support party
pre-dates the seizure of power, by contrast, the dictator controls appointments
to the party executive committee in only 28 percent of cases.
The dictator who
controls appointments to the party executive committee not only cannot make
credible promises to share; he does not want to do so. Instead, he tries to
keep his supporters insecure about the future so that they will compete with
each other and work hard to demonstrate their loyalty. In Rafael Trujillo’s
Dominican Republic, for example, all officials had to sign undated letters of
resignation before taking office. Legislators who displeased
18 This and the following figure
refer to dictatorships in which the regime gained power in an armed
seizure (coup, uprising, rebellion, or
foreign imposition).
19 Jean Ryneman, “Comment le
regime Mobutu a sape ses propres fondements,” Le Monde
Diplomatique, May 1977.
Factionalized Armed Supporters and Party
Creation
117
Trujillo simply disappeared from the
legislature and sometimes from the world of the living without anyone seeming
to notice. Multiple legislators “resigned” within a month after nearly every
election (Galmdez 1973). Cabinet ministers could find out they had lost their
jobs by reading it in the newspaper (Hartlyn 1998). The statutes of the party
Trujillo created after seizing power gave him the unilateral right to make
decisions about who occupied these posts (Galmdez 1973). Under Mobutu,
“state-party personnel are completely dependent on him for selection,
appointment, and maintenance in power ... The powers of appointment and
dismissal that Mobutu wields create constant uncertainty for all officials,
which helps to maintain their loyalty to him” (Callaghy 1984, 180).
In many of the
regimes in which the dictator’s intertemporal commitment problems have not been
solved, both dictators and dictatorships nevertheless last a long time. Mobutu
lasted thirty-seven years in a very turbulent political environment, and
Trujillo for thirty-one. Dictatorships that achieved power by force but then
later created post-seizure parties last more than twice as long on average as
otherwise similar regimes without support parties. To sum up our argument, even
parties that do not deliver benefits beyond a relatively small group and do not
control access to highest offices can still prolong both dictator and regime
survival.
Next, we compare
the effect on dictatorial survival of ruling parties established before and
after seizures of power. We test a linear probability model with country and
year fixed effects, controls for regime duration, and indicator variables for
party history: pre-seizure electoral party, pre-seizure rebel party, no party
(reference category), and new party (post-seizure creation). This analysis
accounts for the fact that some regimes were still in power at the end of the
sample period in 2010. The results show the following average yearly regime
collapse rates: 10.1 percent probability of breakdown for dictatorships without
a support party; less than half that, 4.5 percent, for those in which a party
was created post seizure; 3.8 percent for regimes led by parties first
organized to run in elections before the initiation of dictatorship; and only
1.9 percent for regimes led by parties organized to lead insurgencies. Comparison
between the breakdown rate for regimes lacking support parties and those that
create a party post-seizure provides compelling evidence that party creation prolongs
survival because regimes that lack support parties and those that create one
post-seizure have similar origins: both typically achieved power by force (most
often via coup).20 Apparently, autocracies supported by parties that
have not solved the dictator’s commitment problem - that is, parties that we
20 Regimes that lacked a support party at the time
of seizure but later created parties came to power via a coup in 65 percent of
cases; those that did not create a party seized power in a coup in 60 percent
of cases. In contrast, only 17 percent of regimes supported by a preexisting
party achieved power via coup.
Elite Consolidation
New |
|
1 --- O---
1 |
party |
----- 0— |
---- 1 1 |
Prior |
|
1 -- O---
1 |
rebel - |
---- A- |
1 |
party |
|
|
|
||
Prior |
|
1 --- O---
| |
elected - |
|
—A--- |
party |
_ |
|
1 |
-0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0
Coefficient estimate
O No unit
effects a RE o FE figure 5.7
Parties and regime survival.
Note: Negative coefficient estimates
interpreted as a decrease in the likelihood of collapse, relative to the
comparison group: regimes that never have a support party.
know did not control the dictator’s access
to office because he achieved it before the party came into existence -
nevertheless last quite a long time.
Figure 5.7
displays these same relationships as comparisons among regimes without support
parties and regimes supported by parties created at different times for various
purposes. In all models, dictatorships with support parties are less likely to
end. In models that include fixed effects (circle symbol), postseizure party
creation is associated with a bit more than a 10 percent decrease in the
likelihood of regime collapse compared with having no support party. Parties
originally created before the seizure of power to run in elections or lead
insurgencies reduce the likelihood of regime breakdown even more, but not by a
great deal more.
These
comparisons show that armed forces by themselves often do not provide a
reliable support base for autocracy. Consequently, dictators who are delegated
power by a seizure group that did not need to be organized as a party in order
to achieve power can improve the odds of retaining it by creating a support
party to counterbalance the potential volatility of military support.
the effect
of post-seizure party creation on the likelihood of coups
If our argument about party creation is
correct - that it is pursued by dictators propelled to power by factionalized
armed seizure groups in order to lessen their risk of ouster by force - then we
should see fewer coups and coup attempts in regimes that create parties than in
those that opt not to. To evaluate this expectation, we look at the incidence
of coups in dictatorships without support
Factionalized
Armed Supporters and Party Creation 119
Coup attempts Successful coups
CD
\
Regime duration Regime duration
figure 5.8 Coups in dictatorships with post-seizure parties or no parties.
parties at the time of the seizure of
power. We compare the likelihood of coups in dictatorships that initially
lacked a support party but later created one with those that never organized
supporters into a party at all.
We begin by
looking at the differences in the baseline rate of coup attempts - both failed
attempts and successes - between regimes that had created parties and those
that never did.21 Coup risk declines on average during the first few
years in all kinds of dictatorships, as dictators try to remove their least
reliable supporters from troop commands, and the least stable dictatorships
collapse and exit the sample. Figure 5.8 shows that during the first two
decades in power, regimes that never create a party are at greater risk of both
coup attempts (shown in the left panel) and successful coups (shown in the
right). This implies that dictatorships that never create a party are
particularly susceptible to coup conspiracies.
Because we have
argued that the creation of a mass-based civilian support party deters officers
from staging coups, we expect to see a larger difference in coup attempts than
in successful coups. A comparison of the left and right panels of Figure 5.8
shows larger differences between the two lines for attempted than for
successful coups. Both panels also show that the coup risk for dictatorships
that have created support parties remains stably lower for more than a decade
after party creation.
21 The baseline coup rate is the five-year moving
average of the number of coups and coup attempts, by regime duration year,
divided by the number of regime-years at risk of having a coup (for each regime
duration year).
120
Elite Consolidation
In contrast,
there is a large spike in coup attempts after the first decade in power for
regimes that never create a party. Typically, armed seizures of power are
followed by retirements of officers ranked above those who take power and a
purge of officers who supported the ousted government. Rapid promotions for the
cohort of the active coup plotters and those just below them follow. These
changes in the officer corps create a cohort of coup beneficiaries, but over
time many of these officers will retire or be dismissed, creating opportunities
for younger officers to gain command of troops. Coups depend on troop command,
and these junior officers become the coup plotters of the future. In this way,
the normal seniority-based promotions inherent in military careers interact
with the ambitions and criticisms of junior officers to produce the spike in
coup attempts that begins after about ten years in power unless a well-
established support party deters them.
The difference
in trends for regimes with and without ruling parties is important for showing
that party creation has consequences. If the trend lines moved in similar ways
in each set of regimes, we might wonder if preexisting differences accounted
for the difference in coups. However, the trends diverge, suggesting the
limitations in the coup-proofing strategies that can be deployed by dictators
dependent on all-military support bases.
For further
evidence that dictatorships with parties created post-seizure are less
vulnerable to coups, we note the success rate for coups conditional on attempts:
while 22 percent of coup attempts in regimes with post-seizure parties succeed,
nearly 29 percent succeed in regimes that never established a support party.
After five years in power, the difference is greater: only 20 percent of coups
in regimes with post-seizure parties succeed, while the share that succeeds in
regimes with no party increases to 35 percent.22 This suggests that
once we account for all the factors that lead to coup attempts in the first
place, dictators who have created a new support party have greater ability to
thwart them. This result most likely reflects the strong correlation between
post-seizure party creation and investment in other coup-proofing strategies,
especially the dictator’s establishment of new paramilitary forces recruited
from especially loyal regions. Republican guards, presidential guards, and
other kinds of specially recruited paramilitary forces are usually stationed
near the presidential palace and tasked explicitly with defending him from
armed challenges.
Next, we test a
series of parametric models to evaluate whether creating a party reduces coup
risk. We employ a nonlinear estimator with random effects for each regime.
First, we test a specification with a minimum of control variables: time since
last coup (logged), whether the dictator is civilian
22 These differences are statistically
significant. During the first five years, however, the difference in success
rate is not statistically significant. Remember that these are the success
rates for coup attempts against dictatorships that achieved power without the
support of a party, most of which are led by the military. The higher success
rate found in other studies refers to coups against democracies and other
dictatorships as well (e.g., Singh 2014).
Factionalized Armed Supporters and Party
Creation
121
New party
Civilian leader -
(B
£
3
.N
<E
to
o
5
6 © q:
Coup yrs (log) -
Rebellion -
Coup -
Foreign -
Uprising -
-1 0 1 Coefficient estimate
O Coup successes o Successes with controls
□ All attempts □ Attempts with controls
figure 5.9 Post-seizure party creation and coup risk.
(as opposed to military), and how the
regime seized power (coup, rebellion, foreign imposition, or popular uprising).23
The top set of estimates in Figure 5.9, shown as large diamonds, is from this
model, with successful coups as the dependent variable. Next, we add a set of
standard control variables often thought to affect coup risk: GDP per capita
(log, lagged), economic growth (lagged two-year moving average), oil rents
(log, lagged), military expenditure (log, lagged), civil and international
conflict (lagged), and protests (lagged). In the third specification we return
to the minimal model but use all coup attempts (failed and successful ones) as
the dependent variable. In the final model, we add controls to the all attempts
model. In all four tests, post-seizure party creation is associated with a
lower incidence of successful coups; however, the estimate for New Party is
only statistically significant at the 0.10 level for the all attempts models.
To further
explore how the creation of new support parties influences coup risk, we
estimate a conditional logit model that compares the coup risk of individual
leaders before and after new party creation.24 This analysis looks
only at the
23 The reference category for
seizure type is nonviolent, which includes family seizures, authoritar-
ianization, and rule-change seizures.
24 The specification includes the
time since last coup (logged) and a binary indicator for the Cold War period.
122
Elite Consolidation
sixty-seven leaders in dictatorships that
initially lacked a support party but later created one; that is, it looks only
at rulers who held power during periods both with and without a support party.
Importantly, by focusing on the variation over time for individual dictators,
we can rule out alternative explanations based on differences between leaders,
regimes, and countries. The results from this test (not shown) also indicate
that coup risk is lower after new party creation.25
Thus far in this
chapter, we have combined reshuffling and regime-change coups when examining
how party creation protects the dictator from ouster. Our theory about why
dictators who achieved power by force later create parties to organize civilian
supporters, however, claims that party creation helps the dictator concentrate
personal power over other members of the ruling coalition. That idea leads to
the expectation that new parties should lengthen dictators’ time in power by
deterring coups aimed at replacing leaders (reshuffling coups), but not
necessarily those aimed at ending the regime. Members of the ruling group who
want a change in leadership but not the end of the regime organize most
leader-change coups. Regime-change coups, however, are usually organized by
factions of the military excluded from the inner circle of the dictatorship. If
party creation is a dictator’s strategy for increasing his own power relative
to that of other members of the dictatorial ruling group, as we have argued, it
should protect him from leader-shuffling coups but not necessarily from
regime-ending coups.
Figure 5.10
shows the results from a series of random effects models similar to those in
Figure 5.9. The first two estimates are from models of leader- shuffling coups
that treat regime-change coups as right-censored events, while the latter two
estimates are from models of regime-change coups that treat reshuffling coups
as right-censored events. These tests indicate that post-seizure parties are
associated with fewer leader-shuffling coups but not with fewer regime-change
coups.26
This evidence is
consistent with our theory that post-seizure party creation is a strategy to
protect dictators from their erstwhile allies in the armed forces. That is,
party creation protects dictators from coups led by ambitious regime insiders
eager to take the dictator’s place without ending the regime. Postseizure
party creation is less reliably helpful for deterring coups aimed at ending the
regime. We know from the findings reported in Figure 5.1 that the creation of
new parties contributes to the survival of regimes as well as individual
25 This result is statistically significant only
at the 0.10 level. We also test similar models that divide the newly created
parties into two categories: those led by the regime leader (or close relative)
and those led by someone else. We find that, as expected, only those newly
created support parties led by the regime leader are correlated with lower coup
risk. These are the cases in which party creation contributes most to the
personalization of rule. This finding is highly significant and persists in a
similar model that isolates the temporal variation within regimes.
26 These results also hold in a
conditional logit model and in linear probability models with regime- case
fixed effects.
Factionalized Armed Supporters and Party
Creation
123
Coefficient estimate
O Leader |
0 Leader |
□ Regime |
□ Regime |
shuffle |
shuffle |
change |
change |
coups |
(controls) |
coups |
(controls) |
figure 5.10 Post-seizure party creation and reshuffling versus
regime-change coups.
dictators, but the results shown in Figure
5.10 imply that the extra regime durability associated with party creation
comes not through coup deterrence but through some other mechanism. We discuss
this other mechanism, the civilian side of how newly created parties contribute
to regime durability, in Chapter 6. Those coups that do end the entire regime -
rather than just replace the dictator - occur most often when junior officers
from excluded ethnic groups successfully oust the regime leader and allied
senior officers. Thus, the evidence from differentiating regime-change from
leader-shuffling coups suggests that the kind of parties created by dictators
post-seizure do not successfully coopt ethnic groups excluded from executive
power and the senior officer ranks.
To conclude this
section, dictators who organize post-seizure parties are less vulnerable to
coups than dictators in regimes unsupported by a ruling party, as our argument
detailing the motivations for post-seizure party creation implies. Further, the
evidence suggests that post-seizure party creation helps deter coups emanating
from regime insiders rather than those plotted by groups of soldiers excluded
from the ruling group.
conclusion
Dictators who achieve power through force
of arms can face special difficulties in consolidating their rule because many
of their supporters control sufficient
124
Elite Consolidation
weapons to oust them. This chapter has
focused on the consequences for intraelite bargaining of the interaction
between the dispersion of armed force across members of the ruling group and
the group’s division into multiple factions. When many members of the seizure
group - and the ruling coalition it becomes - command armed forces sufficient
to threaten the dictator with ouster, they can achieve an effective
power-sharing bargain with the dictator if they can maintain their own unity.
If, however, deep factions divide an armed seizure group, those included in the
dictator’s inner circle cannot credibly commit their subordinates to support
the dictator if he shares power and spoils. Consequently, power-sharing
bargains cannot be maintained.
When the
dictator cannot secure his hold on power by agreeing to share with the rest of
the seizure group, he is better off keeping a larger share of the spoils and
other benefits of office so that he can invest in other strategies. We suggest
that dictators who depended on armed supporters to achieve power, but who
cannot count on those supporters for holding onto it, often try to counterbalance
their armed supporters with unarmed ones. To accomplish this, they organize
civilian support networks and appoint their leaders to the dictatorial inner
circle. The addition of civilian supporters to the ruling group changes
bargaining within the group by increasing the diversity of interests and
further reducing the unity of the inner circle; this in turn undermines the
bargaining power of members of the dictatorial inner circle relative to the
dictator. It thus contributes to the personalization of dictatorial rule. These
civilian support organizations are usually called parties.
The evidence
shown in this chapter is consistent with the argument that factionalism within
an armed seizure group increases the likelihood of postseizure party creation.
We also offer evidence that post-seizure party creation usually reflects a
dictator’s interest rather than the collective interest of the ruling group:
dictators usually assume a new party’s leadership themselves; new parties tend
to be established in the run-up to elections that “legitimize” the dictator’s
occupation of national executive office; and dictators often control
appointments to the executive committees of ruling parties created
post-seizure. We further show that post-seizure party creation is associated
with the marginalization of military influence within the dictatorial inner
circle.
Finally, we provide
several kinds of evidence that post-seizure party creation is an effective
dictatorial survival strategy. It is associated with both longer dictator
tenure in office and longer regime survival. Party creation seems to protect
dictators from coups, as would be expected if it were a strategy for reducing
the dictator’s vulnerability to ousters launched from an unreliable military
force. After controlling for other factors known or believed to affect the
incidence of coups, post-seizure party creation is associated with a reduced
incidence of both coup attempts and successful coups.
Further
investigation shows that post-seizure party creation affects the incidence of
leader-change coups but not regime-change coups. This is what would be expected
if party creation is a strategy used by dictators to safeguard
Factionalized Armed Supporters and Party
Creation
125
themselves from armed insiders rather than
a group strategy for regime defense. The findings in this chapter thus explain
how party creation extends the survival of individual dictators: it is
associated with a reduction in the likelihood of coups that would replace one
dictator with another insider. They do not, however, explain how new
dictatorial support parties contribute to regime survival. We turn to that
question in the next chapters.
Post-seizure
party creation thus seems paradoxical within the usual way political scientists
think about authoritarian parties and support coalitions. The creation of a
mass party through which some benefits are channeled from the political center
to ordinary citizens seems to imply the broadening of the dictator’s support
coalition. At the same time, however, such broadening among the mostly
powerless accompanies a disorganization and eventually a narrowing of the
support coalition among the powerful, as threatening military supporters are
replaced by less powerful civilian ones. In most cases, much of the military
becomes marginalized after post-seizure party creation. Civilian party leaders
handpicked by the dictator replace military members of the dictatorial inner
circle, but they have much less ability to constrain or oust the dictator than
do armed supporters. Post-seizure party creation thus transforms the dictator
from a relatively equal bargainer within a group of others similar to himself
into an arbiter among competing support factions, reducing his dependence on
all of them and enhancing his individual discretion over resources and policy.
PART III
RULING SOCIETY
Implementation and Information Gathering
6
Why Parties and Elections in Dictatorships?
IMPLEMENTATION, MONITORING, AND INFORMATION
GATHERING
As the initial conflicts within the inner
circle become resolved, and elite decision-making becomes somewhat predictable,
the ruling group must turn its attention to the rest of the country. Most
dictatorships face some very basic problems when it comes to trying to rule the
places they have taken control of. One ordinary problem is the need to motivate
the implementation on the ground of decisions made in the inner circle,
especially in new dictatorships when local officials may have owed their jobs
to the ousted government.
Policy
implementation requires the cooperation of local officials, who must be
converted to the new order after regime change or recruited afresh, and then
monitored to assure collaboration and prevent abuse of office. Without effective
monitoring, local officials can sabotage policies, abusive ones can motivate
popular opposition to the new regime, and resources extracted from citizens may
stick to officials’ fingers rather than reaching central coffers. Direct monitoring
requires expertise and resources, however. Many dictatorships lack the trained
and loyal manpower needed to do it and the revenues needed to pay them.
Information
shortfalls are another and related ordinary problem (Wintrobe 1998). The
dictatorial elite needs information about who opposes them, how their policies
are working, and what disasters and difficulties afflict people in different
parts of the country. Central leaders have difficulty acquiring needed
information. Local officials engaged in sabotage, theft, or abuse of power will
not provide accurate reports on local conditions. Even loyal and honest local
officials dread being blamed for problems if they reveal them, and everyone
fears retribution for bearing bad news. The potential for violent and arbitrary
129
130 Ruling Society: Implementation and
Information Gathering
punishment in dictatorships distorts and
disrupts the information reaching regime elites.
Cadres and
officials whose futures depend on successful performance of tasks assigned to
them by regime leaders have incentives to report successes and to hide policy
failures and popular opposition. Writing about the last years of the East
German dictatorship, which fell to popular opposition in 1989, Peter Grieder
(2012, 91) reports:
The heavily varnished reports sent to the
centre by district and local party officials only fortified the rarefied fool’s
paradise in which party leaders cocooned themselves. Most functionaries dared
not submit truthful reports lest they be blamed for the problems identified in
them. In 1988 and 1989, almost all failed to inform the Politburo accurately of
the deteriorating situation.
Several of the
most horrific dictatorial policy failures, such as the famine caused by the
Great Leap Forward in China and the mass starvation during Pol Pot’s rule in
Cambodia, resulted partly from local cadres’ unwillingness to report appalling
policy failure on the ground (Kiernan 1982; Manning and Wemheuer 2011).
To solve some of
their problems with policy implementation, monitoring, and information
gathering, dictatorships establish seemingly democratic institutions, such as
elections, mass parties, and legislatures, as we detail later. In order to
engage ordinary people, institutions dependent on popular involvement must
distribute benefits to motivate citizen participation. In return for access to
benefits, help, and opportunities, citizens join the ruling party, vote, and
demonstrate regime support in other ways. Mass organizations also facilitate
mostly nonviolent forms of coercion and social control. The monitoring of local
officials and information gathering are by-products of the more visible
distributive and mobilizational functions of popular institutions.
In this chapter,
we discuss some of the institutional arrangements used in dictatorships to
enmesh, coopt, and gather information from ordinary citizens. We first describe
the uses of ruling parties to routinize the exchange between the political
elite and citizens of benefits for loyalty and service, while solving some of
the dictatorial elite’s implementation and monitoring problems. Next, we
discuss how legislatures fit into the system of local information gathering and
distribution of resources to citizens. Then we show the way elections
incentivize the extension of patron-client networks down to the village and
neighborhood level and the transfer of information from the grassroots to the
center. We demonstrate that elections, even elections without choice, increase
the benefits that reach the grassroots. This chapter thus focuses mostly on the
deployment of positive incentives to encourage information gathering,
monitoring, and citizen support.
We also explain
the staying power of these institutions once they have been established. The
institutions that engage citizens tend to stabilize and become
Why Parties and Elections in Dictatorships?
costly to change, as large numbers of
individuals develop an interest in maintaining them. The tendency of mass
institutions toward stabilization contrasts with the fragility of agreements
made within the ruling group, where temptations to renege on agreements are
ever-present. The stability of mass institutions contributes to regime
routinization.
ELITE COMPETITION AND INSTITUTIONS THAT
ENGAGE CITIZENS
As members of the inner circle strive to
improve their standing relative to others in the elite, they seek new sources
of information and new ways to bolster the clientele networks that support and
depend on them. Formal political institutions that reach, engage, and collect
information from ordinary citizens can contribute to achieving these goals.
Besides newly created ruling parties, explained in Chapter 5, such institutions
include inherited ruling parties, elections, and legislatures. The
institutions that extend distributive, mobilizational, and
information-gathering capacity to the grassroots are run by, and report to,
particular members of the dictatorial elite. They increase the power of the members
of the inner circle who control them because they create resources that are
useful in inner-circle competition. Institution creation generates jobs for
supporters and thus helps the individuals who lead them to build their
individual clientele networks. Institutions also generate new information
streams that benefit those with access to them.
Besides these
advantages to particular individuals, outreach institutions are expected to
help secure the regime,1 which is the reason members of the inner
circle who do not benefit directly from them agree to their creation. These
institutions can contribute to regime persistence by distributing benefits to
ordinary citizens - and thus reducing their likelihood of joining opposition
campaigns or uprisings - by increasing the likelihood of discovering plots and
by reducing predatory behavior by local officials.
PARTIES
In Chapter 5, we focused on the use of
newly created parties to counterbalance factionalized military support. Here,
we emphasize other uses of parties: their information-gathering,
mobilizational, and distributive activities.
The obvious
function of dictatorial ruling parties is to distribute benefits to the
nonelites on whom the dictatorship’s survival depends. The party routinizes the
exchange of material benefits (such as salaries, profit opportunities, favors,
1 A number of studies have shown that
dictatorships supported by parties last longer than those that lack a support
party (Geddes 1999; Gandhi 2008; Magaloni 2008). All members of the dictatorial
elite benefit from this.
132 Ruling Society: Implementation and
Information Gathering
special access, various kinds of goods, and
services) for the loyalty, effort, and time of party activists and members. The
ruling party organization monitors the performance of party cadres to make sure
the dictatorial leadership is getting its money’s worth from those to whom it
provides benefits - in theory if not always in practice.
If the party led
the seizure of power, then members of the party need to be rewarded for the
risks they took and the privations they suffered to make the seizure possible.
Regardless of how the dictatorial elite achieved power, however, the
dictatorship continues to need active effort by loyalists to handle policy
implementation, monitoring both officials and society, and information
gathering as well as the organization of winning votes and the other displays
of support that deter overt opposition.
Demonstrations
to support dictators are rarely spontaneous. They require the work, organization,
and logistical skills of many people, and these people have to have already
developed their links to the rest of the community. It thus makes sense for
dictatorships to use ruling-party networks to orchestrate support
demonstrations. Such demonstrations serve serious purposes. Like election
victories, they signal strength. Outsiders often respond to obviously
orchestrated displays of popular support with puzzlement or ridicule because
they assume the demonstrations aim to fool people about the dictatorship’s
popularity. We think this reaction reflects a misunderstanding. Such demonstrations
show the strength of leaders and the regime in that they demonstrate the
resources and organizational capacity to turn out huge crowds, choreograph
their activities in minute detail, and prevent unwanted demands or unruliness
from arising during mass actions that bring many thousands of people into
face-to-face contact where they could potentially share grievances and plot
unrest.
We interpret the
over-the-top displays of grief and gargantuan demonstrations after Kim
Jong-Il’s death and his son’s succession in North Korea,2 for
example, as a costly signal aimed at two different audiences during a time of
regime weakness. One signal aimed to show foreigners that the population would
defend the regime if it was attacked. The other signaled the resources and
commitment of the faction supporting Kim Jong-Un to members of the elite who
doubted the wisdom of choosing a politically inexperienced twenty- something as
regime leader.
The need to
organize demonstrations and election victories makes intermittent demands on
party activists, but policy implementation, monitoring, and information
gathering are their everyday tasks. Central leaders expect to solve the
implementation problem by appointing party members to administrative jobs.
Leaders assume that people who helped put them in power share
2 “North Korean Leader Kim
Jong-il Dies ‘of Heart Attack,’” 2011, BBC News (December 19), www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16239693
(accessed November 20, 2015).
Why Parties and Elections in Dictatorships?
133
their ideas and interests and will
therefore be loyal. The ruling group tries to assure the loyalty of officials
and policy implementation on the ground by limiting government jobs and
official posts to party members. They hope that shared dependence on the ruling
party will align officials’ incentives with their own and thus prevent sabotage
and noncompliance with central directives.
If the party
lacks sufficient educated members, they must continue to rely on some of the
ousted government’s employees but use party militants to monitor as much of
their behavior and performance as they can. Monitoring is not limited to officials
whose loyalty is suspect, however. Ruling parties also try to monitor their
members who hold official positions to prevent shirking, stealing,
incompetence, and other human frailties.
Cadres assigned
to locations outside the capital are also expected to monitor local conditions
and local people for signs of disgruntlement or opposition. Local officials are
the main source of information about the grassroots for leaders in the capital.
Officials are required to report on local affairs, expressions of opposition,
strangers visiting, movements of people through the area, and anything else
central authorities might consider signs of impending danger as well. In this
way, they contribute to the information available to leaders. Leaders may also
use party loyalists as “a network of unpaid spies and informers [in order] to
keep all potential enemies under surveillance” (Lewis 1980, 150).
Central leaders
assign party cadres many other tasks as well, for example, explaining policy
choices to other citizens, and thus building support and compliance with them.
The dictatorial elite expects party activists to “persuade the masses to ...
fulfill obligations to the state as well as to comply with laws and party
resolutions. At the same time they are expected to give higher-level party
authorities accurate feedback about both basic needs and concerns of the
population and its reactions to party policies” (Porter 1993:> 71).
The ruling party
usually controls local governance through its control over the choice of local
officials. Local administration can include law and order, provision of social
services and emergency aid, hiring in local offices and schools, and allocation
of basic infrastructure like electricity and piped water. If parties are well
developed enough to control so many things of importance in daily life,
citizens have strong reasons to cooperate with the ruling party and to refrain
from overt opposition.
Party cadres are
supposed to provide sufficiently good local governance and distribute enough to
ordinary people to prevent the mobilization of opposition. Some mass parties
also incorporate large numbers of ordinary people in networks that distribute
smaller or intermittent benefits. Typically, party networks distribute whatever
benefits the dictatorship makes available to nonelite supporters during
election campaigns and via party control of local government. Party activists
trade material benefits to citizens in return for political support,
134 Ruling Society: Implementation and
Information Gathering
just as in democracies.3 Regime
leaders want their parties to develop clientele networks down to the grassroots
in order to make sure goods reach the masses and information is collected.
These are
important and time-consuming tasks. Doing them well requires effort and skill
as well as loyalty. Party cadres must be paid for their time and effort. The
payment of salaries and other kinds of benefits to party cadres builds and
maintains a fairly wide network of people who receive something of value from the
dictatorship and therefore tend to support it. Public employees and officials,
who are ruling-party members in most dictatorships organized by parties, often
form the core of popular support for dictatorships. Those employed by the party
tend to be the dictatorship’s most committed supporters because their own
well-being depends on regime survival.
The Limitations of Dictatorial Ruling Parties
Dictatorial ruling parties often come up
short with regard to accomplishing all the tasks central elites assign to them.
Many of the reasons for their failure to perform well lie in human nature. The
dictator himself may cause additional problems with the quality and motivations
of party cadres, however.
Because parties
have so much mobilizational potential, dictators exercise vigilance to make
sure the party support base remains their own rather than being used by those
with the responsibility for day-to-day party leadership or their allies. To
prevent other members of the inner circle from using party- organized mass
mobilization on their own behalf, dictators often interfere with party
leadership. Most of the time (80 percent),4 the dictator himself
leads the ruling party.
The party
strategy of General Francisco Franco of Spain provides an example of such
vigilance and its consequences. Franco delegated the task of creating a support
party from the civilian groups that backed his military uprising to his
brother-in-law, making certain that the party did not become a challenging
center of power during the early days when a chaotic political environment made
that most possible. After its first years, when the regime had stabilized,
Franco selected new leaders, reduced the importance of the party, and halved
its budget (Payne 1987). Throughout the long years of his rule, Franco used the
party to counterbalance his military support base, carefully preventing either
one from becoming the dominant force in the dictatorial inner circle. By the
1950s, “no one belonged to the party who did not in some way make a living from
it” (Payne 1961, 262). Franco, however, repeatedly
3 Although most dictatorships use a party to
organize distribution, dictators who have chosen not to organize a party can
instead use administrative officials to distribute state resources to buy the
cooperation of citizens. Several Middle Eastern monarchies have used this
strategy.
4 This number differs from the
one noted in Chapter 5 because it refers to the proportion of all dictatorial
ruling parties, not just those created after seizures of power.
Why Parties and Elections in Dictatorships?
i35
resisted party leaders’ efforts to rebuild
it into a more engaged organization that could attract idealistic adherents and
thus potentially increase its political heft. The instrumental nature of most
party members’ loyalty did not hinder the party’s ability to turn out huge,
cheering crowds for Franco to harangue, an activity he enjoyed (Payne 1987).
The Spanish
example also illustrates a very common reason for the failure of dictatorial
ruling parties to carry out all the tasks assigned to them. People join them
for instrumental reasons. Once dictatorships are established, opportunists
typically swamp even the parties that attracted very idealistic and committed
members before seizing power. Some dictatorships, notably those controlled by
communist parties, invest heavily in screening applicants and monitoring
members’ behavior, but most do not. Parties need not be all-encompassing or
highly disciplined organizations in order to be useful to dictators, and most dictatorial
ruling parties are not. Even if the party cannot be used as an organizational
weapon, it still builds robust patron-client networks linking regime insiders
to party members. The delivery of benefits via these patron- client networks
creates vested interests in regime survival.
These vested
interests, however, often fail to reach all areas of the country because many
real-world ruling parties have lacked the number of trained and disciplined
cadres needed to penetrate society effectively, especially during the first
years after seizures of power or following post-seizure party creation. As a
result, the number and location of people incorporated into the dictatorship’s
support network can be quite limited. Moreover, central regime leaders often lack
the ability to monitor the behavior of local party cadres. The task of
distributing goods to citizens creates opportunities for party cadres and local
officials to steal, embezzle, and abuse their power. As we explain below,
elections help to reduce abuses that most dictatorial ruling parties could not
otherwise control.
Why Dictatorial Ruling Parties Persist
Despite these limitations, all dictatorial
ruling parties control the allocation of some benefits that citizens value.
Even those that have not successfully developed grassroots networks create
strong attachments with those people whose jobs or other benefits depend on the
ruling party. As a result, if parties are established, they tend to become
self-sustaining. Organizing a ruling party, allocating resources to it to pay
employees and distribute some benefits to others, and building the networks
needed to link the regime inner circle to local leaders create widespread
vested interests in the party’s persistence. Citizens want to continue
receiving whatever benefits the party delivers. Elites who occupy high offices
in the ruling party would be alienated by losing their posts, which might lead
to efforts to unseat the dictator.
In dictatorships
organized by parties, all members of the ruling group - whether officers or
civilians - derive some benefits from the party, but one
136 Ruling Society: Implementation and
Information Gathering
member leads it, and a few control key
party resources, most importantly, appointments to government jobs and party
offices. Whoever controls the party has some influence on membership in the
inner circle itself, as well as lower levels of leadership and vast numbers of
jobs in both government and party. Nor would the dictator usually want to
eliminate a counterbalance to the military. Disbanding the party would leave
the military unchecked, and thus a greater threat to him.
Consequently,
once in existence, regime support parties are rarely disbanded. Indeed, only
10 percent of dictatorships with support parties later dissolve them. Where
they are disbanded, regime insiders often replace them with a new party led by
many of the same people.
To sum up,
parties seem to be an effective way to organize regime supporters and to
routinize the distribution of benefits to them and the gathering of information
from them. From a dictator’s point of view, a party that organizes quotidian,
largely instrumental support may be safer than one that can mobilize great
activism and idealism, unless the dictator himself feels confident about his
ability to control and direct it. Many dictators, like Franco, talk the talk of
heroic party activism, but in practice rely on the government bureaucracy for
making policy and allot to the party only humdrum tasks. Even where ruling
parties have little real capacity to affect policy and leadership choice,5
they tend to persist because they deliver benefits both to the dictatorship’s
inner circle by increasing regime stability and to party activists and members.
DICTATORIAL LEGISLATURES
Some analysts have argued that dictatorial
legislatures serve as arenas for policy bargaining (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006;
Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Gandhi 2008; Malesky and Schuler 2010). Case
studies and interviews with deputies often suggest a different picture, however.
The Indonesian parliament during the long Suharto dictatorship, for example,
“never drafted its own legislation and ... never rejected a bill submitted by
the executive branch. It has no say in cabinet appointments [and] little
influence over economic policy” (Schwarz 2000, 272). In Guinea Bissau, the
assembly provided “pro-forma electoral acclamation of those appointed by the
[ruling] party to government posts. It also [served] as a public forum for the
airing of party propaganda and for the routine yes-voting on party policies”
(Forrest 1987, 113). During the Diori dictatorship in Niger, “the assembly
never served as a serious forum for debate” (Decalo 1990, 257). Ellen Lust-Okar
argues that in dictatorial legislatures “competition is not over policy-making.
Many (and in some cases most) policy arenas are off-limits to parliamentarians
... Rather ... [legislatures]
5 See Brooker (1995) for a
comparison of the ruling parties in a number of party-based autocracies with
regard to how large a role they play in policy choice.
Why Parties and Elections in Dictatorships?
i37
provide an important arena for competition
over access to state resources” (2006, 459).
Interviews with
deputies reinforce Lust-Okar’s claim. In response to the question “To what
extent do you believe that the parliament is able to influence the government?”
only 7 percent of Jordanian deputies thought parliament played a large role
(Lust-Okar 2006, 470). An Ivoirian deputy responded to questions about his
activities as follows: “Individual deputies have no business trying to discuss
[policies made by the ruling party politburo] in the Assembly because rhetoric
is a waste of time and could even be harmful” (Zolberg 1964, 282). Another
reported that deputies are “concerned mainly with gaining access to ...
tangible benefits for their constituents” (Zolberg 1964, 283).
Our reading of
the evidence is that most authoritarian legislatures play a role in the
allocation of private benefits and local public goods to citizens, but that
they have little influence on policy (Truex 2016).
The most
valuable function of legislatures to dictatorships may be that they incentivize
competition among regime supporters for the opportunities the legislature makes
available to deputies themselves. The ruling elite’s decision to elect a
legislature creates highly desirable plums to be distributed to party militants
by the dictator or those to whom he delegates the task of choosing candidates.
Deputies usually receive salaries and other perquisites such as the use of cars
and subsidized housing, as well as access to many kinds of opportunities and
favors that can be used to help their friends, further their careers, and
accumulate personal wealth.6 So, ambitious people have strong
reasons to compete for nominations and office. Ruling elites use this
competition to motivate deputies to extend their distributive networks to the
grassroots and transmit information to the center from the grassroots, as we
describe in the next section.
ELECTIONS
Most dictatorships led by parties have
regular popular elections. Until about 1990, most held single-candidate or
single-list elections that gave voters no choice at all. Even elections without
choice involve substantial costs because a campaign has to be organized to
reach all parts of the country, and in most dictatorships, elites want to be
able to claim high rates of voter participation. The frequency of elections in
dictatorships, especially choice-free elections, raises the question: What are
they for?
The
dictatorships that held regular choice-free elections included the communist
regimes and a number of one-party dictatorships in developing countries.
Before the end of the Cold War, only about one-quarter of party-led
6 See Zolberg (1964, 192-93),
Lust-Okar (2006), and Blaydes (2011) for discussions of the benefits of
elective office.
138 Ruling Society: Implementation and
Information Gathering
autocracies allowed opposition in
legislative elections. The proportion that allows some opposition has risen to
nearly two-thirds (61 percent) since the end of the Cold War.
When voters have
some choice but the regime outlaws important parties, restricts suffrage to
prevent substantial numbers of people from voting, or tilts the electoral
playing field in ways that give the ruling party substantial advantages, we
label elections semi-competitive. Dictatorships have inventive ways to bias
election outcomes. Current semi-competitive electoral systems include those
that:
• Permit all
opposition parties to compete but use control of the media, interference with
opposition campaigning, fraud, violence, and large-scale state spending to bias
outcomes
• Permit some
parties to compete but not others (e.g., regimes that outlaw popular Islamist
parties while allowing secular opposition)
• Permit no opposition
parties but allow independents to contest elections
• Permit
competition among ruling-party candidates but not opposition parties.
Terms such as
electoral authoritarian, competitive authoritarian, and quasi- democratic refer
to dictatorships that hold regular semi-competitive elections, or sometimes a
subset of such systems.7 Since the end of the Cold War,
international donors have tied foreign aid and other resources to holding
elections that allow some competition. Many dictatorships also receive help in
paying for elections. Indeed, some observers have suggested that aid offered to
induce holding multiparty elections has become an important source of illicit
wealth for the dictator’s cronies in some regimes.8
Figure 6.1 shows
the per capita amounts of aid (in constant US dollars) going to dictatorial
regimes in which the paramount leader had won a semi- competitive multiparty
election (solid line), a one-party election (dashed line), or no election
(dotted line).9 The last category includes regimes such as communist
dictatorships, where ruling party elites choose regime leaders (though
legislatures were usually elected in single-party elections); about half of
military-led regimes; and monarchies. Until the early 1990s, dictatorships that
held uncontested executive election rituals, such as Egypt during much of the
time after 1952, received the most aid per capita. Post-Cold War, however,
7 See Ezrow and Frantz (2011)
for a review of the terms used to capture different types of electoral
dictatorships.
8 Wiseman, for example, sees “a real danger that
foreign assistance for elections can simply become a new avenue for personal
accumulation by state elites; in practice a new type of ‘rent’” (1996, 940).
9 Aid per capita is measured using a three-year
moving average. We show the median instead of the mean level to reduce the
influence of outliers. Substantial Western (US) aid flowed to Afghanistan,
Iraq, and Pakistan from 2001 to 2010.
Why Parties and Elections in Dictatorships?
139
Year
-- Multiparty election...... One party election Not elected
figure 6.1 Foreign aid and the election of dictators.
dictatorships that hold semi-competitive
executive elections, and can thus claim to be taking steps toward democracy,
receive the most aid.10
This pattern
reflects two changes that occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s: donors
withdrew aid from dictatorships that refused to hold multiparty contests, and
many autocracies held multiparty elections for the first time. Substantial
research suggests that changing donor behavior prompted many dictatorships to
allow multiparty contests.11 Sometimes these elections led to
electoral defeat for the dictator and democratization. But often, dictators
successfully navigated the imposition of multiparty elections and remained in
power. Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Erica Frantz (2014) show that since the end of
the Cold War, dictatorships increasingly rely on pseudo-democratic institutions
and that this accounts for part of the global increase in autocratic survival
rates.
Even when some
competition is allowed, dictatorial elections rarely determine either who
rules or the government’s policy strategy. Their prevalence, even before the
end of the Cold War and despite the risks they involve, suggests that they have
other important functions, however. In this section, we highlight two of these
functions. First, presidential elections are costly signals of the dictator’s
strength, aimed at deterring elite defections from the ruling coalition (Geddes
2005; Magaloni 2006). Second, legislative and local elections create incentives
that might not otherwise exist for party officeholders and cadres to
10 Levitsky and Way (2010) show
strong evidence that semi-competitive elections do not imply that democracy
lurks around the corner.
11 See Dunning (2004), Wright
(2009), Bermeo (2011, 2016), and Dietrich and Wright (2015).
140 Ruling Society: Implementation and
Information Gathering
extend their patron-client and
information-gathering networks to the grassroots, which helps authoritarian
regimes to survive.
Big election
wins for the dictator demonstrate his capacity to run a successful mobilization
campaign, which deters both elite and mass opponents from active opposition by
raising the perceived probability of regime survival. If an incumbent victory
appears inevitable, potential opponents are less willing to shoulder the costs
of overt opposition. Wins against opposition generate the strongest signals of
regime strength, but even elections without choice show that the dictatorship
has the resources and organizational capacity to ensure mass voting. To be
effective in deterring opposition, vote and turnout counts need to be reasonably
honest (Magaloni 2006). However, dictatorships can apparently tilt the playing
field by controlling the media, concentrating state resources on supporters,
and harassing, threatening, jailing, or beating up opposition activists without
undermining elections’ usefulness in deterring elite defection. In contrast,
visibly fraudulent vote counting has sometimes set off explosions of popular
hostility, bringing down dictatorships (Tucker 2007; Rozenas 2012).12
Most
dictatorships that hold executive elections also elect a legislature and/ or
local officials as well, usually at the same time. Although ruling parties and
dictators seldom lose semi-competitive national elections, individual ruling-
party candidates for the legislature or local office do sometimes lose.
Moreover, competition for ruling-party nominations is often far more fierce
than partisan competition. Even where a dictatorship holds choice-free
elections, ambitious party militants compete with each other for party
nominations. In the Ivory Coast under one-party rule, for example, about ten
candidates competed for each party nomination. “Although electoral competition
has been eliminated, in the realm of recruitment [i.e., nominations]
competition still exists ... This has insured that the system remains
responsive to the demands of various groups in the population” (Zolberg 1964,
272).
The real
possibility of losing in either the competition for nomination or
semi-competitive elections creates incentives for elected officials to deliver
benefits to citizens, as Aristide Zolberg observed. During the decades when it
held no national elections, the Kuomintang (KMT) regime in Taiwan “promoted
electoral participation at the local level, using elections to pressure party
cadres ... Chiang [Ching-kuo] openly stated that the threat of electoral
punishment was necessary to force cadres to jettison ‘old conceits,’
internalize new attitudes, and consolidate the party’s broadening social base”
(Greitens 2016, 101).
12 Examples include the ousters of Slobodan
Milosevic in Serbia and Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia, after the announcement
of election results seen as fraudulent (Kuntz and Thompson 2009). Perceptions
of election fraud have also led to massive unsuccessful protests that were
nevertheless costly to the ruling group, as in Iran in 2009 and Venezuela in
2013.
Why Parties and Elections in Dictatorships?
141
Party leaders’
nomination decisions depend on the potential candidate’s behavior in his
previous office or as a party organizer, as well as loyalty and other factors.
In order to hang on to their posts, officials in most dictatorships have to
ensure high turnout even in elections without choice and substantial majorities
for the ruling party when voters have choices. Low turnout, low vote shares, widespread
absenteeism from pro-regime events, opposition demonstrations, and other
manifestations of citizen anger in their districts alert central leaders to the
faults of local officials and reduce their chance of renomination. In addition,
any sort of electoral competition, whether with tame opposition parties or
other candidates from the ruling party, gives voters the opportunity to throw
out incumbents who have disappointed or exploited them.
Competition thus
puts pressure on local officials and deputies to refrain from exploitation and
brutality toward constituents and compete on behalf of their areas in the
national scramble for schools, clinics, paved roads, and whatever else is being
given out. They need to deliver some benefits and provide some local public
goods in order to ensure turnout, votes for the ruling party, and participation
in ruling-party rallies. The need to deliver benefits to voters gives ambitious
officials and candidates incentives to convey the needs and problems of their
districts to central leaders and build clientele networks to reach the
grassroots. Legislative and local elections can thus improve the dictatorship’s
information-gathering capacity and add many more people to the group receiving
benefits from the dictatorship.
Elections help
dictators overcome their problem monitoring local officials as well. “
[E]lections are a way of obtaining information ... [T]hey provide an occasion
for inspection of the party structure at the local level” (Zolberg 1964, 272).
The failure of local people to turn out or vote for ruling-party candidates
alerts regime leaders to officials’ shirking or bad behavior and initiates
investigation of local problems. By creating these incentives, local and
legislative elections partially substitute for monitoring local officials, with
citizens’ votes serving as “fire alarms.”13 Elections thus give
local officials self-interested reasons to behave as regime leaders want them
to. As several scholars have noted, ruling elites have an interest in controlling
predation by local officials because it contributes to popular opposition to
the regime.14
In other words,
elections help align the incentives of deputies and local officials with those
of the center by giving them strong reasons to limit leakage in the transfer of
benefits from the center to their regions, treat constituents
13 McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) coined the term
“fire alarm” for the use of complaints or appeals to alert principals to the
misbehavior of their bureaucratic agents in situations in which continuous
monitoring would be costly.
14 Note the number of analyses of China’s ruling
party’s use of citizen petitions and internet freedom to complain about
officials as a means of monitoring local officials (e.g., Paik 2009; Lorentzen
2014). China is one of the few contemporary party-led dictatorships that holds
no direct elections above the village level.
142 Ruling Society: Implementation and
Information Gathering
decently, and convey information about the
needs and grievances of voters to central decision makers. After an election,
the knowledge that they will face renomination and reelection gives legislators
and local elected officials reasons to reinforce their clientele networks,
compete for resources from the center for their districts, and do favors for
local notables. Local officials’ need to attract nominations and votes at
regular intervals reduces the temptation to hide local complaints from the
center, steal goods intended for distribution, abuse their authority over
people in their districts, and exploit those dependent on them. In other words,
even uncompetitive elections help to limit principal-agent problems between
central authorities and local officials in contexts in which monitoring would
be both expensive and often ineffective.
In regimes with
uncompetitive elections, information about local officials is conveyed mostly
by real (as opposed to reported) turnout (Magaloni 2006). In most
dictatorships, low turnout means either that local officials and activists have
not done their job of making sure that people go to the polls or that people
are hostile enough to risk penalties for failing to vote.15
Elections, even
if uncompetitive, thus provide regular opportunities for the generation of
information useful to regime elites about how local officials have performed,
whether policies work on the ground, and levels of disenchantment among
citizens in different areas of the country, as a number of analysts have noted
(Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). We think that information about lower- level
officials and policy implementation has more value to leaders than the
distorted information elections provide about popular opposition to the dictatorship.
We do not consider elections good sources of information about citizen opinion
because votes depend on which alternatives exist, whether people see ending the
dictatorship as possible, and other strategic considerations. Besides,
dictatorships need daily information about opposition, not information at
multiyear intervals. This is the reason they invest so heavily in internal
security agencies (discussed in Chapter 7).
The benefits
that ordinary citizens receive because of elections are by-products of
competition among politicians in dictatorships, just as in democracies. Most
of this distribution flows through politicians’ clientele networks, happens in
person at campaign events, or involves the politically motivated allocation of
local public goods, so it is tangible and visible to recipients and those close
to them.
Election
campaigns are a predictable time when citizens can expect to receive something,
beyond whatever services and public goods they usually enjoy, in exchange for
their votes. During election campaigns, many people who have no interaction
with officials or party activists most of the time receive extra food
15 There are a few dictatorships in which leaders
seem to encourage turnout only among those whose votes are easiest to
manipulate, e.g., during Mubarak’s rule in Egypt (Blaydes 2011). As an example
of how seriously most dictators take turnout, Cameroonian President Paul Biya
has dismissed cabinet ministers to punish them for low turnout in their
constituencies (Jua 2001, 39).
Why Parties and Elections in Dictatorships?
i43
and entertainment in autocracies, just as
they do in many democracies. For example, Egyptian calorie consumption rose
during election campaigns in the Mubarak dictatorship (Blaydes 2011).
Belarusian president Aliaksandr Luka- shenka “fixed elections, but still spent
money on his campaign as if he were part of a real contest” (Wilson 2011, 196).
He staged a six-week pop music tour to entertain voters during campaign events
in 2010 (Wilson 2011, 219). Salvadoran military dictator Julio Rivera
“campaigned as hard as, or perhaps harder than, he would have had he been
opposed” (Webre 1979, 47). Paraguayan dictator Alfredo Stroessner “stumps the
country as though he were in a real race ... All his appearances are surrounded
by a great deal of hoopla - fiestas, dances, barbecues, parades ... and
stirring polkas praising Stroessner’s deeds” (Lewis 1980, 106).
As with other
institutions that engage ordinary people, elections tend to become routinized
and predictable over time, even though dictators may have initially introduced
them only to placate foreign donors. The ad hoc referenda held after violent
seizures of power, which new dictators never lose, are seldom more than
opportunistic attempts to use the appearance of popular support to give pause
to opposition elites, international critics, or ambitious rivals in the inner
circle. Once elections have occurred a couple of times, however, eliminating
or postponing them has a much different meaning than failure to hold elections
in the first place.
Because
successful elections are a signal to potential elite defectors of the regime’s
invincibility, postponing scheduled elections signals a regime or dictator in
difficulties. Postponement implies that regime leaders fear defeat. A postponed
election has the same political effect as the announcement that the dictator has
suffered a mild stroke: it sets off a covert struggle for power among potential
successors, increases plotting, and motivates efforts to cooperate among
regime opponents. Indeed, irregular elections (which include those held after a
postponement)16 are twice as likely to be followed by regime
collapse as regular ones, and leaders who preside over irregular elections are
more than twice as likely to face a bad post-exit fate (death, imprisonment, or
exile) compared with leaders who hold regular elections. For these reasons,
dictatorships rarely postpone scheduled elections, even when growth has stalled
or other problems reduce their ability to control election outcomes. Only 8
percent of dictatorships that held one executive election failed to hold others.
If they fear losing elections, dictators have a number of tools safer than
postponement at their disposal. They can alter electoral rules, increase their
control over media, and disqualify opposition candidates, usually without
serious consequences.
16 Unfortunately, available data
do not allow us to distinguish postponed elections from other irregular ones.
144 Ruling Society: Implementation and
Information Gathering
Tests of the Effects of Elections
In what follows, we test some implications
of the argument that dictatorships use elections to incentivize the extension
of their information-gathering and distributive networks to the grassroots. We
reason as follows. If elections are a costly signal of the dictator’s
invincibility, we would expect to see central government spending increase
during election years as officials demonstrate their ability to organize and
mobilize the masses. If sending a costly signal was the only purpose of
elections, however, we would expect to see much higher spending during semi-competitive
election years (when a costlier signal is sent) than during elections without
choice. On the other hand, if an important function of elections is to
incentivize local candidates to extend distribution to the grassroots, we would
expect to see high spending during all elections, regardless of competition
because distribution to the grassroots is costly. Our second test compares
health spending in countries with dictatorships that hold either uncompetitive
or semi-competitive elections with those in which no elections are held. If
elections incentivize spreading benefits to the grassroots, we should see
evidence that health spending reaches ordinary people. To test this
expectation, the third test looks at whether elections actually affect citizen
welfare. We use child mortality as an indicator of welfare.
We first compare
government spending in election and nonelection years. If elections motivate
additional distribution to citizens, government spending should rise in
election years. Other analysts have found evidence in a number of specific
dictatorships of a political-business cycle in which public spending rises
before semi-competitive elections (Heath 1999; Gonzalez 2002; Magaloni 2006;
Pepinsky 2007).17 To investigate whether this is a general
phenomenon, we compare average spending in election years with spending in
nonelection years in dictatorships with support parties.
To pinpoint the
electoral mechanism, we identify the years of first-round presidential and/or
legislative elections in which the incumbent party, regime leader, or a
hand-picked successor was on the ballot, relying on data from the NELDA project
(Hyde and Marinov 2012).18 These elections include both
uncompetitive and semi-competitive events.
17 The foundational literature on political budget
cycles focuses on democracies, positing that myopic voters use retrospective
voting to sanction incompetent politicians. Knowing that voters do this prompts
incumbents to pursue expansionary economic policy prior to elections (Nordhaus 1975).
The evidence for political budget cycles in advanced industrial democracies is
weak, but political budget cycles are more prevalent in new democracies (Block,
Ferree, and Singh 2003; Brender and Drazen 2004; Shi and Svensson 2006).
Analysts suggest that lack of transparency, high personal rents for retaining
office, and a large share of uninformed voters provide stronger incentives for
incumbents to pursue fiscal manipulation before elections. The same conditions
characterize many dictatorships.
18 We use neldaio, neldaii, and
neldaii.
Why Parties and Elections in Dictatorships?
i45
We restrict the
analysis to regularly scheduled elections, excluding any that had been
scheduled but then postponed or canceled (neldai and nelda6). This
qualification is important because the timing of both elections and spending
decisions may be determined by unmodeled factors such as political instability,
international shocks, or economic crises. For example, a rise in the international
price of a country’s main export might motivate a dictator to call elections
while times are good and also encourage increased public spending. We want to
exclude the possibility that dictators time elections to surf waves of
popularity rather than manipulating spending at election time (Kayser 2005).
The possibility of opportunistic election timing is of special concern for
irregularly held elections when, by definition, the election date is not fixed
ex ante, so we exclude those. In the sample period, 1961-2010, there are 174
regular election years.
To investigate
whether elections influence the distribution of benefits, we examine general
government spending, measured as logged per capita expenditures. We include
control variables for decade, leader duration (logged), the age dependency
ratio, trade (% GDP), civil and international conflict, GDP per capita
(logged), population size (logged), and oil rents per capita.19
Standard
empirical specifications in the political business cycle literature employ a
lagged dependent variable model (Brender and Drazen 2004; Alt and Lassen 2006;
Shi and Svensson 2006; Hyde and O’Mahoney 2010). The dependent variable is
typically a change variable as a proportion of the total economy, for example,
ABudget/GDP. The main independent variable is a dummy for pre-election,
election, or post-election year. We depart from this specification in three
ways, while retaining the lagged dependent variable and change in spending as
the dependent variable. First, we purge the dependent variable of the GDP
measure in the denominator to allow for a more transparent test of the
election effect. A measure of economic size and population are included as
right-hand-side variables to ensure that the estimated effect of elections is
conditioned on country size. Second, we estimate an error- correction model
that allows for a more general test of both the long- and short-run impacts of
elections. Empirical models that include only a dummy variable for elections on
the right-hand side of the equation estimate the total effect of elections
without separating short-term changes from long-run equilibrium relationships
(De Boef and Keele 2008). Finally, because of the paucity of data on budget
balance in dictatorships, we estimate the effect of elections on spending,
where the dependent variable is the change in ln(Expenditure)
19 Data on age dependency ratio, trade, GDP, and
population are from the World Development Indicators (2015). Conflict data are
updates to Gleditsch et al. (2002), and oil rents data are from Wimmer,
Cederman, and Min (2009).
146
Ruling Society: Implementation and
Information Gathering
All incumbent elections
Elections with and without opposition
Election year t+1 t + 2 No
opposition Opposition contested
Years since
election Election year
figure 6.2 The electoral spending cycle in dictatorships.
8
8 -
4
4 -
& 0
-4
-4 -
measured in constant dollars, using data
from the World Development Indicators (2015).20 The specification
is:
Aln( Exp) =
ln(Exp )t-1 + AE + Et-1 + AX + Xt-1 + St + Q,t (6-i)
where E is a binary indicator for election
year, X is a vector of control variables, and St are decade effects. We
estimate this equation with a linear model that corrects for heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation in the errors.
The left panel
of Figure 6.2 shows the results. The plot shows that dictatorships, on
average, increase spending during election years, as expected. Expenditures
move closer to the long-run equilibrium levels in the years following
elections, though there is still some increased spending after elections, as
would be expected if much of the extra expenditure in election years is for
construction, infrastructure, and local public goods, which often have costs
extending over multiple years. These findings are consistent with both the
claim that dictatorial elites use spending and mobilization during election
campaigns to signal invincibility and the claim that dictatorships distribute
to the grassroots during elections.
Next, we compare changes in spending at the
time of elections with and without opposition participation. If authoritarian
elections are only a way for
20 The main results for government spending are
robust in specifications without control variables, with regime-case fixed
effects and AR(i) errors, and with year effects, as well as alternative error
estimators. We drop observations associated with the budget crisis in Zimbabwe
in 2008, and the subsequent fiscal rebound the following year, because these
are clear outliers in the spending data. We also drop the election in Senegal
in 1968 because this a clear spending outlier. Adding these observations back
into the estimating sample yields a stronger result than that reported in the
right panel in Figure 6.2.
Why Parties and Elections in Dictatorships?
i47
the dictatorship to demonstrate its support
relative to the opposition (in order to deter elite defections) or to identify
regions of opposition party strength, we would expect spending to increase
before contested elections but not before uncontested ones. If, however,
elections help dictatorial elites to align the incentives of local officials
with their own, then we would expect to see spending increase during elections
regardless of opposition participation. Because potential ruling-party
candidates have to compete for nominations even when elections are
uncompetitive, we argue that uncompetitive elections motivate candidate
behavior and government spending similar to that of candidates who face
opposition party competition.
The right panel
of Figure 6.2 shows the results from a test that splits regularly scheduled
elections into two groups: those in which the dictatorship allowed opposition
participation and those in which no opposition contested the election.21
The plot shows that dictatorships increase spending during both types of elections.
The estimates for each type of election are roughly the same size as the
estimate that pools both groups of elections together. However, the estimates
for contested and uncontested executive elections are not statistically
significant because there are fewer observations in each category when the
sample is divided. To further explore this finding, we also tested models that
separate all dictatorships with legislatures that include some opposition from
those without opposition (or with no legislature). In these tests (not shown),
we find that dictatorships that allow no competition at all still boost
spending during election years.22
The evidence
about government spending thus suggests that both semi- competitive and
uncompetitive elections motivate increased effort by officials to reach
citizens with benefits. Through this mechanism, dictatorships can use elections
to monitor the behavior of local officials and buy support from citizens.
The argument
that elections help to monitor the behavior of local officials implies that
officials engage in less theft and abusive behavior in dictatorships that hold
elections, and therefore that citizen welfare would improve. Next, we
investigate this implication. We assess the effect of authoritarian elections on
citizen welfare. These tests focus on the average effects of different election
rules, not on cycles. The point of this examination is to compare the effects
of semi-competitive and uncompetitive elections, relative to holding no
elections, on the distribution of welfare-enhancing goods to citizens. If
elections
21 Opposition-contested elections, as defined
here, are those that meet the following three criteria: (1) an opposition party
exists to contest the election (neldaj), (2) more than one political party is
legal (nelda4), and (3) there is a choice of candidates or parties on the
ballot (neldaj). All other elections are considered uncompetitive. There are 67
uncompetitive elections and 106 opposition-contested elections in the sample
(1961-2010).
22 Replication files also report
a test that looks separately at the years 1990-2010, in which uncompetitive
elections remain associated with an increase in government spending.
148 Ruling Society: Implementation and
Information Gathering
Child mortality
Health spending
Semi-competitive electoral regime
One-party/candidate electoral regime
Regime duration - GDPpc (log) - Legislature
- Monoethnic party - Multiethnic party -
J-A-
l-D-
Semi-competitive electoral regime
One-party/candidate electoral regime
Regime duration GDPpc (log) Legislature
Monoethnic party Multiethnic party
-1 -0.5 0
Coefficient estimate
-0.1 0 0.1 Coefficient estimate
0 Time trend, |
a Add GDP, oAdd party |
Region effects |
conflict |
0 Time trend, |
a Add GDP, oAdd party |
Region effects |
conflict |
figure 6.3 Dictatorial elections and health
outcomes.
encourage politicians and officials to
extend their patron-client distribution networks to the grassroots, as we have
argued, we should see better welfare outcomes associated with elections.
This analysis
relies on child mortality rates, which are a good indicator of overall popular
well-being, and government spending on health care as a measure of government
effort.23 It compares dictatorships with unelected leaders with
those that hold semi-competitive executive elections and those that hold
one-candidate elections.24 The left panel of Figure 6.3 shows child
mortality rates, and the right panel shows central government spending on
health. The top coefficient in each cluster was generated by a model that
contains only controls for regime duration (logged), geographic region, and
time period fixed effects, to capture world time trends in child mortality and
health costs.25 The second estimate adds GDP per capita (in constant
dollars, logged) and a measure of the time since the last high-intensity
conflict as controls.
23 IMF data on health spending, available from
1985 to 2009, come from Clements, Gupta, and Nozaki (2011). Data on the
under-five mortality rate (U5MR) come from the Institute of Health Metrics and
Evaluation and span the years from 1971 to 2010.
24 Dictatorships that hold semi-competitive
executive elections nearly always also hold competitive legislative elections,
whereas quite a few dictatorships with semi-competitive legislative elections
do not have contested executive elections, so we use executive elections for
this test. The sample used for these tests is all dictatorships: 1971-2010 for
child mortality and 1985-2009 for health spending.
25 There are eighteen region effects corresponding
to the Global Burden of Disease categories from the Institute for Health
Metrics and Evaluation. We do not include country effects because 84 percent of
the variation in the child mortality rate is cross-sectional. However, a
bivariate model with country effects yields similar results.
Why Parties and Elections in Dictatorships?
149
The third
estimate adds information about legislatures and regime support parties. It
includes an indicator variable for the existence of an elected legislature and
indicators for ruling parties with support from just one ethnic group
(monoethnic) and those that are supported by multiple ethnic groups (multiethnic).
The reference category for the party variables is dictatorships without a
support party. If elections in this specification improve child mortality
rates, it means that elections affect welfare beyond any effect of legislative
bargaining directly on welfare or on economic performance (which would affect
welfare indirectly) and any advantage that dictatorships organized by parties
have in the delivery of services. Recall that our argument about the effect of
elections on the incentives of officials implies that more benefits should
actually reach citizens if the regime holds elections. Since the vast majority
of dictatorships that hold executive elections also have ruling parties, this
is a hard test.
Figure 6.3 shows
that child mortality rates are lower and health care spending higher in
dictatorships in which executives face semi-competitive elections compared with
those in which they face no elections, regardless of the specification. Even
after controlling for the effects of legislatures and ruling parties, elections
improve welfare, as our argument predicts.
Our
interpretation of the effect of uncontested elections must be a bit more
tentative because changing the specification affects results, but models that
account for level of development and conflict (bottom two coefficients in each
cluster) suggest that child mortality rates are also lower and health spending
higher in dictatorships with uncontested elections than in those without elections.
The pattern shown here is what would be expected if even uncompetitive
elections create incentives for officials to attend to the welfare of ordinary
people, as we have argued.
The main results
with regard to legislatures and parties are that they make no independent
contribution to child welfare or health spending when elections are controlled
for. Indeed, ethnically exclusive dictatorial ruling parties are associated
with higher rates of child mortality than exist in dictatorships without
parties. This finding suggests that when the leadership of a dictatorial ruling
party excludes some or most of a country’s ethnic groups, welfare- enhancing
benefits go only to included groups. We interpret the nonsignificant
coefficient for multiethnic ruling party as meaning that although ruling
parties distribute benefits, in the absence of elections, party cadres lack
incentives to extend distribution to poorer citizens.
We find no
support for the claim that dictatorial legislatures serve as fora for policy
bargaining (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, 2007; Gandhi 2008). If bargaining in
legislatures contributes to economic performance, as analysts have proposed, it
should lower child mortality rates, but we do not see evidence of that. We take
this to indicate that in most authoritarian legislatures, little real policy
bargaining occurs, or at least that whatever bargaining occurs has little
effect on public welfare. Dictatorships do negotiate with private economic
interests, of course, but primarily through informal personal contacts with
150 Ruling Society: Implementation and
Information Gathering
business people,
as documented in the many empirical studies of state-business relationships in
autocracies (e.g., MacIntyre 1994; Doner and Ramsay 1997; Schneider 2004).
One of the
reasons welfare-oriented policy bargaining rarely occurs in dictatorial
legislatures is that potentially challenging mass-based opposition movements,
of the kind discussed by Gandhi and Przeworski (2006, 2007), have seldom had
enough representation in dictatorial legislatures to bargain there effectively.
In less than a quarter (23 percent) of authoritarian legislatures has the
opposition held more than 25 percent of seats, as would be required in order to
bargain with any chance of success.26 Moreover, several of the dictatorships
that allow the largest number of opposition deputies tolerate only moderate
opposition parties while excluding more popular and challenging parties
(Lust-Okar 2005). Rather than bargaining with the largest opposition group,
some autocrats survive by keeping the most challenging opposition divided from
more easily coopted moderates who are allowed legislative seats and the private
benefits that go with them. The underrepresentation of opposition in
dictatorial legislatures may be the reason for our finding that distributive
effort undertaken in the context of elections has more effect on popular
welfare than legislatures do.
In sum, the
findings offered here suggest that though dictatorial elites use elections
strategically for the survival benefits they confer, elections also bring some
benefits to citizens as a by-product. Post-Cold War foreign aid may thus have
made some contribution to improving the lives of people living in dictatorships
through incentivizing dictators to distribute more at election time, regardless
of whether it has been effective in encouraging democratization.
CONCLUSION
Once elite bargaining has evolved into
somewhat predictable patterns, dictatorships often face problems with the
implementation of their policies, monitoring local officials to prevent theft
and abuse of office, and gathering information from the grassroots. Many
dictatorships use institutions that engage ordinary citizens to help solve
these problems.
In dictatorships
with support parties, central leaders generally assign responsibility for
gathering information about local conditions and opinions, as well as
implementing regime policies, to party members who serve as local officials,
civil servants, or managers and employees in state-controlled firms. Leaders
expect party cadres to explain policies, build support for them, and prevent
ordinary people from ignoring or sabotaging central directives, while also
distributing positive inducements for cooperation. They also expect officials
26 Prior to 1990, this figure was 16 percent. In
the subsequent two decades, this figure jumps to 38 percent.
Why Parties and Elections in Dictatorships?
and cadres to send information about local
problems, how policies work on the ground, and signs of opposition to central
authorities. Often, however, regime elites lack the capacity to monitor the
behavior of party cadres and officials. As a result, they may contribute less
to implementation and information gathering than regime officials had hoped.
Instead, they may steal benefits earmarked for citizens, demand bribes, seize
land and other assets from local residents, sabotage or distort policy
implementation, falsify information about local conditions, and in other ways
abuse their positions of power.
Local and
legislative elections partially compensate for regime leaders’ limited ability
to monitor their local agents, which may be the reason nearly all dictatorships
supported by parties hold elections. Low votes for regime candidates or low
turnout can serve as “fire alarms” to alert leaders to especially incompetent,
abusive, or corrupt local officials. The need to achieve winning votes and high
turnout motivates legislators and local officials to distribute most benefits
provided by central leaders to constituents rather than diverting them, to try
to acquire resources from the center for their areas, and to convey information
about local problems to top officials in order to secure aid. Even where no
partisan competition is allowed, there is competition among potential
candidates for ruling-party nominations. Nominations depend on earlier success
in mobilizing citizens, which gives legislators and elected local officials
reasons to care about the goodwill of constituents.
Legislative and
local elections thus align the incentives of mid- and lower- level officials
with the needs of top leaders. Regime leaders need reasonable levels of
competence and honesty in local officials to prevent mass alienation and
potential opposition mobilization. They also need information about problems
and local disasters so that they can respond effectively. Elections give local
politicians, job-holders, and the regime’s lower-level officials reasons to
develop clientele networks that reach to the grassroots to distribute resources
in exchange for votes, and to bring information about local needs to the
attention of central policy makers. By creating broader vested interests in
regime survival, a more effective system of distribution to the grassroots, and
additional information for regime insiders, elections aid regime survival.
Elections in
which voters “choose” the dictator serve a different purpose, however. The
dictator need not monitor himself, but nevertheless nearly as many
dictatorships schedule regular executive elections as regular legislative
elections. From the dictator’s point of view, executive elections help deter
elite defections, which are the most serious threat to both the dictator’s and
the regime’s survival (Svolik 2012; Roessler 2016). Executive elections
demonstrate the dictator’s control over the resources needed to hang on to
power. They show that he can mobilize very large numbers of people and
demonstrate his command of a nation-wide network of political activists. They
aim to show potential defectors that it would not be easy to organize enough support
to replace the dictator. If campaigns are well run, potential defectors cannot
tell how much popular support is genuine, but they can observe the enormous
152 Ruling Society: Implementation and
Information Gathering
deployment of human and material resources.
To achieve this mobilization, dictators distribute even larger quantities of
goods than do dictatorial legislatures.
A number of
previous studies have shown that dictatorships led by parties and those that
have legislatures last longer than dictatorships that lack these institutions.
In the current chapter we show evidence consistent with the claim that
elections are the institutional mechanism that links parties and legislatures
with regime durability. We show, first, that elections are associated with
increased government spending, as would be expected if dictatorial governments
distribute various kinds of benefits and local public goods during campaigns.
Increased
distribution leading up to elections would be expected no matter what the
reason they hold elections. If the only purposes of elections were to deter
elite defections or to provide information about where opposition exists, we
would expect to see much more public spending during semi-competitive elections
than during elections without choice. Choice-free elections are a weaker signal
of regime invincibility and convey little information about opposition. In
order to test whether elections also help align the interests of central and
local officials, our second empirical test compares the effect of elections
with and without choice on public spending. We find that the increase in
spending is about the same for both kinds of elections. We interpret this
finding as support for the claim that all elections, even uncompetitive ones,
incentivize deputies and local officials to deliver benefits to the grassroots
because they entail competition for party nominations even if there is no
competition in general elections.
As a further
test of the argument that elections incentivize politicians to reach the
grassroots with benefits, we look at whether dictatorships that hold elections
spend more on health than dictatorships that do not, and at whether health
outcomes actually improve. We show that dictatorships that hold semi-
competitive elections spend more on health care than do dictatorships that hold
no elections, and that they have lower rates of child mortality. Even uncompetitive
elections are associated with higher health spending and lower rates of child
mortality than exist in dictatorships that hold no elections. We interpret
these findings as further support for the argument that competition for ruling-
party nominations gives legislators and local officials reasons to attend to
their constituencies even when there is no partisan competition. The lower
rates of child mortality suggest that local officials in systems with any kind
of elections are more likely to play the role regime leaders assign to them in
the distribution of benefits than local officials in systems without elections.
In other words, elections partially substitute for direct monitoring of local
officials by central leaders. Including controls for the existence of a
legislature and ruling party does not change these results, and legislatures
make no independent contribution to these outcomes.
Why Parties and Elections in Dictatorships?
i53
Elections for
legislatures and local offices thus help protect dictatorships by providing a
means of periodic monitoring to detect predatory behavior, theft, and
incompetence in lower-level officials. At the same time, they give officials
and deputies strong reasons to report information about local problems and
discontent to central leaders, to lobby for benefits for their regions, and to
distribute some of the benefits they acquire to local people. In these ways,
mass institutions help the dictatorship located in the capital to extend its
policies and governance to all parts of the country.
7
Specialized Institutions for Monitoring and Coercion
Dictatorial control rests on the threat of
force. To make that threat credible to potential opponents, dictatorships need
visible coercive institutions, that is, armies, internal security police, and
other armed forces even if they face no threats from beyond their borders. For
those dictatorships that relied on these forces to establish their rule in the
first place, the credibility of the threat of further violence exists from the
beginning. Even dictatorships established peacefully, however, deploy the
threat of force and use some violence against opponents. The worst human rights
abuses often happen during the first years of dictatorship, when the ruling
group is unsure of its grip over the country and riven by internal power
struggles. Violence may also be worse because new rulers lack the information
needed for carefully targeted coercion (Greitens 2016). During these years,
they often establish new security agencies and paramilitary forces and increase
military budgets.1 Dictatorships use these forces against people
they suspect of opposition, but investment in them also increases the
credibility of threats of violence and thus can deter further opposition.
Once the
dictatorship has established a ruthless reputation and conflict within the
ruling group has settled down, it usually relies less on overt coercion. Most
repression is preventive, in the sense that it aims to block the dissemination
of negative information about conditions in the country and members of the
dictatorial elite, to discover potential plots and movements before they become
organized enough to challenge the dictatorship, and to undermine and disperse
groups that share critical information or opposition points of view (Dragu and
Przeworski 2017). In other words, though dictatorships that have
1 See Greitens (2016) for
descriptions of the reorganization and creation of new security forces in
Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea soon after the establishment of new
dictatorships.
*54
Specialized Institutions for Monitoring and
Coercion
15 5
lasted a long time usually rely less on
overt violence, they continue to invest in coercive institutions to deter and
undermine opposition.
The decline in
overt violence that usually accompanies the routinization of dictatorial rule
might be caused by its high cost. Coercion uses up resources that could be
spent on other things, and overreliance on it drives both elite and mass
opposition underground, worsening many of the information problems that beset
dictatorships.2
Increasing the
size and political importance of the coercive institutions can also be
dangerous to dictators and their closest supporters. Security services and
armed forces are serious weapons that are difficult to keep under control
(Svolik 2012; Dragu and Przeworski 2017). In this chapter we examine what determines
who aims these weapons at whom.
We first
describe the various security agencies, paramilitary forces, and army that
typically guard a dictator and regime. We provide information about what the
different forces guard against, how they interact with each other, and the
difficulties of controlling them in an environment that lacks third-party
enforcement of legal rules.
Internal
security agencies are specialists in preventive repression (Dragu and
Przeworski 2017). They spy on and intimidate potential dissidents, and they
identify suspected opponents of the dictator inside the inner circle and the
military. The main purpose of these agencies is to gather information that can
be used to devise strategies for preventing overt opposition. Paramilitary forces
have a narrower role. They defend the dictator and dictatorship from military
coups and other armed assaults. The army defends the dictatorship from
invasions, armed rebellions, and, occasionally, popular upheavals. As the tasks
of the different coercive institutions make apparent, dictators use them not
only to protect against different kinds of threats but also to protect against
each other because the dictator cannot count on controlling them. The more
powerful and effective the force, the more dangerous it could be to the
dictator if it turned against him.
Dictators try to
increase their own chances of survival by establishing multiple armed forces to
spy on, compete with, or counterbalance each other (Quinlivan 1999; Haber 2006;
Greitens 2016, 13-14, 79-80). They also try to take personal control of
security agencies and promotions in the army, and to recruit paramilitary
forces from especially loyal citizens. Other members of the dictatorial elite,
however, resist these efforts as part of their general attempt to retain the
capacity to threaten the dictator with ouster, and thus to limit his
discretion.
2 Since Wintrobe (1998), theories of autocracy
have claimed that coercion is more costly than cooptation. Though we know of no
comparative studies of relative costs, we think this claim is likely to be
correct.
156 Ruling Society: Implementation and
Information Gathering
INTERNAL SECURITY AGENCIES
Although dictatorships may find periodic
indirect monitoring (as described in Chapter 6) sufficient for controlling
local officials, they invest much more in specialized institutions to gather
information continuously about the loyalty and job performance of high-level
officials, military officers, and other members of the elite, including those
in the inner circle. These internal security agencies also spy on the
opposition, but since the most serious threats to regime and dictator usually
arise from individuals within the dictatorial elite, much of the surveillance
focuses on them. Internal security police not only provide their bosses with
information about potential challengers, but also use manipulation of
information, censorship, intimidation, beating, torture, imprisonment, death
threats, and murder to deter challenges. These tactics increase the costs of
opposing the regime or dictator. Pervasive spying hinders opposition collective
action by heightening the risk and potential cost of expressing critical
opinions, thus making it harder for opponents to identify each other.
Most of the
time, the internal security forces that handle day-to-day monitoring of
political activity are civilian agencies, not military. They spy directly on
regime officials, party leaders and cadres, civil servants, military officers,
managers of state-owned firms, professors, teachers, journalists, and union
leaders (e.g., Callaghy 1984, 292; Soper 1989; Micgiel 1994, 95; Schirmer 1998,
175; Tismaneanu 2003, 146; Dodd 2005, 79-83; Barany 2012, 214). In other words,
they spy on anyone who might have the capacity to influence others or sabotage
the implementation of regime policy, as well as on opposition leaders. They
may also use large numbers of internet monitors and paid, blackmailed, or
voluntary informers to report on ordinary citizens they could not otherwise
observe (e.g., Lewis 1980, 150; Peterson 2002).
The East German
Stasi, because they kept such extensive records, provides a window on both the
costliness of coercion and how dictatorships actually deploy it. At its peak,
the Stasi employed 100,000 people (Peterson 2002, 26-29). If informers are
included, there was one spy for every sixty-six citizens (Koehler 1999, 9).
Regime leaders put highest priority on monitoring elites. The Stasi placed
informers in ministries, the Planning Commission, the army, and the Stasi itself
(called the Unknown Colleagues). Agents also monitored compliance with the
economic plan and performance in state-owned firms and collective farms,
reporting incompetence, drunkenness, adultery, and inaccurate production
reports as well as dissent (which was much less common than human frailty). In
addition, the ruling party had its own separate security network of 44,000
functionaries in economic enterprises to monitor performance.
In contrast to
many dictatorships, East German leaders put massive resources into monitoring
ordinary citizens as well, because of the special problems caused by the
existence of the very successful West German economy next door. The Stasi had
internment camps in twenty-four locations. Its
Specialized Institutions for Monitoring and
Coercion
!57
domestic counterintelligence sector
included 4,400 agents just for inspecting mail. Every post office had Stasi
officers who opened all letters and packages sent to or from noncommunist
countries. Six thousand agents tapped telephones. Eighteen hundred were
assigned to combat underground political movements, each of whom supervised at
least thirty informers. And of course thousands of agents guarded the borders
(Peterson 2002, 24-25). East Germany is an extreme case, both because of the regime’s
great vulnerability and because they had the resources and human capital to man
such an extensive operation, but building effective security services requires
significant resources everywhere.3
Beyond
resources, it also takes time and training to build reliable internal security
services. In Poland, where the communists knew that extensive coercion would
be required to maintain the regime, the Soviet Union began training Polish
recruits in schools supervised by the Soviet People’s Commissariat for Internal
Affairs (NKVD) in 1940, long before World War II ended. Once the Polish
communist party had established itself in Lublin in 1943, it began sending
hundreds at a time to NKVD officers’ schools, even before the provisional
government was formed (Micgiel 1994, 94-95; Iazhborovskaia 1997). The
willingness of both the Soviets and the Poles to expend the resources required
for this kind of training indicates the importance communist leaders gave to
it. Resources desperately needed for the war were diverted to pay for schools
large enough to accommodate thousands of East European students, while manpower
and highly trained officers were diverted from the battlefield as war raged.
Of course,
post-war Poland and East Germany are not typical, but they provide a sense of
the cost and difficulty of creating an effective internal security service.
Most dictatorships do not begin with military occupation by a more powerful
dictatorship famous for its hyperdeveloped internal security agencies. In the
aftermath of most seizures of power, dictatorships lack the trained and loyal
practitioners an effective internal security service would require. Sheena
Greitens’s data on the ratio of internal security personnel to population in
nine countries shows average ratios of 1:124 for North Korea (1:40 if
informants are included), the most intensively policed country for which we
have information, 1:5,090 for Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and 1:10,000 for Chad
between 1982 and 1990 (2016, 9).
It usually takes
a few years for new dictatorships to reorganize or build a loyal political
police force. Even military-led dictatorships can lack effective internal
security forces initially, despite their expertise in the use of coercion. In
dictatorships launched by military officers, on day one each service typically
controls a separate police apparatus located within its regular chain of
3 East Germany was extreme but not unique. In
Ceausescu’s Romania, besides the other tasks of security agents, they collected
handwriting samples from all residents and registered all typewriters and copy
machines (Soper 1989).
158 Ruling Society: Implementation and
Information Gathering
command and oriented toward preventing
infringements of military discipline. These agencies can be reoriented toward
policing subversion among civilians, but concerns about turf and disagreements
about how to handle opponents can hinder their unification and transformation
into obedient instruments of the dictatorial elite. A further problem with
using troops for subversion control is that many soldiers resist assignments to
repress unarmed citizens (Janowitz 1977; Nordlinger 1977; Barany 2011).
Soldiers often share the grievances that motivate opposition demonstrations and
may balk at orders to fire partly for that reason.
Because of these
problems, even military-led dictatorships typically call on the army for
protection from domestic opponents only when police and paramilitary forces
have failed to control opposition demonstrations or when armed insurgents
challenge them. Using the military to control demonstrations can backfire. The
Egyptian dictatorship begun by the Free Officers’ coup in 1952, for example,
used security police and paramilitary forces against demonstrators during the
Arab Spring in 2011. When that failed to disperse them, the army was called
out, but did not attack demonstrators. Instead, the Supreme Council of the
Armed Forces, which had been a key pillar of regime support, forced the
dictator to resign and took control of the country. “[E]ven had the generals
been willing to shoot demonstrators, many officers and enlisted men would
probably have refused to obey such an order” (Barany 2011, 32-33). Paramilitary
forces are more likely than regular soldiers to shoot unarmed protesters when
called upon to do so (Barany 2011; Nepstad 2015).
Other
dictatorships, whether led by officers or civilians, have had similar
experiences. As a number of observers have noted, autocratic regimes fall to
unarmed popular opposition when generals refuse to use troops to repress
demonstrators. President Ben Ali of Tunisia fled into exile when the army
chief-of-staff refused to deploy troops to disperse protestors (Barany 2011,
30-31). In Georgia, then-President Eduard Shevardnadze withstood weeks of
massive demonstrations, but resigned at the end of the day when “one by one the
heads of police departments and army units declared” their unwillingness to
continue defending him (Wheatley 2005, 185). In the last months of Duvalierist
Haiti, Tonton Macoutes and the police beat, arrested, and murdered rampaging
protesters, but top Duvalierist army officers refused orders to shoot them
(Abbott 1988, 306). Even when officers’ interests link them firmly to the
regime, as they did in the Haitian and Egyptian examples, they resist using troops
to repress demonstrators if they fear soldiers would refuse to fire or would
hand their guns to protestors (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2010; Dragu and Lupu
2017).4
4 There are obvious exceptions to this statement,
especially during civil wars and violent ethnic mobilization, when soldiers
drawn mostly from some ethnic or regional groups fight insurgents from other
groups. See Roessler (2016) for examples.
Specialized Institutions for Monitoring and
Coercion
159
The discomfort
many officers and soldiers feel about using violence against unarmed fellow
citizens partly explains the military’s unwillingness to put down the protests
that overthrew these and several other dictatorships (Haddad z973,
195; Woodward 1990, 164; Kuntz and Thompson 2009; Barany 2011). As a result of
these attitudes, military-led regimes often create civilian security services
to deal with internal opposition, just as most party-led dictatorships do
(Plate and Darvi 1981).5 Some also sponsor informal armed civilian
forces (e.g., death squads) to further deter “subversion.”
Party-based
seizure groups that achieve power via authoritarianization or popular uprising
may also initially lack loyal security services. On assuming dictatorial
powers, they must decide what to do with the preexisting military and police
forces, which may reflect interests and ethnic groups opposed to those that
dominate the ruling party. Unreliable police forces reduce the new elite’s
ability to induce cooperation from the population, and the military tends to incubate
coup attempts rather than keeping the dictatorship safe. Many party-led regimes
create new party-controlled internal security services after
authoritarianization.
Parties that
have led insurgencies, in contrast to other party-based dictatorships, usually
have cadres specialized in internal security before seizing power. Since
successful insurgency requires the maintenance of organized networks for
recruiting manpower, extracting resources, training soldiers, and disciplining
dissidents and “shirkers,” insurgent groups often have the monitoring and
coercive capacity needed to spy on opponents and those who occupy influential
positions while ensuring citizens’ cooperation with the seizure group’s
project. Parties that have fought lengthy civil wars are likely to have the
organization and personnel to take over and/or replace preexisting state
coercive institutions rapidly and thoroughly. As a result, pre-seizure security
organs created by insurgents can be carried over into the new regime.
To sum up this section,
most dictatorships not brought to power by insurgency initially lack their own
loyal and effective internal security agencies. Since police forces carried
over from the ousted government tend to have inadequate resources, loyalty to
the new rulers, and commitment to the new task, dictatorships often establish
new security forces staffed by loyalists. It takes resources and time to build
a dependable internal security force because of the need for trained and
committed personnel to staff it.
The creation or
strengthening of internal security services can increase the information
available to the inner circle, not only about potential opponents, but also
about each other. This is what makes them potentially dangerous to members of
the inner circle as well as their enemies.
5 Janowitz (1977) finds that men
employed in various internal security and national police services outnumber
those in the army in a sample of military-led dictatorships.
160 Ruling Society: Implementation and
Information Gathering
The Dangers of Personalized Control of
Internal Security
Societal opposition may first motivate the
establishment of new internal security agencies. Members of the seizure group
usually support the creation of a strong security apparatus to protect the regime
from opposition threats. These institutions, however, bring real risks for the
dictatorial inner circle if the dictator comes to control them personally. A
dictator who commands the security apparatus and has access to the information
it collects can eavesdrop on the private conversations of his closest
collaborators, making possible preemptive strikes against anyone suspected of
disloyalty or too much ambition. Meanwhile, the dictator’s plans for
humiliating, discrediting, arresting, or executing his erstwhile colleagues
remain secret until he acts.
Reports from the
security services help the dictator identify which members of the inner circle
might challenge him, and hence which he might want to exclude preemptively,
worsening the inner circle’s difficulty in enforcing limits on the dictator.
The dictator’s advantage comes not only from his access to the information
collected, but also from his ability to order security officers to arrest his
colleagues. If the dictator can, in effect, choose members of the inner circle
by excluding anyone he wants, then he has become a free agent with immense
resources and murderous powers.
The dictator’s
information advantage may also allow him to hide some transgressions, as Svolik
(2012) argues. We do not see the dictator’s ability to hide overstepping his
delegated powers as a major cause of the inner circle’s inability to hold him
accountable, however, since transgressions often involve appointments,
dismissals, arrests, and arbitrary policy choices, all of which are highly
visible. Instead, we see the inner circle’s main difficulty as arising from the
riskiness of trying to punish overreaching dictators. The dictator’s control of
security forces can make talking about ousting the dictator so dangerous that
party executive committees with the formal power to replace dictators never
discuss doing so and plots are never developed. If members of the inner circle
cannot oust the dictator for overstepping agreed-on limits, they cannot enforce
constraints on him even when they observe violations.
If both the
dictator and his lieutenants understand that plots are unlikely to succeed, the
dictator will concentrate additional resources and power in his hands, and his
lieutenants will acquiesce. If the likelihood of ouster is very low,
lieutenants are better off as marginal members of the dictator’s coalition than
as ex-members.
With so much at
stake, members of the inner circle who understand the situation they face
should try to prevent the dictator from establishing personal control over the
security apparatus in order to safeguard their ability to limit his discretion.
Usually a unified seizure group can in fact prevent the dictator from taking
over internal security in the same way that they can prevent other power grabs,
though specific circumstances can sometimes give dictators unexpected
opportunities.
Specialized Institutions for Monitoring and
Coercion
In regimes led
by more professionalized military forces, juntas are usually able to prevent
the personalization of internal security. Among the South American military
regimes in Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile during the
1960s to 1980s, for example, only Pinochet in Chile usurped personal control of
security forces (Remmer 1991).
Pinochet’s
control seems to have been an unforeseen consequence of a consensual junta
decision taken to solve a different problem. In the months immediately after
the 1973 Chilean coup, the junta gave provincial military commanders
responsibility for internal security, including the arrest, trial, and
punishment of “subversives,” in their regions. Each commander handled these
responsibilities according to his own views about the legal norms in force,
which led to wide variation in the treatment of the accused. The Chilean military,
with no authoritarian experience during the four decades before the coup, had
virtually no past involvement in subversion control, and some officers found
the new role repugnant. Pinochet and his allies favored a harsh and violent
anti-subversion policy, but some of the provincial commanders refused to ignore
the democratic legal norms still formally in force despite pressure from
Pinochet and other military hard-liners. These disagreements caused conflict
and disunity among high-ranking officers (Policzer 2009).
To maintain the
unity and discipline of the officer corps in the face of deep disagreements
over how to treat opponents, junta leaders decided to centralize subversion
control in an agency outside the regular chain of command of the armed forces.
In other words, junta leaders created a new security agency outside the
military chain of command in order to remove subversion control from the hands
of legalistic officers and reduce disagreements that were undercutting unity
in the army (Policzer 2009).
This decision
inadvertently gave Pinochet the opportunity to appoint the new agency’s top
leadership, and thus to control it (Policzer 2009). It resolved the problem of
conflict within the officer corps but gave Pinochet the capacity to use the
security agency to spy on and coerce officers as well as other citizens,
changing the balance of power within what had started out as a relatively equal
military junta. Thus, it seems that the Chilean military’s lack of recent
authoritarian experience made it more vulnerable to the personalization of
dictatorial power than other professionalized armed forces in the region, most
of which had more recent experience governing.
Where a dictator
gains personal control of the security apparatus, he has taken a giant step
toward the personalization of rule, even in countries with a united military or
disciplined ruling party. In such settings, control of the security apparatus
may not be enough to personalize the dictatorship fully, but it moves in the
direction of power concentration, as in Chile.
In contrast to
the South American military dictators who came from relatively
professionalized military forces, dictators who were creating a new officer
corps as they seized state power, such as Anastasio Somoza Garda in Nicaragua,
Mobutu Sese Seko in the former Zaire, and several other early
162 Ruling Society: Implementation and
Information Gathering
African military dictators, faced few
impediments to personal control over security forces. Top officers in these
armies often owed their recruitment and promotions directly to the dictator,
making them unlikely to contest his appointments to security agencies or
constrain his decisions in any other realm.
Dictators seek
personal control over internal security in order to protect themselves from
ouster, but the personalization of internal security is associated with greater
regime longevity as well as more stable dictator tenure. Our data indicate that
regimes led by dictators who exercise personal control over security forces last
on average seven years longer than similar regimes in which they do not.6
We interpret this increase in regime longevity as a result of reductions in
plotting and intra-elite conflict when the dictator controls security forces,
because other members of the inner circle understand that plots are unlikely to
succeed. Intra-elite conflict is one of the main causes of authoritarian
breakdown (see Chapter 8).
To sum up this
section, dictatorships need internal security services to spy on potential
opponents and deter overt opposition. Security agencies can also threaten
members of the ruling elite, however. If the dictator secures personal control
over internal security forces, then he can also spy on and monitor other
members of the dictatorial inner circle. Control over internal security
provides the dictator with a major information advantage relative to others in
the dictatorial elite, which reduces the likelihood that plots can be kept
secret and thus diminishes their chance of success. Control over the security
service also means that the dictator can order agents to arrest, interrogate,
torture, and execute his inner-circle colleagues. The possibility of such
punishments obviously changes the distribution of power within the inner
circle, rendering constraints on the dictator’s discretion unlikely if not
impossible.
If the dictator
gains the advantage conveyed by direct control over the security apparatus, he
will want to hang on to it, and other members of the inner circle would face
great risks if they tried to remove it from his control. Between 1946 and 2010,
only 3 percent of dictators who gained control of the security apparatus lost
it later.
THE ARMY:
BULWARK OF THE REGIME OR INCUBATOR of plots?
The army serves as the dictatorship’s
defense against foreign invasion, insurgency, and popular uprisings that the
police and security troops have failed to suppress. Dictatorships need to
maintain armies to defend them against armed challenges and make the threat of
violent repression credible, but officers’
6 Regimes without this feature
last fourteen years, on average, while those with it endure for twenty-one
years. This pattern holds in standard duration models of regime failure.
Specialized Institutions for Monitoring and
Coercion
163
training, access to weapons, and command of
armed men mean that they can more easily overthrow the dictator than can
others.
Some analysts
see the uniformed military as the key component of the opposition-control
apparatus in dictatorships (Svolik 2012; Debs 2016). We find that view
problematic. Although officers have played this role in some Latin American
military regimes, dictators have not usually used military officers to spy on,
intimidate, intern, torture, and murder suspected opponents. Dictators
sometimes call on the military to repress particularly threatening
demonstrations, but not for routine subversion or crowd control.
Instead, the
officer corps often nurtures challenges and plots, as the figures in previous
chapters on the frequency of military coups show. There are many reasons for
plots. Officers commissioned before the seizure of power may have received
their promotions because of loyalty to the leaders ousted by the new regime and
may want to reverse the seizure of power. Officers may come from ethnic groups
or political factions not represented in the dictatorial elite and resent
disadvantages for their group. They may be angered by slow promotions, low pay,
or poor living conditions. They may simply be ambitious to rule. Consequently,
dictators have more often felt the need to protect themselves from potentially
disloyal officers than been certain enough of officers’ devotion and
reliability to use them in subversion control. Philippine dictator Ferdinand
Marcos, for example, told reporters that what he feared most was overthrow by
the military. He imagined being assassinated during a coup, with US complicity,
like South Vietnamese dictator Ngo Dinh Diem (Greitens 2016, 126).
This is the
reason internal security police spy on officers, and it is the reason that some
dictatorships spend substantial resources to indoctrinate soldiers and impose
commissars with the power to countermand officers’ orders in military units
(Fainsod 1967, 468-81; Bullard 1985, 65-83; Greitens 2016, 89-90, 97-99). A few
dictators have even stored ammunition in areas inaccessible to the army. The
Duvaliers of Haiti kept the entire national arsenal, even heavy weaponry, in
the basement of the National Palace. They put up with explosions that required
rebuilding three times rather than allow the military access to weapons
(Crassweller 1971, 317-18).
Since the means
of overthrowing the dictator are always at hand for officers (unless weapons
are locked up), their critical opinions or divergent ethnic loyalties can be
dangerous to dictators even if they were allies at the time of the seizure of
power (Roessler 2016). Crafting strategies to maintain military acquiescence is
a challenge all dictatorships face. We described some of the strategies used in
military-led regimes in Chapter 5. Here we consider some less nuanced
strategies used by civilian as well as military dictatorships.
Many dictators (63 percent) try to meet the
challenge of a possibly untrustworthy military by creating presidential guards
or other kinds of paramilitary
164 Ruling Society: Implementation and
Information Gathering
forces outside the regular military chain
of command. The high frequency with which dictators establish new paramilitary
forces indicates how little most of them trust regular officers to defend their
rule. Dictatorships have created three main kinds of paramilitary force: armed
civilian forces to help the regular military fight insurgents (for example,
Orden in El Salvador); party militias, which are typically armed youth adjuncts
of the ruling party; and paramilitary forces recruited from groups thought to
be especially loyal to the dictator himself and expected to defend him from
coups led by regular army officers. We refer to the third kind as loyalist
paramilitary forces to distinguish them from the others. Dictators expect
loyalist paramilitary forces to be more reliable than the regular military
because they recruit them from partisans, co-ethnics or both, while highly
ranked regular officers would often have been recruited and promoted before the
dictatorship began and thus represent a broad range of ethnicities, regions,
religions, and partisan leanings.
Paramilitary
loyalty is reinforced if the new force is closely identified with the dictator
because of shared ethnicity or partisanship and would thus likely be disbanded
if the dictator fell. If that happened, its officers would lose their special
privileges and face possible prison or exile. In other words, loyalist
paramilitary officers stand or fall with the dictator (Snyder 1998;
Escriba-Folch 2013). In contrast, senior officers in the regular military are
more likely to turn their backs on the dictator during periods of crisis
because they typically have fewer ties to the ruler and a more developed
“corporate” identity linked to defending the state, rather than the particular
leader. Senior officers in the regular military often survive successive
dictators in the same regime with their ranks intact, and they may even survive
regime collapse, especially if they cause it. The fates of regular military
officers are not routinely linked to the dictator’s fate.
Dictators
establish loyalist paramilitary forces to change the assessments of regular
army officers about the likely risk of failure for coup attempts. To enhance
the deterrent power of paramilitary forces, the dictator may buy them better
arms and training than the regular army. He may schedule ostentatious parades
of uniformed paramilitary forces and their weapons. Loyalist paramilitary units
are often stationed in or near the dictator’s residence as a specialized and
highly visible defender of the dictator and dictatorship.
We see the coup
deterrence value of loyalist paramilitary forces as arising from their staffing
by officers and men from groups identified with the dictator who expect to
share his fate if he is overthrown. An alternative explanation for why the
establishment of paramilitary forces reduces the likelihood of coups is that
the existence of multiple independent armed forces in the dictatorship raises
the collective-action costs of committing to and executing coups (Quinlivan
1999; Bohmelt and Pilster 2015). In this view, coups do not succeed unless
officers from both the regular military and the paramilitary go along
Specialized Institutions for Monitoring and
Coercion
165
with them.7 This argument simply
applies the well-known logic of collective action: the more independent actors
are needed to accomplish a collective goal, the greater the difficulty of doing
so. As obstacles to cooperation increase, coups should decrease (Singh 2014).
Dictatorships
sometimes also create party militias to help defend themselves. On average,
party militias cost less and receive much less training than presidential
guards and other forces stationed near the dictator’s residence. In a few
well-known instances, party militias were well funded and grew into very wellarmed
and important elite political players, as during the Banda dictatorship in
Malawi and Qaddafi’s rule in Libya. In Malawi, the militia reported directly
“to the president on the mood in the countryside and on all significant new
arrivals in every village in the country” (Decalo 1998, 86). In these cases,
militias effectively armor the dictator. Most of the time, however, militias
have a less central role. They engage large numbers of young men, provide them
with light weapons and rudimentary training, and assign them tasks such as
keeping order and rooting out subversion among students or ordinary citizens.
Members of militias are expected to inform on their neighbors, patrol problem
areas, help to mobilize others for regime projects, and train as auxiliary
national defense forces in case of invasion or rebellion.
Regime insiders
create party militias to coopt the part of the population (young men) most
likely to lead popular opposition by giving them a stake in regime persistence.
Militias are supposed to help with internal security while delivering benefits
to those who join them - at low budgetary cost, since they usually receive no
salaries. The benefits to militia members include the power to order others
around, recognition from political leaders, camaraderie, and informal
opportunities to steal, extort, and demand sex from those they police.
Militia members
have a lot of discretion over who they stop, search, and demand fines or
payments from, as well as how much force to use, which naturally leads to
abuses. They often become undisciplined and venal, making use of the powers
granted them to pursue their own ends. In Congo/Zaire, for example,
Disciplinary Brigades set up unauthorized barricades to “stop and harass
people indiscriminately, demand ‘tips,’ and illegally detain people” (Callaghy
1984, 293). Like death squads, these forces may commit many human rights abuses
without making the dictatorship safer because regime leaders cannot control
their behavior. In practice, popular militias have often caused opposition to
dictatorships because of arbitrary acts of violence, theft, and intimidation,
and they have eventually been disbanded or integrated into the regular military
as a means of imposing discipline in a number of cases.
7 Because counterbalancing creates an additional
armed actor within the regime, it opens up the possibility that these actors
will take different sides during periods of unrest even if one does not
automatically side with the dictator (Morency-Laflamme 2017).
166 Ruling Society: Implementation and
Information Gathering
Controlling Military Leadership
Many dictators also try to control their
military forces through direct interference with promotions. The source of
officers’ autonomy from the dictator, if it exists, is the professional norms
that determine promotions, recruitment, and retirement. Meritocratic
recruitment and promotion based on competence and seniority mean that career success
in the military does not depend on political loyalty. As long as recruitment to
the officer corps is open to talent and promotions depend on performance and
years of service, ethnic and partisan groups different from the dictator’s will
be represented in the higher ranks of the officer corps as will a range of
opinion. If, however, the dictator can override professional norms to recruit,
promote, and retire individual officers on the basis of loyalty or ethnicity,
the officer corps cannot maintain its autonomy because the dictator can reserve
high ranks for loyalists.
Nearly all
dictatorships (and many democracies) use loyalty as one criterion for
highest-level promotions, but in some, the existing officer corps is all but
destroyed by purges, forced retirements, and promotions aimed at ending
military autonomy. At the extreme, insurgents may replace the whole military
they have fought against with their own officers and troops when they take
power. The decimation of the officer corps was almost as severe after the
communist takeovers in Eastern Europe. Many officers were imprisoned or
murdered in order to keep communist party rule safe from potential military
intervention.
Some dictators
see the promotion of co-ethnics as the best strategy for achieving interest
congruence between officers and themselves. Reserving the most sensitive
military posts for clan or even family members, as in Syria under the Assad
family, a number of monarchies, and Iraq under Saddam Hussein, takes this
strategy to an extreme. Using ethnicity or partisanship as the main criterion
for promotion increases the value to co-partisan/co-ethnic officers of the
dictatorship continuing to rule. As with limiting the dictatorial inner circle
to co-ethnics, discussed above, this strategy aims to reduce factionalism, and
thus decrease the likelihood of rogue coups, while increasing interest congruence
between soldiers and political leaders (Roessler 2016). The politicization of
promotions boosts the power of loyal officers while marginalizing or retiring
those thought less reliable. For officers disadvantaged by partisan promotions,
however, this strategy makes opposition more attractive.8
The extreme
examples of dictatorial interference in the military are possible when the
armed forces backing the dictator (e.g., the Soviet occupation army in Eastern
Europe or victorious insurgent forces) can defeat the regular army he wants to
subjugate. A dictator who lacks his own military force, however,
8 See Roessler (2011, 2016) for
an analysis of how excluding ethnic rivals from the inner circle to lower coup
risk can increase the chance of civil war.
Specialized Institutions for Monitoring and
Coercion
would face the immediate threat of a coup
if he tried wholesale interference with promotions and retirements. Promotions
are central to the career interests, day-to-day well-being, and future
prospects of officers. One of the attractions of careers in the military is the
clear, predictable career path and the opportunity for upward mobility it
provides to young men who lack political or social connections. Political or
ethnic favoritism in promotions threatens career expectations and is
immediately visible to other officers. It is a relatively easy grievance to
organize around because it affects not only personal welfare but also military
professionalism and esprit de corps, which even officers who are not personally
disadvantaged may feel strongly about.
Officers passed
over for promotion, forced into retirement, or dismissed have led quite a few
coups, and soldiers loyal to jailed former commanders sometimes free them as
the first stage of a coup. Dismissed and jailed former high-ranking officers
have led a number of insurgencies as well (Roessler 2016). So, dictators have
to make careful strategic calculations before trying to take control of the
officer corps through recruitment, promotions, and dismissals.
The
establishment of a countervailing paramilitary force increases the feasibility
of interfering with promotions because it can reduce the odds of a successful
coup, though the creation of paramilitary forces itself carries some risk. The
diversion of scarce resources to pay and arm them reduces the benefits that can
be allocated to the regular military, and descriptions of why coups occurred
sometimes also mention officers’ complaints about the better weapons and nice
uniforms of paramilitary troops (Nordlinger 1977).
The implications
of creating a new presidential guard or other paramilitary force, however, may
be less initially obvious to regular officers than interference with
promotions. These new forces are usually announced with patriotic fanfare, and
they may at first appear to add new units to the regular forces. Thus, they can
seem to strengthen the military rather than challenging its monopoly of force.
Because the consequences of creating new paramilitary forces are less obvious,
dictators may establish them before they try to interfere with promotions.
Once a well-funded paramilitary unit guards the presidential palace, prospects
for successful coups decline, and officers may plot fewer attempts because they
fear violent defeat by the new armed force. The establishment of paramilitary
forces may thus embolden dictators to interfere with promotions in the regular
army.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COUNTERBALANCING
AND INTERfERENCE
One implication of this discussion is that
dictators who counterbalance the regular army by creating loyalist
paramilitaries will then be more likely to interfere in the military’s
promotion decisions. We evaluate whether the successful pursuit of one
strategy for reducing the potential threat from the
168 Ruling Society: Implementation and
Information Gathering
military - counterbalancing - paves the way
for the successful pursuit of another - interfering with promotions. As with
other power grabs by dictators, we expect the success of one to increase the
likelihood of the next one in the kind of spiraling consolidation of personal
dictatorial control described in Chapter 4.
Our argument
about the linked fates of dictator and paramilitary forces recruited from his
group also implies that loyalist paramilitary units should deter coups more
effectively than paramilitary forces created for other purposes, such as to
keep youth loyal or to battle insurgency alongside the military. If loyalist
paramilitaries more effectively deter coups, they would have a larger effect on
dictators’ propensity to manipulate military promotions than would other kinds
of paramilitary. In contrast, claims that paramilitary forces reduce the likelihood
of coups by increasing the number of independent armed forces that must agree
to oust the dictator imply that any kind of paramilitary force would have the
same effect, both on the incidence of coups and on interference with
promotions. Our data on different types of paramilitary forces allow us to test
these two logics: (1) the linked fate story, which implies that loyalist
paramilitaries should increase the likelihood of interference with promotions
but that other types of paramilitary force should not and (2) the collective
action logic, which implies that all kinds of paramilitary should increase the
likelihood of interfering with promotions.
To classify
paramilitary forces, coders first noted the creation or existence of armed
forces that were both outside the regular military chain of command and not
part of the regular police or internal security service. Once such a force had
been identified, it was coded according to the following rules:
• Coded 2 if
paramilitary forces are created to fight on the government’s side during civil
wars or insurgencies (e.g., anti-insurgent forces in El Salvador or Thailand)
or to carry out other tasks the military or security service wants
accomplished.
• Coded 1 if a
party militia or other irregular armed force organized by the regime support
party has been created.
• Coded 0 if the
regime leader creates a paramilitary force, a president’s guard, or new
security forces apparently loyal to himself.
• Use this code
if a military or paramilitary force has been recruited primarily from the
regime leader’s tribe, home region, or clan; if they report to him; or if they
are newly garrisoned in the presidential palace.
The same code
was then used for every subsequent country-year until the paramilitary force
was disbanded or integrated into the regular military or until the regime
ended.
Some dictators
created more than one loyalist paramilitary force. In these cases, the
country-year was coded as “0” after the first was created and continued to be
“0” in subsequent years until all loyalist paramilitaries were
Specialized Institutions for Monitoring and
Coercion
169
disbanded or the dictatorship lost power.
For country-years in which more than one kind of paramilitary force existed,
the lowest applicable code was used.
To test our
arguments, we examine two related forms of meddling in the military’s
leadership: purges (defined as arrests, executions, or murders) of senior
officers and dictatorial control of promotions. Our argument implies that these
kinds of interference should be more likely to occur when the dictator has
already established a loyalist paramilitary force.
We coded a purge
when one or more military or security service officers were jailed or executed
without reasonably fair trials or was murdered. Coders were instructed to rely
on country specialists and/or journalists for judgments about whether arrests
for plotting or treason trials were government responses to real events. They
were told not to code a purge if the evidence indicated that a person tried for
treason really did try to overthrow the government by violent means and was
given a reasonably fair trial.
Dictatorial
promotion strategies were coded as follows:
• Coded 2 if
country specialists do not report that the regime leader promotes officers loyal
to himself or from his ethnic, tribal, regional, or religious group or that he
forces officers not from his group into retirement for political reasons
• Coded 1 if
country specialists report promotions of top officers loyal to the regime
leader or from his group, but not widespread use of loyalty as a criterion for
promotion or retirement.
• Coded 0 if
country specialists report promotions of large numbers of officers loyal to the
regime leader or from his group, or large numbers of forced retirements.
The same
historical event might, in some cases, serve as the basis for coding both
purges and promotion practices. For example, the communists in Hungary both
arrested (purged) many senior officers when they took over and began
interfering with promotions at the same time. For this reason, we test separate
models for each of these forms of interference with military leadership.
Importantly, however, the creation of paramilitary forces is not only conceptually
distinct from interference in the regular military, but also coded in our data
as a distinct phenomenon in the historical record.
The data on
military purges and promotion practices are constructed such that once we find
evidence that the dictator pursues either of these strategies for the first time,
the variable is coded the same way for all subsequent years while he remains in
power unless a change in strategy is reported in the country specialist
literature.9 This coding procedure assumes that a dictator who can
9 For example, immediately after the Communist
victory in China, Mao controlled some top promotions, but the revolutionary
army included many officers with views very different from Mao’s, and military
leadership was very decentralized. The first years after the seizure of power
are coded as “ 1.” In 1954, however, under Soviet influence, Peng Dehuai was
appointed defense
170 Ruling Society: Implementation and
Information Gathering
interfere with promotions in one year could
probably do so again but may not be observed doing so because he has already
put the officers he wants in place. The dictator’s control over the military
tends to persist over time because the officers he promoted retain their posts
or are further promoted, and they in turn promote their allies.
To test whether
loyalist paramilitaries increase the likelihood of interfering with military
leadership, we restrict the analysis to years in which the dictatorship does
not interfere with military promotions, and test whether dictators with
loyalist paramilitaries in those years are more likely to interfere with
promotions in the regular military the following year. This design means we are
testing whether dictators with loyalist paramilitaries initiate interference in
the military more quickly than dictators who lack them, given that the dictator
has not yet interfered in these ways.
In the full data
set, loyalist paramilitaries are more common (35 percent) than party militias
(18 percent) and irregular forces created to fight alongside the regular
military (9 percent). However, in the samples we employ that restrict the
analysis to years prior to military interference, the incidence of different
types of paramilitaries is more evenly distributed. Prior to observing
promotion interference (921 observations), loyalist paramilitaries (16 percent)
are less common than party militias (19 percent) but still more common than
anti-rebel paramilitaries (10 percent). Prior to observing the first military
purge (2,555 observations), loyalist paramilitaries (27 percent) are the most
common, with party militias (20 percent) and anti-rebel paramilitaries (9
percent) less
prevalent.10
We begin the
analysis by comparing the baseline probabilities in Figure 7.1.11
The plots in the top two panels of the figure show the probabilities of
dictatorial interference with promotions and military purges, both with and
without an existing paramilitary force of any kind. Just under 5 percent
(0.046) of dictators who lack a paramilitary force initiate interference with
promotions, while just under 8 percent (0.077) of those supported by
paramilitary forces of one kind or another do so. Dictators unsupported by a
paramilitary force begin a purge
minister and began intensive
professionalization of the armed forces, which included limits on Mao’s
interference (Whitson 1973, 98-100). From 1955 until 1959, when Mao succeeded
in purging Peng Dehai from the regime’s inner circle, Chinese promotions are
coded as “2” because Mao had little influence on them.
10 The data are constructed so no observations
were coded with more than one type of paramilitary. Therefore, colinearity
issues do not arise in the analysis that includes all three types of
paramilitaries in the same specification.
11 The analysis examines pooled leader-year
observations when the dictator did not interfere the previous year. There are
164 leaders in 74 countries (921 observations) in the analysis of promotions;
this excludes leaders who interfered in military promotions in their first year
in power. The purge analysis examines 340 leaders in 115 countries (2,555
observations), again excluding leaders who purge the military in their first
year in power. It is more common for leaders to interfere in promotions than to
purge the military during their first year.
Specialized Institutions for Monitoring and
Coercion
171
Promotion
Purge
£
2 o.c
Q_
® 0.06
c 0.1 o
o
£
o
tr 0.08
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0.075 |
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0.044 |
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No paramilitary Any paramilitary
Promotion
No Loyalist paramilitary
Loyalist
paramilitary
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0.096 |
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0.051 |
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Purge
paramilitary
figure 7.1 Paramilitary forces and interference in the army.
paramilitary
0
0
of officers in 2.5 percent of observed
years, while those supported by one initiate a purge 3.1 percent of the time.
These percentages may seem low, but recall that all country-years in which
dictators had previously interfered with promotions or purged officers have
been excluded from the data set. So, these are estimates for the beginning of
dictatorial efforts to control military leadership in countries in which the
dictator has previously not interfered.
The lower two
panels compare dictators who lack loyalist paramilitaries with those who have
them.12 Just over 5 percent of dictators unsupported by loyalist
paramilitary forces begin interference in the military’s promotion practices,
while almost 10 percent of dictators who can count on the support of a
12 The group that lacks loyalist paramilitary
forces includes dictatorial country-years in which party militias and/or
anti-rebel irregular forces exist plus country-years that lack any kind of
paramilitary.
172 Ruling Society: Implementation and
Information Gathering
Purges
Loyalist paramilitary - Leader duration
(log) - Military leader - Leader age - Party paramilitary - Anti-rebel
paramilitary - Int'l conflict -
Loyalist paramilitary - Leader duration
(log) - Military leader - Leader age - Party paramilitary - Anti-rebel
paramilitary - Int'l conflict - Civil conflict -
-1 0 1 Coefficient estimate
0 1 2
Coefficient estimate
figure 7.2 Loyalist paramilitary forces and interference.
loyalist paramilitary force do so. The
relative increase from the baseline probability of 5.3 percent is more than 80
percent. For purges of officers, we find that 2.5 percent of dictators
unsupported by loyalist paramilitary forces initiate a purge of senior
officers, while 3.8 percent who can depend on loyalist paramilitary support do
so. The relative increase for purges is 50 percent.
Next we test a
series of logistic regression models that control for the length of time the
dictator has been in power.13 The first specification, shown by
squares in Figure 7.2, includes only the indicator variable for the existence
of a loyalist paramilitary force and the natural log of leader time in power.
The next set of specifications, shown as triangles, adds two variables that
pertain to individual dictators: their age and whether they were military
officers before becoming regime leaders. Next, we add indicators for other
types of paramilitary forces (party militias and anti-rebel irregular forces).
The final specification, shown as diamonds, adds indicators for civil and
international conflict.
The left panel
of Figure 7.2 shows the results for initiation of interference with promotions
in the regular military, while the right panel shows results for first military
purges. In all tests, the coefficient for loyalist paramilitary is positive and
significant, indicating that these specific paramilitary forces are associated
with a higher likelihood of interfering with leadership in the military.14
Models with a full set of covariates (depicted by diamonds) indicate
Promotions
Civil conflict -
2
13 This design mimics standard hazard models; we
control for log duration in the reported analysis and show in replication files
that the results remain when using duration time polynomials instead.
14 Replication files show that this result is
robust to including indicators for how the regime seized power and structural
covariates (GDP per capita, population, oil rents, and growth). Models with
leader-specific random effects yield similarly sized coefficient estimates but
larger estimates of the variance in the purge model.
Specialized Institutions for Monitoring and
Coercion
i73
that loyalist paramilitary forces are
associated with a 5.7 percent increase in the probability of beginning to
interfere in military promotions and a 1.7 percent increase in the likelihood
of starting a military purge, which is roughly similar to the increases
depicted in the lower two panels in Figure 7.1.
The models in
Figure 7.2 also suggest that dictators are more likely to interfere in military
leadership earlier in their tenures, when they are younger, and when they came
to the dictatorship from careers in the military. Finally, participation in an
international conflict increases interference in military leadership, but the
estimates are significant only at the 0.10 percent level.15
Importantly for
our argument, the estimates for other kinds of paramilitary forces are not
statistically significant, suggesting that these forces do not encourage the
dictator to grab more power from the regular military. In the replication
files, we test similar models for party militias and anti-insurgent irregular
forces separately and again find no consistent association between them and
initiation of interference in regular military promotions or purges.
These findings
provide initial evidence that loyalist paramilitaries help dictators to
consolidate power over the regular military by interfering with their promotion
procedures and purging senior officers of doubtful loyalty. We find no evidence
linking paramilitary forces of other kinds, namely, party militias and
anti-insurgent irregulars, to interference with the regularmilitary. This
suggests that counterbalancing is not simply a numbers game in which dictators
need only increase the number of security veto players to increase plotters’
collective action problems in order to protect themselves. Rather, we suggest
that the informal personal ties between the dictator and the loyalist
paramilitary he creates by recruiting from co-ethnics, co-partisans, or his
home region allow him to interfere with impunity in the internal workings of
the regular military.16 When regular army officers know that
loyalist paramilitary forces will defend the dictator to the bitter end because
their own futures are tied to his fate, they are less likely to attempt coups
to stop the dictator’s manipulation of promotions or purges of senior officers.
Regular officers’ reluctance to risk punishment for failed coups emboldens
dictators to interfere more.
CONCLUSION
Coercive institutions in dictatorships
maintain the credibility of the dictator’s threat to use force against
challengers and opponents. Most of what such institutions do is preventive
rather than active repression. They deter overt opposition and monitor elites
and ordinary citizens in order to interrupt plots and opposition movements
before they have even been organized.
Internal
security services focus much of their effort on high-ranking and midlevel
elites. They gather information about party officials, military officers,
15 We caution against
interpreting the estimate for international conflict because identification
relies on a very few “positive” cases in
each model.
16 This set of findings is
consistent with Morency-Laflamme’s (2017) analysis of Benin and Togo.
174 Ruling Society: Implementation and
Information Gathering
high-level civil servants, and
administrators, in addition to union leaders, teachers, journalists, opposition
leaders, and anyone else able to undermine policy implementation or plot the
dictator’s ouster. Security agencies combine spying with the authority to
arrest, intimidate, interrogate, and execute people thought to represent a
threat to the regime or dictator. Some security services also employ informers
to spy on ordinary people, but this level of surveillance requires more
financial resources than many dictatorships have. The internet has increased
the feasibility of monitoring ordinary citizens and interfering with their
access to information and ability to express opposition, however.
The coercive
institutions of dictatorships are weapons that can be used by the dictator to
undermine or even murder other members of the dictatorial elite if he can gain
full control over them. Other members of the elite, however, have strong
incentives to resist the personalization of control over security services and
the dictator’s efforts to undermine the autonomy of the army.
If the dictator
has secured personal control of the internal security apparatus, he has a major
advantage in the power struggle with other members of the inner circle. Control
of internal security tilts the distribution of two crucial resources,
information and capacity for violence, in the dictator’s favor and thus reduces
the likelihood that other elites could oust him or constrain his behavior via
credible threats to oust. The dictator’s control of internal security amounts
to a major step in the direction of the personalization of rule, and other
members of the inner circle can rarely reverse it within a dictator’s lifetime.
Armies are the
last defense of dictatorships threatened by rebellion or uprising, but since
military coups are the most frequent means of ousting them, dictators often
fear their armies. Consequently, many dictatorships create paramilitary forces
to defend against coups and counterbalance the regular army. We term
paramilitary forces recruited from ethnic, partisan, or regional groups closely
tied to the dictator “loyalist” to distinguish them from other irregular armed
forces such as party militias and anti-insurgent forces.
As a further
safeguard against the army, dictators also want to manipulate recruitment,
promotions, and retirements to favor loyal officers, and they may want to
purge, arrest, and execute officers whose loyalty they suspect. The main
impediment to interference with military leadership is the dictator’s fear of
coups, which officers may risk in order to safeguard the army’s autonomy and
their own careers and futures. Because the establishment of a loyalist
paramilitary force increases the risk that coups will fail, dictators supported
by them can interfere with military leadership with greater impunity.
These strategies
for keeping armed supporters in check work some of the time, but officers can
at times fight back, and other members of the dictatorial elite may support
them. The establishment of paramilitary forces and the politicization of
promotions have been mentioned as causes for a number of coups (as discussed in
Chapter 3), and purged officers have also gone on to lead insurgencies in some
instances (Roessler 2016). Such a backlash can lead to authoritarian breakdown,
a subject to which we now turn.
PART IV
DICTATORIAL SURVIVAL AND BREAKDOWN
8
The Egyptian monarchy fell to a coup led by
Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Free Officers in 1952 (Haddad 1973, 7-23).
The dictatorship established by Nasser lasted until 2012, when popular protests
forced its final attenuated incarnation to allow a fair election. Massive,
largely nonviolent demonstrations forced the resignation of the regime’s fourth
dictator, Hosni Mubarak, in 2011, but the officer corps, a pillar of the regime
since 1952, remained in control of the country until their candidate lost the
2012 election. This election ended Egypt’s second modern authoritarian regime.
The new democratically elected regime lasted only until another military coup
ended it in 2013.
Egypt’s
experience illustrates that dictatorships can fall in a variety of ways,
ranging from coups carried out by a handful of officers to election losses and
popular uprisings. In some instances, the end of a dictatorship leads to democratization;
in others, a new autocratic leadership group takes over, as in 1952 Egypt,
bringing with it new rules for making decisions, a new elite group, and a
different distribution of benefits and suffering. This chapter investigates how
and why dictatorships end, as well as why democracy sometimes follows, but
often does not.
We begin with
some basic information about how dictatorships end. Next, we describe the
decision calculus facing regime insiders as they decide whether to desert a
dictatorship, followed by a discussion of how economic and other kinds of
crisis can alter their assessment of the costs of opposition. We then analyze
how characteristics of the dictatorship itself contribute to destabilizing
conflict within the inner circle. In the sections that follow, we investigate
how specific pre-seizure-of-power features of the group that established the
dictatorship influence the way the dictatorial elite responds to challenges
and the opposition they cause. We explain why some kinds of dictatorship
survive crises better than others and, finally, why some tend to exit
peacefully through
177
178
Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
fair, contested elections when faced with
strong opposition, while others grip power with tooth and claw until violently
cast out.
HOW DICTATORSHIPS END
Potential opposition leaders exist at all
times in all dictatorships. They may come from groups outside the regime’s
distributive network, but they often come from groups currently or formerly
allied with the dictator. Because ties to the dictatorship often entail
resource and network advantages, it is easier for those linked to it to
challenge the dictator and regime than it is for those without such resources
(Svolik 2012; Roessler 2016). Overthrows led by current or former regime
allies are thus common.
Citizens living
under dictatorship, whether regime insiders or not, must decide whether to
challenge it and, if so, the method for taking action. Potential opposition
leaders assess their options carefully, taking into account whether they have
the support and resources they need to mount a particular type of challenge
successfully, as well as the risk and potential cost of failure.
These strategic
choices depend on the costs and difficulties of creating and maintaining
different kinds of opposition in varying circumstances. Some methods of ending
dictatorships, such as election campaigns, require much more overt opposition
support than others, such as coups. In 1952 Egypt, many people felt angry about
British control of the Suez Canal, but citizen anger was not aimed at ousting
the king. Officers chose a coup as their method of overthrow because they had a
comparative advantage in the deployment of force, but also because a coup had a
reasonable chance of success at a time when organizing sustained popular
opposition would probably have been impossible. Political and economic
circumstances also influence when potential opposition leaders can attract
enough support to succeed. The Free Officers chose a time when many Egyptians
felt their government had failed to defend their interests, and when the
government itself was in chaos. This timing reduced the chance that citizens
would defend the king and that the government would respond to the military
challenge quickly or coherently.
Potential
opposition leaders’ choices about how to try to end dictatorships cause regime
breakdowns to unfold in the patterns that we label coups, popular uprisings,
opposition election victories, and so on. Each of these labels identifies not
only the form an attempt to overthrow a dictatorship takes but implicitly the
kind and approximate number of people involved in the effort. “Coup” labels an
ouster of political leaders carried out by military defectors from the regime.
Coups require the voluntary cooperation of only a few officers because
lower-level officers and soldiers usually obey orders. They typically take only
a day or two, and usually no more than a few people are killed during them.
They are thus relatively easy for officers to organize. “Popular uprisings”
require the voluntary cooperation of many more people, usually civilians; they
can last from a few days to many months; and they often result in quite a few
deaths
Why Dictatorships Fall
179
0.02
Coup Election Popular Insurgency Insider
Foreign State
uprising rule change imposed
dissolution*
figure 8.1 How autocratic regimes end.
*State dissolution includes cases in which
a previously independent state was subsumed into another one, cases in which a
state broke up into constituent parts, and cases in which a dictatorship ended
but was not immediately followed by a government that controlled a substantial
part of the state’s territory.
and injuries even though protesters are
generally unarmed. “Insurgencies” also require the cooperation of substantial
numbers of people, but involve confrontation between armed opposition and the
military forces defending the dictatorship. Consequently, many more are likely
to be killed. Insurgencies can last from a few days to many years, and during
that time, insurgent leaders must find ways to arm, train, and feed their
troops. So, this strategy requires a much more substantial commitment from participants
than popular uprisings. Finally, a successful opposition election campaign
requires cooperation from even more people than uprisings or insurgencies,
usually near 50 percent of the adult population, but participation is
relatively costless compared with other methods of ousting dictatorships.
Figure 8.1 shows
how dictatorships ended between 1946 and 2010. It reveals that more
dictatorships fell to coups than to other kinds of challenge. The second most
common means of ending dictatorships is elections won by someone not supported
by the dictatorship.1 Overthrow by popular uprising occurred less
often before 1990, but has become much more frequent since the
1 Regime-ending elections include both
semi-competitive elections that the dictatorial ruling party expected to win
but did not and fair elections that dictatorships that had agreed to step down
organized as a means of determining who would succeed them. The latter are
usually organized by military dictatorships.
0.35
0.26
0.17
0.08
0.08
□
0.04
Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
0.3
cc
0.2 A
o
O
1950
1960
1970
1980
Year
1990
2000
2010
No election/one-party election
Multiparty election
figure 8.2 Semi-competitive elections and coup attempts in dictatorships.
end of the Cold War. Insurgencies toppled
some dictatorships, as did foreign invasions. Some ended when regime insiders
changed the basic rules governing leadership choice, e.g., adopted universal
suffrage, transforming oligarchy into democracy.
Coups are the
most common method of ending dictatorships for the same reason that they are
the most common means of initiating them: coups require the cooperation of the
fewest individuals, and soldiers have weapons. Though coups are easier to
coordinate than other forms of regime ouster, however, they entail risks. About
half of coups fail (Singh 2014). Failed coups can lead to dismissal from the
army, imprisonment, and execution for treason, so the cost of failure for the
top officers involved can be high.
The high cost of
failure and the irreducible element of luck in whether coups succeed lessen the
appeal of plotting where alternative mechanisms for ending dictatorships exist.
Coup attempts have declined since the end of the Cold War, when more
dictatorships began to allow semi-competitive elections in which multiple
parties can compete (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz 2014). Figure 8.2 shows the
relationship between semi-competitive elections in dictatorships and the
frequency of coup attempts from 1946 to 2010. The vertical bars show the yearly
rate of coup attempts in dictatorships that either hold no elections or hold
elections that offer voters no choice. The solid line shows the attempted coup
rate in dictatorships that hold semi-competitive elections. As the graph
demonstrates, coup attempts tend to be more common in dictatorships that do not
allow the opposition to compete in elections - as expected if potential
opposition leaders chose methods for trying to end
Why Dictatorships Fall
dictatorships strategically.2
Where the opposition can participate in elections, however unlikely they are to
win, regime opponents are less likely to take the risk of a coup attempt.
In sum, potential
opposition leaders try to end dictatorships using the means of doing so with
the best chance of success - given their resources and support networks - and
the lowest potential cost for failure. They seldom indulge in quixotic acts.
They also choose times to act when they expect substantial support from others
for regime change. We discuss the dynamics that underlie potential opposition
leaders’ decisions to take action against the dictatorial elite in the section
that follows.
INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION
Dictatorships provide substantial benefits
to regime insiders and some citizens, as described in Chapter 6, but they also
survive because most of the time those who do not receive benefits avoid the
costs of opposition. Opposition increases when the benefits that individuals
usually receive have declined, when the risk of opposition has fallen, or both.
In order to build a foundation for analyzing the effects of specific events and
institutions on the survival of dictatorship, this section develops an abstract
description of individuals’ decision calculus as they decide whether to oppose
the dictatorship.
The Interests of Regime Insiders
Ordinary citizens can play a large role in
ending dictatorships, but they rarely do so without leadership, and the individuals
who lead them often spent earlier stages of their careers as supporters of the
dictatorship. This is so partly because the dictatorship is often the only game
in town for the politically ambitious and partly because participation in the
dictatorship is the best way to gain access to the resources and build the
clientele networks that facilitate opposition mobilization later. When members
of the inner circle defect, they can often take with them the clientele
networks originally built within the ruling group using state resources
(Garrido 2011).
Members of the
inner circle will defect to the opposition if:
2 The attempted coup rate is the average number
of attempted coups per year. In regimes lacking semi-competitive elections, the
attempted coup rate is 14.0 percent; in those holding semi- competitive
elections, the attempted coup rate is 9.6 percent. During the pre-1990 period,
the attempted coup rate is 50 percent higher in regimes lacking
semi-competitive elections than in regimes with semi-competitive contests. But
the gap narrows during the two decades from i990 to 20i0: the coup rate is only
25 percent higher during this period.
182
Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
qOj + (i-q)~Oj + (1-p) sOi + (i-s)~Oi <
t(i-p) rOk + (i-r)~Ok - pC
(8.1)
p
where:
p is the probability the status quo regime
will survive
q is the probability of
maintaining/acquiring office in the status quo regime
r is the probability of achieving office in
the new regime (for a partisan of the new)
s is the probability that a partisan of the
old regime achieves/retains office in the new regime
q > s
t is the probability of the new regime
turning out as anticipated3
Oj is the benefit of office to a partisan
of the status quo in the status quo regime
Ok is the benefit of office in a
new regime to a partisan of the new regime
Ol is the benefit of office in a
new regime to a partisan of the old regime
Oj > Ol
C is the cost of opposing the status quo
regime.
The term qOj captures the idea that the
better the posts individuals have or expect, the more they would have to lose
by defecting, but also that no one in a dictatorship can be sure of occupying
the same post or receiving the same benefits tomorrow that they receive today.
Dictatorships lack enforceable contracts to ensure that promises of future
rewards will be kept or that legal provisions that have governed past events
will govern future ones. Potential defectors must assess their future prospects
based on incomplete but well- informed insider information.
If, however, a potential defector has been
excluded from the inner circle or has failed to receive a hoped-for post and
does not expect it in the future, then qOj becomes zero, substantially reducing
the cost of defection. A member of the elite’s failure to receive a hoped-for
office can trigger defection - as happened when leaders of the Mexican Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) nominated someone else as the party’s
presidential candidate, and Cuauhtemoc
3 We assume that if the new regime turns out
different from what those who invested to bring about regime change had hoped
(e.g., if a popular uprising results in a new dictatorship rather than
democracy), then those who hoped for a different outcome receive zero. We do
not assume a benefit from the fall of the status quo regime for individuals
excluded from the new ruling group because the new regime could turn out worse
than the status quo regime (e.g., Qaddafi’s dictatorship was worse than the
monarchy it replaced for most Libyans, and Qaddafi’s regime may have been
better for most Libyans than the failed state that followed its overthrow).
Why Dictatorships Fall
183
Cardenas left the party in order to
organize a new opposition party to challenge the PRI dictatorship. Loss of
current positions of power can also result in defection. After the Iraqi coup
of 1958, Brigadier-General ‘Abd al-Karim Qassem became commander-in-chief of
the armed forces, prime minister, and defense minister in the new dictatorship.
His closest collaborator, Colonel ‘Abd al-Salam Aref, became deputy prime
minister, interior minister, and deputy commander-in-chief of the armed forces,
but when disagreements arose, Qassem excluded Aref from the inner circle by
naming him ambassador to Germany. Rather than accepting the sinecure, Aref
defected and returned to Iraq to challenge Qassem’s leadership. Although he was
arrested and served time in prison, a few years later Aref led the coup that
overthrew Qassem (Dann 1969, 20-32, 37-41, 77-89, 363-72).
Cardenas and
Aref are examples of members of dictatorial elites who defected after events
that caused a reassessment of their likely future in the dictatorship. Most
members of the PRI remained loyal in 1987, however, as did many Iraqi officers
during Qassem’s rule. The dictators’ supporters defect only if they think their
chances of achieving their ambitions by joining the opposition outweigh the
future benefits of loyalty to the current ruling group. The term (i-q)~Oj
captures the idea that loyal members of the dictatorial elite continue to
receive benefits (such as the German ambassadorship) as long as the regime
survives, even if they lack high-level posts.
Insiders also
decide to defect when events lead them to believe that the regime may fall,
lowering their assessment of p, the perceived chance of regime survival. If the
regime is going to collapse, those who jump ship earlier have better prospects
for achieving respected positions in the opposition than those who cling longer
to the old order. Because no one knows whether and when the regime will fall,
however, one insider may defect while others see defending the dictatorship as
the more sensible strategy.
In some
situations, members of the status quo ruling group may continue to occupy
valued posts after regime change. If democracy replaces the dictatorship, for
example, the former ruling party often becomes a viable party in the new
regime, and some of its members may be elected to Congress or continue to
occupy high-level bureaucratic posts. Military officers also often retain their
posts after democratic transitions, even when commanding officers are forced to
retire or prosecuted. The term (i-p)sOi captures the possibility of continued
benefits for members of the old status quo ruling group after regime change. If
individuals expect continued benefits from remaining members of the old ruling
party or clique even after regime change, they have no reason to defect.
The terms on the
right-hand side of the inequality are analogous to those on the left, but refer
to expected benefits under a different regime. The main difference between left
and right is that the right-hand term includes C, the cost of opposition, and
t, the probability that the new regime really turns out the way its supporters
claim or hope it will. The cost term is included because opposition to
dictators is invariably costly, and that cost must be borne
184
Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
regardless of whether the opposition
ultimately succeeds. The cost is likely to be greater if the old regime
survives, captured by the term p, which would be low if the regime is expected
to collapse and very high in stable autocracies.
The probability
that the new regime will function as anticipated, t, is included to reflect the
uncertainty that exists about what will happen after regime change. In order to
attract citizen support, those who lead opposition parties, uprisings, or
insurgencies must promise democratization regardless of what they intend or
what is likely. The ubiquity of such promises suggests that opposition leaders
understand this. The outcome of successful ousters is uncertain, however, for
both elites and citizens, as they cannot be sure that they will receive
promised benefits from the change. In fact, they cannot be certain that the new
regime will be more democratic, or better in any other way, than the old one
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Slightly more than half of authoritarian
breakdowns since World War II were followed by new dictatorships, not
democratization (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014).
Lower-level regime insiders face a similar
decision calculus. Ordinary citizens’ decision-making differs from that of
regime insiders in that they have little expectation of achieving office in the
current regime or a future one. So their decisions about joining the overt
opposition depend on whether they are receiving benefits from the current
dictatorship, their assessment of the probability that it will persist, the
benefits they expect from an alternative to the status quo, and the cost of
opposition.
Potential
opposition leaders unaffiliated with the dictatorship share a similar decision
calculus with ordinary citizens, except that they have a good chance of
securing office under the future regime. Their calculation would therefore
include terms like those on the right-hand side of Equation 8.1.
If citizens
receive a stream of benefits under the status quo (e.g., a salary or advantages
associated with a clientele network linked to regime leaders), they are
unlikely to participate in a movement to unseat the dictator. Mass actions to
remove dictators most often occur when economic misfortune or policy failure
prevents regime insiders from delivering benefits, economic growth, and everyday
services to citizens (Bratton and van de Walle 1997).
A dictatorship’s
reputation for zero tolerance of opposition and for draconian punishments
deters the expression of opposition by raising C. Effective security services,
pervasive networks of informers, and intrusive mass-level institutions for
social control raise the likely costs of opposition. Citizens are more likely
to join the opposition, however, if large numbers of others have joined, both
because large numbers increase the likelihood that the regime will fall and
because the presence of large numbers indicates a lower risk of suffering
punishment for joining (Kuran 1989, 1991; Lohmann 1994). Unless
Why Dictatorships Fall
185
the cost of opposition is near zero,
however, as in secret-ballot elections, most will not participate because they
will receive any benefits of regime change whether they participated or not.
Perceptions about Regime Survival
Dictatorships rarely end unless many
citizens oppose them, but they often fail to end despite widespread citizen
opposition, especially when people keep their opposition private, as they do
most of the time (Kuran 1989). As Adam Przeworski (1986) explained long ago, in
stable dictatorships most people seem to support the regime, but after the
dictatorship falls, almost everyone seems to have wanted regime change. This kind
of process is called a tipping phenomenon.
Perceptions
about the likelihood of dictatorial collapse follow the same tipping logic.
Before the dictatorship faces serious challenges, individuals inside and
outside the dictatorial elite expect it to survive. They adapt their behavior
to do the best they can within the current political system and, even if they
hate the dictatorship, see little point in shouldering the costs of overt
opposition. Once challenges begin to reduce perceptions of dictatorial invincibility,
however, assessments can cascade downward until nearly everyone believes the
regime will fall.
Understanding
that a minor challenge can precipitate a dramatic downward rush in assessments
of regime strength, some members of the dictatorial elite may defect at this
point in order to establish reputations with the opposition in anticipation of
regime change, but most will remain loyal. In this way, some politicians who
spend their early careers as loyal servants of the dictator can become stalwarts
of democratic politics during transitions - joining those who defected after
loss of office.
Some citizens
may also then make their opposition public when the first challenge emerges,
but most will play it safe. As soon as some people begin to express opposition,
however, others recalibrate the likelihood of dictatorial survival, leading
more citizens to express opposition, and so on. As citizens update their
estimates of the prospects for regime survival, more and more become
comfortable expressing their discontent in election campaigns or demonstrations.
If the dictatorship can crush or defuse early demonstrations, perceptions
about likely survival may increase again. If not, however, they can drop
sharply. Eventually, those who sincerely support the dictatorship begin to see
costs associated with such support and keep quiet about it, contributing to the
perception that the regime is done for.
In this way,
perceptions about future regime survival affect the willingness of members of
the dictatorial elite to defect and of citizens to express overt opposition by
changing their calculus of p, the probability of regime survival.
i86
Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
THE EFFECT OF CRISIS ON DECISIONS TO OPPOSE
THE DICTATORSHIP
Many observers believe that economic crisis
contributes to authoritarian breakdown. Here, we focus first on the mechanism
through which externally induced economic problems might threaten regime
survival. As an example of an external crisis, consider a fall in the
international price of a country’s most important export. Typically, such a
decline would reduce the growth rate, affecting the benefits available to
citizens, and reduce government revenues. Reduced revenues could result in
downward pressure on public employment, wages in the public sector, spending on
schools and health care, state investment, and all the benefits that
dictatorships provide for their supporters. After the international price of
oil dropped in 2013, for example, Venezuela’s reduced ability to pay for imports
led to empty shelves in many grocery stores. These included the centerpiece of
the Chavez/Maduro regime’s most popular program for channeling benefits to
supporters, the state stores that sell food at subsidized prices in poor
neighborhoods. So, not only was the benefit stream provided by the dictatorship
for all citizens reduced by the price shock, but the ruling elite even lost
some of its ability to deliver special advantages to its most loyal supporters.
These problems have worsened over time.
What happened in
Venezuela is an extreme example of what happens after price shocks and other
economic crises. For those regime beneficiaries who occupy posts in government,
such challenges reduce the expected value of future benefits from office, Oj,
as wages fall. The likelihood of being appointed to a new and/or better post or
retaining the one held, q, also declines because of budget pressures to reduce
public employment, as do expectations about future benefits from the regime in
case one fails to achieve or retain a particular job, ~Oj. For ordinary
citizens, such crises reduce the expected benefits from the current government,
including expectations about future economic growth.
These reductions
increase the attractiveness of joining the opposition, for both regime insiders
and ordinary citizens. If individuals see that many others have become visible
regime opponents, as often happens during economic crises, their assessment of
the probability of regime survival, p, also falls. Through these two mechanisms,
overt opposition can grow and the likelihood of regime survival decline.
Dictatorial
policy makers can mitigate or exacerbate the effects of exogenous crises by
their actions, just as democratic governments can. They make politically
motivated choices not only about policy responses but also about which parts of
the population will bear the largest cost of the downturn. Members of the
dictatorial inner circle try to distribute the costs of the crisis so that they
fall most heavily on those with the least capacity to destabilize the regime,
usually the less organized and economically weaker parts of the population. The
Chavez/Maduro dictatorship, for example, closed many subsidized grocery stores,
but not those in politically volatile Caracas.
Why Dictatorships Fall
187
ECONOMIC CRISIS AND BREAKDOWN
Despite the belief that economic crisis
destabilizes dictatorships and the plausibility of the scenario described,
some careful statistical studies have shown little effect (e.g., Przeworski et
al. 2000). We suggest that the contradictory results found in large-N studies
are caused by differences in the capacity of dictatorships to respond to
economic crisis by redistributing the costs in politically effective ways. In
other words, we think that economic crisis is more destabilizing for some
kinds of dictatorships than others, leading to weak or contradictory results
when all dictatorships are lumped together.
Regime elites,
we suggest, can decrease popular opposition by building the kinds of
organizational infrastructure that can deliver help after economic crises or
natural disasters, and can prevent regime insiders from stealing aid meant for
disaster victims. The party-based networks of officials and supporters built to
incorporate more citizens into the dictatorship’s support base and facilitate
the collection of information about events and attitudes at the grassroots,
described in Chapter 6, can also be used to deliver disaster aid or
redistribute the costs of economic crisis. We believe that the extensive
patron- client networks developed in party-led dictatorships help regime elites
to continue distributing to those most essential for their survival while
shifting the burden of the crisis to other, politically weaker parts of the
population. During economic crises, ruling parties with wide-ranging
distributive networks can help prevent benefits from the status quo regime from
dropping too far among those citizens most capable of overthrowing the
dictatorship.
All dictatorial
support parties try to coopt citizens, but we believe that those that had
established extensive patron-client networks before the seizure of power have
an advantage over parties created after seizures of power. Their advantage
arises from the necessity of developing relationships between central party
leadership, local party leaders, and people living in different areas in order
to survive while out of power and, often, subject to repression. We expect
these relationships to have been especially strong where the party needed to
exchange protection or other benefits for manpower and resources in order to
maintain an insurgency or where it needed to exchange goods and services for
votes in competitive or semi-competitive elections. Because of their more
developed and extensive patron-client networks, we expect such support parties
to contribute to regime durability during crises.
In contrast,
dictatorships that have failed to build such penetrating party networks may
lack the means to respond effectively when natural disaster or economic crisis
strikes. Even a manageable natural disaster or economic challenge can become
calamitous for the dictatorship if it fails to respond effectively.
In the next
section we test whether institutions associated with extensive patron-client
networks insulate dictatorships from the destabilizing effects of economic
crisis.
i88
Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
Empirical Approach
To investigate how economic crisis affects
regime stability, we create a binary variable that flags observations if the
country has experienced negative growth during the previous two years, which
we call crisis. If the lagged two-year moving average of economic growth (per
capita) is less than -2 percent, crisis takes the value of 1, and zero
otherwise. We create a similar indicator for good economic times, which we call
boom; it is coded 1 if growth (per capita) is greater than 5 percent.4
Separating out the two extremes of economic growth allows for a more
transparent test of the proposition that economic crisis undermines authoritarian
rule. If we simply examined the effect of economic growth as a continuous
variable, we would not be able to assess the potentially destabilizing
influence of unusually poor growth easily, or the potentially stabilizing
effects of especially good economic times.
As in earlier
sections, we use an exogenous indicator of political institutions that
encompass citizens in well-organized networks, inherited party, which
identifies regimes led by a political party that was organized either to lead
an insurgency or to participate in elections before the authoritarian seizure
of power. This variable does not vary over time within particular regimes since
it measures a pre-seizure characteristic of the party that later became the
dictatorial ruling party.
To estimate the
effect of economic crisis on regime breakdown, we test a linear probability
model with country fixed effects and time period effects, while controlling for
duration dependence with a cubic polynomial. This approach allows us to model
all country-specific characteristics, such as geography, colonial history, and
religion, without dropping dictatorships that remain in existence throughout
the time period covered by the data, such as the Communist Party regime in
China or the monarchy in Saudi Arabia.
We use a minimum
number of control variables because many factors that influence regime
stability, such as protest and civil war, are post-treatment phenomena; that
is, economic crisis may cause protest or insurgency. Even international war can
result from a dictator’s initiation of conflict to divert citizens from
economic distress. Therefore, we include only three potential confounders:
prior experience of democracy, whether the dictator was a rebel leader before
the seizure of power, and whether he was a member of the military. These
variables ensure that the inherited party variable is not simply picking up the
destabilizing effect of earlier democratic experience or the stabilizing
influence of revolutionary party organization. First, we test the following
specification:
4 Crises occur in roughly 17
percent of observations, while booms occur in 19 percent.
Why Dictatorships Fall
189
No interaction
Interaction included
Crisis Inherit x
Crisis Inherited party Boom Inherit x Boom Prior democracy Military leader
Rebel leader
|
0.034 |
|
|
-0.06 |
|
|
0.011 |
|
|
|
0.026 |
-0.021 |
|
-0.019 |
|
1 |
1 |
|
0.057 |
-0.047 |
|
-0.046 |
|
|
0.03 |
-0.035 |
|
|
0.025 |
-0.022 |
|
-0.02 |
|
1 |
1 |
-0.05 0
-0.05 0 0.05
Coefficient estimate
figure 8.3 Economic crisis, party networks, and authoritarian breakdown.
0.05
Pr(Yt = i| Yt-1 = 0)
= a0 + Inheritit + fi2* Crisis + fi3*Boom
+fi4*Rebel leader + fi5*Military
leader + *Prior Democracy + Si + qt + e
(8.2)
where Si are country effects and yt
are five-year time period effects. Then we include an interaction between
crisis and inherited party as well as one between boom and inherited party.
This allows us to test whether the effect of crisis varies depending on whether
an inherited support party leads the dictatorship.
Figure 8.3
reports the results. When no interaction is included in the specification
(left side), the estimates for crisis are positive and significant, indicating
that economic crises are associated with authoritarian breakdown. Further, the
estimate for inherited party is negative and significant, showing again that
such parties contribute to regime durability. This result suggests that the
patron- client networks established in long-lasting parties, the ability to
cope with succession (also a feature of inherited parties), or both contribute
to regime resilience. This model does not show whether such parties
specifically help dictatorships weather economic crises, however.
The second model
(right side) does that. Including an interaction term allows us to examine the
effects of patron-client networks that reach ordinary citizens on the
likelihood of breakdown during or soon after economic crisis. The
190
Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
estimate for the effect of the interaction
between crisis and inherited party is negative and statistically significant.
This means that economic crises are less likely to destabilize dictatorships
led by parties that have developed extensive patron-client networks.5
The positive estimate for crisis alone means that economic downturns increase
the likelihood of collapse in dictatorships that lack extensive party networks.
In short, the data analysis confirms the argument that a well-organized ruling
party can help dictatorships survive economic crises.
POWER CONCENTRATION AND REGIME SURVIVAL
External crises are not the only challenges
dictatorships face. Conflict within the inner circle can threaten regime
survival even without other challenges. As Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C.
Schmitter (1986) noted decades ago, the collapse of authoritarian regimes can
begin with factionalism and disagreements among the dictatorship’s most
powerful decision makers. Insider conflict can motivate the dictator to demote
or exclude members of the inner circle, potentially weakening it;
alternatively, losers in factional struggles may defect from the regime in
order to lead opposition to it. If elite conflict becomes public, it can also
change citizens’ perceptions of the likelihood of regime survival, p,
increasing their willingness to undertake overt opposition. Intra-elite
struggles can thus make the regime seem weak to outside opponents, emboldening
latent opposition to mobilize against it, as well as directly causing elite
defections.
Elite conflict
often involves challenges to the incumbent dictator. In Chapters 4 and 5 we
showed that early leadership conflict can result in either power sharing
between the dictator and his closest allies or the concentration of power in
one man’s hands. Chapter 5 focused on the special difficulty of enforcing
power-sharing bargains among members of armed seizure groups. Now we
investigate how those earlier outcomes affect longer-run regime resilience and
the ways dictatorships break down.
We focus on how
the concentration of power can reduce subsequent conflict within the
dictatorial inner circle. In order to concentrate power, dictators engage in
strategies that end up reducing internal differences. They purge members of the
inner circle most inclined or most able to challenge them, while frightening
the rest into quiescence. Over time, they develop ways to control the futures,
lives, and welfare of other members of the dictatorial elite. Spy agencies, as
noted in Chapter 7, often report the contacts and conversations of members of
the inner circle to them, making possible preemptive strikes against anyone
suspected of critical thoughts, let alone deeds. When dictators control
appointments to top offices and the political police report directly to them,
open
5 The estimate for the linear
combination of crisis plus the interaction is 0.010 and not statistically
different from zero.
Why Dictatorships Fall
191
disagreement and criticism of the dictator
disappear from the corridors of power. Plotting becomes riskier. The dictator’s
ability to use rewards, privations, and violence against his closest allies
prevents most inner-circle conflict during his lifetime.
The strategies
that dictators with concentrated powers use to keep themselves safer can
undermine prospects for regime survival after the dictator dies, however.
Typically, personalist dictators exile, jail, or execute the country’s most
able politicians, administrators, and officers in order to reduce the likelihood
that they will eventually lead opposition. Such dictators value loyalty more
than competence when promoting officers or making administrative appointments,
which undermines the military as a fighting force and the bureaucracy as a
reservoir of technical skills, further reducing the likelihood of challenges.
The dictator’s worry about survival often also leads to the rapid rotation of
officials through offices and locations and of military officers through
commands, which reduces their ability to build loyal political networks of
their own that might serve as the core of a plot or opposition movement, but
also undermines their ability to develop experience and expertise. These
strategies reduce the competence and organizational resources of potential
successors.
The dictator’s
strategic use of corruption can also damage prospects for regime survival after
his death. Corruption tends to be higher in more personalized dictatorships
than in those in which power is less concentrated (Chang and Golden 2010). The
dictator’s personal corruption arises not only because he needs resources to
buy political support but also from his knowledge that he and his family are
likely to lose their in-country assets and wind up in exile (at best) if he
loses power. So he needs a substantial insurance fund held safely outside the
country.
The dictator’s
lieutenants engage in corruption for the same reason; in case the regime falls
or they fall out of the dictator’s favor, they will need funds to support their
families in exile. The supporters of personalist dictators are vulnerable to
loss of office, arrest, exile, and murder if the dictator becomes suspicious
about their loyalty. So they need insurance funds. And if the dictator rotates
supporters rapidly through offices, they have incentives to amass these funds
quickly, while they can. Few supporters of personalist dictators can continue
political careers post-dictatorship, another reason to get it while they can
(Bratton and van de Walle 1997).
Facilitating
lieutenants’ corruption can be part of the strategy of power concentration.
Dictators who allow rampant corruption often use their security police to
collect information about it so that officials who displease them for any
reason can be humiliated, deprived of office, and jailed when their corruption
is “discovered.” Even though nearly all officials engage in corruption and
everyone knows that everyone does it, corruption scandals erupt frequently in
personalized dictatorships, as the dictator uses this strategy to keep his
lieutenants on their toes, off-balance, and insecure.
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Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
The strategies
dictators with concentrated powers use to maintain control reduce destabilizing
inner-circle conflicts during their lifetimes, but also increase the
difficulties anyone who follows them in office will face. If the dictator dies
or is assassinated, his disarticulated supporters, accustomed to competing
against each other for his favor, have difficulty overcoming the collective
action problem of regime maintenance. The dictator’s hollowing-out of regime
institutions leaves them incapable of shaping bargains between the dictator’s
successor and other regime insiders. As a result, like the initial bargaining
period following the seizure of power, uncertainty is pervasive and the risk of
regime collapse is high.
These features
of personalized dictatorship lead us to expect that, all else equal, regime
breakdown would be less likely during the lifetimes of dictators with
concentrated power, but would become more likely after their deaths. The
overall effect of personalism on regime survival, however, depends on how long
an otherwise similar dictatorship would have been expected to survive under
more collegial leadership. If we would expect a regime to survive only a few
years, then increasing its resilience during the dictator’s lifetime would, on
average, increase its duration. If, on the other hand, a dictatorship has the
characteristics that would lead us to expect survival for many decades, then
the increased vulnerability to breakdown after the first dictator’s death
associated with personalism would likely reduce its expected duration.
The two regime
characteristics with well-established effects on the duration of dictatorships
are dominant-party rule, which tends to increase it, and military rule, which
tends to decrease it. Party-led dictatorships can enforce norms about the
selection of leaders better than other dictatorships can, and thus are more
capable of managing succession without crisis. Yet party constraints on
dictators are precisely the things a dictator intent on concentrating power in
his own hands wants to change. We therefore expect the personalization of rule
to increase the likelihood of the dictator retaining office until he dies, but
to reduce regime longevity in dictatorships organized by parties.
In contrast,
military-led dictatorships tend to replace dictators frequently via
sometimes-violent coups. The dispersal of arms within the dictatorial elite in
military-led regimes encourages recurring conflict within the inner circle.
This instability can in turn prompt officers to return to the barracks if they
believe conflict threatens the military’s unity (Geddes 1999). In military-led
regimes, we therefore expect personalization to extend not only the dictator’s
survival but also the regime’s because the average collegial military regime
has a shorter lifespan than the average dictator.
To test these
ideas, we examine the direct effect of the personalization of power on
dictatorial resilience and how personalism interacts with exogenous
characteristics of the seizure group that tend to be carried over into the
dictatorship.
Why Dictatorships Fall
193
Data and Measurement
To carry out this investigation, we use the
time-varying measure of personalism introduced in Chapter 4. As a reminder, it
is a composite measure of personalism from an item response theory (IRT)
two-parameter logistic model (2PL), rescaled on the [0,1] interval, where
higher levels of personalism approach
1 and lower levels of personalism approach 0. The
items used to derive the latent estimate capture both personalization of the
supporting political party (rubber stamp, party executive committee,
appointments, and new party) and the leader’s consolidation of power over the
military and security forces (security apparatus, paramilitary, promotions,
and purges). This time-varying indicator measures differences in power
concentration between regimes, between leaders in the same regime, and over
time during any individual leader’s tenure in power. It thus allows us to
investigate how personalism influences regime stability in different contexts.
Because our
indicator of personalism “measures” post-seizure behavior, we cannot rule out
the possibility that dictators pursue these strategies after considering their
prospects of survival, which we cannot observe. Indeed, we believe that this is
exactly what they do. However, our goal here is not to show that personalism
causes regime survival but rather to examine whether the concentration of
personal power in the leader’s hands correlates with regime longevity and
whether exogenous traits - such as military rule or dictatorial leadership
organized by a political party - shape this relationship.
To review the
measurement of the exogenous seizure group characteristics we focus on in this
section:
• A dictatorship
with an inherited support party (inherit) is one in which the ruling party was
originally organized during an earlier regime either to participate in
(democratic or autocratic) elections or to lead an armed insurgency. While this
measure only uses information about the seizure group prior to gaining power,
it nonetheless identifies most of the same country-years as the older
regime-level indicator, dominant party, proposed by Geddes (1999, 2003) and
updated by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014).6 The older regime-type
coding tried to distinguish dictatorships in which the ruling party was strong
enough to constrain the dictator from those in which it was not. The latter
were labeled personalist. Thus, the cases with inherited parties, though
measured before the seizure of power, are party-led dictatorships in which the
level of personalism tends to be relatively low. This may increase the
difficulty of showing how personalism affects the survival prospects of such
regimes. We note, however, that
6 Eighty-four percent of regimes coded as dominant
party by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz have an inherited support party, and 68
percent of regimes (but 80 percent of observations) with inherited parties are
coded as dominant party.
194
Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
though dictators have greater difficulty
concentrating power when an inherited party organizes the regime elite (as
shown in Chapter 4), some dictators - e.g., Stalin, Mao, and Kim Il-sung - have
nevertheless succeeded in doing so.
• We define a
military-led regime (military-led) as one in which the first dictator was an
active-duty or recently retired member of the military of the regime that
governed immediately before the seizure of power.7 Dictators whose
military titles were earned in the insurgency that brought them to power are
coded as insurgents, not military, and therefore the regimes they lead are not
considered military-led. This operationalization, again, uses only information
from before the seizure of power and thus does not contain information about
the behavior of the regime or its leader once in power. Military-led simply
identifies dictatorships initiated by military seizure groups.
Military-led
does not distinguish between more and less personalized military-led regimes,
as did the older regime-type coding. All of the regimes coded by Geddes,
Wright, and Frantz (2014) as “military” have a first military leader, but only
a little more than half (56 percent) of dictatorships with a first military
leader were coded as “military” in the older data. The coding rules for that data
set limited the term “military” to regimes in which the officer corps could
constrain the dictator’s discretion.8 Other dictatorships led by
officers were coded as “personalist.” In the data we use now, personalism can
be measured as a separate time-varying characteristic measured yearly.
By using
measures of military-led and inherited party that rely only on preseizure
characteristics of the first leader and the seizure group, we can examine how
the post-seizure behaviors that we identify to measure personalism influence
regime survival in different contexts. We have constructed two ways of defining
the autocratic context (military-led and inherited party) that are exogenous to
regime survival. That is, dictatorial leaders’ strategies for avoiding regime
collapse cannot have influenced the formation of a political party organized
before the seizure of power. Nor can it have affected whether military officers
first seized power.
Because we
define military-led regimes and inherited-party regimes in this way, we can use
them as stand-ins for “political institutions” in the Northian sense of
constraints or norms that shape political behavior and thus structure
7 If the first leader of the regime is not a
member of the military but a subsequent leader comes from the military, we do
not consider this regime military-led because choosing a subsequent leader of a
certain type may be a by-product of attempts to enhance regime longevity. In
the main estimating sample of the 270 regimes in 117 countries, 38 percent of
regimes have an inherited party and half are military-led.
8 See Geddes, Frantz, and Wright (2014) for a
discussion of different meanings of the term “military rule” and the conceptual
underpinnings of different ways of coding military-led dictatorships.
Why Dictatorships Fall
195
equilibrium outcomes (North 1990). These
institutional features thus circumvent the Rikerian objection to institutional
analysis (Pepinsky 2014) because dictatorships cannot change these
characteristics after seizing power.9
We examine the effects of personalism and
exogenous characteristics of the seizure group on autocratic breakdown using
two types of estimators. First, we test a logistic regression model with
control variables, including decade dummies to capture trends in autocratic
survival across time and regime duration polynomials to model time dependence
in the data. The duration polynomials allow the logistic regression to mimic
standard survival approaches, such as the Cox proportional hazard model (Beck
and Katz 1995; Carter and Signorino 2010). For this estimator, we model
heterogeneity across regimes using regime- level random effects. Second, we
estimate a linear probability model with country and year fixed effects. This
estimator allows us to incorporate fixed unit effects without dropping
countries that do not experience regime change in the period from 1946 to 2010.
With each estimator we cluster the standard errors by regime.
We control for
confounders thought to affect regime breakdown: log GDP per capita, log oil
rents per capita, conflict (civil and interstate), and prior democracy.10
Further, we include a variable that indicates whether the regime originated in
revolution, from Levitsky and Way (2013), who argue that postrevolutionary regimes
are especially durable. Including this variable is important because we want
to know whether our findings hold even after we account for the revolutionary
origins of some of the most durable autocracies of the twentieth century.11
In other words, we want to make sure that the effect we show for inherited
parties is not entirely due to revolutionary parties.
Finally, each
specification includes binary indicators for military-led regime and inherited
party regime. These are not mutually exclusive categories because some
military-led dictatorships seized power with the aid of inherited political
parties. After estimating a specification without interaction terms, we report
estimates from separate specifications, one of which includes an interaction between
military-led and personalism and the other an interaction between inherited
party and personalism. We use these interactions to show that the
9 There may, however, be unobserved factors that
cause selection into military-led or inherited party regimes that also cause
regime (in)stability. We rule out unobserved country-specific sources of
spurious correlation by employing country fixed effects estimators.
10 We also tested models with two
potential post-treatment variables, economic growth and antigovernment
protest, with similar results.
11 We drop this variable with the fixed effects
estimator since only ten countries have periods of rule under both a
revolutionary regime and a nonrevolutionary regime. Results including this
variable, however, remain consistent.
196
Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
Personalism - |
|
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||
Pers. x Military - |
- A- |
A |
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Pers. x Inherit - |
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_ [—| |
j—] |
|
Military-led - |
|
^a_ |
-< |
k- □- |
Inherited party - |
£ |
—□— |
|
|
GDP pc (log) - |
< |
I ] |
Oft |
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Civil war - |
|
-A— |
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|
Revolut. regime - |
—□— |
|
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Prior democracy - |
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% |
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-□— |
Oil rents - |
£ |
|
□- |
|
Int'l war - |
1 1 |
—A— 1 1 1 1 |
—□— 1 |
-4-20 2 4 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2
Coefficient
estimates O No interaction A Personal x Military □ Personal xInherit
figure 8.4 The effect of personalism on authoritarian breakdown.
FE, fixed effects. RE, random effects.
effects of the concentration of power in a
dictator’s hands differ depending on whether his initial support base was
rooted in the military or in an inherited party.
Figure 8.4 shows the results. Estimates
from the first specification (top line in each cluster) in the left panel do
not include either interaction term and thus simply estimate the average effect
of personalism across all dictatorships in the sample. The coefficient for
personalism is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that more
personalism on average is associated with a lower
Why Dictatorships Fall
197
probability of regime breakdown. The
estimate for inherited party is also negative and significant, indicating that
inherited parties prolong dictatorships, all else equal.12 That for
military-led regime is positive and significant, consistent with prior
research showing that military regimes tend to be fragile (Geddes 2003). Like
previous studies, our results link specific autocratic institutions to greater
durability (Geddes 1999; Gandhi 2008; Magaloni 2008). Unlike previous studies,
however, we are able to rule out the possibility of reverse causation. That is,
the possible tendency of more durable dictatorships to adopt party institutions
(Pepinsky 2014) could not cause the relationship because the measures we use
to capture institutions pre-date the existence of the dictatorship.
The next two
models (identified by triangles and squares) include interaction terms, which
estimate the effect of increases in personalism in military-led dictatorships
(triangles) and in those led by inherited parties (squares). These estimates
show statistically significant effects in opposite directions. The estimate
for the effect of increases in personalism in military-led regimes (the linear
combination of military x personalism plus personalism) is negative and significant.
In contrast, the estimate for the effect of increases in personalism in
party-led regimes (the linear combination of inherit x personalism plus personalism),
while negative, is not statistically significant.
The negative
estimate for personalism in military-led dictatorships means that as leaders in
these regimes concentrate more power in their own hands, the regimes they lead
become less vulnerable to overthrow. This result makes sense because for
military dictators, power concentration involves building up nonmilitary security
forces such as internal security police, who usually spy on officers as well as
civilians, and paramilitary forces recruited from regions and ethnic groups
especially likely to be loyal to the dictator.13 These forces loyal
to the dictator reduce the ability of officers in the regular military to oust
the dictator and thus also to force him to consult with them. Power
concentration also often includes a gradual change in the dictator’s support
base from primarily military to greater reliance on organized civilian, ethnic,
or even family networks. A dictator who succeeds in replacing some of his
initial military support with civilians has reduced the proportion of members
of the inner circle who control the arms and men needed to replace him at
relatively low cost. He may at the same time replace officers from multiple
regions and ethnic groups with co-ethnics, co-regionalists, or family members,
thus further reinforcing the likelihood of future loyalty.
The positive
coefficient for military-led by itself in the model that includes the
interaction indicates that more collegial military regimes (those with the
12 Recall that the specification includes
regime-case random effects as well as a control for revolutionary regimes. The
result for inherited parties remains after dropping revolutionary regimes from
the estimating sample.
13 Remember that control of
security forces and the creation of loyal paramilitary forces are two of the
indicators that go into the measure of personalism.
198
Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
lowest concentration of power in the
leader’s hands and lowest personalism scores) tend to be short-lived. This
result reinforces earlier findings about collegial military rule and statements
above about the fragility of dictatorships in which armed force is widely
dispersed within the ruling group. In more collegial military-led
dictatorships, security services often remain within the military chain of
command, and paramilitary forces are not usually created unless the military
wants help fighting insurgencies. Thus in collegial military- led
dictatorships, the dictator may personally control no armed forces to defend
him if other officers decide to remove him.
In contrast to
the findings about personalization in military-led regimes, the results show
that power concentration in dictatorships led by inherited parties makes them
more vulnerable to breakdown. The coefficient for inherited party by itself
indicates that party-led regimes with relatively collegial inner circles are
more durable than other kinds of dictatorship. The coefficient for the interaction
between inherited party and personalism means that the personalization of
party-based rule decreases its durability. This reflects the difficulty of maintaining
personalized rule after the death of the individual who has concentrated vast
powers in his own hands even in party-based regimes.
The control
variable estimates are stable across specifications and in the expected
directions: oil-rich autocracies and revolutionary regimes are more stable,
while dictatorships in countries with a prior history of democracy and those
experiencing conflict are more likely to collapse.
Next, we turn to
the estimates from the specifications with fixed effects, shown on the right
side. Recall that this estimation approach accounts for all unobserved
country-specific factors - such as religion, state strength, colonial legacy,
ethnic fractionalization in society as well as in the military at the time of
independence, history of democratic experience, geographic region, terrain, and
climate - that might influence the propensity for either a group led by
officers or an inherited party to seize power. The first specification (top
estimate in each cluster) excludes interaction terms. The estimate for
personalism in this model is negative and statistically significant, indicating
that even when we look only at variation over time within countries,
concentrating power in the hands of the dictator increases regime longevity on
average.
The estimate for
military-led regimes is positive but very close to zero and not statistically
significant. Because the group of military-led regimes includes about equal
numbers in which the dictator concentrates power (what Weeks [2014] calls
“strongman” regimes) that last much longer than other military-led regimes and
those in which he does not (what she calls “juntas”), the near-zero estimate
for military-led in a fixed effects specification should not be surprising.
The estimate for
inherited party is still negative and statistically significant, providing
strong evidence that dictatorships led by inherited parties are more durable,
on average, than those that lack such parties. Remember that we have coded this
regime characteristic based only on pre-seizure information, and thus it is not
contaminated by the strategic maneuvers of regime elites trying to
Why Dictatorships Fall
retain power after they have seized it.14
Further, because we have estimated the effect of this feature of dictatorships
in a fixed effects model, we can rule out the possibility that relatively
time-invariant factors specific to individual countries - such as the
historical legacy of strong states (Slater 2010) or aspects of political
economy that shape dictators’ or elites’ political preferences (Pepinsky 2014)
- explain the finding.
In the second
fixed effects specification (middle estimate in each cluster), we include the
interaction between personalism and military-led regimes. The estimate for
military-led regimes alone is positive and statistically significant (though
only at the 0.10 level). The positive estimate suggests that military-led
regimes in which the dictator has not concentrated power in his own hands are
roughly 5 percent more likely to collapse in a given year than collegial,
civilian- led dictatorships.
The estimate for
personalism alone is negative and statistically different from zero. This
suggests that personalism stabilizes authoritarian rule in dictatorships
initially led by civilians (when inherited party is controlled for). The civilian-led
dictatorships that lack inherited parties include monarchies, some post-Soviet
dictatorships in which the dictator juggles multiple, often shortlived
parties, the Sukarno regime in Indonesia, two brief Ecuadoran dictatorships
led by Velasco Ibarra, and a few others. These regimes tend to be highly
personalized.
The estimate for
the interaction between personalism and military-led regimes is strongly
negative and significant, confirming the earlier result that the
regime-prolonging effects of personalism are greatest in military-led regimes.
Finally, the
last model reported on the right side includes the interaction between
personalism and inherited party. The estimate for this term is positive and
statistically significant, meaning that personal concentration of power makes
dictatorships led by inherited parties less resilient. The estimate for
personalism alone is negative and significant, indicating that power concentration
strongly stabilizes regimes that lack an inherited party. The estimate for
inherited party alone is negative and significant, indicating that regimes led
by inherited parties with relatively collegial leadership are the most durable.
Combined, these results confirm the pattern identified by Geddes (1999), in
which what she labeled “military regimes” (roughly equivalent to less personalized
military-led regimes here) are least resilient; “dominant-party regimes”
(equivalent to less personalized regimes led by inherited parties here)
survived longest; and “personalist regimes” (a combination of personalized
military-led and personalized civilian-led) occupied the middle ground.
14 In addition, there are no “hybrid regimes” in
this analysis (Pepinsky 2014, 641). We have simply used a concrete, observable
feature of the pre-seizure history of the regime support party to
operationalize what we believe is a theoretically important concept.
200
Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
0.15 -
0
2
0 0.05 •
0
TO
c
cc
.c
o
Military-led low personalism
Military-led high personalism
Inherited party low personalism
Inherited party high personalism
figure 8.5 The effects of personalism in dictatorships with different
leadership configurations.
0
95% ci
Figure 8.5
summarizes the findings for personalism in dictatorships with different
leadership configurations, using the estimates reported in the two fixed
effects models in Figure 8.4. Military-led regimes with the lowest personalism
score are almost 5 percent more likely to fail in a given year than civilian
regimes. Military-led regimes with the highest personalism scores, however, are
less likely to fail than civilian regimes. Turning to regimes with inherited
parties, we see the opposite pattern. Those with low personalism scores are 9
percent less likely to collapse than regimes without inherited ruling parties,
while regimes with inherited parties but high personalism are no more or less
likely to fail than regimes without inherited support parties. This figure
illustrates the very different effects that concentration of power in the
dictator’s hands has on regime survival, depending on other inner-circle
characteristics: it enhances regime survival in military-led dictatorships but
decreases it in dictatorships led by inherited parties.
This pattern of
results reflects the consequences for regime durability of the modes of
bargaining and handling intra-elite conflict in dictatorships led by different
kinds of groups. Regimes based on collegial military rule tend to break down
easily, both because the dispersal of armed force encourages intraregime
conflict and because officers sometimes choose to return to the barracks if
internal conflict threatens military unity (Geddes 1999). The personalization
of military-led regimes reduces intra-elite conflict by concentrating power in
one man’s hands and thus tends to prolong regime survival during that man’s
lifetime. If military seizure groups cared only about regime survival, more
officers would consent to the personalization of rule. They also care about the
integrity of the military as a fighting force, however, and their own standing
Why Dictatorships Fall
201
within the regime, both of which pull them
toward maintaining greater collegiality.
In contrast, the
personalization of party-based dictatorships increases their vulnerability to
breakdown. As we show later, personalization undermines the ruling party’s
ability to cope with succession. Many of the strategies dictators use to
concentrate power in their own hands reduce prospects for regime survival after
their deaths.
Overall, these
findings suggest that personalism erodes the institutional framework -
regardless of whether the framework is provided by inherited parties or
military institutions - through which elites bargain over power with the
dictator. How personalism influences regime survival differs in these two
contexts because, in the absence of personalized power, the dispersal of arms
and norms of obedience inherent in military institutions tend to shorten regime
duration, while cohesive party institutions stabilize and lengthen dictatorships
by improving the elite’s ability to handle leadership succession.
LEADERSHIP CHANGES AND REGIME BREAKDOWN
In the full sample of cases, nearly half
(47.5 percent) of all leader exits coincide with regime collapse, which
suggests that leadership transitions pose serious challenges for autocratic
stability.15 Here, we investigate how the personalization of power
affects the likelihood of regime survival in the immediate aftermath of a
dictator death or ouster.
Because of the
threat to regime survival caused by elite disunity, whenever some members of
the inner circle organize to remove a dictator, they risk not only their lives
and livelihoods if they fail, but also the survival of the regime regardless of
whether they fail. Those whose posts and benefits depend on the threatened
dictator may mobilize against the challengers, especially if they expect to be
purged along with the dictator - as in many cases they do. Even if the dictator
is successfully removed, a deep split within the regime elite makes the new
dominant faction vulnerable to power grabs by other insiders ambitious to
concentrate resources in their own hands, as well as to external opposition.
The Dominican
Republic’s experience after Rafael Trujillo’s assassination illustrates what
tends to happen. Trujillo’s right-hand man, the puppet civilian president
Joaquin Balaguer, succeeded Trujillo smoothly, but a three-sided power struggle
began immediately among what had been the main beneficiaries and supporters of
the Trujillo regime: the military, Trujillo’s initial base of support, which
saw itself as his natural heir; Trujillo’s extended family, which had gained
control of most of the Dominican economy under Trujillo and
15 We restrict our analysis to
regime leaders who held power on January 1 and thus exclude most
leaders who held power for less than a
year.
202
Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
wanted one of their own to lead the regime
to safeguard their interests; and Balaguer, who led the ruling party and
controlled government administration. These three groups failed to achieve a
power-sharing agreement, and no one group could dominate the others, leaving
the dictatorship vulnerable to outside opposition. A minority faction of the
military that favored democratization seized power and ended the dictatorship
less than a year after Trujillo’s death (Wiarda 1975, 263; Hartlyn 1998, 96).
The difficulties
the Trujillo inner circle faced in trying to reconsolidate the regime under a
new leader are not unusual in personalized dictatorships. Figure 8.6 shows how
increased personalism affects the probability that the dictator’s removal from
office coincides with regime collapse. The analysis looks at the 465 dictator
exits in the data set. We report the results of four specifications. The first
simply controls for how long the regime and the dictator have lasted up to the
time of the leader’s exit. The second adds calendar time to control for world
trends; and the third adds a battery of control variables shown in other
research to affect dictatorial resilience: GDP per capita, oil rents, protest,
civil conflict, inherited party, military-led, and revolutionary party. The
last specification excludes monarchies to check the suspicion that monarchies,
which tend to be long-lived and personalistic, might be driving results.
Depending on the specification, the estimate for the effect of personalism
shows that increasing the personalism index from its lowest to highest value
increases the probability that dictator exit coincides with regime collapse by
more than 50 percent. In short, replacing the dictator, whether because of
death or ouster, without destabilizing the regime becomes substantially less
likely as the dictator concentrates personal power in his hands.
Two different
processes contribute to the result in Figure 8.6. First, as in the
post-Trujillo example, regime elites in personalist dictatorships have
difficulty cooperating to maintain the regime after the dictator is gone. This
difficulty arises from the dictator’s strategy of negotiating separately with
different support factions and the weakness of institutions within which
bargaining and policy choice formally occur. Second, personalist dictators’
strategies for securing their own safety result in fewer ousters by regime
insiders and consequently more by regime outsiders, who generally seek to end
the regime as well as ousting the dictator. In the next section we focus on a
smaller sample of cases that excludes those in which the opposition intended to
overthrow both the dictator and the regime: natural deaths of dictators.
Death of the Dictator and Regime Survival
Unlike other kinds of leadership change, a
dictator’s natural death in office is an exogenous challenge to the regime he
led. Regime weakness or inner-circle conflict does not cause it, and thus
cannot explain why dictatorships are vulnerable in the wake of it. Some
dictatorships can better handle a leader’s death than others, however. In the
next section, we test the argument that personalized dictatorships have greater
difficulties surviving succession than
Why Dictatorships Fall
203
Leader
duration
Regime
duration
Personalism -
Coefficient estimate
figure 8.6 Probability that dictator exit coincides with regime collapse.
Note: *Added covariates: growth, GDP pc,
oil rents, protest, civil conflict, inherited party, military-led,
revolutionary regime
those with more collegial leadership by
investigating what happens after the natural death of a dictator. We show that
concentration of power in the dictator’s hands undermines the dictatorial
elite’s capacity to retain its hold on power after the dictator’s natural
death.
To evaluate the
effect of power concentration on the capacity of dictatorships to handle
succession after a leader’s death, we examine the relationship between
personalism, measured as its average level during the three years prior to the
first dictator’s death, and the square root of the number of years the regime
survived after it.16 The data include all forty regimes in which the
first dictator died a natural death in office. The left panel of Figure 8.7
plots these two variables against each other to reveal a strong negative
relationship: regimes in which the first dictator had concentrated more power
collapse much sooner after his death than regimes in which the first leader
accumulated less personal power. The right panel shows the same relationship
after conditioning on a number of other factors: calendar time, regime duration
up to the time of
16 The post-death regime duration variable is
skewed, so we use the square root of duration in this analysis. Tests for
normality indicate that the square root transformation results in a less skewed
distribution than the untransformed number of years or the log. For regimes
with leader death before the regime’s third anniversary, we take the average
level of personalism during the tenure of the leader. The right panel of Figure
8.7 is an added-variable plot from a kernel regression.
O Base model A Add period FE □ Add
covariates* o Drop monarchies
-0.2
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0
204
Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
Unconditional
E 4
0
-4 •
Conditional on covariates
1
-0.5 -0.25 0 0.25
e(Personalism index)
figure 8.7 Effect of personalism on capacity to handle succession.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 Personalism index
8
4
s2
s2
the first leader’s death, whether the first
dictator came from the military, and the average oil rents accruing to the
regime during the first leader’s time in power.
Next, we extend
the analysis to all 61 dictators whose tenure ended in natural death. This
group includes the 40 first regime leaders in the prior analysis as well as 21
subsequent leaders who died natural deaths. We examine how personalism during
the time just before the dictator’s death influences later regime stability in
a standard empirical model of regime failure. This analysis differs from prior
analyses in that we look only at the 52 regimes in which at least one dictator
died naturally while in office, and we examine only how long regimes last after
leaders’ deaths.
Since we examine
only regimes in which a dictator left office as a result of natural death, we
need not worry that the death reflects strategic efforts to constrain or oust
the leader in order to preserve or destabilize the regime. The design excludes
cases such as the reshuffling coup that ousted the senile Tunisian leader in
1987 or the rebellion that forced out the cancer-ridden leader of Zaire in
1997. In cases like these, we do not observe natural death in office precisely
because actors who saw a leader nearing death removed him in order to preserve
the regime in Tunisia and to end it in Zaire. By examining regime duration
post-natural death, our design looks only at the cases in which the level of
personalism (during the years just before the death) is plausibly exogenous
since new leaders cannot alter what happened in the past (Jones and Olken
2005).
Mimicking a
survival model, we test a binary cross-section time series model with regime
failure as the dependent variable and log regime duration to account for
duration dependence (duration after leader death). The explanatory
Why Dictatorships Fall
205
Duration after leader death (log)
Duration at leader death (log)
Personalism GDP pc (log) Oil rents (log)
Military-led Inherited party
-0.5
-A-
A-
-o-
-1------ 1---
0 0.5
Coefficient estimate
1.5
O Base model A Add GDP, oil □ Add military,
party
figure 8.8 Personalism and post-death regime survival.
variable of interest is the average level
of personalism in the regime during the three years before the dictator’s
natural death, as above. The covariates in the base model include decade
dummies and the log number of years the regime had been in power at the time of
the leader’s death (duration at leader death). Decade dummies account for
global temporal patterns in the rise and fall of dictatorships, while duration
at leader death accounts for the possibility that regimes that have existed for
a long time before the dictator dies may be more resilient than young ones.
The top
estimates in each cluster in Figure 8.8, depicted as diamonds, show the results
from this test: personalism during the time just before a dictator’s death
increases the likelihood of regime collapse afterward. Next, we add two
structural covariates to the model, GDP per capita and oil rents. The result
for personalism remains. Last, we add two measures of exogenous institutions
discussed throughout this chapter, indicators for military-led and rule based
on an inherited party.17 Again, the result for personalism persists.
Military-led regimes are more vulnerable to breakdown in this sample as in
other analyses.
17 Results in the replication files show that the
estimated effect of personalism varies (i.e., there is a nonproportional
hazard): as regimes survive longer after the natural death of a leader, the
marginal effect of his pre-death level of personalism declines. Thus,
personalism has the strongest effect soon after the natural death of a
dictator, as intuition would suggest. If readers want to
206
Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
The findings in
Figures 8.7 and 8.8 are consistent with the claim that personalism is
destabilizing during successions. Importantly, the measure of personalism used
in these tests is exogenous to the behavior of dictators who follow after the
death of a previous leader. Instead of capturing the potentially strategic
behavior of post-death leaders, the personalism variable used here is
constructed using only information about the dead leader’s behavior while in
office. It is thus a proxy for the institutional environment bequeathed to new
dictators after the natural death of their predecessors.
Up to this
point, we have investigated some of the causes of dictatorial collapse. We turn
now to what happens after dictatorships fall.
THE DICTATOR’S FUTURE AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF
DEmOCRATIZATION
What happens after a dictatorship falls
depends to a considerable extent on how the dictator and his closest allies
respond to angry citizens, embittered officers, and demanding foreigners when
they face regime-threatening challenges. In this section, we investigate one of
the factors that determines those responses: the expectations of dictators and
their closest supporters about what will happen to them and their families if
the regime falls, that is, the right-hand side of Equation 8.1. The costs of
losing power vary across dictatorships and across individuals within
dictatorial elites. These differences affect the willingness of dictators and
other members of the dictatorial elite to negotiate peaceful transitions when
regime survival appears doubtful. The willingness to negotiate in turn affects
how dictatorships end and what kind of political system follows them.
Negotiation to
end a dictatorship empowers parts of the opposition committed to
democratization and aims to devise a peaceful means of choosing the specific individuals
to whom power will be transferred. For these reasons, negotiated regime
transitions tend to end in competitive elections and to result in democracy. By
contrast, the dictator’s refusal to negotiate increases the likelihood that
regime opponents will resort to force to unseat him. Forced ousters, in turn,
reduce prospects for democratization (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014).
For dictators who have concentrated great
power in their hands, losing office can be personally disastrous. Earlier
research using regime-type data shows that dictators who concentrate more power
in their hands while they rule face a higher probability than other
ex-dictators of exile, imprisonment, execution,
interpret this substantively, the pattern
suggests that dictatorial elites may be able to consolidate against the
destabilizing effect of past personalism over time, if they can survive the
first year or two.
Why Dictatorships Fall
207
and assassination after ouster, even if
democratization follows their overthrow (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014). In
the abstract terms of Equation 8.1, the personalization of power causes the
dictator’s expectations about future benefits under a different regime to drop
very low. Because of their greater chance of a bad fate after stepping down,
dictators who have amassed great personal power tend to resist negotiations
with the opposition that might lead to peaceful transition and instead cling
to power until violently overthrown (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014).
Characteristics
of the seizure group also affect the costs of losing office for the dictator
and his close allies. We turn now to an examination of these costs and how
personalism interacts with these traits to influence the chance of
democratization.
Costs of Losing Power in
Military-Led Dictatorships
The cost of returning to the barracks for
most military officers is low if the regime democratizes. They simply continue
their chosen careers. Sometimes the dictator himself and a handful of other top
officers are forced into exile or prosecuted for human rights abuses, but such
punishments have rarely extended to the rest of the officer corps after a
peaceful transition to democracy. Violent overthrow can lead to much higher
costs for officers if insurgents, foreign invaders, or a rebellious faction of
the military defeats them, especially if the violent overthrow results in a new
dictatorship. After violent overthrows, top officers of the ousted dictatorship
are often jailed or exiled and sometimes executed; insurgents may replace the
entire officer corps. Ghana’s multiple experiences with military rule fit this
pattern. Ghana has experienced three negotiated democratizations after military
interventions; the most serious punishment imposed on outgoing officers after
democratization was the forced retirement of a few at the top. In contrast,
after Ghana’s one experience with the violent ouster of a military regime, the
mutiny led by Flight Lieutenant J. J. Rawlings in 1979, a number of officers
were executed (Singh 2014). Recent events in the Middle East show the same
pattern. After the 2012 democratization in Egypt, the old dictator was
arrested for corruption and a few top officers were forced to retire. The rest
of the military remained intact and, indeed, able to seize power again a year
later. In Libya, however, where the old dictator was violently defeated by a
combination of insurgency and foreign intervention, the dictator was killed and
his army disbanded.
Officers who
have served in military governments should thus prefer democratization if they
fear regime breakdown, since their prospects for punishment are higher in a
future dictatorship than in democracy (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014; Debs
2016). If they prefer democracy for these reasons (or others), they should
negotiate their extrication when p, the likelihood of regime survival, has
fallen. The incentives facing the military dictator, however, can differ from
those facing other officers. The dictator faces a higher risk of punishment
208
Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
than do others, so he may try to cling to
power when other officers want to negotiate extrication.
As a result of
these differences in interests, collegial military-led regimes, in which other
officers can constrain the dictator’s choices or remove him if he makes choices
they oppose, are more likely to negotiate a return to the barracks. When the
dictator resists a return to the barracks, other officers can force him from
office. The replacement of a military dictator by a faction intent on
democratization has occurred many times since 1946. Hard-line Argentine General
Galtieri’s replacement by the moderate General Bignone in 1982 is one example.
After their humiliating defeat in the Malvinas/Falklands conflict and massive
protests against military rule, the military junta replaced Galtieri with
Bignone, oversaw competitive elections in 1983, and rushed a transition to
civilian government. Other officers also forced Colombian General Rojas Pinilla
to resign after a popular uprising, so that his replacement could oversee
elections and a transition to democracy (Martz 1962, 249-53).
In these
examples and many others, a military faction responded to widespread popular
opposition to military rule by ousting the dictator clinging to power, and then
organized a transition to democracy via competitive elections. These are cases
in which other officers imposed their own interests on military dictators who
were trying to avoid the potential costs of losing office - and did so through
means visible to observers.
In contrast,
military-led regimes in which the dictator has concentrated great power in his
own hands and can therefore act to further his individual interests often
refuse to negotiate. Further, when they do negotiate, they may later renege on
power-sharing agreements. Examples include Colonel Mobutu Sese Seko in
Zaire/Congo, who agreed to power sharing with the opposition in 1992, but
retained control of the army and ruling party, which enabled him to break his
promises and reconsolidate his position as dictator (Schatzberg 1997, 70).
Similarly, ex-Sargent Gnassingbe Eyadema in Togo “surrendered power” in 1991 to
the interim prime minister who had been selected by a national confer- ence,18
but was able to use the military to wrestle control back into his own hands by
the end of the year (Press 1991). Dictators who have concentrated great power
in their hands tend to resist losing office to the bitter end. Insurgents
forced Mobutu from office five years after he broke his promises about power
sharing. Eyadema remained in power until he died of natural causes more than
ten years after breaking his agreement with the opposition. He was succeeded by
his son, who still rules as this is written.
In other words,
in military-led dictatorships in which one officer has concentrated immense
discretion in his hands, other officers have lost the ability to pursue their
own interests in a peaceful return to the barracks if regime survival is
threatened. In more collegial military regimes, however, the interests of
18 “Togo’s President Agrees to
Yield Power to a Rival,” New York Times, August 28, 1991.
Why Dictatorships Fall
209
officers other than the dictator tend to
prevail, which increases the likelihood of a negotiated transition and democratization.
Earlier research
confirms that collegial military regimes are more likely to be followed by
democracy than are regimes led by officers who have concentrated greater power
in their hands (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014). This relationship could be
spurious, however. If more professionalized military institutions can better
obstruct the personalization of rule, and richer countries tend to have more
professionalized military institutions, then wealth may be the underlying
reason for the correlation between collegial military rule and democratization.
To rule out this possibility, we conduct more rigorous tests of this
relationship below (see Figure 8.9).
The Costs of Losing
Power in Party-Led Dictatorships
The minimum cost of ending dictatorship for
members of a party-based dictatorial inner circle is that they must compete
with other parties for the benefits associated with rule rather than having a
monopoly. If they lose elections, they lose automatic access to state resources
for personal consumption or use in election campaigns, and they lose
opportunities for corruption and business advantages associated with their
political connections. Party cadres may also lose their government jobs. So the
losses can be substantial, but loss of office does not usually lead to jail or
execution except sometimes for top leaders.
As with military
regimes, former members of the dictatorial government are better off under a
subsequent democracy than under a new dictatorship (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz
2014). Members of the inner circle may therefore want to increase the chance of
a peaceful, nonviolent regime change by negotiating with the opposition and
agreeing to reforms that increase the fairness of elections, but dictators, who
face the possibility of jail or assassination if they step down, often refuse
to negotiate. In contrast to the many coups that have ushered in democratic
transitions when military dictators opposed compromise, however, civilian
members of the elite surrounding a dictator who refuses to negotiate have more
difficulty ousting him in order to oversee a peaceful transition. As a result,
democratization is less likely to follow party-led dictatorships than those led
by military officers.
The dictator’s
concentration of power in party-led dictatorships further reduces the
likelihood of democratization. Officials of personalized party-led
dictatorships face less difficult futures than do top leaders but are more
likely to be politically marginalized and deprived of economic assets after democratization
than are officials from dictatorships with more collegial decision-making. As
Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle note:
Recruited and sustained with material
inducements, lacking an independent political base, and thoroughly compromised in
the regime’s corruption, they are dependent on survival of the incumbent.
Insiders have typically risen through ranks of political service
210
Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
and, apart from top leaders who may have
invested in private capital holdings, derive livelihood principally from state
or party offices. Because they face the prospect of losing all visible means of
support in a political transition, they have little option but to cling to the
regime, to sink or swim with it. (1997, 86)
This difference
in future prospects between officials of regimes in which the dictator has
concentrated great power and those in which a party organization maintains a
degree of power dispersal arises from the dictator’s control of appointments in
the former. The personalistic dictator’s exile, imprisonment, or execution of
the most able and popular politicians in the ruling party, while at the same
time making appointments based on loyalty alone, reduces the likelihood that
the party will be able to transform itself into a successful competitor if
democracy succeeds the dictatorship.
These
considerations mean that party-led dictatorships are less likely to negotiate
transitions than collegial military-led dictatorships, especially if power is
concentrated in the hands of the dictator.
Costs of Losing Power
for Monarchs
Twelve monarchs have lost dictatorial
control since 1946, three of them in Nepal.19 Coups ended seven of
the monarchies, popular uprisings three, and insurgency one. Seven
authoritarian monarchies remain in countries with more than a million
inhabitants, all but one in the Middle East or North Africa. In only one
instance was a transition to constitutional monarchy and competitive elections
negotiated: in Nepal in 1991. In this instance, the constitutional monarchy
survived until a later king usurped unconstitutional powers in
2002. The Nepali monarchy was abolished a few years
later after a popular uprising. Of the monarchs ousted by coup, popular
uprising, or insurgency, one was murdered along with his family during the
coup, one died in prison afterward along with several family members, and the
others were exiled. Much of their property was confiscated. None survived as
constitutional monarchs in democracies.
In short, since
1946 monarchs ousted by force have not enjoyed a peaceful, economically secure
retirement in their own countries, and other members of their families have
also faced punishments and exile. Since these numbers are small, conclusions
have to be tentative, but these experiences suggest that monarchs and their
families have a lot to lose if they are forcibly ousted. It might seem that a
ruling family’s best strategy in the face of opposition or demands for
democracy would be to pursue gradual democratization (that is, steps toward constitutional
monarchy as practiced in Europe), which might safeguard their lives and quite a
bit of their status and property.
19 This number does not include a
few monarchs who briefly held formal power but never actually
ruled, such as King Michael of Romania
during Soviet occupation.
Why Dictatorships Fall
211
The majority of
the monarchies ousted by coup, however, appeared to be following exactly that
strategy. They held regular semi-competitive parliamentary elections. Elites
controlled these parliaments, as occurred before full democratization in
Europe, and monarchs controlled substantial areas of policy. These regimes
might have gradually become fully constitutionalized and democratic over time
as some European monarchies did, but they were overthrown before that could
happen. These experiences suggest that the strategy that worked for a number of
European monarchies may not be available to contemporary monarchs.
In contrast to
much of Europe when parliamentary supremacy was being imposed on monarchies,
nearly all countries that achieved independence after World War II (which
includes most contemporary authoritarian monarchies) created standing armies
more or less immediately. Coups carried out by small, recently created armies
occurred within ten years of independence in a quarter of countries that gained
independence after World War II, including a number of monarchies. Once a
country has a professional army (that is, one not raised by tribal levies or
maintained by regional aristocrats) and an officer corps open to the middle
class, monarchs apparently become susceptible to dissatisfied officers just as
other rulers are. This may have reduced the feasibility of incremental
democratization strategies for monarchs. It should perhaps not be surprising, then,
that most contemporary monarchies have opted to rely on repression and
cooptation through distribution rather than steps toward democratization when
faced with opposition demands.
To sum up our
argument about prospects for democratization, the costs of losing power for
dictators and their closest collaborators influence their willingness to
negotiate stepping down once the dictatorship’s prospects look dim. When
dictators negotiate an exit, authoritarian breakdown usually results in democratization.
When the dictatorial elite circles the wagons, however, and fights until the
end, the fall of one dictatorship is likely to coincide with the beginning of a
new one. In the next section, we test some of the implications of this
argument. We investigate, first, the effect of the personalization of
dictatorial rule on prospects for both democratization and a peaceful
transition. Second, we show that the effect of personalization on the
likelihood of democratization varies depending on whether dictatorial elites
come from the military or a ruling party.20
THE EFFECT OF PERSONALIZATION ON PROSPECTS
FOR DEMOCRACY
Figure 8.9 shows how the personalization of
power influences the chance of democratization and a peaceful transition. For
these tests, we estimate kernel regression models, including common covariates
of democratization: GDP per
20 We cannot test claims about
monarchies because their number is too small.
212
Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
Democratization Armed collapse
Year Year
figure 8.9 Personalism and democratization.
capita, regime duration, a Cold War dummy,
civil conflict, prior democracy, and regime institutions (military-led, inherited
party, personalism). The left panel shows that personalism lowers the chances
of democratization during the entire sample period, conditional on old regime
breakdown.21 The estimates on the vertical axis correspond to the
difference in the probability of democratic transition (given old regime
collapse) between dictatorships with collegial leadership (0 on the personalism
index) and those in which the dictator has concentrated power (1 on the
personalism index). While not shown, the control variables yield intuitive
results as well. Wealthier dictatorships, military-led regimes, and those that
were preceded by democracy are more likely to democratize. New autocracies were
more likely to replace dictatorships that collapsed during the Cold War than those
that have broken down more recently. The substantive effect of personalism is
larger than that of any covariates except the Cold War.22 These
results suggest that concentration of power in dictators’ hands impedes
democratization in the wake of authoritarian breakdown.
One of the
mechanisms through which we believe personalism affects the likelihood of
democratization is that dictators who have concentrated power in their hands
resist negotiating peaceful transitions, which results in more of those that
eventually do fall being ousted by force. In the right panel of Figure 8.9, we
show the results of an investigation of this claim. The dependent variable in
the right panel is forcible regime overthrow (conditional on the occurrence of
regime collapse). Personalism increases the likelihood that the
21 The plot depicts the nonlinear
fit for the point-wise derivatives for personalism, over time.
22 The standardized coefficient from a linear
model is also larger than that of any other variable except time period. Adding
personalism to a logit model increases the area under the curve from 0.809 to
0.835.
Why Dictatorships Fall
213
dictatorship ends in violence. Paralleling
the results for democratic transition in the left panel, model results also
suggest that dictatorships in wealthier countries, military-led autocracies,
and those with a prior history of democracy are less likely to end violently
(and thus more likely to have negotiated transitions). Dictatorships that
collapsed before 1990 were more likely than those that have ended since then to
hang on until forced out by armed opponents.
In sum,
personalist dictators tend to resist negotiating transitions, possibly because
they face high risks of post-exit punishments. Their lieutenants also have more
to lose from regime breakdown than do high-ranking supporters in more collegial
dictatorships. And of course, it is more dangerous for members of a personalist
dictator’s inner circle to try to oust the dictator or negotiate with the
opposition behind the dictator’s back. These differences in the costs of regime
breakdown to high officials of personalized dictatorships help explain why
personalist rulers fight to hold on to power even when the fight looks fairly
hopeless - as in Syria after 2011 - and why, in turn, their opponents often use
violence to try to force them out. Recall that contemporary Syria scores almost
as high on our measure of personalism (shown in Figure 4.3) as North Korea.
Personalism in
Military-Led Regimes
Past research has shown that military
regimes are more likely than other dictatorships to end with democratization
(Geddes 2003; Debs 2016; Kim and Kroeger 2017). In this section, we investigate
the effect of personalism within this subset of dictatorships by adding an
interaction term between personalism and military-led rule to a model of
democratic transition.23 We report the results from a series of
linear models with controls for duration dependence in Figure 8.10. First, we
test a specification that includes only an indicator variable for military-led
regimes, the measure of personalism, and an interaction between the two. Next,
we test a specification with country and time period fixed effects, and finally
a specification with an assortment of control variables: economic growth, GDP
per capita, conflict, oil rents, prior democracy, and revolutionary regime, as
coded by Levitsky and Way.
In all
specifications the estimate for military-led regimes is positive and
significant, indicating that collegial - or less personalized - military
regimes are more likely to democratize than similarly collegial civilian-led
dictatorships. This finding confirms earlier research (see especially Kim and
Kroeger 2017). The estimate for the interaction term between military-led and
personalism is, as expected, negative and significant: as power becomes more
concentrated in a military dictator’s hands, democratization becomes less
likely. Highly
23 Recall that military-led is
measured before the seizure of power and is thus exogenous to the dictator’s
behavior once in office.
214
Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
Military-led - Personalism - Pers. x
Military -
Civil conflict -
Int'l conflict -
Prior democracy -
GDP pc -
Growth -
Oil rents -
Rev. regime -
------------------- 1--- 1------- 1-- r~
-0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1
Coefficient estimate
o No FE A fe □ FE + covariates
figure 8.10 Personalism, military rule, and democratization.
personalized military-led regimes are thus
no more likely to democratize than civilian dictatorships.
To conclude this section, on average,
military-led dictatorships are more likely than those led by civilians or
monarchs to negotiate exits from power and thus more likely to end in
democratization. When a military dictator has concentrated great power in his
hands, however, other officers cannot impose their preferences on the dictator.
Consequently, he tends to resist negotiation with the opposition and, if he is
ultimately ousted, to be overthrown by force by a group that establishes a new
dictatorship.
conclusion
Most dictatorial regimes end when coups
replace them, incumbents agree to fairer elections and lose, a popular uprising
forces incumbents to resign, or an insurgency defeats them in battle. Each of
these events means that important political actors not only oppose the
dictatorship but consider it worthwhile to take potentially dangerous and
costly public action against it. Latent opposition is widespread in many
dictatorships, but most of the time opponents have strong reasons not to plot
or engage in public expressions of discontent. In this
Why Dictatorships Fall
215
chapter, we investigated some of the
factors that can transform latent opposition into overt political activity and
some characteristics of the dictatorial elite that increase its vulnerability
to ouster.
The chapter
began with a schematized description of the incentives facing dictatorial
elites and others as they contemplate opposition. The schematization shows the
interplay among the benefits individuals receive from the dictatorship, their
expectations about future benefits under a different regime, their perceptions
about the likelihood that the current regime will fall, and the cost of overt
opposition. This abstract version of the situation facing political actors in
dictatorships helps situate different real-world events and crises in relation
both to each other and to the likelihood of regime change. The remainder of the
chapter describes how various events and regime characteristics can change the
decision calculus of individuals and thus the likelihood of authoritarian breakdown
and what follows it.
Events such as
economic crises and natural disasters typically reduce benefits for both
citizens and elites. All else equal, a decrease in benefits would increase
public opposition and the likelihood of regime collapse. The dictatorial elite
may, however, be able to distribute the costs of crisis to shield the
individuals most able to threaten regime survival, and may also deliver help
effectively. When dictatorships can do these things, they tend to survive. They
have greater ability to respond to crises effectively if leaders have
previously built patron- client networks that reach ordinary people. An
effective response is also more likely if sufficient discipline has been
enforced within the ruling group to prevent the theft of relief supplies and
other benefits meant for people afflicted by the crisis.
Our analysis
shows that dictatorships led by parties that began as insurgent or electoral
organizations in the political systems that pre-dated their seizure of
dictatorial power survive longer than dictatorships in which regime elites
created parties after achieving power or remained unstructured by a party.
Importantly, dictatorships led by inherited parties are less affected by
economic crises than other authoritarian governments. We interpret this finding
as meaning that patron-client networks that encompass a substantial part of
the citizenry help to perpetuate dictatorships, not only by including more
people in routine distribution during normal times, but also by maintaining the
organizational resources needed to manage crises.
Not all
challenges to dictatorial survival arise in the external world. Conflict within
the inner circle of dictatorships can also precipitate regime breakdown. Our
investigation shows that power concentration in the dictator’s hands increases
the durability of military-led dictatorships, which otherwise tend to be
relatively short. In collegial military regimes, wide dispersal of arms results
in frequent inner-circle conflicts over leadership, which can destabilize the
regime. The concentration of power in the dictator’s hands limits the ability
of other officers to overthrow him, and thus increases regime stability during
the dictator’s lifetime, as well as leader security.
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Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
Civilian-led
regimes experience less leadership conflict on average. The ouster of a
dictator by a civilian ruling group requires coordinated action by most of the
inner circle (Svolik 2012), which is harder to organize than a coup. This is
one reason civilian-led regimes tend to survive longer. More collegial
dictatorships led by inherited parties tend to be even more stable. They rely
on the ruling party’s executive committee for high-level decision-making, so
policy choices tend to have wide backing from the inner circle, reducing
conflict. Members of the inner circle also have a lot of experience bargaining
with, and a lot of knowledge about, one another. These characteristics and
experiences contribute to orderly successions and thus, on average, to highly
durable dictatorships.
In contrast to
the orderly successions characteristic of relatively collegial dictatorships
led by inherited parties, the death of a dictator who has concentrated great
power in his hands often leads to regime crisis. Dictatorships are less likely
to fall in the aftermath of the dictator’s natural death than after a coup or
other violence ouster, but much more likely to fall than during periods of
stable leadership (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz 2016). Besides the conflict over
who will succeed the old dictator, succession usually results in a period of
uncertainty and struggle over what norms will govern elite bargaining under the
new dictator. The high stakes and extreme dangers involved in choosing the next
dictator increase the likelihood of intra-elite conflict, and thus the chance
of both regime collapse and the purge of parts of the ruling group even if the
regime survives.
Besides
affecting how long dictatorships survive, the concentration of power in one
man’s hands also affects the likelihood of a peaceful, negotiated transition,
once survival appears unlikely. Dictatorships with more collegial decisionmaking
tend to negotiate their extrication from power when they doubt their ability to
hang on to it, but personalized dictatorships often fight to the bitter end.
Two factors contribute to this difference. First, dictators who have concentrated
great power in their hands have more reason to fear jail, execution, or
assassination after ouster than do more consultative dictators, regardless of
whether they are officers or civilians. Second, dictators with more power
concentrated in their hands can exclude from the inner circle, arrest, or kill
allies who want to negotiate with the opposition, and in this way retain a monopoly
over decisions about how to respond to challenging situations. In more
collegial regimes, in contrast, dictators have to bargain with other members of
the inner circle over whether and how to negotiate. Dictators’ top supporters
generally have less to worry about post-exit than dictators themselves
(Albertus and Menaldo 2014), so they tend to favor negotiation when they fear
regime collapse.
In regimes led
by a military junta rather than a strongman, a dictator who refuses to
negotiate when the rest of the junta favors it is likely to be ousted and
replaced by another officer who favors a return to the barracks. The ouster of
a
Why Dictatorships Fall
217
hard-line dictator by a faction that favors
negotiated transition has happened many times near the end of military-led
regimes.
Members of
ousted dictatorial elites are usually better off under democracy than in
hostile new dictatorships. Consequently, when they negotiate stepping down,
they rarely resist democratization.
These
differences among members of dictatorial elites in the costs and risks of
transition result in a tendency for junta-led dictatorships to negotiate peaceful
transitions to democracy via fair elections to choose new civilian rulers.
Civilian-led dictatorships with collegial leadership are less likely to exit
peacefully via elections than junta-led regimes, but more likely to do so than
civilian regimes in which the dictator has concentrated great power in his
hands. Where a transition occurs peacefully via negotiation and elections, the
immediate outcome is usually democracy. Where, however, the dictator retains
his steely grip until forceful overthrow, democracy is less likely to follow.
Ouster by coup, insurgency, or foreign invasion leads to control by the leaders
of the group that led the armed overthrow. Such leaders nearly always promise
democratization, but deliver on their promises only some of the time.
9
Conclusion and Policy Implications
Between his accession to full power in 1979
and the US invasion of Iraq in
2003, Saddam Hussein concentrated immense discretion
over policy, personnel, and life itself in his own hands, undermining the
Iraqi military’s professionalism and ability to fight in the process, and the
capacity of the Ba’th Party to run a government. His drive to concentrate power
began immediately. Less than two weeks after replacing the previous dictator,
Saddam announced the discovery of a plot involving top regime officials; a
special party court met, judged twenty-two guilty, and sentenced them to
execution. Those executed included five members of the dictatorship’s
sixteen-man inner circle, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). Saddam and
other remaining members of the RCC carried out the executions in person. Up to
500 other party members were executed along with numerous military officers
(Amnesty International 1980, 331, 336; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 1987,
209-10; Tripp 2007, 214). Needless to say, when the dictator can murder other
members of the inner circle, they have little ability to constrain his
decision-making or enforce power sharing.
Before taking
the top post, Saddam had already gained control of the regime’s extensive
internal security forces and overseen earlier purges of the military and party.
Nevertheless, at each subsequent crisis, Saddam purged more people in order to
further narrow decision-making circles and concentrate ever more control in his
hands. After terrible losses during the Iran-Iraq War in the early 1980s,
Saddam reshuffled the RCC, the Ba’th Party Regional Command (the party’s
executive committee), and the cabinet to eliminate everyone except his
relatives, closest allies, and proteges. He appointed close relatives,
including sons, sons-in-law, and several half-brothers, to key security and
ministerial posts (Brooker 1997, 119; Tripp 2007, 228, 244).
As soon as the
war ended in 1989, Saddam again turned his attention to reducing potential
threats from the officer corps - which he had had to rebuild
218
Conclusion and Policy Implications
219
to prevent defeat by Iran - through
retirements, demotions, “accidents,” and arrests (Tripp 2007, 240-45). In 1995,
the Economist explained why the army was unlikely to oust Saddam: “the army is
demoralized, barely a serious fighting force; its senior officers have been
switched, fired, executed or so tarred with Mr. Hussein’s brush that they have
no future outside his orbit.”1 Even relatives had become unsafe by
the mid-1990s, when two sons-in-law (high- ranking officers holding very
powerful posts) were murdered along with many members of their families.
In short, Iraq
under Saddam Hussein was an extreme example of what we have labeled personalist
dictatorship. Our analysis in Chapter 8 of how personalized dictatorial rule
influences the likelihood of democratization implies that if foreigners
intervene militarily to remove a personalist dictator like Saddam Hussein or
Moammar Qaddafi of Libya, the intervention is unlikely to result in democracy.
Not only do new dictatorships often follow the violent ouster of personalist
regimes, but civil war and state disintegration follow these kinds of
authoritarian breakdown more often than other kinds (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz
2014).
If the goal is democratization, our
analysis suggests that violent foreign intervention to overthrow dictators similar
to Saddam Hussein has only a modest chance of success. In the remainder of this
conclusion, we summarize our findings chapter by chapter and then discuss the
policy implications (in boxes) that follow from our results. Though no one can
know for certain what consequences a policy choice will have since many factors
contribute to final outcomes, the evidence we provide in this study enables a
probabilistic prediction. We think that the academic and policy communities
should seek to develop “evidence-based” policy guidelines modeled on those that
inform many decisions in medicine, and we see our study as a step toward doing
that.
Chapter 2
focuses on the initiation of dictatorship and the situation that faces new
autocrats immediately after the seizure of power. Most post-1946 dictatorial
seizures of power replace other dictatorships, but about 30 percent replace
democracies. The vast majority occur when many citizens are fed up with the
incumbent, whether democratic or not. Those who overthrow governments often
promise democracy and other desirable goals such as growth and an end to
corruption, but they rarely deliver.
Military
factions or political parties initiate most dictatorships. The former usually
seize power via coups. The latter most often either authoritarianize a
democratic government they already lead or seize control via armed rebellion.
During the whole post-World War II period, foreigners installed as many
dictatorships as did homegrown insurgencies, but foreign imposition of dictatorship
has become less frequent during recent decades. Since the end of the
1 “Saddam Sacks a Henchman,”
Economist, July 22, 1995, 46.
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Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
Cold War, authoritarianization has grown
more common, while military coups and foreign interventions have decreased.
Those who oust
governments rarely have detailed plans about what they will do once they have
control. This is especially true for forcible seizures of power such as coups
and insurgencies. The need for secrecy before coups prevents wide consultation
about policy during the plotting stage, and the lack of government experience
of most coup and insurgent leaders limits their ability to foresee the
decisions they will face once in office.
Consequently,
most dictatorial seizures of power are followed by a period of chaos,
uncertainty, and conflict within the ruling group. They argue over what to do,
who will lead, and how much power the new dictator will have relative to others
in the dictatorial elite. This situation makes it hard for foreign policy
makers to figure out a best response. Even participants may not be able to
predict how the new dictatorship will shape up and what policies it will
follow.
Because poor
incumbent performance partly motivates dictatorial seizures of power, and
plotters strategically time them to coincide with widespread popular
disenchantment, the new elite has to grapple immediately with the serious
problems that undermined the old regime. New dictatorial elites often take
power during economic crises, and their first order of business may be the
urgent search for foreign aid. The policy implications that flow from Chapter 2
are outlined in the box below.
The difficulties and uncertainty new
dictatorships face mean that international actors can exercise more influence
immediately after a seizure of power than later, after the seizure group
consolidates its control. Early on, strategies are unsettled, but later, vested
interests will have developed. In cases where the leadership position remains
contested after the seizure, foreign policy makers may be able to disadvantage
hard-line or extreme factions by promising a more positive future relationship
should the moderate faction secure control.
International
actors may even persuade members of the seizure group to hand power to a
neutral political actor instead of holding onto it. This kind of strategy seems
to have guided recent international responses to some coups. During the last
two decades, members of the international community have been quick to pressure
some coup makers to return power to civilians, and some of these interventions
have persuaded the military to give up direct power. In Honduras in 2009 and
Mali in 2012, for example, officers turned power over to civilian interim
governments after becoming convinced that aid and international recognition
would be withheld until they did so.
Members of the
international community have been slower and less united in condemning the
authoritarianization of democratic politics led
Conclusion and Policy Implications
221
by elected leaders such as Recep Tayyip
Erdogan of Turkey. After a failed coup attempt in 2016, Erdogan ordered the
arrest of about 50,000 people, including much of the opposition. The following
year, a constitutional revision granted Erdogan quasi-dictatorial powers.2
It is harder to achieve international consensus about such democratic
breakdowns because regime transition often occurs incrementally. Knowing that
the authoritarianization of previously democratic governments has been one of
the more common means of initiating dictatorship (responsible for 16 percent of
new dictatorships since World War II), and has become more common since the end
of the Cold War, might help policy makers agree to withhold aid after explicit
authoritarianizing actions such as Erdogan’s.
Military
officers initiate most dictatorships. In Chapter 3 we investigate the
conditions associated with coups that install new dictatorships. We find, contrary
to several popular theories, no relationship between coups and widespread
popular opposition to incumbents, mass political mobilization, or inequality.
Instead, our findings suggest that officers pursue their own interests when
deciding whether to intervene in politics. We find that soldiers are less
likely to seize control when they come from the same groups and share interests
and ideas with political leaders. We confirm other research showing that coups
are more likely in poor countries and that they were more frequent during the
Cold War than since it ended.
Our findings raise questions about the
wisdom of using military aid to support one side or another in the political
conflicts of other countries. Resources meant to shore up incumbents may
instead contribute to the fulfillment of officers’ unlawful political ambitions.
US military and other forms of aid played a large role in the buildup of deadly
and extensive security services in numerous Cold War allies, while the Soviet
Union and China contributed to similar buildups among their allies. Competition
between the United States and the Soviet Union also motivated US support for
coups that ousted leftists and Soviet support for coups against conservatives.
In that context, coups were frequent, and military dictators ruled many
countries.
During recent decades, most coups have
faced international disapproval and sanctions, though the al-Sisi coup in Egypt
is a
2 “Turkey Is Sliding into
Dictatorship,” Economist, April 15, 2017.
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Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
conspicuous exception. The sharp decline in
the incidence of coups since the end of the Cold War suggests the
responsiveness of officers to international pressure. Our findings, along with
those of others, imply that the decisive withdrawal of foreign support after
coups can reverse military seizures of power. We believe that other potential
military interventions have been deterred by knowledge of the hostility of
international aid givers toward coups and that this is one of the reasons for
the substantial decrease in coups since 1990 (Marinov and Goemans 2014).
During the
consolidation stage that follows the initiation of a new dictatorship, members
of the new dictatorial elite bargain and fight over how to distribute power
among themselves. Struggles among members of the dictatorial elite during the
first months and years of the dictatorship determine the degree to which the
dictator can concentrate control in his own hands - as opposed to sharing power
within a collegial inner circle.
Chapter 4 begins
the explanation of why some dictators can concentrate so much power in their
hands while others cannot. After the seizure of power, the ruling group must
choose one member as leader if they have not already done so. All members of
the dictatorial elite want to maintain the dictatorship, but at the same time,
they want to increase their own power and access to resources relative to
others in the inner circle. The day he is chosen, the dictator has little more
power than his colleagues, but that can soon change because dictatorships lack
third-party enforcement of bargains and contracts. Once the man who is
delegated leadership powers has the additional resources that control of the
state gives him, other members of the dictatorial elite may find it difficult
to enforce limitations on the dictator’s discretion agreed to earlier.
The lack of
binding third-party enforcement in dictatorships means that the only way the
rest of the elite can constrain the dictator and enforce consultation during
decision-making is by credibly threatening to oust him if he fails to share power
(Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2012). A unified and disciplined elite can bargain
effectively with the dictator because their unity reduces collective action
problems, and thus they can make credible threats to oust if the dictator
usurps more power than was delegated to him. A factionalized, divided, or
undisciplined seizure group, however, cannot create the kind of inner circle
that can bargain effectively with the dictator. Instead, the dictator can
bargain with each faction separately. Factions compete for the dictator’s
favor, driving down the price he has to pay for support. Factions also increase
the collective action problems involved in trying to replace a dictator, which
reduces the credibility of threats to oust.
Bargaining
between the dictator and a factionalized inner circle can result in narrowing
of the dictatorship’s support base and the concentration of great
Conclusion and Policy Implications
223
power and discretion in the dictator’s
hands, which we label personalism. If the dictator does not need the support of
everyone who joined in the effort to overthrow the old regime in order to hang
on to power, he can exclude some members of his initial support coalition and
keep their share of spoils or distribute them to remaining supporters. This is
the reason we often see some of the supporters of a seizure of power jettisoned
from the dictatorship’s support coalition within the first year or two. Those
thrown over the side tend to be those most likely to disagree with the dictator
over policy or to challenge his right to rule.
Because dictators often exclude some
members of the initial inner circle and narrow their initial support coalition,
international observers should not view the inclusion of moderates or
pro-democracy figures in the first authoritarian cabinet or command council as
guarantees of moderation. Dictators strategically include such figures
precisely in order to reassure foreign lenders, investors, and aid givers while
also allaying the fears of influential domestic actors, but these individuals
may be the first to go once the dictatorship seems a little safer.
Unity and
discipline tend to be higher in seizure groups whose organization long
pre-dates the establishment of dictatorships. At the moment of seizure, the
military that takes power in a coup could be united and highly disciplined or
factionalized by ethnicity or competing partisan loyalties. Long- established
military forces tend to be less factionalized than recently created ones. The
party that seizes power could be a highly disciplined “organizational weapon”
or a loose coalition of parties and groups put together to compete in the last
fair election before authoritarianization. These group characteristics develop
before the seizure of power. In social science terminology, they are exogenous
to the dictatorship. Consequently, these seizure-group characteristics can
help to explain things that happen later during dictatorships because they
could not have been caused by decisions made by the post-seizure dictatorial
elite.
The empirical
section of Chapter 4 shows that factionalism within the seizure group before
the establishment of the dictatorship is associated with greater concentration
of power in the dictator’s hands post-seizure. We find that ruling parties
formed before the dictatorship to lead insurgencies or compete in elections
inhibit the later personalization of dictatorship and that dictators from more
undisciplined militaries are more likely to concentrate power in their own
hands than other military dictators. Dictators who have taken initial steps
toward personalization during the first three years of rule tend to concentrate
further power in their hands over time.
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Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
The personalization of dictatorship has
dire consequences for people living under it, as well as their neighbors. As a
number of studies have shown, the personalization of dictatorial rule is
associated with worse governance, more erratic and aggressive international
behavior, and enhanced prospects for violence during and after regime overthrow
(Frantz and Ezrow 2011; Weeks 2012). The concentration of power leads to
erratic decision-making and international adventurism, which results from the
absence of consultation within the regime leadership and the unwillingness of
the dictator’s terrified assistants to give him accurate information either
about other countries’ likely responses or about their own country’s
capacities.
Personalist
dictators replace subordinates at will, often isolating themselves from information
and advice that might have dissuaded them from engaging in risky and ultimately
costly acts of international belligerence. Saddam Hussein, for example,
consulted only his son-in- law (a general) before the final decision to invade
Kuwait. The army chief of staff, whom Saddam had consulted earlier, had told
him that an invasion would lead to war with the United States, which Iraq would
lose. So, Saddam dismissed him (Ashton 2008, 266-69).
Given the
consequences of personalist rule, we think members of the international
community concerned with development and peace should do what they can to
inhibit its emergence. An obvious implication is that policy makers should take
an especially discouraging stance toward military dictators ranked low before
the seizure of power because the choice of a low-ranking officer to become
dictator indicates a factionalized military seizure group. Even if we believe
that some circumstances legitimate support for military coups, we should avoid
supporting post-coup dictatorships led by junior officers (such as Captain
Moammar Qaddafi or Liberia’s Sergeant Samuel Doe), who have the potential to
become some of the most violent and erratic dictators.
The findings in
Chapter 4 also imply that incremental authoritarianizations led by parties
organized during the president’s election campaign, like the ones that backed
Hugo Chavez in Venezuela or Alberto Fujimori in Peru, are likely to turn out
worse than authoritarianizations led by longer-established parties. Policy
makers should be especially quick to respond to actions such as arrests of
opposition leaders when carried out in authoritarianizing democracies led by
recently created parties unable to constrain their leaders.
Chapter 5 highlights the effects of a
second characteristic of the seizure group that pre-dates the dictatorship and
shapes bargaining between the
Conclusion and Policy Implications
225
dictator and his supporters: the dispersal
of arms across members of the group. In this chapter, we focus on dictatorships
brought to power by armed groups. Most armed groups achieve power in coups, but
some lead insurgencies or are imposed by foreigners. In armed seizure groups,
many individual commanders could potentially oust the dictator. If the group is
also unified and disciplined, then the relative ease of ousting the dictator
gives them strong bargaining power, and they can establish a power-sharing
agreement with the dictator. Governments with this form are sometimes labeled
juntas. If, however, the dictator’s armed supporters are divided into factions,
then superior officers may not be able to make credible promises to support the
dictator if he shares because they may not be able to commit subordinates in
other factions to refrain from rogue coups.
In this
situation, power-sharing bargains are not credible and therefore cannot secure
the dictator’s position, so he has no incentive to share with other officers.
Instead, he must try to find different strategies for increasing his security.
Among those strategies, we suggest that the creation of a civilian support
party can counterbalance the dictator’s unstable military support base. We
argue that this strategy may be safer than creating counterbalancing
paramilitary forces (though many dictators do this too) because officers see
civilians as less threatening to their prerogatives and monopoly of force than
armed groups. The creation of a civilian support base helps defend the dictator
from coups because officers try to avoid confrontations between troops and
crowds of civilians, and parties are good at mobilizing crowds into the streets
when dictators need shows of support.
Our empirical
investigation supports this argument. Dictators create civilian support parties
to counterbalance and marginalize their original factionalized, armed support
base. Post-seizure party creation helps dictatorships that seized power by
force survive longer. Dictatorships that lack support parties face a 10 percent
chance of breakdown each year, while similar dictatorships in which a party was
created post-seizure have less than a 5 percent chance of breakdown per year.
“Civilianization”
is the term used to describe the replacement of a military ruling council by a
mostly civilian party-led ruling body under the same dictator. The dictator
may formally retire from the military as well. Such systems are usually
augmented by controlled elections for a tame legislature and some form of
election to legitimate the dictator. Dictators who have civilianized their
regimes usually claim to be democratizing, and observers may be confused about
whether these are steps toward democracy. Our findings show that, on the
contrary, civilianization substantially prolongs the survival of dictatorships.
The main policy implication of Chapter 5 is
thus clear: members of the international community should not view the
civilianization of military- led regimes as an indication of impending
democracy. As long as the
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Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
dictator himself remains in control, they
should not reduce any costs they have imposed on the dictatorship. Post-seizure
party creation, and civilianization more generally, are dictatorial strategies
for concentrating more power in the dictator’s hands at the expense of wider
consultation within the officer corps, while prolonging dictatorship.
A large majority
of armed seizure groups are composed of military officers, meaning that
officers lead the bulk of dictatorships discussed in Chapter 5. Several studies
have shown that dictatorships led by somewhat collegial groups of officers
(juntas) end sooner than other kinds of dictatorship. Not only are they
relatively short-lived, but they are more likely to negotiate a peaceful return
to the barracks via fair, competitive elections than are other kinds of
dictatorship. In short, junta- led military regimes are more likely to
democratize after shorter periods of rule than personalized military-led
dictatorships or civilian-led dictatorships. For international policy makers
concerned about democratization, it is thus better to encourage a return to the
barracks rather than multiparty elections in which the dictator competes. Many
dictators have found ways to win multiparty elections.
In order to
extend their control beyond the apex of the political system, dictatorial
elites must find ways to monitor lower-level officials and gather information
about all parts of the country. These are difficult problems in dictatorships.
Local officials may oppose the new dictatorship, or they may simply be
motivated by self-interest. They may sabotage official policies, abuse the
people who depend on them for services, and steal from both ordinary people and
the government. Accurate information gathering poses problems even if the
dictatorship replaces all officials with individuals who support it because the
future careers of officials may depend on things going well in their districts.
Officials may fear bringing the dictator bad news. In Chapter 6, we consider
some of the institutions dictatorships use to monitor officials and gather
information.
The common
institutions that link citizens to political leaders in information-gathering,
mobilizational, and distributive networks are ruling parties, elections, and
legislatures. These institutions incentivize the extension of patron-client
networks from the center to ordinary citizens and the transmission of
information from the grassroots to the center.
Dictatorial
ruling parties link central elites to large numbers of public employees and
local officials via a patron-client network that distributes jobs and other
advantages and opportunities in return for loyalty and effort on behalf of the
party. These secondary elites administer central and local governments and
distribute whatever benefits citizens receive from the center. To survive, the
dictatorship needs local officials to refrain from sabotaging policies
Conclusion and Policy Implications
227
and stealing from those they govern. One
element in the dictatorship’s strategy for maintaining good behavior among its
officials is to limit employment to those thought to be loyal because party
officials have vetted them. Ruling parties control access to government jobs in
nearly all dictatorships organized by parties.
In most
dictatorships, however, it is easy to join the ruling party. Even where the
party requires ideological knowledge and a period of probation to demonstrate
commitment before membership is granted (like the communist parties or the
Iraqi Ba’th), most observers report that opportunists outnumber those committed
to party ideals. Apparent ideological commitment or party loyalty has failed to
restrain self-interested behavior by officials.
So, top leaders
in dictatorships need ways to monitor officials. Some dictatorships, such as
the communist regime in East Germany, have used very extensive secret police
networks for this, but most dictatorships lack the resources necessary for
such individualized surveillance. We argue in Chapter 6 that elections for
legislative assemblies and local government create incentives that induce
officials and elected representatives to behave better than they otherwise
would. We believe that this substitute for direct monitoring is sufficiently
valuable to dictatorial leaders to make elections worth their expense and
risk.
Dictatorial
ruling parties rarely lose elections, but individual candidates for legislative
and local office lose more often. When officials know that they will have to
run in semi-competitive elections before too long and that they could lose,
they have reasons to extend their patron-client networks all the way to the
grassroots, distribute as much as they can to the people who will vote,
restrain their own and others’ predation on the powerless, and convey
information about local needs and problems to the center in the hope of getting
help. Even where popular elections are uncompetitive, officials and deputies
have to compete for party nominations. Elective offices come with many
benefits, so competition is stiff. In this way, elections and nominations take
the place of direct monitoring by central party officials. They give local
officials strong reasons to behave as the center wants them to, and they supply
the punishment for not behaving that way in the form of loss of valuable
offices and the salaries and perquisites that go with them.
We see executive
elections as having a function different from legislative and local elections.
The main purpose of executive elections is to demonstrate to potential rivals
within the inner circle of the dictatorship that the dictator and his faction
have the resources and organization to be unbeatable, and in this way to deter
elite defections (Magaloni 2006). Other elites would not be deterred by fraud.
Instead, the ruling faction demonstrates its resource advantage by staging an
expensive, nationwide campaign; distributing things of value to many citizens;
and often manipulating the economy to give the impression of prosperity.
Overwhelming votes for the incumbent show that opposition challenges have
little hope of success.
The loyalty,
monitoring, and information that elections foster must be paid for. In Chapter
6, we show that government spending in dictatorships rises in
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Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
election years. A side benefit of regular
elections is that some spending reaches ordinary people that might not have
done so in the absence of officials’ concern about winning future nominations
and elections. We show that infant mortality is lower on average in
dictatorships that hold regular elections, even when elections allow no choice.
A policy implication of Chapter 6 is that
conditioning aid or loans on semi-competitive elections may help improve
popular welfare by incentivizing local officials to work to make benefits and
services intended for ordinary citizens available to them. Although the
introduction of semi-competitive elections while the dictator remains in
control may have little effect on near-term prospects for democratization, such
elections do seem to give dictators reasons to extend welfare- enhancing
services to more people.
In contrast to
Chapter 6’s focus on democratic-looking institutions for indirect monitoring
and information gathering, Chapter 7 examines the coercive institutions that
dictatorships use directly and openly for information collection, deterring
overt opposition, and protecting themselves from overthrow. New dictatorships
often create or revamp internal security forces to increase their capacity to
ferret out plots, intimidate opponents, and impose extrajudicial punishments on
those suspected of opposition. They also often raise military pay and promote
officers to deter potential opposition in the army.
Internal
security forces focus most of their attention on powerful people because they
are most likely to be able to oust the dictator. They thus spy on high party
officials, military officers, high-level bureaucrats, elected officials, union
leaders, teachers, professors, journalists, and others with potential for
mobilizing opposition, persuading others, and spreading discontent. Where the
dictator has managed to take personal control of internal security, he can use
it to spy on members of the dictatorial inner circle and to arrest or kill
anyone he sees as a potential challenger. We find that about two-thirds of
dictators have personal control over internal security.
In addition to
security police, dictatorships also need armies to protect them against armed
attacks from insurgents and external enemies. Usually, dictatorships inherit
the armies of their predecessors, so they cannot count on their unconditional
loyalty. If past recruitment has been open to talent and promotions based on
seniority and merit, then the officer corps will include men from the various
ethnic, regional, religious, and partisan groups that exist in the country.
This diversity of backgrounds and underlying interests helps explain why armies
so often incubate plots, even when the dictator is himself an officer. If the
army retains professional norms, including standard promotion rules, it
Conclusion and Policy Implications
22 9
retains some autonomy from the dictator,
and the dictator has reason to fear it. The army is the political actor most
likely to be able to credibly threaten the dictator with ouster if he violates
sharing agreements.
In response to
fear of the army, dictators establish loyalist paramilitary forces recruited
from groups especially close to them to counterbalance the regular army and
defend them from coups. Paramilitary forces can thus undermine the army’s
ability to constrain the dictator. Dictators also interfere with military
promotions and purge distrusted officers to render the military less dangerous,
but this kind of interference can itself motivate coups by officers trying to
defend professional autonomy or their own career interests. So dictators have
to calculate their strategy toward the military with care. We show that
dictators with paramilitary forces to defend them from coup attempts are more
likely to interfere with promotions and purge officers.
Our analysis suggests that international
actors should avoid providing kinds of aid that can be used to build up
internal security police. Engorged security police enhance the dictator’s
concentration of powers and unrestrained policy discretion. Foreign policy
makers should probably avoid providing support for political police in
dictatorships in general, but that should be especially true if the internal
security police report directly to the dictator, and thus enhance his capacity
for arbitrary and violent action.
Chapter 8
investigates the breakdown of dictatorships. Exogenous shocks such as
international economic crises, natural disasters, and the death of the dictator
can challenge the survival of dictatorships. However, regimes established by
seizure groups with some traits (for example, those organized by inherited
parties) are more resilient in the face of crises than others. These exogenous
traits interact with institutions and strategies chosen after the seizure of
power to enhance or limit the dictatorship’s vulnerability to breakdown. In
this chapter, we show the consequences for regime survival of some of the
decisions made earlier to enhance the power of particular actors relative to
others in the dictatorial elite (and described in Chapters 4-7).
The chapter
focuses first on describing how dictatorships break down. Coups, elections, and
popular uprisings are the most common ways of ending dictatorships. Coups still
oust more dictatorships than other methods, though their incidence has fallen
since the end of the Cold War. Almost as many dictatorships end in contested
elections as in coups. Unarmed popular uprisings have become a more frequent
means of deposing dictatorships since the end of the Cold War.
Most of Chapter
8 investigates the reasons for the breakdown of dictatorships. Popular
hardship can motivate citizens to take the risk of demanding
230
Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
regime change, but some dictatorial elites
respond more effectively to crisis than others. We show that economic crisis
increases the chance of regime failure in dictatorships not organized by
inherited parties, but not in those led by parties originally organized to
compete in elections or lead insurgencies. We interpret these findings as
evidence that the distributive networks developed by parties that had to work to
attract followers during their formative stages help dictatorships survive
economic hardships. Dense, preexisting networks reaching into the grassroots
increase the ability of the dictatorial elite to respond effectively to crises.
Party networks can organize a safety net or redistribute costs to protect the
citizens most capable of threatening the dictatorship.
We also explain
how the leadership configuration arrived at through the bargaining described in
Chapters 4 and 5 affects both the likelihood of regime breakdown and whether
democratization results from it. We investigate the consequences of the
concentration of power in the dictator’s hands on the durability of autocracies
and what kind of regime tends to follow them.
Concentration of
powers interacts with exogenous seizure-group characteristics, resulting in
different outcomes, depending on other traits of the leadership. We show that
the personalization of power in military-led regimes tends to increase their
durability because it reduces leadership conflict, which otherwise tends to be
high. Seizure groups organized by inherited parties, however, are weakened by
the personalization of rule because it increases their vulnerability to
succession crises.
Leadership
succession is an inherent weakness of dictatorship. Otherwise invincible ruling
groups may disintegrate during succession struggles. These struggles are a time
of uncertainty and intense bargaining even in regimes with
well-institutionalized succession rules, but they are fraught with fear and
real potential for individual and regime disaster in those that lack such
institutions. Dictatorships in which the leader has amassed great personal
power rarely have binding succession institutions, because such leaders put a
high priority on eliminating them. Instead, personalist dictators may refuse
even to identify a successor, though some groom sons or other close relatives
to succeed.
We show that
succession is more challenging for dictatorships in which the dictator has
concentrated power than in those with more consultative decisionmaking. The
likelihood that the dictator’s exit, whether by natural death or ouster,
coincides with immediate regime collapse increases by roughly 50 percent as
the personalism score varies from its lowest to highest value. As a further
examination of the effect of personalization on the dictatorship’s capacity to
deal with succession, we look at what happened after the deaths of all
dictators who died of natural causes while still in power. Regimes in which the
dictator had amassed substantial personal power (measured during the three
years before his death) are less likely to survive after he dies than regimes
with a more collegial leadership.
Since the timing
of natural death is not controlled by the dictator or members of the inner
circle, our finding can be interpreted as showing a causal link
Conclusion and Policy Implications
231
between personalism and regime durability:
personalization before the dictator’s death decreases the ability of
successors to reconsolidate the regime under new leadership. Dictatorships led
by inherited parties with collegial leadership handle succession relatively
well, while even inherited parties have difficulty with succession when the
dictator has concentrated great power in his hands.
Personalism also
influences how dictatorships break down, and what is likely to follow their
collapse. We find that concentration of power in the dictator’s hands reduces
the likelihood of nonviolent regime change. We have shown elsewhere that coerced
or violent transitions increase the likelihood that a dictatorship is replaced
by a new dictatorship rather than a democracy (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz
2014).
What happens
after a dictatorship falls depends to a considerable extent on how the dictator
and his closest allies respond to the challenges they face from angry citizens,
embittered officers, and foreigners pressing for change before the regime
falls. We investigate one of the factors that determines those responses: the
expectations of dictators and their closest supporters about what will happen
to them and their families after they leave power.
We observe that
military dictators are sometimes prosecuted for human rights violations and
sometimes forced into exile, but other officers can usually continue their
military careers untarnished after returning to the barracks. Consequently,
collegial military-led dictatorships tend to negotiate in response to
challenges because most officers do not fear returning to the barracks, and
they have the weapons and control over men needed to replace dictators who
resist negotiation. Negotiated transitions tend to lead to democratization.
In personalized
military-led dictatorships, however, the dictator himself makes decisions about
whether to negotiate, ignoring the interests of other officers. Other officers
have less capacity to oust a military dictator with concentrated power because
of his control over the security police and, often, loyal paramilitary forces
as well. Since the dictator faces a higher probability of punishment post-exit,
he tends to refuse to negotiate and to hang on until forced out. Consequently,
personalist military-led regimes are less likely to democratize.
Personalization
of civilian-led regimes also lowers prospects for democratization. Personalist
dictators purposely undermine national institutions such as the military,
government administration, and the ruling party that might serve as
springboards for opposition challenges. A by-product of these strategies is
that the individuals who might otherwise have led a movement for democratization
may no longer live in the country (or at all), and the institutions that often
incubate new opposition organizations may have been destroyed. Further, the
dictator’s marginalization, exile, imprisonment, or execution of the most able
and popular politicians in the ruling party reduces the likelihood that the
party will be able to transform itself into a successful competitor if democracy
succeeds the dictatorship. As a result, other members of the dictatorial elite
have reason to remain loyal to the dictator as he refuses to negotiate a
peaceful
232
Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
transition and instead clings to power with
tooth and claw until the bitter, violent end.
For all these
reasons, democracy is less likely to follow personalist rule than other kinds
of dictatorship. We find that concentration of power in one man’s hands reduces
dictators’ willingness to negotiate peaceful exits. Personalist dictators often
hang on until forced out by violence. Violent regime breakdown, in turn, stacks
the deck against subsequent democracy, regardless of whether foreign invaders,
domestic insurgents, or army officers led the overthrow.
We and other researchers have amassed many
different kinds of evidence that personalist dictators wreak havoc in their own
countries, threaten neighbors, and set the stage for a renewal of dictatorship
after they fall. In short, dictatorship causes more damage when one man can
deploy vast, arbitrary powers of life and death. The principal policy
recommendation implied by this research is that international policy makers
should avoid contributing to the personalization of dictatorial rule, even if
current security interests suggest supporting such dictators against neighboring
autocrats.
The almost
uncritical support of “our” dictators ended with the Cold War, but decisions
about which dictators to provide with loans and aid still depend heavily on
strategic interests. We do not suggest that strategic interests be ignored, but
rather that policy makers should also take into account the extent of
concentration of power in the dictator’s hands because dictators with unlimited
policy discretion can switch sides easily and unpredictably, using the very
weapons provided by their allies to turn against them later.
While aid and
loans are positive forms of intervention that can be used to shape the behavior
of leaders in other countries, sanctions and military intervention try to
change behavior by imposing costs. We suggest that decisions about economic and
military intervention to destabilize dictatorships should be informed by
realistic assessments of whether the intervention is likely to succeed and what
will happen if the dictator falls. Escriba Folch and Wright’s (2015) finding
that economic sanctions destabilize personalist dictators only in countries
that lack substantial oil exports implies that sanctions aimed at bringing down
dictatorships should be used only against personalists without oil since
sanctions against other kinds of dictatorship are likely to cause popular
suffering without bringing down the dictatorship.
Before using
sanctions against personalist dictators without oil, however, we need a
careful, evidence-based assessment of what kind of government is likely to
replace such a dictatorship brought down by
Conclusion and Policy Implications
23 3
foreign intervention. In the post-Cold War
period, democracy is a little more likely than new autocracy to follow the
overthrow of personalist dictatorships (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014).
Nevertheless, the likelihood of a new dictatorship is quite high, and the
likelihood of civil war or disintegration into chaos, though low, is not
insignificant. The four dictatorships in which the United States has intervened
militarily since 2001 - Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria - ranged from
somewhat to extremely personalized before the interventions.3 These
military actions ended the dictatorships in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, but
none of the countries has democratized. Instead, they are among the places most
likely to be home to terrorist organizations that target Western interests. At
the time of writing, insurgents continue to control portions of each of these
countries, and further disintegration seems possible.
Observation of
events suggests that the more arbitrary, violent, and paranoid the personalist
dictator is, the more likely an overthrow will result in another autocracy,
civil war, or failed state. This is so because more paranoid dictators destroy
more of the human talent and institutional competence in their countries,
leaving them harder to govern in the future and more vulnerable to the
breakdown of basic state services and the disintegration of order. In other
words, the more the dictator “deserves” to be ousted, the more likely his
ouster is to make conditions even worse for citizens in his country.
Quite a few
personalist dictatorships rely on narrow ethnic, clan, or religious groups for
support, as the Taliban, Saddam, and Qaddafi did, while Assad still does. We
believe such dictatorships are especially likely to experience bloody
transitions and violent, unstable futures.
A dictatorship based on a narrow ascriptive
category is more likely to continue fighting to survive despite low odds of
winning, as we have seen in Syria in recent years. When some members of the
ruling minority have grown fat at the expense of the rest of the population,
popular hostility toward the dictatorship tends to spill over onto their
nonelite co-ethnics. All members of the minority may then fear sharing the
post-dictatorship fate of the elite, so they become willing to defend the
dictatorship even at great cost.
If the
dictatorship is eventually ousted, the government that follows it may have
difficulty leading a return to normalcy because minority groups that lose power
along with the dictator have reasons, and often the
3 We have not included the
countries in which military involvement was limited to drone strikes or support
for military interventions led by allies, but most of them also fit the pattern
described.
234
Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
resources needed (because of the benefits
and favoritism they experienced during the dictatorship), to organize warfare
against the government that replaces them. This adds to the dangers faced by
political leaders and citizens after transition.
The survival
strategies typically used by personalist dictators also imply some further
post-ouster consequences that well-intentioned foreigners considering
intervention should ponder. During his years in power, the dictator with great
power concentrated in his hands makes every effort to eliminate the most
competent and politically gifted of his fellow citizens, whom he views as
potential rivals. Some are killed and others jailed for years. At best, they
will have spent long years in exile by the time the dictator falls. They will
thus lack the networks of allies and mutual assistance that politics depends
on, especially in places where rules are not enforced and institutions have
been hollowed out. The dictator’s effort to rid himself of rivals will limit
the pool from which new leaders can come after his ouster and reduce the
political resources they have to draw on. Consequently, the first
post-personalist political leaders may lack the skills and political networks
needed for a transition to competent, nonviolent government.
The destruction
of both political and civil society institutions under personalist rule also
leaves nations that have endured it with little human infrastructure with which
subsequent political leaders can build stable government. Personalist dictators
control appointments and promotions in all important areas of government and
the security forces as well, and they promote on the basis of loyalty rather
than competence or expertise. Over time, such appointment strategies not only
reduce the talent of the government led by the dictator but can also strip the
country of its ablest and best-educated citizens, many of whom flee rather than
face the dangers, uncertainty, and limited opportunities available in the
dictatorship. The decimation of institutions under personalist rule often
includes the military and ordinary police, leaving them subsequently incapable
of maintaining order or defending the new government from violent attacks.
In the
frightening dog-eat-dog environment fostered by personalist dictatorship,
interpersonal distrust aids survival. Only family or clan members can be
counted on for help, which reinforces people’s sense of responsibility toward
extended family members. This intensified familism tends to persist after the
fall of the personalist dictator and to undermine the neutrality and competence
of government agencies, including the police and military. It affects hiring,
promotions, and the delivery of government services, including safe streets.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
23 5
For all of these
reasons, the governments that follow personalist rule often lack competent,
unbiased personnel. The dearth of capable personnel makes it difficult for an occupying
army to deliver ordinary government services such as electricity, water, and
garbage collection. The politicization of the police and security services
under the dictatorship may mean that they have not been trained for the neutral
maintenance of order and safe streets. Citizens may hate and distrust them.
Foreign occupiers may undertake training new police and military forces, but
they will have difficulty overcoming the distrust and intensified in-group
loyalties developed during the dictatorship.
Corruption is
usually high in personalist dictatorships. When corruption has become expected,
it does not disappear just because political leadership has changed. No one
knows whether the new government will be more honest than the last or whether
it will survive. So, the get-it-while-you-can logic tends to persist.
The intervener
is likely to be blamed for the political violence and disorder that follow
intervention. In these circumstances, citizens who welcomed foreign
intervention as a means of getting rid of a hated tyrant may very quickly come
to revile the foreigners and the government allied with them for failing to
keep them safe and foster the return of normal life. These attitudes undermine
the occupier’s efforts to promote the country’s development into a stable ally
willing to protect the intervener’s economic and security interests.
Governments contemplating intervention to rid other countries of personalist
dictators should contemplate these likely outcomes.
These are
probabilistic statements. We do not claim that foreign interventions against
terrible dictators never improve things. We think the Vietnamese intervention
to remove Pol Pot in Cambodia definitely improved life for Cambodians.
But we do urge
policy makers not to assume that nothing can be worse than the current
dictatorship or to make decisions under the illusion that democracy is somehow
the “natural” consequence of freeing people from a tyrant.
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Afghanistan, 14, 30, 32, 138, 233 Ahidjo,
Ahmadou, 7 Al Said family, 9 Al Saud dynasty, 5 Algeria, 29 Allende, Salvador,
25 Amin, Idi, 11 Aref, ‘Abd al-Salam, 183 Argentina, 3, 31, 46, 161, 208 army.
See military Assad family, 28, 84, 166 Authoritarian Regimes Data Set, 13, 21
authoritarianization, 4, 27, 31-2, 41, 220, 224 Peru, 29, 31 Turkey, 220
Venezuela, 4, 29 Zambia, 9 autogolpe. See authoritarianization
Ba’th party (Iraq), 32, 78, 218, 227 Ba’th
party (Syria), 32 Balaguer, Joaquin, 202 Banda, Hastings, 70, 165 Bangladesh,
69, 102 Barre, Siad, 105 Belarus, 143
Ben Ali, Zine El-Abidine, 158 Benin, 39,
69, 95-6, 173 Bignone, Reynaldo, 208 Biya, Paul, 7, 142 Boix, Carles, 12
Bratton, Michael, 209
Brazil, 31, 106, 161 Burkina Faso, 7, 31
Burundi, 14
Cambodia, 14, 40, 50, 130, 235 Cameroon, 7,
142 Cardenas, Cuauhtemoc, 183 Ceausescu, Nicolae, 157 Cerezo, Vinicio, 29 Chad,
29, 157
Chavez, Hugo, 4, 12, 29, 186, 224 child
mortality, 148-50 Chile, 25, 28, 69, 161
China, 3, 5, 35, 82-4, 130, 141, 169, 188,
221 Chinese Communist Party, 82 civil war, 1, 17, 159, 219, 233 civilian-led
dictatorship coups in, 49
democratization
and, 214, 217 initiation of, 42 leadership succession in, 216 personalism in,
200 personalization of, 231 Colombia, 106, 208 Colorado Party (Paraguay), 84,
102-3 Communist Party (Uzbekistan), 61 Cote d’Ivoire, 29, 137, 140
counterbalancing, see also coup-proofing coup, 14, 27, 178 Afghanistan, 32
Argentina, 3, 31, 46 Bangladesh, 69
253
254
Index
coup (cont.)
Benin, 69, 95-6
bloodless, 103
Brazil, 31
Burkina Faso, 31
causes of, 44-57
Chile, 25, 28, 69, 161
definition of, 6, 20
democratic breakdown and, 52-4
Egypt, 44, 46, 70,158,177-8, 221
end of dictatorship, 179
Guatemala, 32
Honduras, 220
Indonesia, 84
inequality and, 54-6
initiation of dictatorship, 28, 31, 89, 221
Iraq, 10, 32, 37, 46, 78, 183
leadership shuffle, 7, 46, 55, 72, 122,
204 Liberia, 224 Libya, 31, 46, 224 Mali,
220 Mauritania, 10, 46 Niger, 32
paramilitary forces and, 164 party creation
and, 95-125 plotting, 31, 33, 36, 38, 44, 69, 99,102,120, 163, 167, 220 regime
change, 6, 46, 49-52, 55, 72, 122, 180, 229 Sudan, 10 Syria, 28, 32 Tunisia,
204 Turkey, 8 coup attempt, 33, 101, 159, 164, 173,
229 Benin, 96 Paraguay, 103
semi-competitive elections and, 180-1
Somalia, 105 Soviet Union, 62 Turkey, 221 coup failure. See coup attempt
coup-proofing, 50, 114, 120, 163-5,
167-8
Coups for Various Purposes, 46
De Waal, Alex, 63, 97 Deby, Idriss, 29
Decalo, Samuel, 102 democracy definition, 5
Democratic Republic of Congo, 26, 81, 161,
165, 204, 208 democratization
costs of losing power and, 206-11
personalism in military-led regimes and, 213
personalization
and, 211 Deng Xiaoping, 83 dictatorial legislatures, 136 dictatorship
beginning of, 5,
18, 27 coding rules, 5, 18 definition of, 1 end of, 6, 19, 72, 179 Diori,
Hamani, 136 Doe, Samuel, 36, 90, 99, 224 Dominican Republic, 116, 201 Duvalier
family, 29, 158, 163
East Germany, 130, 156 economic crisis,
187-90 Ecuador, 161
Egypt, 14, 44, 46, 70, 98, 138, 142-3, 158,
z77-8, 207, 221 El
Salvador, 143 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, 221 Escriba Folch, Abel, 232 Evren, Kenan,
8 Eyadema, Gnassingbe, 208
failed state, 17, 219, 233 foreign aid, 150
elections and, 138 leadership selection and, 138 foreign imposition of
dictatorship, 26-8, 219 foreign invasion, 52, 219, 233 end of dictatorship, 180
Franco, Francisco, 134, 136 Fujimori, Alberto, 29, 89, 224
Galtieri, Leopoldo, 208 Gandhi, Jennifer,
12 Gbagbo, Laurent, 29 Georgia, 140, 158 Ghana, 6, 36, 80, 207 Gorbachev,
Mikhail, 61 government spending, 144-7 Greitens, Sheena, 157 Grieder, Peter,
130 Guatemala, 29, 32, 102 Guei, Robert, 29 Guinea Bissau, 136
Index
25 5
Haber, Steven, 3 Habre, Hissene, 29 Haddad,
George, 28, 44, 70, 177 Hadenius, Axel, 12 Haiti, 29, 158, 163 Hashemite
dynasty, 10 health spending, 147-50 Ho Chi Minh, 83 Honduras, 220 Hungary, 80,
103, 169 Hussein, Saddam, 17, 80, 82, 157, 166, 218-19, 224
indirect military rule, 5, 19-20, 29
Guatemala, 29 Indonesia, 5, 84, 199 inequality and coups, 54 insurgency, 27,
29, 33, 35, 40, 159 Algeria, 29 Cambodia, 40 Chad, 29 China, 35
Democratic
Republic of Congo, 26 end of dictatorship, 180 Mexico, 40 Mozambique, 29
Nicaragua, 29 Vietnam, 29, 35 internal security agencies, 160-2 coup-proofing,
168 loyalty of, 168-73 international war, 1, 188 Iran, 26, 140, 218-19
Iraq, 10, 14, 17, 32, 37, 46, 78, 82, 138,
157,
166, 183, 218-19, 224, 233
Jordan, 10,137 Jurabekov, Ismail, 63-4
Kabila, Laurent, 26
Karimov, Islam, 61-5, 69, 71, 77-8, 85
Karzai, Hamid, 30 Kaunda, Kenneth, 9 Kendall-Taylor, Andrea, 139 Kerekou,
Mathieu, 39, 69, 96-7 Khmer Rouge (Cambodia), 40, 50 Khomeini, Ruhollah, 26 Kim
Il-sung, 81, 83, 194 Kim Jong Il, 132 Kim Jong Un, 132 Korean Workers’ Party,
81 Kountche, Seyni, 102
Kuomintang (Taiwan), 140 Kuwait, 224
Le Duan, 83
leadership selection, 68-74, 98 foreign aid
and, 138 party-based dictatorship, 192 Togo, 208 legislatures, 136-7 Levitsky,
Steven, 12, 82, 195, 213 Lewis, Paul, 102 Liberia, 36, 90, 99, 224
Libya, 14, 17, 31, 38, 46, 90, 165, 207,
219,
224, 233
Lukashenka, Aliaksandr, 143 Lust-Okar,
Ellen, 136
Madagascar, 39 Maduro, Nicolas, 186
Magaloni, Beatriz, 115 Malawi, 70, 165 Mali, 220
Mao Zedong, 83-4, 169, 194 Mauritania, 10,
46 Mexico, 40, 116, 182 military, 162-3
leadership control over, 166-7 leadership
interference, 167 military dictatorship, 51, 226 Argentina, 39, 208 Benin, 95
Burkina Faso, 7 Chile, 161
civilianization of, 102 Colombia, 106, 208
compared with personalist dictatorship, 12
costs of losing power in, 207
definition of, 194
democratization and, 208
dispersal of arms, 192
Egypt, 102
Ghana, 207
internal security agencies in, 157, 159
leadership rotation in, 108 leadership shuffle coups and, 55 military
marginalization in, 109 Niger, 102
party creation and, 107 personalization in,
208, 213, 231 regime breakdown and, 192, 197,
199
transition to indirect military rule, 20
256
Index
Milosevic, Slobodan, 30, 140
Mobutu, Joseph, 26, 81, 104, 116-17, 161,
208
monarchic dictatorship
costs of losing power in, 210
Egyp^ 44,
177
initiation of, 7, 9, 28 Iraq, 30 Jordan, 10
Oman, 9
Saudi Arabia, 188 Montenegro, 30
Mozambique, 29 Mubarak, Hosni, 142-3, 177
Nasser, Gamel Abdel, 44, 70, 102, 177
National Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, 62
National Union party (Egypt), 102
Nepal, 210
Ngo Dinh Diem, 163
Nicaragua, 29, 78, 161
Niger, 32, 102, 136
Nordlinger, Eric, 14, 45
North Korea, 81, 83-4, 132, 157, 213
O’Donnell, Guillermo, 190 Oman, 9
Paraguay, 84, 102-3, z43 Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (Mexico), 116, 182-3 parties, 131
party-based dictatorship, 137 China, 188
costs of losing power, 209 definition of,
193 democratization and, 209 initiation of, 28, 159 internal security agencies,
159 patron-client networks in, 187 personalization of, 201, 209 regime
breakdown and, 192, 199 Zambia, 9 party creation, 95-125 Bangladesh, 102 causes
of, 113 coup type and, 122 coups and, 119, 121 Egypt, 102 elections and, 110
leadership characteristics and, 112 leadership rotation and, 108 military
marginalization and, 110
Niger, 102
Paraguay, 102-3 regime survival and, 118 Somalia, 105 trends over time, 114
People’s Revolutionary Party (Benin), 96 personalism, see also personalist
dictatorship; personalization causes of, 65-94 costs of losing power and, 206
factionalism and, 89-92 intitial regime leaders and, 86-8 measurement, 79
patterns, 85
regime
consolidation and, 88-9 personalist dictatorship, 17
compared with
military dictatorship, 11
consequences of,
224, 232
costs of losing
power in, 191, 210, 213
definition of,
11, 70
democratization
and, 219
Iraq, 17, 219
leadership succession in, 230 Libya, 17,
219 Malawi, 70
regime breakdown
and, 191, 202 Uganda, 12 Uzbekistan, 61 Venezuela, 12 Yemen, 71
personalization, 12-13, 65-94, 115, 124, 161-2, 224 democratization and, 211
internal security agencies and, 160 leadership death and, 204 leadership
succession and, 203 regime breakdown and, 190-201 Uzbekistan, 61-5 Peru, 29,
31, 161, 224 Philippines, 154 Pinochet, Agosto, 25, 69, 161 Pol Pot, 130, 235
Poland, 157 Popkin, Samuel, 35
popular uprising, 27, 29, 33, 41, 52, 90, 178, 229
Colombia, 208
Cote d’Ivoire,
29
end of
dictatorship, 179
Haiti, 29
Iran, 26
Nepal, 210
Index
257
Qaddafi, Moammar, 17, 31-2, 38, 90, 165,
182, 219, 224, 233 Qassem, ‘Abd al-Karim, 183
Rakosi, Matyas, 80 Ratsiraka, Didier, 39
Rawlings, Jerry, 6, 36, 207 regime
definition of, 5
revolutionary, 82, 195 regime breakdown
economic crisis
and, 187-90 leadership change and, 201-6 leadership death and, 205
personalization and, 190-201 Rivera, Julio, 143 Roessler, Philip, 48 Rojas
Pinilla, Gustavo, 106, 208 Romania, 157, 210
Saleh, Ali Abdullah, 71 Sandinistas, 29
Sankara, Thomas, xv, 7 Saudi Arabia, 3, 5, 10, 188 Schmitter, Philippe C., 190
seizure group, 4, 10
beginning of dictatorship, 30 costs of
losing power (military), 207 costs of losing power (party-based), 209 costs of
losing power (ruling family), 210 definition of, 3
dispersal of
arms, 99-101, 118, 124, 192, 200-1, 215, 224 factionalism, 11, 97-101, 107,
124, 160, 222-3
initiation of
dictatorship, 25-43 military, 4, 7, 34, 39-40, 70, 79, 89, 105, 194, 200, 224
party-based, 4, 8, 32, 37, 159 personalization of dictatorship, 65-94
preexisting traits of, 3, 5, 11-13, 193, 207 regime breakdown and, 190-201
ruling family, 9 self-coup. See authoritarianization semi-competitive
elections, 137-50, 180, 187, 211, 227-8 child mortality and, 144-50 definition,
138
foreign aid and, 138 government spending
and, 144-50 health spending and, 144-50 Serbia, 30, 140 Shah of Iran, 26
Shevardnadze, Eduard, 140, 158
Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party, 105-6
Somalia, 105
Somoza family, 29, 78, 161 South Korea, 154
Soviet Union, 114, 157, 221 Spain, 134
Stroessner, Alfredo, 84, 102-3, z43
Sudan, 10 Suharto, 5, 84, 136
Svolik, Milan, 12, 45, 54, 57, 68, 89, 160
Syria, 28, 32, 84, 166, 213, 233
Taiwan, 140, 154 Teorell, Jan, 12
Third Force Movement (Colombia), 106
Togo, 173, 208
Trujillo, Rafael, 117, 201-2
Tunisia, 158, 204
Turkey, 8, 221
Uganda, 11
United National Independence Party
(Zambia), 9 Uruguay, 161 Uzbekistan, 61-4, 71, 76
van de Walle, Nicolas, 209 Venezuela, 4,
12, 29, 140, 186, 224 Vietnam, 29, 35, 50, 83, 235 Vietnam (South), 163
Way, Lucan, 12, 82, 195, 213 Weeks,
Jessica, 198
Xi Jinping, 83
Yemen, 14, 71 Yugoslavia, 30
Zambia, 9 Zerbo, Saye, 7 Zia, Mohammad, 69,
102 Zolberg, Aristide, 140
“With insightful
theorizing, novel empirical evidence, and captivating historical detail, the
authors offer answers to some of the most critical questions about autocratic
rule. This book will set the agenda for the study of
authoritarianism for
years to come.”
Beatriz Magaloni,
Professor of Political Science and Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute,
Stanford University
“How Dictatorships
Work artfully combines the minutiae of autocratic rule with rigorous attention
to general patterns based on an assiduously collected and award-winning
dataset, in order to illuminate the multifarious challenges faced by ‘seizure
groups’ and their leaders that seek to consolidate rule and stave off
oppositional
conspiracies."
David D. Laitin,
Professor of Political Science, Stanford University
“Dictatorship is the
oldest and historically most prevalent form of political organization - and
also the most poorly understood one. In How Dictatorships Work, modern social
science confronts authoritarian politics. The result is a landmark theoretical
and empirical synthesis. Anyone interested in authoritarian politics,
democratization, and regime change needs to read this
path-breaking book.”
Milan Svolik,
Professor of Political Science, Yale University
“A top-notch analytic
and empirical view of the operation of dictatorships. As democracy seems
currently to be in decline, Geddes et al. have provided a foundational book for
understanding the world as it unfolds before us. Every student of comparative
politics -and, indeed, of any form of politics - must read
this book to understand the nuanced differences across dictatorships and the
hopes that some forms provide for a more accountable future.”
Bruce Bueno de
Mesquita, Julius Silver Professor of Politics at New York University
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